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CRUCIAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION

THIRD EDITION

HENRY EHLERS GORDON C. LEE

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Crucial Issues
in
EDUCATION

THIRD EDITION



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Preface to the Third Edition



No critic of American democracy can justly complain that there has been a lack of thinking about education during the past decade. We have found that trying to keep abreast with the many current books, articles, and speeches on the subject has been a challenging experience. Although some criticisms of education merely project the fears of disturbed and unbalanced minds, other criticisms are stimulating, constructive, and helpful. We hope this anthology helps to disentangle real issues from verbal ones, and provides a reasonably fair picture of the vitality as well as of the volatility of contemporary educational thought.

Each problem is highly controversial, and the editors have endeavored to present opposing viewpoints as fairly as possible. If some selections seem dogmatic and intolerant, let the reader recognize the limitations of language and of human nature. Actually, all statements should be considered as hypotheses, that is, as suggestions or proposals to be examined. Were it not for the stylistic problems involved, would it not be well if all our assertions could be made in the form of questions? Should not the reader be encouraged to subject every paragraph, every sentence, to critical examination? Should he not constantly inquire: "Is this true? Is this sound? Is this adequate? Is this practical?" Even if the reader holds a nondemocratic outlook (according to the criteria set forth in some selections), is not this one of his "rights" in a liberal society? If democracy means shared thinking, is not the person who *fails* to think, rather than the one who *differs* from the majority, the least democratic in his basic attitude?

Each chapter may be viewed as a dialogue between some of the outstanding minds of our time. To gain the most from this anthology, the student himself must somehow participate in the dialogue. For, in the words of Robert Maynard Hutchins: "Edu-

cation is a kind of continuing dialogue, and a dialogue assumes, in the nature of the case, different points of view." * The issues in this anthology are not divided between the "right side" and the "wrong side." They are between sincere, patriotic Americans, some emphasizing one set of values, others giving priority to different values. The most difficult questions are: Which values deserve greatest attention? What practices will best implement the values we agree should be emphasized?

It is not the function of this anthology to provide clear-cut answers to any of the problems raised. Rather, each chapter presents claims and counterclaims, assertions and denials, proofs and disproofs, conflicting values and rival hypotheses. Such an approach may tend to unsettle the immature mind—sometimes to the point of confusion and bewilderment—but it also unsettles the habit of dismissing great issues in terms of verbal generalities and catchword stereotypes. And we should always remember that the human mind is like a parachute: useless until open.

Now a word of thanks. This anthology would not be possible were it not for generous permissions to reprint selections of many authors and publishers. Acknowledgements of these are made in the accompanying footnotes. Many colleagues, students, and friends have contributed to one or another of the anthology's many revisions. For this 1964 revision, we are particularly indebted to Professors Robert H. Beck and R. Freeman Butts (Education); Melvin Rader (Philosophy); Arval Morris (Law); to Rudy Johnson and a dozen other librarians in Duluth, Minneapolis, and Seattle; to many students over many years, especially to Judy Niemi and Dick Green; to Patricia Kelly, typist; and to our wives.

H. E.
G. C. L.

Duluth, Minnesota
Seattle, Washington
1964

* Robert M. Hutchins, cited (with exact reference) by Justice Felix Frankfurter in *Wieman v. Updegraff* 344 U.S. 183 (Nov. 25, 1952). See also R. M. Hutchins, "Is Democracy Possible?" *Saturday Review*, 42: 16-18, 58, February 21, 1962; Arnold Toynbee, "How to Change the World Without War," *Saturday Review*, 45: 16 f., May 12, 1962.

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PART 1

Freedom
in Education

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The Spirit of Inquiry

This is a book about liberal education; in the end *every* crucial issue in education resolves to a question of the "liberality" of the education provided or the effect of one or another policy upon that liberal quality. By liberal education we mean an education that stimulates in each person a compelling urge to explore the unknown and to exercise to a fuller degree the vast possibilities of his mind. The man on the street may say "I think" when he means "I feel" (that is, "I am attached to these prejudices"). But for a scholar, "I think" is intellectually meaningless unless that thinking has included a fair and impartial study of competing points of view. No pattern of ideas is so sacred that the thinker's mind should be closed to other alternatives. "You have been told to prove you are right," said Louis Pasteur, "but I say, try to prove you are *wrong*." The scientist, like the inventor, believes that if we all worked on the assumption that what is accepted as true is really true, there would be little hope for advance. Hence the heritage of knowledge is always slightly tentative and subject to reconstruction in the light of new discovery. But through the cooperative endeavors of many investigators, "the great community"¹ gradually accumulates a body of knowledge which progressively acquires "the virtues

¹ Concerning "The Great Community" as an ideal in American philosophy, read Max H. Fisch (ed.), *Classic American Philosophers*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951, pp. 34-39.

characteristic of science: clarity and consistency, testability and adequacy, precision and objectivity.”² In the words of Nobel prize-winner P. W. Bridgman:

. . . the most vital feature of the scientist’s procedure has been merely to do his utmost with his mind, *no holds barred*. This means in particular that no special privileges are accorded to authority or to tradition, that personal prejudices and predilections are carefully guarded against, that one makes continued check to assure oneself that one is not making mistakes, and that any line of inquiry will be followed that appears at all promising.³

In an authoritarian society, teachers are expected to transmit a fixed set of values; education is indistinguishable from indoctrination. Problems are approached from an “official” or “approved” point of view, while opposing viewpoints are presented as mere straw men easily knocked over. Such “education” develops minds undisciplined in resourcefulness and versatility, minds either soft or inflexible. The few adults who outgrow such “education in immaturity” look back on their schooling as a form of prolonged infancy, and upon their teachers as intellectual baby sitters hired to keep young minds asleep.

In a democratic society, schools also transmit truths and values; but here they are transmitted in a tentative, experimental manner—as the best that openly critical thinking has arrived at thus far. The democratic teacher has a profound respect for traditions, but he views them critically, as subject to modification and improvement. Man is a time-binding animal, and tradition is a splendid banquet which our ancestors have provided for us. But in a society which has respect for the new as well as the old, for the living as well as for the dead, each generation must study anew to determine which of tradition’s foods are still edible, which no longer are nourishing. This process can occur when all viewpoints are privileged to defend themselves and thereby fairly win or lose a place in the living world. We cannot avoid this confidence in ourselves or in the generations to come.

² Wilfrid Sellars and Herbert Feigl (eds.), *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949, “Introduction,” p. 5.

³ P. W. Bridgman, *Reflections of a Physicist*, New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1950, p. 370.

Thus, democratic education has two major functions: to impart accumulated knowledge and traditions, and to encourage the discovery of new truth. On the one hand, schools should train men to shape the society of their generation on the basis of the accumulated wisdom of the past. On the other hand, schools should stimulate creative thinking—thinking which continually renders previous knowledge suspect. This dual function of education was expressed by the founder of Christianity who came “not to destroy but to fulfill the law” and “not to send peace but a sword.”⁴

If these two purposes seem contradictory, it is only because the nature of our dynamic society is not understood. In a democracy, liberty depends on liberalism—defined as faith in change by reason and persuasion rather than by force or violence. By placing its primary emphasis on the individual, democracy becomes an open society, in which individuals can challenge any and all traditions; in which private experience is the ultimate criterion of truth and value; and in which informed public criticism is the primary means of improving our heritage. The strength of an open society rests on independent, self-reliant citizens who are free to talk, to meet, to think, to seek truth, to move about, to be different, to try something new, to make the most of their lives according to their own ideals.

“The case for democracy,” wrote Carl Becker, “is that it accepts the rational and humane values as ends, and proposes as the means of realizing them the minimum of coercion and the maximum of voluntary assent.”⁵ In democratic schools, the rational side of human nature should be disciplined to think independently, the humane side to think cooperatively. If education is properly balanced, democratic citizens must, in the neat phrase of Alexander Meiklejohn, learn “to think independently together.” When reason and humanity are properly balanced, men learn to think for themselves, but they also learn to modify their thinking (or rationalization) in terms of opposing opinions of other men—men for whom they have respect and affection, but who happen to think differently from them. In short, “It is one thing to educate people to the end that control of them may be developed; it is quite another thing to

⁴ Matthew 5:17; 10:34.

⁵ Carl Becker, *New Liberties for Old*, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941, p. 151.

educate to the end that control *by* the people may be increased and perfected.”⁶

In a dynamic society, debate and controversy are signs of health, not of sickness. Varied and conflicting ideas and interests are the very lifeblood of a free society, provided that citizens are willing to compromise and to pool their many diverse ideas through joint, cooperative thinking. Schools do not fulfill their major function unless scholars become social catalysts, forcing men to reconsider their opinions, and helping them to formulate reconstructed viewpoints appropriate to the new generation. In this manner, education helps to break the “crust of custom” that tends to form over inherited beliefs and prejudices, there is an ever-evolving synthesis of old and new, and progress is both possible and peaceable.

Viewed in this manner, the so-called “crisis” in contemporary education, with its many “crucial issues” is not a cause for alarm, but for rejoicing: it is a new stimulus to serious inquiry.

Pros and Cons. Near the end of each chapter in this anthology are some “Pros and Cons,” or bibliographies of varied and opposing views about topics considered in that chapter. These “Pros and Cons” proceed from the logic once so aptly expressed by the editors of *The New Yorker* when they noted that “an author so little moved by a controversy that he can present both sides fairly is not likely to burn any holes in the paper.”

Why should we read *both* (or *several*) sides of a disputed issue? The reason is plain. We are so comfortable with ourselves and with the prejudices we now hold that we are loath to read anything that might upset these cherished beliefs. As scholars, however, we must abide by the Socratic maxim “The unexamined life is not worth human living.” This may also be translated, “The unexamined belief is not worth human holding.” A careful study of opposing viewpoints will generally clarify an issue. It will help replace emotional outbursts by rational discussion and it should help remove unreasoned prejudices, misleading clichés, and ambiguous half-truths. The net result is a reconstruction of our original beliefs, making them more comprehensive and precise, and an increase in our personal esteem and self-confidence, because our

⁶ A. V. Sayers, *A First Course in the Philosophy of Education*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1952, pp. 3-4.

beliefs (and the personality they reflect) are now upheld with understanding and integrity. Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote, in his essay on "Intellect" that

God offers to every mind its choice between truth and repose. Take what you please—you can never have both. Between them, as a pendulum, man oscillates. He in whom the love of repose predominates will accept the first creed, the first philosophy, the first political party he meets—most likely his father's. He gets rest, commodity and reputation; but he shuts the door of truth. He in whom the love of truth predominates will keep himself aloof from all moorings, and afloat. He will abstain from dogmatism, and recognize all the opposite negations between which, as walls, his being is swung. He submits to the inconveniences of suspense and imperfect opinion, but he is a candidate for truth, as the other is not, and respects the highest law of his being.

PREVIEW OF COURSE

What Are Education's Most Crucial Issues?

Peruse the book hurriedly, study the general contents carefully, and decide which issue, or issues, you personally would like to study in greatest detail. What issues would you add to—or drop from—this anthology? What criteria might be used to determine whether an issue is significant or trivial? whether a discussion is constructive, or merely a form of emotional release (e.g., name calling)? The book demands that you exercise your critical faculties, and you are encouraged to exercise them, first of all, on the anthology itself.

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CHAPTER 1

Censorship, Loyalty, and Academic Freedom

Indoctrination and Academic Freedom

1.1 Introduction: The Balancing of Conflicting Interests

"MARTHA, methinks the whole world is queer except thou and me," said the old Quaker to his wife, "and sometimes, Martha, methinks even thou art a bit peculiar." Every person, every group, is more or less like this. We all tend to become narrow, provincial, and so set in our own patterns of belief that we cannot tolerate others. The extreme form of fanaticism or narrow-mindedness was parodied by Lord Macaulay:

I am in the right and you are in the wrong. When you are stronger, you ought to tolerate me, for it is your duty to tolerate truth. But when I am the stronger, I shall persecute you, for it is my duty to persecute error.¹

To see democracy in action is to see hundreds of zealous minorities clamoring for power, each sure of its own truth and righteousness.

With so many conflicting ideas, how can we decide which shall prevail? We all agree that society must have unity—"order is heaven's first law"—and the power to manage must ultimately rest in someone's hands. Otherwise we find ourselves like Stephen

¹ Attributed to Thomas Babington Macaulay by David Spitz in *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949, p. 283. Compare "Holy Willie's Prayer" by Robert Burns.

Leacock's horseman, riding not one horse but many horses, each one galloping wildly in a different direction. To prevent such disunity, democracy accepts majority rule as a working principle.

Obviously, however, if the power to manage is not limited, justice will be destroyed. For this reason democracy guarantees two fundamental liberties: First, the rulers themselves must be subject to replacement according to the changing attitudes of the people who elect them. Second, there must be genuine freedom for such attitudes to change by allowing lone thinkers and minority groups the right to challenge prevailing beliefs. For a democratic society to remain stable, minority groups must not be compelled to feel that they are *fixed and permanent minorities*. Unless all groups have full rights to speak and to organize, majority rule will degenerate into rule by force, and enlightenment and reason will be lost to passion and prejudice. The whole strength of reason, and of government based on reason, depends on the condition that reason can be set right when it is wrong—that people hear all sides of an issue. Otherwise errors harden into prejudices, the will of the stronger soon overcomes the judgment of the wiser; those in power close the avenues of communication so that rulers cannot be replaced; and there is no protection for minority groups to inquire, criticize, and organize.

American defenders of censorship admit the values of freedom. But they insist that the days of pioneering and *laissez faire* are over; and that in a complex, populous, industrial society, considerable "censorship" (defined as "responsible control") is inevitable. Schools are institutions whereby society controls child growth and development. To be sure, growth in schools is normal and natural; but it is directed, scheduled, planned, compressed, and accelerated according to the judgment of teachers. Even so-called "nondirective" learning involves a form of control in which a skilled teacher plans, devises, and contrives learning situations appropriate to the pupils being taught. In short,

While many people regard the public schools as the means of great personal advantage to the pupils, the fact is too often overlooked that they are governmental means of protecting the state from the consequences of an ignorant and incompetent citizenship.²

² *Fogg v. Board of Education of Littleton*, 76 N.H. 296, 299 (1912).

Freedom, then, is a *social* value: Individual liberties will be destroyed if there are no social controls. Liberty, carried to excess, leads to its own destruction, for it then permits the enemies of liberty to gain power. The "paradox of freedom"³ is this: Complete absence of restraint ultimately leads to the greatest of all restraints; for it permits the bully to enslave the meek, and it allows the intolerant to destroy both the tolerant and tolerance itself. Liberty and fraternity cannot exist except as they exist together.

In any social group, different individuals will cherish different values; and in the resulting conflict of values, some type of social control is inevitable. Even the freedoms guaranteed by our Bill of Rights have never been absolutes—that is, values which could be pursued with no limitations whatsoever. For example, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of assembly may be restricted if its abuse leads to riots or to other serious disturbances of peace and order:

It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when . . . the speaker passes the bounds of argument and persuasion and undertakes incitement of riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of peace.⁴

Again, the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not include the obscene, the profane, the libelous, or insulting words which incite an immediate breach of peace:

Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.⁵

³ Carried to extremes, both freedom and repression lead to paradoxes. The paradox of freedom is well stated by Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. 348–350, 546–547; London: Routledge, 1945, I: 265–266, II: 160–162. The paradox of repression is more obvious: It is simply a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

⁴ *Feiner v. New York*, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).

⁵ *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940); *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). In *Roth v. United States*, 364 U.S. 467 (1957), the Court reaffirmed this viewpoint: The intent of the First and Fourteenth Amendments was

Likewise, in cases involving freedom of religion, our courts have traditionally steered a middle course between unlimited freedom (on the part of individuals or groups of individuals) on the one hand, and complete state control on the other. In the Oregon case, an oft-quoted passage reads:

The fundamental liberty under which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.⁶

But a prior passage in the same Oregon decision reads:

No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate *all* schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend *some* school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to public welfare.

Underlying these court opinions are the following general principles:

. . . in all freedom of expression cases it [the Court] must grapple with fundamental policy questions as it seeks to balance two significant interests—the public interest in preventing the supposed evil and the public interest in preserving freedom of expression. In each such case the Court must decide whether the seriousness of the evil, and the probability that the utterance under attack may cause or substantially contribute to that evil, are sufficiently great to justify the interference with

“. . . to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. . . . All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the [constitutional] guarantees. . . . But implicit in the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”

⁶ *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

freedom of expression in this particular case and the resulting suppression of freedom of expression in similar situations.⁷

Realistic democracy provides a middle-of-the-road solution for problems which arise from conflicts among interests or pressure groups. Its method is give-and-take. Its normal solutions are compromises. Extreme solutions are rare. . . . The American democratic faith is a system of checks and balances in the realm of ideas. It asserts the possibility of a balance between liberty and authority, between the self-expression of the free individual and the necessary coercion of the organized group. The democratic faith is, then, in essence, a philosophy of the mean.⁸

1.2 The Uses and Abuses of Freedom^{*}

Walter Lippmann

. . . Freedom of speech has become a central concern of the Western society because of the discovery among the Greeks that dialectic, as demonstrated in the Socratic dialogues,

⁷ William B. Lockhart and Robert C. McClure, "Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution," 38 *Minnesota Law Review* 295: 295-422 at 368, March 1954. For further study of the "clear and present danger" doctrine and of the more recent "balance of conflicting interests" doctrine, read Edward G. Hudon, *Free Speech and Press in America*, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963. An outstanding criticism of the "balance of conflicting interests" doctrine is Laurant B. Frantz, "The First Amendment as an Absolute," 71 *Yale Law Journal*, 1424-1450, July 1962.

⁸ Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1940, p. 418.

* Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy*, Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 124-131. Copyright 1955, by Walter Lippmann. By permission of the publisher.

Editor's Note: This statement becomes even more significant when we remember that for over forty years Mr. Lippmann has written scores of books and articles defending the philosophy of democratic liberalism. Thus, in 1920, he wrote: "It seems to me perfectly clearly established that no official yet born on this earth is wise enough or generous enough to separate good ideas from bad ones, good beliefs from bad beliefs, and that the utmost that anyone can ask of a government, is that if it is efficient it should detect and run down criminal acts; that beyond reaching words which are the direct and immediate incitement to criminal acts, no government dare go; and finally, that the man who is not willing to defend the freedom of ideas with which he profoundly disagrees, has not the soul of a free man."—*The Bulletin (of) the League of Free Nations Association*, Vol. I, No. 1, March 1920. By permission.

is a principal method of attaining truth, and particularly a method of attaining moral and political truth. "The ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will," said Aristotle, "make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise." The right to speak freely is one of the necessary means to the attainment of the truth. That, and not the subjective pleasure of utterance, is why freedom is a necessity in the good society. . . .

The method of dialectics is to confront ideas with opposing ideas in order that the pro and con of the dispute will lead to true ideas. But the dispute must not be treated as a trial of strength. It must be a means of elucidation. In a Socratic dialogue the disputants are arguing cooperatively in order to acquire more wisdom than either of them had when he began. . . .

Divorced from its original purpose and justification, as a process of criticism, freedom to think and speak are not self-evident necessities. It is only from the hope and the intention of discovering truth that freedom acquires such high public significance. The right of self-expression is, as such, a private amenity rather than a public necessity. The right to utter words, whether or not they have meaning, and regardless of their truth, could not be a vital interest of a great state but for the presumption that they are the chaff which goes with the utterance of true and significant words.

But when the chaff of silliness, baseness, and deception is so voluminous that it submerges the kernels of truth, freedom of speech may produce frivolity, or such mischief, that it cannot be preserved against the demand for a restoration of order or of decency. If there is a dividing line between liberty and license, it is where freedom of speech is no longer respected as a procedure of the truth and becomes the unrestricted right to exploit the ignorance, and to incite the passions, of the people. Then freedom is such a hullabaloo of sophistry, propaganda, special pleading, lobbying, and salesmanship that it is difficult to remember why freedom of speech is worth the pain and trouble of defending it. . . .

. . . It is sophistry to pretend that in a free country a man has some sort of inalienable or constitutional right to deceive his fellow men. There is no more right to deceive than there is a right to swindle, to cheat, or to pick pockets. It may be inexpedient to arraign every public liar, as we try to arraign other swindlers. It may

be a poor policy to have too many laws which encourage litigation about matters of opinion. But, in principle, there can be no immunity for lying in any of its protean forms.

In our times the application of these fundamental principles poses many unsolved practical problems. For the modern media of mass communication do not lend themselves easily to a confrontation of opinions. The dialectical process for finding truth works best when the same audience hears all the sides of the disputation. This is manifestly impossible in the moving pictures: if a film advocates a thesis, the same audience cannot be shown another film designed to answer it. Radio and television broadcasts do permit some debate. But despite the effort of the companies to let opposing views be heard equally, and to organize programs on which there are opposing speakers, the technical conditions of broadcasting do not favor genuine and productive debate. For the audience, tuning on and tuning off here and there, cannot be counted upon to hear, even in summary form, the essential evidence and the main arguments on all the significant sides of a question. Rarely, and on very few public issues, does the mass audience have the benefit of the process by which truth is sifted from error—the dialectic of debate in which there is immediate challenge, reply, cross-examination, and rebuttal. The men who regularly broadcast the news and comment upon the news cannot—like a speaker in the Senate or in the House of Commons—be challenged by one of their listeners and compelled then and there to verify their statements of fact and to re-argue their inferences from the facts.

Yet when genuine debate is lacking, freedom of speech does not work as it is meant to work. It has lost the principle which regulates it and justifies it—that is to say, dialectic conducted according to logic and rules of evidence. If there is no effective debate, the unrestricted right to speak will unloose so many propagandists, procurers, and panderers upon the public that sooner or later in self-defense the people will turn to the censors to protect them. . . .

It follows, I believe, that in the practice of freedom of speech, the degree of toleration that will be maintained is directly related to the effectiveness of the confrontation in debate which prevails or can be organized. In the Senate of the United States, for ex-

ample, a Senator can promptly be challenged by another Senator and brought to an accounting. Here among the Senators themselves the conditions are most nearly ideal for the toleration of all opinions. At the other extreme there is the secret circulation of anonymous allegations. Here there is no means of challenging the author, and without any violation of the principles of freedom, he may properly be dealt with by detectives, by policemen, and the criminal courts. Between such extremes there are many problems of toleration which depend essentially upon how effective is the confrontation in debate. Where it is efficient, as in the standard newspaper press taken as a whole, freedom is largely unrestricted by law. Where confrontation is difficult, as in broadcasting, there is also an acceptance of the principle that some legal regulation is necessary—for example, in order to insure fair play for political parties. When confrontation is impossible, as in the moving picture, or in the so-called comic books, there will be censorship. . . .⁹

1.3 Free Teachers—the Priesthood of Democracy*

David Fellman

The embattled fundamentalist, William Jennings Bryan, declared in the course of his argument in *Scopes v. State*, the "monkey" case, that "the hand that writes the teachers' pay-check is the hand that runs the schools . . . otherwise, a teacher

* Editors' note: Compare the following statement by John H. Hallowell: "Majority rule . . . presupposes widespread discussion and deliberation and presupposes that the discussion will be conducted in the most reasonable manner possible, to the end that policy may be framed in the interests of the common good. . . . It is the reasoned judgment of the majority that obligates our compliance with its decision, not the will of the majority as such. To the extent, therefore, that the rule of the majority becomes more an expression of will and less an expression of reasoned judgment, to that degree does it become less democratic and more tyrannical."—John H. Hallowell, "The Meaning of Majority Rule," *Commonweal*, 56: 167–169, May 23, 1952. By permission.

* David Fellman, "Academic Freedom in American Law," 1961 *Wisconsin Law Review*, 3–46, January 1961. By permission. David Fellman is Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin. See also W. P. Murphy, "Educational Freedom in the Courts," *AAUP Bulletin*, 49 328–359, December 1963.

might teach anything!" This "hired hand" theory concerning the nature of the teacher's office was stated with equal bluntness by State Senator Clayton Lusk of New York, who once said that "teachers who are paid out of public funds . . . have no right . . . to believe in . . . changes in the state or national government." A similar view was stated a long time ago by the trustee of a great midwestern private university, in these words:

In social and political science they [the professors] are only a little less qualified to be the final arbiters as to what shall be taught than they are concerning financial problems. In all things they should promptly and gracefully submit to the final determination of the trustees. A professor must be an advocate, but his advocacy must be in harmony with the conclusions of the powers that be.

To cite one more example of this sort of thinking, the Executive Vice-President of Renssalaer Polytechnic Institute asserted, following the dismissal of a distinguished literary critic from the faculty because of his political views: "We adhere to an unwritten regulation of long standing that there shall be excluded from our classroom all controversial discussions about politics, religion, and sociology."

It should be a matter of great satisfaction to all who care about education that such views are rarely stated today, at least not in public. For these views represent a grotesque misconception of what a university is, and of the rationale for the academic freedom of its professors. . . .

Academic freedom involves, basically, the professor's freedom of research, and the freedom to speak and write about the results of his research. As President Schurman of Cornell University said, at about the time of the founding of the American Association of University Professors: "freedom of investigation, freedom of teaching, freedom of publication, are the soul of the university." Or, as Robert M. Hutchins declared in a notable address:

A university is a community of scholars. It is not a kindergarten; it is not a club; it is not a reform school; it is not a political party; it is not an agency of propaganda . . . Freedom of inquiry, freedom of discussion, and freedom of teaching—without these a university cannot

exist. . . . The university exists only to find and to communicate the truth. If it cannot do that it is no longer a university.

Similarly, the 1940 statement of principles of the American Association of University Professors describes academic freedom in terms of "full freedom in research and in the publication of the results. . . . freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject," and freedom to speak and write as a citizen. The statement recognizes, however, that these freedoms are not absolute. Thus it is noted that "research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution." As for classroom teaching, the professor is enjoined to "be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject." And when speaking or writing as a citizen, the professor is asked to remember that "as a man of learning and an educational officer," the community imposes special obligations upon him to be accurate, to exercise "appropriate restraint," to "show respect for the opinions of others," and to make it clear that he is not an institutional spokesman. . . .

No one can deny that academic freedom, like all freedoms, must operate within the terms of the accepted and dominant culture, in all countries, but for us the difference lies in the character of the American culture, which is based upon freedom and democracy. We agree with Lord Acton that "at the root of all liberty is the liberty to learn." Our view of higher education is reflected in the famous remarks which Thomas Jefferson made about the time of the founding of the University of Virginia in 1820: "This institution will be based upon the illimitable freedom of the human mind. For here we are not afraid to follow truth, wherever it may lead, nor to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it." We also agree with Cardinal Newman that a university is a place

. . . in which the intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in some antagonistic activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth. It is a place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge.

Thus, in our American civilization the university must operate without intellectual boundaries because it must be completely free to search for the truth, and, as W. T. Couch once observed: "Academic freedom is the principle designed to protect the teacher from hazards that tend to prevent him from meeting his obligations in the pursuit of truth."

The principal device for preserving academic freedom is a tenure system. Briefly, tenure has come to mean that after a defined probationary period the teacher acquires a permanent position from which he cannot be discharged without good cause shown, upon specific notice and a fair hearing, or what has come to be known as academic due process. Tenure does not mean that a teacher cannot be discharged from his job at all, but it does mean that he cannot be dismissed arbitrarily. . . .

All sorts of subjects have caused trouble in the schools, including religion, science, history, politics, questions of war and peace, and above all, social and economic issues, such as those dealing with free trade, monetary policy, labor problems, government regulation of business, public utilities, communism and other varieties of radicalism, sex and birth control, prohibition and race questions. As long ago as 1901, President Hyde of Bowdoin College pointed out that one of the basic reasons for the rise in academic freedom cases at that time was that increasingly the colleges and universities were concerning themselves with social and economic questions which divide the public and which people care about. In a broader sense, it must be noted that in the nature of things the scholar is necessarily a disturbing person, since he is professionally committed to raising questions about accepted ideas and institutions which, as in the case of Socrates, are bound to evoke reactions ranging from uneasiness to alarm. Professors deal with new ideas, and as Walter Bagehot once observed, "one of the greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new idea."

During the past few years, Justices of the Supreme Court have spoken out more and more clearly in defense of academic freedom. . . . [To cite a single example] Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

That our democracy ultimately rests on public opinion is a platitude of speech but not a commonplace in action. Public opinion is the

ultimate reliance of our society only if it be disciplined and responsible. It can be disciplined and responsible only if habits of open-mindedness and of critical inquiry are acquired in the formative years of our citizens. The process of education has naturally enough been the basis of hope for the perdurance of our democracy on the part of all our great leaders, from Thomas Jefferson onwards.

To regard teachers—in our entire educational system, from the primary grades to the university—as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from that restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are guaranteed by the Constitution . . .¹⁰

No teacher, whether protected by legal tenure or not, has a right to his job if he does his work incompetently, and appellate courts have often upheld dismissals for reasons of incompetence or negligence. Such facts as inability to maintain discipline, lack of knowledge of subject matter and inability to cooperate with colleagues, serving as a barmaid in her husband's beer garden after school hours, publicly advocating no participation in any way in a war effort on grounds of conscientious objection, subjection to epileptic fits, or striking a child in anger, have been held by courts to justify dismissals for incompetence. Of course, the burden of proving incompetence is on the school authorities, and dismissals on this ground have been set aside by reviewing courts where they found the proof insufficient. Thus, it has been held that incompetence is not established by the mere fact that the teacher signed the nominating papers of a communist candidate for office, nor

¹⁰ Felix Frankfurter, *Wieman v. Updegraff*, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

by the fact that the teacher committed in the course of a long and faithful service a single breach of strict ethics by feigning illness to go hunting, nor by the mere fact that pupils and parents express dissatisfaction.

Courts have sanctioned many other reasons for dismissing teachers from their posts . . . lack of students . . . neglect of duty . . . unprofessional conduct . . . insubordination . . . belonging, contrary to regulations, to trade unions . . . marriage. . . .

Tenure and Academic Freedom. So far as academic freedom and tenure in colleges and universities is concerned, American decisional law may be described as formless and almost rudimentary. . . . [In 1957 the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld] the right of the board to discharge professors "without assigning cause for their removal and without a hearing, if it saw fit to do so." . . . [In 1958 the South Dakota Supreme Court] expressed its doubts regarding the merits of a tenure system for college professors. . . . If this represents the thoughts of very many judges, then manifestly the teaching profession has a considerable job of education on its hands. . . .¹¹

Conclusion. Academic freedom is one of America's most precious assets. Without it our colleges and universities cannot accomplish the indispensable purposes of higher education. If the

¹¹Editors' note: Perhaps we should end with a note of optimism, remembering that the minority opinions of Holmes and Brandeis in the twenties became the majority opinion in the thirties. In today's (1963) court three justices (Warren, Black, and Douglas) have spoken out persistently and forcefully in behalf of academic freedom. Thus in the *Adler* case (a 6-3 decision), Mr. Justice Douglas warned that a "party line" was as obnoxious in America as it is in Russia; for it means that "Fear stalks the classroom. The teacher is no longer a stimulant to adventurous thinking; she becomes instead a pipe line for safe and sound information. A deadening dogma takes the place of free inquiry. Instruction tends to become sterile; pursuit of knowledge is discouraged; discussion often leaves off where it should begin. . . . A system which . . . has this effect is alien to our system and should be struck down. Its survival is a real threat to our way of life. We need be bold and adventurous in our thinking to survive. A school system producing students trained as robots threatens to rob a generation of the versatility that has been perhaps our greatest distinction. The Framers knew the danger of dogmatism; they also knew the strength that comes when the mind is free, when ideas may be pursued wherever they lead."—William O. Douglas, dissenting opinion, *Adler v. Board of Education* 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

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teachers are shackled in their thinking, then the students are cheated of part of their heritage. While the case for academic freedom is a powerful one, and while it is accepted in some important circles of American life, it cannot be said that the judges have even begun to demonstrate any serious appreciation of what it is all about. This does not mean, of course, that academic freedom and security of tenure cannot rest upon wholly nonlegal grounds. Many American professors enjoy both without the consolation of any positive law or even board regulation. Nevertheless, courts are powerful agencies of social control, and even their inactivity may entail serious consequences. They have much to offer in the defense of intellectual freedom. When American courts come to understand that the right of teachers and students to academic freedom is a fundamental legal right which is as much entitled to judicial protection as any other constitutional right, then indeed, will the cause of intellectual liberty acquire a powerful and most welcome ally.¹²

¹² Editors' note: Elsewhere, in discussing "the price of freedom," Professor Fellman has indicated why academic freedom will remain a persistent problem in our society: "In many ways, democratic government asks much of people. Since it relies upon persuasion and reason, it asks them to do some thinking, and particularly, to think a great deal about difficult public questions. Every educator knows how very painful thinking really is, both for himself and his students. It can hardly be denied that many people have found a considerable measure of satisfaction in dictatorship because it releases them from the irksome obligation of thinking. Furthermore, democracy asks us to be tolerant even of those with whom we may be in sharpest disagreement. Since intolerance of dissident opinions is certainly as 'natural' as tolerance, and in fact seems to require much less of an exertion of will, this too is asking a good deal of us. Democracy is incorrigibly skeptical and tends therefore to be unsatisfying for those who demand the security of a full set of the correct answers to all the questions which perplex the human race. Democracy is not so much concerned with correct answers as it is with a methodology for reaching essentially tentative decisions in a workaday world.

"We have to recognize that the price we must pay for living in a free speech society is very great, though of course we are persuaded that the price is not too great. . . . Far more wonderful than our oversized automobiles, our television and air-conditioning, our jet planes and our hydrogen bombs, is the free human mind. Good government, the cultivation of the arts, the progress of the sciences and technology, all require an atmosphere of freedom of thought and of freedom to put thought into words. The price may seem to be a steep one, but what is purchased is the greatest bargain in all history. . . ."—David Fellman, *The Limits of Freedom*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1959, pp. 92, 122–123. By permission.

1.4 To Make Men Free^{*}

• *Archibald MacLeish*

Freedom, in American usage, means the freedom of the individual human being to think for himself and to come to the truth by the light of his own mind and conscience. It is the freedom defined by the American Constitution. Congress is forbidden to make any law abridging the freedom of speech. There is to be no establishment of religious authority or supervision. There is to be no meddling, in other words, by state or by church with a man's thoughts or what he chooses to say about them. When it comes to thoughts, when it comes to ideas, when it comes to opinions and their expression, a man is free. His freedom is guaranteed by the fundamental law of the Republic. The opinions of others are not to be imposed upon him, no matter whose opinions they may be—the opinions of a church or the opinions of the government or the opinions of his fellow citizens—even the opinions of a majority of his fellow citizens.

A man's freedom to believe, that is to say, does not depend on *what* he believes. It does not depend on his being "right" as others see the right, no matter how numerous they may be or how well entrenched or how powerful. Right and wrong as others judge the right and wrong are irrelevant to the American conception of freedom to think and believe and say. That, of course, is the nub of the whole matter, and the essential distinction between freedom as we mean it and freedom as it is meant in certain other quarters of the earth. In the American conception of freedom, the man and his conscience come first and the established opinions, the accepted verities, the official views come after.

* Archibald MacLeish, *Freedom Is the Right to Choose*, Boston: Beacon, 1951, pp. 173-175, 180-182. By permission. Under the title "To Make Men Free," this article appeared in the *Atlantic* 188: 27-30, November 1951.

Mr. MacLeish has been a Pulitzer Prize winner in poetry, Librarian of Congress, Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Director of the Office of War Information, and a member of the executive board of UNESCO. He is now Boylston professor of rhetoric and oratory at Harvard and author of the critically acclaimed play *J.B.* (1958).

Strangers to the American tradition find this aspect of our historical belief in freedom difficult, if not impossible, to accept. Their inclination is to interpret freedom to mean freedom to think *right* thoughts. Which means, freedom to think as they think, and, by enlargement, freedom to think as their friends think, or their party, or their church, or their veterans' organization, or their union, or their professional association, or whatever. The majority, the institution, the accepted opinion comes first with them and the man and his conscience nowhere. Freedom is freedom to be like everybody else, to think as the majority in the town or state or country thinks, to teach what the legislature or the dominant political or religious opinion wants taught, to conform.

The pressure which the word freedom has been under in the past few years is a pressure of this character: a pressure from those who have never really accepted or wholly understood the meaning of the word in its American use. There are some, of course, who deliberately reject the American meaning—who would destroy it if they could, replacing it with an interpretation more amenable to their own beliefs—but they are not numerous as yet. The real danger to freedom in the United States—to the word and to the thing—is the danger of the impairment of the American usage by negligence and default. Unless we can maintain the pure traditional meaning of the word—unless we can understand in common and as a nation that the only opinion established in this country by the American Constitution is the opinion that a man is free to hold *any* opinion—unless we can agree among ourselves that by freedom we mean precisely *freedom*, we may end by finding ourselves “free” in the sense in which the Russians now find themselves “democratic.” . . .

The American Proposition is the proposition, advanced at the beginning of the Republic and enacted into law when the Constitution was adopted, that a man's freedom to be a man, and to find and speak the truth that is in him, is more important than the protection of any accepted belief, any official verity, against criticism, against challenge, against dissent. More important not only to that man but to all men, to the society which all men compose, to the nation, to the world, to life itself. It is a proposition, in other words, which rests upon an act of faith, the most courageous of all earthly

acts of faith—an act of faith in man and in the God whom man, in the freedom of his conscience and his thought, can find.

When it was first enacted into law the American Proposition was new. It is still new: the one wholly new and revolutionary idea the modern world has produced, for all its triumphs in science and technique—an idea so new and so revolutionary in its literal and explicit meaning that half the patriotic societies which celebrate their attachment to the American Revolution have yet to understand it or accept it. But it is new and revolutionary, not solely because it proclaims human liberty, nor solely because it founds its conception of human liberty on the freedom of the individual human mind, defending that freedom in the most explicit and peremptory terms against the tyranny of organized opinion. It is new and revolutionary because of the act of faith which it expresses.

Our reliance in this country is on the inquiring, individual human mind. Our strength is founded there: our resilience, our ability to face an ever-changing future and to master it. We are not frozen into the backward-facing impotence of those societies, fixed in the rigidness of an official dogma, to which the future is the mirror of the past. We are free to make the future for ourselves. And we are free because it is the man who counts in this country: always and at every moment and in any situation, the man. Not the Truth but the man: not the truth as the state sees the truth or as the church sees the truth or as the majority sees the truth or as the mob sees the truth, but the truth as the man sees it, as the man finds it, for himself as man. Our faith is in the infinite variety of human beings and in the God who made them various and of many minds; in their singularity, their uniqueness, the creativeness of the differences between them. Our faith, in simple, sober truth, is in the human Being, the human spirit, the hungers and the longings that lead it toward its images of truth, its perceptions of the beauty of the world.

Those who launched the great human adventure which this Republic is, dared to put their trust in the individual man, the man alone, the man thinking for himself. They dared to believe in a *people*, which is a nation of individual men constituting among themselves a society; for a people is not what the totalitarians call "the masses"; a people is an agreement of many alone to make together a world in which each one of them can live as himself. The

founders of the American Republic believed in a people. They not only provided no censors for the thoughts of those who were to come after them: they prohibited censors. They not only provided no moral or intellectual or religious authority to govern the beliefs of their successors: they rejected forever the establishment of any such authority. They trusted men.

It is in that trust that the Republic can still be defended. Indeed it is only in that trust that it can be defended as the kind of country it is. To attempt to defend it otherwise—to attempt, above all, to defend it by debasing the coinage of meaning in which its nature is expressed—is to lose both the country itself and the struggle against Communism which is cited as justification of the fraud. If freedom can come to mean something less than freedom in the general mind, it can come to mean the opposite of freedom. If freedom ceases to express the American faith in man and in man's unqualified right to find the truth for himself, it will shortly express a faith in established truth, in the rightness of official opinion. When that happens we shall have lost both the American Proposition and the fight against Communism. For the one idea that can triumph over the police-state notion that the truth is already known, once for all, and that the truth is therefore entitled to impose itself by force, is the American Proposition that a man is free to find the truth for himself. It is the one idea that can triumph because, as long as it is held, man himself is the cause of those who hold it. And against that cause no enemy has prevailed for long.

Open-mindedness and Responsible Control

1.5 Introduction

An "open mind" is not the same as an "empty mind." But when a mind is "informed," does this mean "stocked with information"? "indoctrinated"? or "ready to inquire"?¹³ In the educa-

¹³ These three meanings of "informed" are developed by Robert Hanvey in "In Pursuit of Reasons," *School Review*, 69: 127–135, Summer 1961. See

tion of free men, a distinction should be made between education and propaganda: "Education and true leisure enable men to exercise judgment; propaganda and mass entertainment persuade them to surrender it."¹⁴

If democracy is to survive, it will do so because its people maintain for themselves the ultimate powers of decision. Carl Sandburg explains the spirit of democracy in terms of an old Moslem legend. According to this legend, the people greatly revered a prophet named Hadji, and eagerly awaited his message to them. When the prophet arrived, he began his sermon with a question "O true believers, do you know what I am going to say to you?" The congregation answered, "No," and the Hadji replied, "Then truly there is no use in my speaking to you."

Some time later Hadji came again to address the congregation, and once more he began his message with the question, "O true believers, do you know what I am going to say to you?" The congregation responded in one voice, "We know! We know!" Then the prophet left the pulpit, saying, "Truly, since you know, why should I take the trouble of telling you?"

Then for the third and last time the prophet came to preach, and the people made extensive preparations for the occasion. When Hadji faced the congregation he again asked the same question, "O true believers, do you know what I am going to say to you?" From the congregation came shouts and cries, "Some of us know and some of us do not know." Then the prophet replied, "It is well in the sight of Allah, O true believers, that some of you know what I am going to say to you and some of you do not. Truly, therefore, let those who know tell those who do not know."

What is the lesson of this ancient fable? According to Carl Sandburg, it is this: How wonderful it might be if we could sift out those who know from those who don't know. But there is no way to do this. Hence we must rely on free communication, on uncensored education, on open debate and public discussion, on

also John S. Brubacher, "Education in an Era of Revolution," *Educational Forum*, 15: 271-281, March 1951; and Robert H. Ennis, "A Concept of Critical Thinking," *Harvard Educational Review*, 32: 81-111, Winter 1962. (Good bibliography on methodology.)

¹⁴ Charles Morgan, cited in William Albig, *Modern Public Opinion*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956, p. 302.

the maintenance of an equilibrium between all the great forces and interests in our society, both within the government—and education—and outside. For the emergence of any one group, whether it represents many or few, as the dominant force, sooner or later spells the end of freedom to all. In an open society one church may criticize another church. The CIO may differ from the NAM. But the government stands aloof from such controversy unless public peace, order, or welfare are seriously endangered. Free men believe that truth is best found, not by submission, but by the exercise of independent judgment; indeed, it is only by the exercise of such thought and freedom that man gains his true dignity and his fullest self-realization.¹⁵

Whether with Hobbes we define freedom as the right to do what one pleases, or with Plato as the right to do as one should, censorship is incompatible with democratic self-rule. In the words of a recent committee of scholars:

Censorship of the Hobbesian variety, based on the concept of freedom to do as you please, places censorship in the hands of those who happen to be in power; it extends their power to the determination of what is right and wrong, just and unjust, good and bad. Censorship of the Platonic variety, based on the concept of freedom to do as one should, places censorship in the hands of the wise and good, if they happen also to have secured power. But since the possession of power is in either case essential, there is no practical way to distinguish the judgment of officials who are wise and good from the arbitrary judgment of officials who are unwise and bad. Power tends to corrupt, in censorship as in other modes of its exercise.¹⁶

But although society as a whole may be free, each institution of society is limited in terms of specific tasks and functions. Hence, in the words of the President of Queen's College:

The fact that society at large permits activities to be carried on freely or ideas to be circulated freely does not obligate colleges to give

¹⁵ Carl Sandburg, *Remembrance Rock*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1948, pp. 885-886.

¹⁶ Richard McKeon, Robert K. Merton, and Walter Gellhorn, *The Freedom to Read: Perspective and Program*, New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1957, p. 97. By permission.

them hospitality under the guise of academic freedom or of constitutional rights. Prize fights, burlesque shows, and propagandizing are not proper college activities, no matter how acceptable they may be elsewhere. . . .

"In the exercise of its freedom . . . the selection of its faculty, the construction of its curriculum, the organizations and activities it permits, the visitors it invites—a college must meet a single generic test: does the exercise of its freedom serve the purposes for which the college itself exists. Nor is it enough to justify the exercise of its freedom on purposes for which it merely can be said, "There is no law against them," or that "They will do no harm." This is too aimless to be compatible with the importance of colleges and with the conservation of the time, energy, and resources required for their work. Colleges have little justification for engaging in anything for which there is not a presumption of positive educational value. Academic freedom is quite capable of deterioration into academic self-indulgence and triviality; it is the obligation of the academic community to see that it does not. Certainly, if a college is to preserve its integrity, it must not be used to serve purposes incompatible with its own. . . .

That is why a college must exercise the utmost care if it insists on providing a forum for those within its own society who are dedicated to the destruction both of academic freedom and of freedom in general. To justify such insistence, the case for a truly academic need must be all but overwhelming. A college must provide an understanding of communism; it is equally obligated to lend no aid to its conspiracy. This is why invitations to communists to speak on a campus must be discriminating. Thus, an invitation to the Soviet Educational Advisor, obviously a communist, to visit a college to describe the system of Soviet education is one thing; an invitation to the National Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States is another. One invitation serves a legitimate educational purpose which the college needs to fulfill; the other, in effect invites the Communist Party to make use of the college. . . .¹⁷

In the selections that comprise this section, Father Connell defends censorship, and three other Catholic writers question its value. The next two short selections (by British writers) show that, although an open-minded person must be sceptical about common prejudices, it does not follow that a sceptical person is open-minded. The final selection by Samuel Withers shows how

¹⁷ Harold W. Stoke, "The Invitation of Speakers to the College Campus," *School and Society*: 107-108, March 10, 1962. By permission.

responsible control may be combined with open-mindedness in the selection of library books.

1.6 Censorship and the Prohibition of Books in the Catholic Church*

Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R.

The Catholic Church approaches the problem of man's right to knowledge with the realization that in settling concrete problems relative to human freedom two fundamental principles must be observed: First, liberty is a most precious possession, based on the dignity of every human person as a creature of God destined to an everlasting existence; hence it must be respected and protected. Second, for the good of society as well as for the welfare of individuals, personal liberty must be curtailed in certain circumstances. This is particularly true when the limitation of liberty is required as a means of protecting individuals from sin or moral evil, which would constitute an impediment to the attainment of their final goal, eternal happiness with God. In determining the extent of man's rights in particular cases a just and reasonable mean must be observed between these two principles. If the first is overemphasized, liberty degenerates into license. If the second is stressed too much, authority becomes tyranny and the way is opened to totalitarianism.

These two principles must be properly coordinated in one of the problems which the Church treats in detailed legislation—the problem of the right to read certain books and other forms of published literature, a problem with a direct bearing on the right to knowledge and its free use. . . .

The notion that people should be allowed to read everything they wish is quite common in our land, for we are a freedom-loving

* Rev. Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., "Censorship and the Prohibition of Books in the Catholic Church Law," 54 *Columbia Law Review*, 699-709, May 1954. By permission. Father Connell is Dean of the School of Sacred Theology, The Catholic University of America.

people, resenting any restriction of our freedom. How often do we hear the statement that reading will never cause the reader any harm! An example of this is a statement made by Verner W. Clapp, Acting Librarian of Congress:

The notion that mankind is corrupted by books is, I believe, a notion held by those whose own reading has been largely of that enforced and unselective kind which the mass media provide. Books are corruptive only to those who seek to be corrupted; but they are already corrupt.¹⁸

Despite the dogmatic assurance with which this statement is made, the fact is that people can be influenced to evil as well as to good by what they read. And while we justly uphold the ideals of freedom we must admit that freedom has its limitations. Catholics believe that the laws of their Church in regard to censorship and the prohibition of books represent a reasonable limitation of their freedom. And before passing an unfavorable judgment on the Church's legislation on this matter, one should examine the principles on which the Church bases its policy in restricting the right to read for those who are subject to the authority of the Church.

The Catholic Church believes that the chief purpose of man's earthly life is to prepare for an eternal life after death. Happiness in this everlasting existence is merited by living in this world a life in conformity with the commands of God; and it is supremely important to live this life in such a manner as to attain this goal. Whatever advantages may accrue through the exercise of personal freedom, they can have no real value if they impede or imperil the attainment of one's eternal destiny. Hence it is not an evil but a good when those in authority, whether parents, civil rulers or ecclesiastical authorities, regulate the exercise of freedom by those subject to their jurisdiction so as to aid them to observe God's law and to reach the eternal happiness which the Creator has appointed to every human being.

Everyone admits that it is perfectly reasonable to limit the freedom of individuals when the purpose of such limitations is to prevent them from doing physical harm to themselves or to others. If I refuse to give a person a gun with which he is likely to shoot

¹⁸ *Washington Sunday Star*, December 6, 1953.

himself or others I am indeed limiting his freedom, but no reasonable person will accuse me of doing wrong. Instead of hampering his proper use of freedom, I am preventing him from abusing it. The Catholic Church applies this same principle to the unrestricted right to read. There are books which would cause spiritual and moral harm to many persons if they were permitted to read them indiscriminately; hence the Church forbids the reading of such books.

Naturally it will be asked by what authority the Church claims the right to do this. The Church replies that it has received from God Himself the right to teach officially the truths of religion and morality and the right to legislate on matters pertinent to the spiritual welfare of those subject to its jurisdiction. . . .

Anyone who admits the existence of an intelligent and all-powerful Deity must grant that if He wills, He can authorize an organization on earth to represent Him in proposing to mankind the doctrines of religion and the principles of morality. For such a person, therefore, the vital question is whether or not the Almighty has acted thus in respect to the Catholic Church. . . .

As to the matter of religious belief, the Catholic Church is convinced that its duty of preserving in its members the faith in the truths which God has communicated to men calls for legislation against books that might endanger that faith. The Church is not motivated by a fear that the arguments brought against its teachings are sufficiently cogent in themselves to discredit Catholic teaching. Rather, the Church recognizes that many Catholics do not possess sufficient technical knowledge of Catholic doctrine or of history to meet all the arguments that can be brought against Catholic belief; hence the Church legislates against books with such a purpose. . . .¹⁹

¹⁹ Editors' note: Compare the following statement by John B. Sheerin, C.S.P., in *The Catholic Lawyer*, Autumn 1957: "Censorship is necessary to conserve essential values of the American way of life . . . foes of censorship should realize that freedom is not the highest value, that it exists for the preservation of purity, truth, and justice, and those other ideals that make up Western culture."—Cited in *Censorship Bulletin*, 2: 11, New York: American Book Publishers Council, Inc., April 1958. In contrast, read the following statement issued jointly by ex-presidents Hoover and Truman: "We Americans know that if freedom means anything, it means the right to think. And the right to think means the right to read—anything, written anywhere, by any man, at any

1.7 Pluralism and Open-mindedness: Three Liberal Catholic Views

Jacques Maritain: "Medieval versus Modern Conceptions of Freedom"^{*}

... the historical climate of modern civilization, in contradistinction to medieval civilization, is characterized by the fact that it is a "lay" or "secular," not a "sacral" civilization. . . . The unity of religion is not a prerequisite for political unity, and men subscribing to diverse religious and nonreligious creeds have to share in and work for the same political or temporal good. Whereas "medieval man" . . . entered the State (what State there was) to become a "citizen," through the Church and his membership in the Church, modern man is a citizen with full civic rights whether he is a member of the Church or not. . . .

Common consciousness has also become aware of the fact that freedom of inquiry, even at the risk of error, is the normal condition for men to get access to truth, so that freedom to search for God in their own way, for those who have been brought up in ignorance or semi-ignorance of Him, is the normal condition in which to listen to the message of the Gospel and the teachings of the Church, when grace will illumine their hearts. . . . The emphasis has shifted from power and legal constraints (which the Church exercises, now as ever, in her own spiritual sphere over her own subjects, but not over the State) to moral influence and authority. . . .

time."—*Censorship Bulletin*, 2:12, New York: American Book Publishers Council, Inc., April 1958. However, American ideals and American practices frequently do not coincide. In *Time Film Corporation v. City of Chicago*, 365 U.S. 391 (1961), the Court defended "prior restraint" with respect to movies in a 5-4 decision. The minority opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, indicates "the extent to which censorship has recently been used in this country."

* Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, Chap. 6, "Church and State," pp. 160-162. Copyright 1951 by the University of Chicago Press.

Julian Pleasants: "Open-mindedness and Scientific Research"†

. . . Scientific theories and achievements have enormously widened the scope of human power, freedom, and responsibility, in the control of nature. In the face of disease and malnutrition the medieval Christian practiced the virtue of resignation; the scientist practices the virtue of research (prudence). Much of what we once blamed on God we now blame on ourselves. . . .

In my opinion, the basic difference between this modern world that values research so much, and the Catholic segment that values it so little, is that the Catholic part had given up the virtue of prudence, and the modern world, through the advance of science, rediscovered it. The temptation to give up prudence for formalism is an ever-present temptation for Catholics, since we have it on the highest authority that "the children of the world are more prudent in their generation than the children of light," especially in regard to the things of this world.

The scientific method could not have come upon the world as a new dawn if the sun of prudence had not already set. The modern scientific method is nothing more than the first five steps in prudent judgment. In fact, Saint Thomas Aquinas's exposition of these steps reads like some Science Department's outline for the writing of a thesis: history of the question, present understanding of the question, assembling of the data by search of the literature and by experimental discovery of new data, speculation about the relationships involved (Saint Thomas calls it *eustochia*—happy conjecturing—a most felicitous term), and reasoning from the known to the unknown.

This very prudence, which seems today the property and even the discovery of the scientist, is by right the central governing virtue of Christian life. To it belongs, by right, the spirit of critical in-

† Julian Pleasants, "Catholics and Science," *Commonweal* 58: 509-514, August 28, 1953; reprinted in *Catholicism in America*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1954, pp. 177-178, 175, 169, 173, 178-179. By permission of *Commonweal* magazine. Julian Pleasants is a research scientist on the staff of the Lebund Institute at the University of Notre Dame.

vestigation, of discovery, invention, and experimentation, whether our aim at the time is to know something, to make something, or to do something....

[In spite of this Thomistic emphasis of prudence] . . . twenty years ago, Catholic effort in scientific research was perhaps one-thirtieth of that done by an equal number of non-Catholics. Right now, Catholic effort is probably one-tenth of what would be expected from a comparable group of non-Catholics, despite the fact that a few Catholic centers are developing their resources very rapidly....

The philosophy of life that is prevalent though by no means universal among American Catholics is, in my opinion, the key to the scarcity of Catholic creativity. Father Joseph Buckley, S.M., may have put his finger on it in 1940 when he contrasted "The Philosophy of Life of Catholics and the Catholic Philosophy of Life." . . .

This prevailing philosophy of life of Catholics is almost sheer formalism, obedience to certain arbitrary prescriptions for the sake of an arbitrary reward. In such a view, salvation is simply an application of definite formulas to a few definite occasions of life. Where the formulas do not apply, the matter is of no real significance. Nothing new need be added. Formalism does not forbid creative activity—it just takes the heart out of it.

• Formalism provides no status for the virtues of science, art, and prudence, since they are meaningless to someone who already has all the answers. The idea of Christian life as charity working with the tools of science, art, and prudence to redeem the world becomes equally meaningless. Formalism is the peculiar temptation to which the American Catholic has for the moment succumbed....

In the face of what evolutionism and scientism have so obviously done to the religious attitude of so many men, it may take strong faith on the part of Catholic college administrators to believe that the discovery of new truth and the elaboration of new theories is more likely than not to help us know God better and serve Him more prudently. We have to be convinced on *a priori* grounds that God has made things well, that the more we understand of what He has made, the better we can know Him, and that the more we understand the nature of things, the better we can

use them for the purposes for which He made them. Yet nothing in science itself forces us to direct either our thoughts or our actions to God. We have to be ready to run the risk of misdirected science if we are to have science at all.

Catholicism and science were meant for each other. In the Church we find the feminine element of life in its perfection. Well is she called "Mother" Church, she who hands down Christian tradition from generation to generation and trains the little ones. Yet the Church as a human institution suffers the temptations of its state, *les défauts de ses qualités*: the temptation to timidity, the temptation to rank custom above life and obedience above prudence. Modern science is a masculine element, inquisitive, daring, critical, willing to try the new, yet careless of holding fast to what is good in the old, lacking often in reverence for human nature and even for things themselves, feeling strangely dissatisfied in the midst of its triumphs. Each needs the other.

Gustave Weigel: "Eternal Truths and Creative Scholarship"‡

No one will say that intellectualism in the abstract is anywhere suppressed in our Catholic circles. We are all convinced that it is good and our tradition has always favored it. Catholics at large expect at least their priests to be learned and we have always made much of those Catholics, clerical or lay, who have distinguished themselves in science. Yet, with all this in favor of scholarship, the number of Catholics who take it up in America is small. . . .

I make this postulate to explain our situation . . . : The general

‡ Rev. Gustav Weigel, S. J., "American Catholic Intellectualism," *Review of Politics* 19: 275-307, July 1957. By permission. More recently Father John J. Cavanaugh, President of Notre Dame University, asked "Where are the Catholic Sachs, Oppenheimer, Einsteins?" (*Time* 70: 49-50, Dec. 30, 1957; *Commonweal* 67: 372, Jan. 10, 1958.) Concerning the effects of censorship (i.e., lack of prudence) on creativity in art, read Walter Kerr, *Criticism and Censorship*, Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1956. See also Msgr. John Tracy Ellis, "No Complacency," *America* 95: 14-18f., April 7, 1956; George H. Tavard, "Theology in the Catholic Colleges," *Commonweal*, 78: 273-275, May 31, 1963.

Catholic community in America does not know what scholarship is. Instead of a true concept, false conceptions are prevalent. . . . In Catholic institutions . . . much stress is placed on reason, but the student is discouraged from using it originally. . . .

Philosophy is not envisaged as a personal quest for truth but rather as a predigested apologetic of religious belief. Young men, firm in their faith and lovers of debate, esteem this highly, but they escape the encounter with scholarship. . . .

[Frequently] in Catholic teaching circles . . . there is a strong urge to make questions timeless with timeless answers. New questions are preferably reduced to old ones and hence they need not be answered anew, because the old answer is already there. This deep-freeze technique gives the student the impression that there really are no new questions. Contemporary men only rediscover in their time the eternal questions already eternally answered in the past. . . .

Catholic teachers . . . wish to prevent the students from meeting thought which has not yet been apologetically sterilized. Instead of making the disciplines an intellectual encounter with the real as it swims into our experience, they prefer to petrify it by reducing it to a logical scheme of abstract verbalisms. The student is habituated not to consider the existent real with its confusions, effervescence and rich variety. He is taught to look spontaneously for a given atemporal scheme of terminological coordinates which he can superimpose on reality, concentrating on the scheme and ignoring the reality. The schemes are a heritage from an unexamined past where they were made under the pressures of that moment but not necessarily relevant to our day. The student in consequence feels an unreality in his vision of the real. Memorization has been valued over direct investigation. A contemporary thought must not be analyzed for what it contains but quickly categorized so that it will fall into a place in the prefabricated scheme. Once in its place, it can be ignored, because knowing is reduced to categorizing, and the categories were justified once and for all.

This kind of training leads away from scholarship. The postulate of all scholarly investigation is the nagging existence of mystery. The training of not a few young Catholics makes them believe that

there is no mystery. It is all objectively clear and the category schemes of the past can make it manifest. If that is so, there is nothing more to be done. It has been done already and why waste time doing it over again? Better to dedicate one's life to something more rewarding.

1.8 Prejudice*

R. W. Jepson

. . . the remarkable triumphs achieved in the sphere of pure science have been due to the unbiased, disinterested and unemotional way in which investigators have pursued their tasks. But outside this sphere, in our everyday life. . . all of us are liable to be led astray by our feelings. Even the scientific investigator, in his private unprofessional life, will often allow himself to be swayed by the very irrational impulses he has resolutely repressed in his study or laboratory. . . .

The feeling that exercises perhaps the most powerful influence upon our thinking is our love of ease and comfort and "a quiet life," and the consequent dislike of anything that threatens to disturb them. Hence the general prejudice against change or innovation.

We are creatures of habit. The oftener we act or think in a certain way, the more mechanical and the easier it becomes to go on acting and thinking in the same way, and the more difficult, and

*R.W. Jepson, *Clear Thinking*, London: Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1940, excerpts from Chap. IV. By permission. R. W. Jepson is a former headmaster, the Mercer's school, Holborn, England.

Compare the following statement from a eulogy of Judge Learned Hand: "Judge Hand's belief in reason as a source of law, and his distrust in his own reason's results seem paradoxical at first. Yet they are logically conjoined. He who is least certain is most likely to be receptive to reason. He who is most receptive to reason is least likely to embrace those brethren of certainty—the absolute, the general principle, the formula and the controlling concept. The inquiring mind will continue to inquire. . . ."—John J. Cound, "Learned Hand," 44 *Minnesota Law Review*, 217-221 (1961). See also Wallace Mendelson, "Learned Hand: Patient Democrat," 76 *Harvard Law Review*, 322-335, December 1962.

therefore the more distasteful, it becomes to deviate from our established routine.

Right from our earliest days our habits of thought and ways of looking at things are being moulded by circumstances almost beyond our control. In the family, the school, the district in which we live, the social class to which we belong, we are surrounded by customary modes of thought and behavior, which we adopt as a rule without question; for most of us naturally dislike being thought different from those with whom we are in daily contact. And these close ties breed loyalties which we are naturally loath to disown. In later life, we are apt to think that the world in which we grew up was the best of all possible worlds, and to regard the customs and notions which helped to mould our own selves as the acme of wisdom and sound sense, never reached before or since. We refer to our own times as a kind of golden age; we call them the Good Old Days (thus begging the question), compared with which the present is decadent and degenerate. . . .

The next feeling that we so often allow to interfere in our thinking is that of pride or *amour propre*. When we have once adopted an opinion, our pride makes us loath to admit that we are wrong. When objections are made to our views, we are more concerned with discovering how to combat them than how much truth or sound sense there may be in them; we are at pains rather to find fresh support for our own views, than to face frankly any new facts that appear to contradict them. . . . "We like to continue to believe what we have been accustomed to accept as true, and the resentment aroused when doubt is cast upon any of our assumptions leads us to seek every manner of excuse for clinging to them. *The result is that most of our so-called reasoning consists in finding arguments for going on believing as we already do.*" . . .

The third feeling is that most commonly associated with prejudice—self-interest. It is uncommonly difficult not to allow our love or desire for power or wealth or possessions or personal advancement to interfere with our judgment. This is especially the case where matters of public policy, involving the welfare of the whole community, are concerned. The natural interest, or instinct, we have for self-preservation extends also to the preservation of the power and privilege belonging to our own social class or professional

status. The suggestion of any form of social reconstruction will naturally cause the average person to ask, "How is it going to affect me? What sort of position am I going to occupy in the new order of things?" One is reminded of the story of the two Yorkshiremen (?), one of whom is explaining to the other his ideas of Communism. He says, "If tha has two houses, tha gives one to't folk that has none." His friend nods gravely, "And if tha has two cows, tha gives one to thy neighbour that has none." Again his friend's assent is forthcoming. "And if tha has two pigs . . ." "Nay, lad," protested the other, "tha knows I have two pigs." . . .

Prejudice springs from the unconscious and is the result of feeling, and try as we will we cannot keep emotion out of our thinking. . . . Here I can only suggest one or two prophylactics: a readiness to listen patiently and tolerantly to other people's opinions; a determination in dispute to get to the root of a question, to stick to the point, to try to look at facts squarely and dispassionately and to judge them on their merits; to keep calm and cool, and to avoid personalities and rancour. All these counsels are easy enough to give but not so easy to carry out. But it is worth while trying to follow them in the hope that the effort will grow into a habit; and when we want help we shall profit by consulting trustworthy authorities and those whose views are expressed moderately, rather than those who have an axe to grind and who use rhetorical exaggeration, stamping emphasis, catch-phrases, slogans, cheap quips and other devices that are only calculated to arouse feeling and irrational tendencies.

All these steps will naturally follow if we are keen enough on getting at the truth and on living useful and purposeful lives—in fact, if we cultivate a passion that will override and direct our other feelings, a passion not only for the truth but also for the achievement of a high aim and purpose. Herein lies the true solvent for prejudice.²⁰

²⁰ Editors' note: Compare the following: ". . . The venerable tradition of respectful argumentation, based on evidence, conducted with courtesy, and leading to the exposition of truth, is a precious part of our heritage in this land of freedom. It is the duty of educated men to understand, appreciate and perpetuate this tradition."—Msgr. James P. Shannon. "The Tradition of Respectful Argument," *America*, 107: 539, July 28, 1962. Reprinted with permission from *America*, the National Catholic Weekly Review, 920 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y.

1.9 The Limits of Scepticism—A Parable*

I met a man about a week ago who took a very firm line about badgers. He said they didn't exist. "Somehow or other," he said, "the idea has grown up that people wish to be told stories about this preposterous animal, and letters are written to the *Times* and to *Country Life* about it. But there aren't any. If there were, I should have seen them—and I haven't."

I said I had.

"Where?"

"In a wood."

"Pure hallucination. A lot of people have told me that they have seen ghosts. But I don't believe it. I've seen none myself. What was this thing doing?"

"Moving about."

"Was it eating anything?"

"Not that I noticed."

"Did it emit any groans?"

"No."

"Did it carry its head in its hand?"

I was thoroughly annoyed. . . . "There were badgers," I said, "in Kenwood at Hampstead quite recently. They came into people's gardens."

"Did you see them there?"

"They came at night, and left their traces."

"You're sure you don't mean burglars?"

"Look here," I said, "there is a badger at the Zoo."

"Probably a small panda."

"How do you know there is a panda at the Zoo?"

"Because there aren't any badgers."

"When I tell you I know farmers who give a guilder a year to badger-digging parties, because they say badgers eat their young

* "The Unbeliever" by Evoie, London: *Punch* magazine, 206: 410, May 17, 1944. (C) *Punch*, London. Adapted. By permission. This selection indicates that scepticism may be carried too far. It also suggests that some major differences have to do with unstated assumptions.

lambs, when I say that you can see the traces of badgers at any time in hundreds of places, when I assure you that books have been written about the lives and loves of badgers, photographs reproduced of badgers and their young—”

“Ectoplasm,” he said.

“Badgers make admirable pets. There are people writing to the papers who honour and cherish them. These people sit down to tea with their badgers and drink milk with them. Badgers are very tidy. They live in setts, and are drawn by dogs—”

“Like the Eskimos.”

“They are plantigrades. They bring out their beds to be aired. They are obstinate. They bite. They eat roots, beetles, worms, rabbits. The shriek of a badger at night is a very terrible thing.”

“So is the shriek of a ghost.”

“Probably many of the stories about ghosts originate from the cry of a badger.”

“You might just as well say that many of the stories about badgers originate from the cry of a ghost.”

“Possibly the trolls and gnomes were badgers.”

“Possibly the badgers were gnolls and tromes.”

“Badger-baiting was one of the most popular sports of our ancestors.”

“So was killing dragons.”

“Well,” (I asked), “What do you *really* believe about badgers?”

“In an excessively urbanized country it is found necessary to invent stories of glamour and mystery about the countryside, and the wild creatures of the wood. . . . There may have been badgers long ago, just as there were dragons and griffins. But they are gone.”

“Do you deny the whole testimony of natural history books, encyclopedias and ecologists?”

“Paid propaganda.”

The man was becoming tiresome. “Just because you’ve never seen a badger,” I said, “you say there aren’t any. Very well. Do you often go through Trafalgar Square?”

“Almost never.”

“Can you believe there’s a haystack in it?”

“No.”

"I thought so. Just because you don't pass by Trafalgar Square every day on a bus as I do . . . you suppose I'm a liar when I say there's a haystack in it."

"Yes, I do."

"Very well. Come and see then."

We went. There wasn't. Some idiot had burned it down.

"Don't ever talk to me about badgers again," said this man.

I shall not.

1.10 Library Censorship Should Be Done by People Who Read^o

Samuel Withers

"There are dangerous books in our school libraries," cries a would-be censor, waving "The Catcher in the Rye" or "1984" or some other candidate for literary banishment. "Let me read you this page." And a school board, or P.T.A. committee, or self-appointed vigilante group listens to a passage containing taboo Anglo-Saxon words, a sex description or an unorthodox political idea. Those in authority who are alarmed at the fragment read out of context raise a cry—and another school is suddenly called upon to defend its library.

The issues in school library censorship include the centuries-old question of freedom of information and expression, but they are more complicated than is the problem of adult freedom to read. . . . No matter how firm a believer in the First Amendment the school librarian may be, she can never forget that she is not buying books for adults. "Lady Chatterley's Lover," for instance, has passed court tests for its value as "good" literature and can be found in many public libraries; but it is not in the libraries of the schools.

^o Samuel Withers, "The Library, the Child and the Censor," *New York Times Magazine*, April 8, 1962, pp. 53-58. Copyright by *The New York Times*. Reprinted by permission. Samuel Withers taught high-school English before becoming administrative director of the Council for Basic Education in Washington. Compare the editorial, "Brave New World, Indeed," *Commonweal*, 72: 80-81, April 22, 1960. See also E. Thorwald Esbensen, "How Far Have Book Burners Gone?" *School Executives*, 76: 69-71, May 1957.

The schools legally act *in loco parentis*, and supervision of their pupils' reading is only a part of the supervision that is assumed necessary as youngsters approach the magical age of 21. If parents have the duty to screen their daughters' boy friends and to indicate (hopefully) what time their daughters are expected home from dates; the librarian also has a duty to screen books for these daughters—and their boy friends.

In selecting books the school librarian must balance two factors: (1) a work of obvious intrinsic literary merit should not be rejected because of a few sex references or taboo words which, in context, help to create the book's merit; and (2) the adolescent's lack of experience, both of sex and of literature, sometimes makes him take sexual and taboo references out of context.

Librarians know that when a book is furtively passed to a friend with a note, "See page 161," it is not being read as a piece of literature. And yet they cannot deny good reading to the whole school because of the prurience of a few. The balancing of these two factors makes the task of selection extremely difficult and often frustrating. J. D. Salinger's "The Catcher in the Rye," for instance, generally praised by our critics as an honest and accurate novel, includes some language and references which make the school librarian's decision anything but easy. With certain books, whether the librarian chooses to stock them or to reject them, she will still be wrong in the minds of some people in the community.

No matter how many hours of considered thought a school librarian gives to selecting books, there are, in many communities, people whose judgments are quick and untroubled by self-questioning. . . . In Channelview, Texas, a suburb of Houston, a woman . . . noted that a book entitled "Living Biographies of Greek Philosophers" was in the school library. Because Plato "talks about free love and communal living," she objected to the book's availability to school children. She also found Plato guilty by association with Socrates, who had been executed for his subversive ideas.

Absurd criticisms of school libraries are not always made by single voices. Self-appointed committees can be collectively ridiculous. Last November in Pontiac, Mich., sixteen parents tried to have the school ban "The Scarlet Letter," "The Good Earth" and "Drums Along the Mohawk." The parents called these books "pornographic."

The Hawthorne classic was chosen for this category because it deals with an adulterous woman, and "Drums" was chosen because it recounts the activities of a servant girl who lives with an Indian. The school authorities pointed out that the girl is punished for her way of life, but the spokesman for the sixteen parents answered, "I think she wound up very well satisfied with the Indian."

Words of her satisfaction with the Indian spread to Davenport, Iowa, where some investigating citizens found the same three books in the school library. While the books were temporarily removed from circulation, Dr. Anthony Marinaccio, the superintendent, himself reread "The Scarlet Letter." Throughout the hassle the newspapers kept Iowans up to date on Hester Prynne's fate, finally announcing acquittal and restoration to the library.

Who are the censors of local school libraries? If they are objecting on political grounds, they are usually members of super-patriotic groups or of venerable lineage societies. These critics, however, go after textbooks more frequently than library books, as did J. Evetts Haley and his Texans for America last fall, supported by a D.A.R. leader, Mrs. A. A. Forrester of Texarkana. Haley selected some fifty books on the Texas state approved list for his own "disapproved list," but he was less concerned with school libraries.

So-called "liberal" groups are also sometimes responsible for pressures on school reading, but they, too, have been more interested in textbooks than in library books. Local chapters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People have been responsible for agitation to remove books containing unflattering portraits of, or terms for, Negroes from school reading programs. Thus the classic "Huckleberry Finn" was squeezed out of the classrooms of the New York City schools, and others, but is generally allowed sanctuary in the school libraries.

"Obscenity" and "vulgarity" are the usual reasons for attempts to censor school libraries. George Orwell's "1984," an anti-totalitarian novel, required defense in Wrenshall, Minn., and elsewhere because of a detailed and convincing love scene. This scene is essential to Orwell's purpose in the book, to show the dehumanizing effect of totalitarianism; but critics attack it out of context, fearing it will be

read by youngsters who will assign it the same emphasis that *they* do.²¹

Regional feeling is also responsible for censorship. In 1956, South Carolina's Legislature passed a resolution "requesting that the State Library Board remove from circulation certain books antagonistic and inimical to the traditions of South Carolina."

In Savannah, Ga., four books were recently removed from the local school libraries on recommendation of the Chatham County grand jury.

The books removed were "Laughing Boy" by Oliver LaFarge (a Pulitzer Prize winner), "Black Boy" by Richard Wright, "The Walls Came Tumbling Down" by Henrietta Roosenburg, and "Color Blind" by Margaret Halsey. . . .

The shape of arguments for and against school library censorship then begins to take recognizable patterns. Those who want certain books removed point to descriptions, dialogue or words without their contextual reference. Those who defend the school library books look for the value of a book as a whole piece of literature. They remind critics of "The Catcher in the Rye," for instance, that the naughtiest Anglo-Saxon four-letter verb appears in Salinger's book because Holden Caulfield, seeing it on a wall, is disgusted by it and wants to protect his sister and all the other innocents of the city from seeing it.

Much has been done to combat attempted amateur censorship, and still more can be done. The American Association of School Librarians, a subsidiary of the powerful American Library Association, has adapted the latter's Library Bill of Rights for the schools. The association asserts in the School Library Bill of Rights, among other things, that it is the responsibility of the school library "to provide materials on opposing sides of controversial issues, so that young citizens may develop under guidance the practice of critical reading and thinking."

²¹ Editors' note: We add the following anonymous poem, called "The Censor's Case":

Your honor, this book is a bucket of swill;
 It portrays a young couple alone on a hill,
 And a woman who lived in a shoe as a house
 With her brood—but not once does it mention her spouse.
 I submit that this book is obscene, vile and loose
 And demand its suppression. Its name? "Mother Goose."

It is also its responsibility "to place principle above personal opinion and reason above prejudice in the selection of materials of the highest quality. . . ." . . . The criticism of sex sleuths and word watchers can be properly evaluated only by people who read. . . .

There will always be a question of censorship in school libraries because adolescents cannot be considered in every way adult. Mrs. Clifford Brown, school librarian in Stephenson, Mich., said in the *Michigan Librarian*:

"In a way [the school librarian] does have to censor. Whether or not it is censorship, though, depends upon her approach to her task." Her positive attitude of looking for the good in a book will produce a better library than the negative attitude of "feeling certain that she will find something evil or crude."²²

²² Editors' note: In general, the same principles which apply to the selection of books for libraries also apply to the selection of materials and the control of learning experiences within the classroom. Says I. B. Berkson:

"The nature of knowledge and thought, which always involves presuppositions, and the exigencies of teaching conditions, which rarely permit full discussion, make a large measure of indoctrination unavoidable. The more we are conscious of this, the less likely are we to fall prey to its negative aspects. In any case, frank indoctrination is better than the pretense of neutrality. . . .

"Neutralism in teaching should not be confused with objectivity; it is the latter which we should try to approximate. Objectivity requires—not the absence of a point of view—but seeing the matter from more than one point of view and by emancipation from a narrower outlook in favor of a wider perspective. Teaching should be as positive as is reasonably warranted by the field of study. The teacher who fails to impart a knowledge of the premises and conclusions generally accepted is as culpable as the one who engages in one-sided instruction when there is a difference concerning central issues.

"Good teaching will have two aspects. It will include the communication of positive knowledge and accepted principles along with an analysis of the line of reasoning, or wherever appropriate, the repetition, or at least the description of the experiments by which the conclusions were reached. The other aspect is the discussion of diverse views on issues still unsettled. . . .

"The classroom is not a public forum; it has, to a large extent, the aspect of a captive audience. Discussion is only one aspect of scientific procedure; there is the matter of logic and experimental procedure, of the competence of the discussants. . . . The school's obligation is to follow established principles and to uphold warranted knowledge as against the views commonly held in the market-place. The competition is between scientific and critical beliefs, on the one hand, and popular emotional beliefs, on the other."—I. B. Berkson, *The Ideal and the Community*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958, pp. 253–264. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated. Mr. Berkson is Professor of Education, The City College of New York.

Education and the Cultivation of Loyalty

1.11 Introduction: Loyalty and Conformity

The education of a free people should not only be *better* than the education of a slave people; it should be of a different *kind*. The selections in this section are concerned with questions such as the following: What is the difference between education and indoctrination? How can we encourage loyalty to "the American way of life" without curbing free inquiry? Can we have emotional attachment to common ideals without having state-control and dogmatism? Can our schools promote loyalty and patriotism without curbing independence and diversity of thought?

In striving for allegiance and for loyalty, great care must be exercised lest we destroy the central ingredient of a free society. Even in a post-McCarthy era, it may be well to recall the story of an Armenian named Joe. Joe had the finest lamb in all Armenia, with the longest and softest fleece. The lamb was so famous that Joe's neighbors decided to steal it. When he saw them coming, Joe carried the lamb into his cabin and barred the door. He began shooting at the robbers, first from the window on the East, then from the window on the West, then from the East again. But each time Joe crossed the room, he tripped and fell over the lamb. Finally, he opened the door, kicked the lamb outside, and went on shooting. Freedom is democracy's lamb—as well as democracy's lamp—and our Bill of Rights was intended to protect that freedom. We may trip over our freedoms occasionally, but our constitution should remind us why we cannot save our freedoms by throwing them away. In the words of William H. LaPrade:

A free society cannot avoid an element of risk. It will search in vain for absolute security. It is based on the assumption that people can be trusted to be free, that a majority of them will not in the long run persist in acting to their own disadvantage, that, given freedom to think,

to act, and to influence each other, they will on the whole do better for themselves than if their direction were entrusted to a few, however wise, not subject to popular control. This is the traditional faith at the heart of our political society.²³

The essence of democracy—and the ideal of democratic education—is the encouragement of freedom, responsibility and creativity on the part of all citizens. On no other basis may democracy be so clearly distinguished from totalitarianism. Dictators sometimes suppose that they do not need the opinions of dissenting groups. They try to dispense with opposition. They imprison, exile, or shoot their opponents. Democracies, on the other hand, have learned on the basis of long experience dating back to the Magna Carta and before that opposition is indispensable. Consider the British phrase "*Her Majesty's loyal opposition.*" To totalitarians, the terms "loyal" and "opposition" are contradictory: "How can anyone who opposes the government be loyal to it?" they ask. But democracies encourage criticism and dissent, and even pay public salaries to elected representatives of minority groups. For in a democracy, majorities may become minorities without any loss of rights, and minorities may become majorities without any added privileges. To stifle the voices of any of its citizens is to undermine the basic foundation of democratic unity—freedom of the individual citizen. The state may indeed compel obedience to laws which have won the consent of the majority of its citizens. But these laws are always open to challenge and revision. The majority is not a fixed group but a fluctuating one, and the possibility always remains open for the minority to become the majority by argument and persuasion.

In civilized societies, men learn to discuss issues, to meet their opponents face to face, to examine competing hypotheses, to restudy their traditions, to picture a type of life more ideal than that to which they are accustomed. Out of such discussion gradually emerges a body of common opinion. Roman philosophers referred to it as "natural law." Anglo-Saxon jurists called it "common law." Contemporary educators speak of it in terms such as "consensus,"

²³ American Association of University Professors, Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, William T. LaPrade, chairman, "Report," *AAUP Bulletin* 37: 72-91, Spring 1951. By permission.

"pragmatic agreement," or "practical intelligence." In thus clarifying their agreements and differences, men cease to be children: They learn to modify customs and traditions, and thus develop reason and humanity, the basic virtues of civilization. And they learn to organize society on the basis of compromises and of hard-won beliefs which transcend divisive boundaries, and serve to glue together otherwise intransigent groups. Paraphrasing Edwin Markham's poem "Outwitted," Horace Kallen has expressed the social side of democracy and science thus: ". . . other ways of thought and life draw circles which shut the differences out, as heretics, rebels, and things to flout, but democracy and science are the methods that win, for the circle they draw brings the differences in."²⁴

Here we may recall the story of a commercial fisherman who repeatedly came back from his ten-day fishing excursions with fresher, livelier, more valuable herring than any of his competitors. Asked for the secret of his success, he replied: "Into each vat of herring, I put two or three halibut. It is true that the halibut eat a few of the herring. But the rest of the herring are kept moving, and this keeps them fresh and alive." It is because democracy permits the expression of minority opinions which the majority loathes and despises—and also permits the uncensored refutation of such opinions—that a democratic state is kept fresh and alive. It is for exactly the same reason that a democratic state is able to inspire loyalty. In the words of Zechariah Chaffee:

Loyalty is a beautiful idea, but you cannot create it by compulsion or force. . . . You make men love their government and their country by giving them the kind of government and the kind of country that inspire respect and love; a country that is free and unafraid, that lets the discontented talk in order to learn the causes for their discontent and end those causes, that refuses to impel men to spy on their neighbors, that protects its citizens vigorously from harmful acts while it leaves the remedies for objectionable ideas to counter-argument and time.²⁵

The assumption of authoritarian societies is that most men are incapable of forming reasonable judgments. Therefore, authori-

²⁴ Horace M. Kallen, *Democracy's True Religion*, Boston: Beacon, 1951, p. 10.

²⁵ Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941, pp. 564–565. Read also H. G. Creel, *Confucius, the Man and the Myth*, New York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1949, Chap. 10.

tarianism makes its appeal not to reason but to tradition, to emotion, and to force. In contrast, the democratic state wins loyalty by permitting its citizens to convince themselves that the democratic way is worthy of devotion because, in the light of an intelligent examination of alternative ways of life, democracy will be seen to be superior to its rivals.

Are we to conclude from this that the child of a democratic society is to grow up like Topsy, with no guidance, no instruction, no attempt to mould his character? Not at all! It is the never-ending task of our schools to distinguish between the average, the best, and the worst. We educate our children insofar as we help them to move upward, and we do this by bringing them under the influence of the best that has been thought, and felt, and spoken, and written, on every subject. Insofar as there is progress, the best of yesterday becomes the average of today, and the best of today becomes the average of tomorrow. Democratic education cannot be satisfied with the average, the commonplace, the reduction of all to a least common denominator. If our schools are to perform their maximum service, they must transmit the highest product, the ripest fruit, the nearest approximation to truth yet realized by the minds of men.

This includes contact with minds which are discontented with our present best, minds which reach forward to future improvements in unforeseen directions. The issue arises: Who is to decide what *is* best? Those who believe in academic freedom insist that the scholar who is disciplined in and dedicated to his special area of competence should be given freedom to make that decision for himself. If we heed the politician or the pressure group, instead of the specialist and scholar, we may be sure that the average, the mediocre, the group with the largest numbers, will prevail. But if we heed the scholar, we have at least a reasonable chance that superiority will win out. Such superiority, of course, is contingent upon the quality of professional knowledge, skill, and expertness of the teacher.

In his field of competence, the technical expert is supposed to be "professional"—that is, capable and objective in his thinking. Hence, if teaching is to be considered a profession—one comparable to the medical profession—the teacher must be allowed great lati-

tude of judgment. A teacher's relation to a student is analogous to that of a doctor advising a patient, or a judge trying a case of law. If such professional people are to make their proper contributions to society, they should be free from intimidation and subordination. Indeed, they should be beyond reasonable suspicion of subjection to such influences, whether from political, religious, or economic pressure groups. When such freedom prevails, the scholar enjoys "academic freedom."

However, even as a teacher has the right and the duty to resist undue pressures towards conformity to views of ignorant or partisan community organizations, so the child under that teacher's guidance has the right to be himself, and not be subject to undue pressure toward conformity by narrow-minded or thoughtless teachers. Parents have entrusted to the school their most precious possession, and it behooves each teacher to be alert and informed lest, perhaps unconsciously, he is inconsiderate and unfair towards a child with whose outlook on life the teacher is unfamiliar. It is with the problem of finding some reasonable balance between the rights of the state, the rights of the teacher, and the rights of the child, that the following selections are concerned.

1.12 The Flag Is a Symbol of Our National Unity[°]

Felix Frankfurter

National unity is the basis of national security. . . . The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies

[°] Selections 1.12 and 1.13 are two opposing judicial views concerning the problem as to how our schools may best inspire loyalty and patriotism. In *Minersville v. Gobitis* 310 U.S. 585 (1939) there was only one dissent to Justice Frankfurter's opinion defending a compulsory flag salute. However, this lone dissent of Chief Justice Harlan Stone became, three years later, the basis for the majority opinion of the Court (see Selection 1.13), opinion written by Justice Robert H. Jackson in *West Virginia v. Barnette* (1942).

In the excerpt that is cited, the first three paragraphs are from Frankfurter's majority opinion in the *Minersville* case; the remaining paragraphs are from Frankfurter's minority opinion in the *Barnette* case.

of the mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization. "We live by symbols." The flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the framework of the Constitution. This Court has had occasion to say that ". . . the flag is the symbol of the Nation's power, the emblem of freedom in its truest, best sense. . . . it signifies government resting on the consent of the governed; liberty regulated by law; the protection of the weak against the strong; security against the exercise of arbitrary power, and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign aggression." . . .

Great diversity of psychological and ethical opinion exists among us concerning the best way to train children for their place in society. Because of these differences and because of reluctance to permit a single, iron-cast system of education to be imposed upon a nation compounded of so many strains, we have held that, even though public education is one of our most cherished democratic institutions, the Bill of Rights bars a state from compelling all children to attend the public schools. *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* 268 U.S. 510. But it is a very different thing for this Court to exercise censorship over the conviction of legislatures that a particular program or exercise will best promote in the minds of children who attend the common school an attachment to the institutions of their country. . . .

The precise issue, then, for us to decide is whether the legislatures of the various states and the authorities in a thousand counties and school districts of this country are barred from determining the appropriateness of various means to evoke that unifying sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or religious. . . .

One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the thoughts and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic. We owe equal attachment to

the Constitution and are equally bound by our judicial obligation, whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or the latest immigrants to these shores. As a member of this Court. . . . I cannot bring my mind to believe that the "liberty" secured by the Due Process Clause gives this Court authority to deny to the State of West Virginia the attainment of that which we all recognize as a legitimate legislative end, namely, the promotion of good citizenship, by employment of the means here chosen. . . .

The present action is one to enjoin the enforcement of this [flag salute] requirement by those in school attendance. We have not before us any attempt by the State to punish disobedient children or visit penal consequences on their parents. All that is in question is the right of the State to compel participation in this exercise by those who choose to attend the public schools. . . .

The great leaders of the American Revolution were determined to remove political support from every religious establishment. They put on an equality the different religious sects—Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, Quakers, Huguenots—which, as dissenters, had been under the heel of the various orthodoxies that prevailed in different colonies. So far as the state was concerned, there was to be neither orthodoxy nor heterodoxy. And so Jefferson and those who followed him wrote guaranties of religious freedom into our constitutions. Religious minorities as well as religious majorities were to be equal in the eyes of the political state. But Jefferson and the others also knew that minorities may disrupt society. It never would have occurred to them to write into the Constitution the subordination of the general civil authority of the state to sectarian scruples.

The constitutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. . . . Otherwise each individual could set up his own censor against obedience to laws conscientiously deemed for the public good by those whose business it is to make laws.

The prohibition against any religious establishment by the government placed denominations on an equal footing—it assured freedom from support by the government to any mode of worship

and the freedom of individuals to support any mode of worship. Any person may therefore believe or disbelieve what he pleases. He may practice what he will in his own house of worship or publicly within the limits of public order. But the lawmaking authority is not circumscribed by the variety of religious beliefs, otherwise the constitutional guaranty would be not a protection of the free exercise of religion but a denial of the exercise of legislation.

The essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by our Constitution is therefore this: no religion shall either receive the state's support or incur its hostility. Religion is outside the sphere of political government. This does not mean that all matters on which religious organizations or beliefs may pronounce are outside the sphere of government. Were this so, instead of the separation of church and state, there would be the subordination of the state on any matter deemed within the sovereignty of the religious conscience. . . . The validity of secular laws cannot be measured by their conformity to religious doctrines. It is only in a theocratic state that ecclesiastical doctrines measure legal right or wrong.

An act compelling profession of allegiance to a religion, no matter how subtly or tenuously promoted, is bad. But an act promoting good citizenship and national allegiance is within the domain of governmental authority and is therefore to be judged by the same considerations of power and of constitutionality as those involved in the many claims of immunity from civil obedience because of religious scruples.

That claims are pressed on behalf of sincere religious convictions does not of itself establish their constitutional validity. Nor does waving the banner of religious freedom relieve us from examining into [sic] the power we are asked to deny the states. Otherwise the doctrine of separation of church and state, so cardinal in the history of the nation and for the liberty of our people, would mean not the disestablishment of a state church but the establishment of all churches of all religious groups. . . .

That which to the majority may seem essential for the welfare of the state may offend the consciences of a minority. But, so long as no inroads are made upon the actual exercise of religion by the minority, to deny the political power of the majority to enact laws concerned with civil matters, simply because they may offend the

consciences of a minority, really means that the consciences of a minority are more sacred than the consciences of a majority.

We are told that symbolism is a dramatic but primitive way of communicating ideas. Symbolism is inescapable. Even the most sophisticated live by symbols. But it is not for this Court to make psychological judgments as to the effectiveness of a particular symbol in inculcating concededly indispensable feelings, particularly if the state happens to see fit to utilize the symbol that represents our heritage and our hopes. And surely only flippancy could be responsible for the suggestion that constitutional validity of a requirement to salute our flag implies equal validity of a requirement to salute a dictator. The significance of a symbol lies in what it represents. To reject the swastika does not imply rejection of the Cross. And so it bears repetition to say that it mocks reason and denies our whole history to find in the allowance of a requirement to salute our flag on fitting occasions the seeds of sanction for obeisance to a leader. To deny the power to employ educational symbols is to say that the state's educational system may not stimulate the imagination because this may lead to unwise stimulation. . . .

The flag salute exercise has no kinship whatever to the oath tests so odious in history. For the oath test was one of the instruments for suppressing heretical beliefs. Saluting the flag suppresses no belief nor curbs it. Children and their parents may believe what they please, avow their belief and practice it. It is not even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting the flag involves the slightest restriction against the fullest opportunity on the part both of the children and of their parents to disavow as publicly as they choose to do so the meaning that others attach to the gesture of salute. All channels of affirmative free expression are open to both children and parents. Had we before us any act of the state putting the slightest curbs upon such free expression, I should not lag behind any member of this Court in striking down such an invasion of the right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech protected by the Constitution.

I am fortified in my view of this case by the history of the flag salute controversy in this Court. Five times has the precise question now before us been adjudicated. Four times the Court unanimously

found that the requirement of such a school exercise was not beyond the powers of the states. . . .²⁶

1.13 Public Schools May Not Compel Declarations of Belief^o

Robert H. Jackson

. . . The [Jehovah's] Witnesses [hold] that the obligation imposed by law of God is superior to that of laws enacted by temporal government. . . . [They consider the U.S. flag a "graven image" which they dare not "bow down" to, according to Exodus 20:4, 5.] For this reason they refuse to salute it. . . .

As the present Chief Justice [Harlan Stone] said in dissent in the *Gobitis* case, the State may "require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization

²⁶ Editors' note: The following paragraph suggests the relationship of these flag-salute cases to the *McCollum*, *Engel*, *Murray* and *Schempp* cases to be studied in Chapter 2. "In a commentary [on the *McCollum* decision] John Courtney Murray found that 'Justice Frankfurter is still saying, "We live by symbols." Only now the life-giving symbol is not Holmes' flag but Horace Mann's public school.' Father Murray was concerned lest the symbolism of democratic unity be confined to the public schools, leaving the private schools as rather an anachronism in the American scene. . . . [But Father Murray] would have to look very hard to find commitment to the view [that public schools should] perform functions properly and constitutionally located elsewhere. To a very large degree the symbolism of democratic unity as found in the public school is possible because we are a pluralist, heterogeneous nation. To work under these conditions and to make it possible for private or sectarian schools to flourish for those who so desire, the public schools must remain as symbols produced by a system of government where all elements can fuse regardless of race, creed, or nationality."—Helen S. Thomas, *Felix Frankfurter*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960, p. 61.

^o Majority opinion, *West Virginia . . . v. Barnette* 319 U.S. 624 (1942). Here is an instance where the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself quite radically within three years time—as a comparison of the Jackson and Frankfurter opinions will show. There was but one judge who dissented in this decision—Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whose opinion was cited in selection 1.12.

This decision has some relevance to the Regent's Prayer case. (See Selection 2 10.) For if a state, under our constitution, may not compel any student to salute the American flag, how can it require students to recite a prayer?

of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country." 310 U.S. at 604 (1939). . . . Here, however, we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief. They are not merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that they may be informed as to what it is or even what it means. The issue here is whether this slow and easily neglected route [i.e., presenting information about historical foundations of the American way of life] to arouse loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan. . . .

There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones. Associated with many of these symbols are appropriate gestures of acceptance or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared head, a bended knee. A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn. . . .

Over a decade ago Chief Justice Hughes led this Court in holding that the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition by peaceful and legal means to organized government was protected by the free speech guaranties of the Constitution. *Stromberg v. California* 283 U.S. 359 (1931) . . . Here it is the State that employs a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as presently organized. It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks. Objection to this form of communication when coerced is an old one, well known to the framers of the Bill of Rights. . . . The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a

ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the individual by official authority. . . .

It was said that the flag-salute controversy confronted the Court with "the problem which Lincoln cast in memorable dilemma: 'Must a government of necessity be too *strong* for the liberties of its people, or too *weak* to maintain its own existence?'" and that the answer must be in favor of strength. . . . [Our answer is that] Government of limited power need not be anemic government. Assurance that rights are secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel safe to live under it makes for its better support. Without promise of a limiting Bill of Rights it is doubtful if our Constitution could have mustered enough strength to enable its ratification. To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak government over strong government. It is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind in preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing and disasterous end. . . .

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no election. . . .

National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement. . . . As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity,

down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissentors. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.

It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment of our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority....

To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.

QUESTIONS AND READINGS FOR STUDY AND DISCUSSION

A Free Society's Climate of Opinion

DEMOCRACY AND ITS COMPETITORS

List the major characteristic features of democracy. What are meant by the following: "majority rule and minority rights," "sovereignty of the people," "civil rights," "civil liberties," "balance of power"?

List some mistaken notions, including half-truths, concerning the

meaning of democracy. What do communists mean by the "people's democracy"?

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THE MEANING OF CENSORSHIP: PROS AND CONS

Which of the following²⁷ seems to be the best definition of "censorship?"

1. Abridgment of freedom of speech and press, with governmental sanctions. [If "censorship" is defined so as to include *only* (1), would it follow that nongovernmental groups do not exercise censorship, but merely their freedom of speech and press?].
2. Abridgment of freedom of speech and press with economic sanctions; for example, Catholic boycotts of movie houses or of book dealers showing or selling "listed" movies or books.
3. Self-regulation within an industry; for example, motion picture producers' code, television code, comics magazine association code.
4. Personal, or private control; for example, a religious fundamentalist, for fear of upsetting his beliefs, may refuse to read a book defending evolution.

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*Nelson, Jack and Gene Roberts, *The Censors and the Schools*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1963.

Smith, James M., and Paul L. Murphy, *Liberty and Justice: A Historical Record of American Constitutional Development*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1958 (Chaps. 21, 24, 27, and 28 on civil rights and civil liberties).

LOYALTY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: "RISKS OF FREEDOM" VS. "RISKS OF REPRESSION": PROS AND CONS

Are loyalty and freedom so related that the more we have of one the less we have of the other? Can we cultivate a high degree of loyalty without sacrificing self-reliance and independent thought? Or, conversely, can we enjoy the fullest measure of freedom without weakening our sense of loyalty?

What is to be done about communists, fascists, or others who do not accept the democratic frame of reference?

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American Association of University Professors (AAUP), "Reports . . . Discussions . . .," *AAUP Bulletin* 35: 211-215, June 1949 (R. M. Hutchins); 41: 13-18, March, 1955 (D. W. Bolinger); 41: 753-784, December 1955 (Fritz Machlup); 44: 401-402 (Haverford Faculty) and 403-415 (Morton Cronin) (1958); 48: 50-51, March 1962 (Statement of AAUP Principles); etc.

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American Patriotism and World-Mindedness

TEACHING ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS

How can our schools best teach about the UN? about the USSR? about fascism and communism? Are world-mindedness and national patriotism incompatible? What should schools do to help students realize the significance of law and government in local, national, and international affairs? Evaluate the Peace Corps.

What are some of the possibilities that seem to lie ahead? For example (1) a world ruled by Russia or China, (2) a world ruled by the U.S.A., (3) some form of international government agreeable to the many diverse nations concerned.

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- Fromm, Erich, *May Man Prevail?* New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961.
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COURSES ON COMMUNISM

Is the subject of communism a "malignant cancer" to be approached only with serum and surgical equipment, or is it a subject for dispassionate, objective study?

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Bosmajian, Haig A., "Anti-Communism in the Grade Schools," *School and Society*, 91: 93-95, February 23, 1963.

Butts, R. Freeman, "Search for Freedom—The Story of American Education," *NEA Journal*, 49: 43f, March 1960.

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Open Book Exam

Here, and following each chapter, is a set of problems or questions suitable for the open-book type of examination, which means that you are permitted, indeed encouraged, to make use of your notes, books, and other relevant materials as you see fit.

1. The theory of "balance of power" or "balance of conflicting interests" is usually applied only to (a) the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government, or to (b) national, state, and local units of government. Show how this theory may also be applied to (c) public and private agencies, economic and educational, to (d) secular and ecclesiastical interests, and to (e) conservative (social inertia maintaining the *status quo*) and liberal (revolt and reform, replacing new ideas by old ones). Give specific examples illustrating (b), (c), (d), and (e) in education.
2. Which, if any, of the following practices denies human freedom: compulsory vaccination? compulsory school attendance? prescribed courses of study? the right of a majority to impose its policies on a minority? Explain the meaning of the definition of democracy as "majority rule and minority rights."
3. Clarify and distinguish the meanings of the following pairs of terms: "teach" and "teach about"; "reform" and "revolution"; "conspiracy" and "heresy"; "conspiring to overthrow democracy" and "trying to overthrow the party in power"; "communism" and "socialism."
4. Define "academic freedom." Is it absolute and unlimited? Or does it vary according to the level of development of students? According to national and local climates of opinion? Should academic freedom be limited to the higher levels of education? To utterances inside the classroom? To the area in which a teacher has special training and competence?

5. Who is to judge whether or not a teacher's academic freedom has been abridged? On what basis or in the light of what standards?
6. Do the principles of civil liberty and academic freedom demand protection of those who, wrapped in the cloak of freedom, employ this freedom to destroy the very types of societies that guarantee such freedoms? What, for schools and colleges, follows from your response?
7. In what respects is it the proper function of our schools (a) to maintain the present social order, (b) to inform the students as to alternative types of society, (c) to encourage students to forsake present practice in favor of new social goals?
8. Are nondemocratic systems of education (which compel assent to beliefs) capable of engendering more loyalty and patriotic fervor than democratic ones? Compare and contrast the liberal-democratic and the authoritarian viewpoints on loyalty.
9. Compare the Platonic and the Hobbesian definitions of "freedom"—"freedom to do as you should" versus "freedom to do as you please" (see page 28). Indicate good and bad features of each meaning, in its social application.
10. Discuss as time will allow *one* of the paragraphs below.
 - A. To what extent is the practical application of freedom in education governed by the necessity or desirability of "shielding" or protecting young people from some unpleasant facts of life? To what extent do you feel that teachers should be restricted in the interest of the mental health and emotional stability of children? Illustrate and defend your position.

OR

- B. Consider the proposition that academic freedom should be extended to protect the teacher who, while competent in his field, is:
 1. strongly anti-semitic; or who is
 2. an extreme religious fundamentalist; or who is
 3. a staunch advocate of white supremacy; or who is
 4. a conscientious objector; or who is
 5. an avowed social and moral nonconformist.

With respect to those of the above cases in which you would advocate restriction of the freedom of teaching (for example, refusal to employ as teachers, or restriction of the scope of teaching, as when a

conscientious objector might be permitted to teach mathematics, but not permitted to teach social studies), justify or defend your stand.

OR

C. Comment on the following quotation:

"[American] school boards and trustees of colleges and universities have a heavy responsibility. They must see to it that among our teachers there is an adequate supply of 'Communists,' of able, fearless, outspoken advocates of the unpopular view. It must be arranged by the authorities [so] that both sides of fundamental issues shall be represented by teachers who believe in them. Under the actual conditions of democratic life the practical question is not, 'Shall we have any "Communists" on our faculties?' but rather, 'How can we get enough "Communists" to give proper expression of views, which run counter to the general trend of habit, emotion, interest, of the community at large?' We must provide for the criticism of our institutions as well as for their advocacy."²⁸

²⁸ Alexander Meiklejohn, "Teachers and Controversial Questions," *Harpers*, 177: 15-22, June 1938.

CHAPTER 2

Religion, Morals, and Education

Moral and Spiritual Values in Public Education

2.1 Introduction: Religion in a Pluralistic Secular State

HISTORICALLY, religion has been a source of social unity. Today it is often a cause of disunity. Jew and Gentile, Catholic and Protestant, Hindu and Moslem, theist and atheist—such divisions are so pronounced that no one religion seems capable of forming a center for modern society. Most religions have taught that true progress is progress in charity, all other advances being secondary thereto. But because the religions of mankind remain irreconcilably plural, science, art, and the secular state have at present taken charge of those interests that alone seem capable of knitting together the many divided groups.

But the state is not almighty, and we should not look to it for everything. In a free society the worth of the individual is supreme, and the great bulk of individual affairs lies outside the province of government. The modern state is indeed a center of unity; but in a free society the state enforces unity only in terms of the practical needs of communal living: Its only obligation is to keep its citizens together in peace and harmony. Citizens may be influenced by their churches, and indirectly churches may thus have an effect on state policies. But the state deals with its citizens as citizens, not as

members of any special church or creed. History affords ample proof that, united with government, religion becomes legalistic or superstitious; united with religion, government becomes despotic or totalitarian.

In the United States, all attempts to set up any one religion as an exclusive faith have met with failure. Since Washington's day, Americans have recognized that ". . . the Government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion."¹ The United States Government is not a Christian, a Jewish, or a Mohammedan nation; neither is it agnostic nor atheistic. Our democratic society is a cooperative, interactive society; and where we cannot agree on a set of beliefs, such beliefs cannot be a part of our democracy—except insofar as we are free to disagree. Which is to say: America is religiously pluralistic.

Does lack of reliance on a single viewpoint mean the absence of any viewpoint? Does loss of "faith" in an *exclusive* set of beliefs mean the complete lack of religious faith? Some think so. Others, like Elliot E. Cohen, believe it implies a new type of shared conviction:

It seems to me that the free citizen, religious or nonreligious, does have at least one shared conviction. Whether he professes to believe in God, or professes not to believe in God, he has a conviction that there is no God but God. To put it another way: I think both the religious believer and the man of secular faith in the United States come very close to holding in their hearts the Hebraic commandment "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me." I take this to mean that whether one believes in some transcendent power or not, one does not believe that there is any

¹ U.S. Treaty with Tripoli, November 4, 1796, Article XI (Barlow translation). Concerning the authenticity of Article XI, read *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America*, edited by Hunter Miller, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931, Vol. 2, pp. 349–385, especially pp. 365, 371–372, 384. Read also Leo Pfeffer, *The Liberties of an American: The Supreme Court Speaks*, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1956, pp. 31–46.

However, inasmuch as American society is historically based on Christian traditions, Justice Story very properly declared in 1844 that "The Christian religion is part of the common law" (*Vidal v. Girard's Executors*, 2 Howard 127). A later Court affirmed that all of the state constitutions either directly or by implication indicate "a profound reverence for religion and an assumption that its influence in all human affairs is essential to the well-being of the community" [*Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States*, 143 U.S. 457, 468 (1892)].

idea, institution, or individual—a man, a nation, an "ism"—that man can accept as a God.²

The democratic citizen should be humble enough not to think of himself as God or as godlike, and he is on politically safe ground so long as he permits no group or institution to arrogate to itself the attributes of the divine.

We include the state among such institutions. The order of a democracy is not a single order of the state: It is a system of orders, some in conflict with others, some even in conflict with the state itself, as presently conceived. Like the lobby of a hotel, the state is a kind of hallway whose function is to connect the more private rooms and thus to serve as a common center of communication. But free men cannot allow the state to claim overriding allegiance in all things. For the religious man, God alone may have the final claim, and such a man may freely assert: "There is a higher law than the Constitution." For the scientist, Euclid's adage still stands: "There is no royal road to geometry." As for poetry and art, "Art for art's sake" may not represent the entire truth, but it points up the fact that creative endeavors cannot be genuine unless free. As Charles Morgan has said: "If art has anything to teach it is . . . that to mistake one supposed aspect of truth for Truth itself and so to imprison man's curiosity and aspiration in the dungeon of an ideology, is the unforgivable sin against the spirit of man."³ If society is to enjoy the maximum benefits of the aspiring saint, the reflective scientist, or the creative artist, the state dare not dictate precisely how or what such men shall think or say. The sanctions of religion, the theories of science, and the creations of art cannot be coerced.

But they can be embraced in a free manner. Woven into the three-hundred-year-old fabric that clothes American society is a

² Elliot E. Cohen, "The Free American Citizen, 1952," *Commentary*, 14: 219-230, at 225, September 1952. By permission.

Compare Harry Emerson Fosdick, "How Shall We Think of God?" *Harper's*, 153: 229-233, July 1926; St. Thomas Aquinas, "We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not." *Summa Contra Gentiles* 1: 30, 33; and for a more difficult reference: Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

³ Charles Morgan, *Liberties of the Mind*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951, p. 91. Compare Archibald MacLeish, "The Muses' Sterner Laws," *New Republic*, 128: 16-18, July 13, 1953; Ben Shahn, "Non-conformity," *Atlantic*, 200: 36-41, September 1957.

dominant pattern of self-reliance and independent thought. America is a strong nation because its citizens are courageous. They are courageous because they are free to disagree, to quarrel with authority, to challenge orthodoxy. Democratic society does not provide a cloistered world where the opinions or prejudices of any group are shielded from the criticism of others. Democracy is not for weaklings, nor for indoctrinated automatons. It is for citizens of independent convictions, but citizens who have genuine respect and affection toward others—even toward those whose views they detest. In a true democracy every citizen wears a crown. Every citizen is a trustee of freedom.

In a pluralistic society opinions differ; and in a free society, no single opinion ("theory," "answer," "faith") is privileged over another, except insofar as it can be supported by evidence. If we are not free to seek the evidence, then we are not in a position to defend *any* answer to a problem. It follows that when problems are controversial, not less, but more, discussion of these topics is required. Unless, of course, one fears that in a free contest of facts one's pet prejudices may lose out.

A free society should encourage discussion about religion. Even if we so desired, we could not avoid the issue, since education is equally significant to democracy and to religion. In a society which not only tolerates but (by remission of taxes) encourages religion, questions inevitably arise as to the basic authority behind educational institutions, and about the viewpoints expressed by teachers. In mid-century America we face problems such as these: If Communist party members are disqualified from teaching, because of subjection to foreign discipline, what about Catholic priests and nuns?⁴ Can religious instruction be made a part of education without substituting indoctrination for learning? Or without doing violence to our traditional separation of church and state? Can religion be taught in public schools without partiality toward some religious beliefs as against others? Can public funds be allocated to parochial schools without breaking down our traditional separation of church and state? These questions furnish the subject matter for most

⁴ This problem has been quite thoroughly explored in *Zellers vs. Huff*, 236 P.2nd, 949 (N.M. 1951); *Harfst v. Hoegen*, 349 Mo. 808; 163 S.W. and 2nd 609 (1942), and will not be considered in the selections to follow.

of the selections in this chapter. Let us hope we can discuss them openly, fairly, fearlessly, and intelligently. Whether we like it or not, these are issues that face contemporary America.

Selections 2.2 and 2.3 consider these questions: Can moral and spiritual values be taught as a part of citizenship training, but without recourse to religion? Can religion be taught in public schools in a manner free from sectarian bias? An optimistic statement concerning this possibility is that of Philip H. Phenix, who urges:

. . . the formulation and adoption of a faith more comprehensive and profound than the warring dogmas of most existing faiths, including scientific naturalism. This faith would rest upon the following premises: (1) that there are ultimate concerns which human beings have about such matters as the origin of existence, the meaning and purpose of human life, and the source of moral guidance; (2) that these questions arise out of the common and universal situation or predicament; (3) that to the questions there are many different answers and expressions of these answers, and that no single set of answers to the common questions has been found which will command universal assent; (4) that there is an obligation in the school program to recognize and to acknowledge the ultimate questions and in appropriate ways to help students to confront them; and (5) that the school can and ought to utilize the beliefs and practices of the historical religions (and "anti-religions") to illustrate ways in which men have sought to answer these problems. Indeed, the working out and advancement of such a common faith—one which properly balances the need for unity with commitment and diversity—is the essence of the American common school tradition.⁵

Another way to phrase the issue is this: Does "teaching" religion mean "teaching about" it in an impartial, objective manner? Or does it mean "teaching of" it, so as to establish commitment to a particular outlook? Consider the "teaching" that employs religious works of literature and art, or music classes that sing sacred hymns or anthems. Public schools may "teach" these so long as they are used as works of art, music, or literature, but not as acts of religious

⁵ Philip H. Phenix, "Religion in American Public Education," *Teachers College Record*, 57: 26-31, October 1955. By permission. For a pessimistic viewpoint concerning such a program, showing that different religious groups hold vastly different conceptions of "God," "human nature," etc., read Solomon B. Freehof, "To Find a Philosophy," *Religious Education*, 49: 112-115, March-April 1954.

worship. On this point George Huntston Williams has summarized the prevailing view:

A public school is not an assembly for worship. Therefore, the reading of the Bible (regardless of what version or how prudential the selections), the singing of hymns, and the saying of prayers, all constitute acts of worship or piety (as distinguished from instruction). Whenever the sensibilities of any pupil or the parent of any pupil are truly offended, the practices may be rightly challenged as a violation of the principle of the separation of church and state even where custom or state laws, dating from a period of more homogeneous culture, have permitted or indeed required such acts.

It has taken mankind millennia to distinguish between citizenship and churchmanship, between God and country. America has been a pioneer in separating civil and ecclesiastical functions and loyalties. The public school teachers may rightly point to God and to the institutions of religion, commonly held by our citizens, but as public school teachers and public servants, they go beyond their proper competence when they try to commit or convert to religion, however innocently, by Bible reading, prayers, by mingling the observation of Chanukkah and Christmas, or other forms of subtle indoctrination in, or unwitting dilution of, religious faith.⁶

2.2 Public Education and the Good Life*

William K. Frankena

[“The Good Life” has two distinct meanings:] . . . the good life in the sense of the morally good or virtuous life, and the good life in the sense of the happy or satisfying life. For con-

* G. H. Williams, “Church-State Separation and Religion in the Schools of Our Democracy,” *Religious Education*, 51: 369-377, September-October 1956. By permission.

• William K. Frankena, “Public Education and the Good Life,” *Harvard Education Review*, 31: 413-426, Fall 1961. By permission. Footnote references here omitted. William K. Frankena is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan.

See also Cheong Lum, George Kagehiro, and Edwin Larm, “Some Thoughts on Moral and Spiritual Values and the Secular Public School,” *Progressive Education*, 30: 166-171, 192, April 1953.

venience . . . I shall call the former the *moral* life and the latter the *good* life. Now . . . public education is and should be concerned to promote morality as well as happiness. But, while formal public education, on this assumption, has the same ends as education in general, it is in a special position. Just because it is supported by the state, it has a limitation which private education does not have. This limitation is not just a matter of constitutional law or of the intentions of our founding fathers, as many seem to think; it is a matter of philosophical principle which underlies, or at any rate should underlie, both the constitution and the thinking of our founders. The limitation, as I understand it, is that, in the interests of freedom of conscience, thought, and worship, the public schools, being organs of the state, cannot teach religion. Like the state itself, they must be neutral with respect to the various churches and religions; they must be neutral even as between religion and antireligious philosophies of life. They can and should teach informative courses *about* religion—its history, beliefs, institutions, influences, etc.—but they may not seek to inculcate or propagate any particular kind of ultimate creed, religious or nonreligious. What J. S. Mill says about universities applies to public education as a whole:

. . . it is not the teacher's business to impose his own judgment, but to inform and discipline that of his students. . . . The proper business of a University is . . . not to tell us from authority what we ought to believe, and make us accept the belief as a duty, but to give us information and training, and help us to form our own belief in a manner worthy of intelligent beings. . . .

This neutralist, but not necessarily secularist, conception of the relation of state-supported institutions to religion has been subject to heavy attack during "the current upsurge of religiousness" which the events of our century have brought about. The spokesmen of religion are generally against it, and many public school teachers, themselves religious, are uncomfortable with it. In the rest of this paper, however, I shall take it for granted.

At this point we come face to face with our problem. We have said both that public education should promote the good and the

moral life, and that it should be neutral with respect to religion. But, from these two propositions taken together, it follows that public schools and colleges can promote the good life and the moral life only if and insofar as these do not require or rest on religion, i.e., on religious belief and observance. We must therefore try to determine whether, how, and to what degree public education can be concerned to advance the good life and morality when they cannot be concerned to advance religious faith and worship. Robert M. Hutchins raises this problem when he says:

. . . public institutions seem required by the Constitution to be secular. Yet it must be admitted that religion is of the greatest moral importance. . . . Men, simply because they are men, are unlikely to find within themselves the power that can bring the good life and the good state to pass. . . . If a college cannot make its students religious, it cannot, to that extent, make them good.

But his subsequent discussion does not help us very much, because he is concerned with higher education in general, not with public education as such, whether higher or lower. The drift of his thesis that religion is indispensable to the good and the moral life, however, must be noted, for one who accepts this thesis *without qualification* must conclude *either* that our public schools must teach religion, *or* that they cannot promote morality or the good life. Either way, as I see it, the upshot for him is that public education should go out of business. On the other hand, it need not go out of business, if there is any important extent or way in which the good and the moral lives are independent of specifically religious beliefs and experiences.

To deal with this problem we must now try to discern some-what more clearly and fully just what the public schools, in their programs of education for the good and the moral life, are debarred from doing on the above view of their relation to religion. Let us look first at education for the good life, i.e., non-moral education. What is it that the school might possibly do here? (1) They might re-teach an individual, on the basis of human experience and reflection, what the ingredients of the good life—the values of human life—are. (2) They might provide him with an experience and an

appreciation of some of these values, e.g., the enjoyment of music or poetry. (3) They might furnish him with knowledge, which is at once one of the great goods of life and a necessary means to the realization of the others. (4) They might train his intellect, imagination, and sensibility so as to enable him to discover further knowledge, perhaps even to discover new values or forms of satisfaction. (5) They might help him to work out a philosophy of life, which seems to be one of the things human beings need to be happy.

Now we can see what the *public* schools, by the fact that they are debarred from teaching religion, are precluded from doing with respect to the good life. They cannot advocate any specifically religious values, i.e., values whose realization is conditioned by religious belief or observance, as necessary for the good life. They cannot provide the student with any first-hand experience of such values, e.g., of the values of worship or of "the peace that passeth understanding," though they can through the teaching of art and literature give him an imaginative realization of these values, along with others. Whatever knowledge they may pass on to him, they cannot pass on any of the "truths" of religion, natural or revealed. The fear of the Lord may be the beginning of wisdom, as the author of *Proverbs* asserts, but the public school cannot teach the "wisdom" of which this "fear" is the beginning, though it may and should inform its pupils about the history, beliefs, and institutions of the religions which are inspired by this "fear." As for teaching its pupils a philosophy of life—this it cannot do for the same reason that it cannot teach a religion. As Mill says, all it can do is to give them "information and training" so that they may form their own belief "in a manner worthy of intelligent beings." . . .

Just as the public educator is debarred from teaching values, principles, or virtues which presuppose the acceptance of religious beliefs, so he is also debarred from teaching any values, principles, or virtues which presuppose the acceptance of anti-religious beliefs, e.g., such naturalistic ones as those of John Dewey. But it should be added at once that he may try to give his students an *understanding* of both the religious and the naturalistic ways of thinking, feeling, and living through a study of representative poems, paintings, and other works of art, as well as of representative religions

and philosophies. He cannot seek to conduct them in either way, but he may and should try to show them what each way is like to one who follows it. In such imaginative realization of opposing ways of life, for which belief is not required but only a "willing suspension of disbelief," lies one of the chief contributions of the study of art and literature.

This seems a good place to speak of the vexed and vexing subject of "spiritual values." . . . [If by "spiritual values" we mean] "specifically religious values" . . . public education cannot be concerned to promote spiritual values. But "spiritual values" is often used to include also values which are not so specifically religious—namely, aesthetic, moral, and intellectual ones. In this sense of the phrase there definitely is a place for some "spiritual values" in the public school. . . .

The crucial question for our purposes . . . is whether there are any important values or ingredients in the good life which are not dependent on any religious belief. To many people it seems clear that there are such goods as knowledge, artistic creation and appreciation, friendship, love, freedom, sense of achievement, etc., which do not have any religious faith as a necessary condition of their attainment or enjoyment. Some may reply that these goods are illusory or even delusive, but to say this presupposes a certain religious conception of the universe and so begs the question. In any case, not all religious thinkers have taken this hard line. It may be that the values mentioned gain an additional dimension if they are woven into a religious life, but it is at any rate plausible to hold that they do or at least may bring a genuine worthwhileness into the life of an unbeliever as well. Even if they do not constitute a good which is self-sufficient in Aristotle's sense, they may still be desirable in themselves.

If this is so, then it is also plausible to maintain that religion is not so indispensable to the good life that only a religious institution can minister to such a life. For then it is possible that there is a part or aspect of the good life for which a neutral institution such as the state may be concerned, even if there is also another part or aspect of it which is beyond the care or competence of such an institution. That is, there may be good things which are Caesar's,

as well as good things that are God's. St. Thomas implies as much when he finds a place for natural as well as supernatural happiness....

Many people have often been moved to do what is right by considerations which are not religious. Perhaps all who are moral have sometimes been moved by such considerations as a desire for peace or for a stable social order, even if St. Augustine talks in one place as if he would have been an Epicurean of the worst sort if he had not believed in God and a hereafter. For some moral persons religious considerations seem never to play a part at all. . . . As St. Paul said, even "the Gentiles which have not the [revealed] law—are a law unto themselves," having "the [moral] law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness."

There is a different kind of "revelation" which is sometimes said to be necessary as a basis for morality, namely, the "realization" of other people as persons whose lives have the same "inner significance" that ours have. Josiah Royce describes this realization of our neighbor, which he calls "the moral insight," most vividly, and William James dramatizes it even more in the essay "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," where he speaks of this "higher vision" which pierces the "great cloudbank of ancestral blindness weighing down upon us" and "makes an epoch in [the] history" of the person to whom it comes. And he calls it a "religious insight." Now, I am inclined to agree that a morality without this insight is in some way truncated, as Henri Bergson holds. But I find it misleading to call it a "religious" rather than a "moral" insight, for, while it may involve some kind of regeneration on the part of one who has it, it is not clear that it presupposes any belief of a specifically religious or theological nature, e.g., the belief that there is a God or that human beings have immortal souls. In any case, however, there seems to be forms of morality . . . which do not rest on such a "higher vision of an inner significance," and even if these moralities are truncated, they may be an important part of our moral education. . . .

What I have been arguing is this: (1) that public education, if it exists at all, should be concerned to do what it can to promote the good and the moral life, (2) that, because it is publicly-supported, it cannot seek to inculcate any religious belief as part of its

endeavor to advance the good or the moral life, and (3) that this fact does not mean that it must go out of business, since there are important values, principles, and virtues to which religion is not indispensable, logically, psychologically, or otherwise. . . .

The thought behind this paper is that . . . the public schools may remain non-malevolently neutral and yet have an important sphere of operation relative to morality and the good life, and that, if and insofar as religion is required for certain dimensions of happiness and virtue, these schools should rather be supplemented than subverted.⁷

⁷ Editors' note: Since values are not the monopoly of any one segment of our society, the public schools, as representatives of all the people, are obligated to find common values—values to which all members of the community may in good conscience pay allegiance irrespective of racial origin, religious creed or social class. In the middle ages, church membership was prerequisite to citizenship, but in the modern world, says Maritain: ". . . the only solution is of the pluralistic type. Men belonging to most different philosophical or religious creeds and families could and should cooperate in the common task and for the common welfare of the earthly community, provided they similarly assent to the basic tenets of a society of free men. . . .

"Thus it is that men possessing quite different, even opposite, metaphysical or religious outlooks—materialists, idealists, agnostics, Christians and Jews, Moslems and Buddhists—can converge, not by virtue of any identity of doctrine, but by virtue of an analogical similitude in practical principles, toward the same practical conclusions, and can share in the same practical democratic philosophy, provided that they similarly revere, perhaps for quite diverse reasons, truth and intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of moral good."—Jacques Maritain, "The Foundation of Democracy," *The Nation*, 160: 440-441, April 21, 1945. By permission.

If we consider freedom to be democracy's most fundamental value, then, in the words of Frederick C. Neff: "The problem of choice between secular and other kinds of education is not a matter of choosing between the moral and the immoral. Rather, it involves a choice between two competing standards of the good life. In precise terms, the choice is between intelligence and dogma, between experience and speculation, between the demonstrable and the mystical, between diversity and uniformity; it is a choice between standards that are flexible and standards that are rigid, between methods that are critical and methods that are premised. A basic issue confronting the free, public, secular school of our time has to do with the moral struggle between freedom and the hostile remnants of a prescientific and predemocratic past. It is the issue of democracy versus absolutism."—Frederick C. Neff, "How Moral is Secular Education," *Christian Century*, 73: 1323-1325, Nov. 14, 1956. By permission.

From either of these viewpoints, our public schools have the duty to teach moral and spiritual values on the basis of human reason and experience, but not on the basis of supernatural authority.

2.3 The Function of the Public Schools in Dealing with Religion*

American Council on Education

PUBLIC education in the United States is committed by federal and state law to the general principle that sectarian religious instruction must be excluded from the curriculum. This does not mean, however, that the problem of what to do about religion in the public schools has been solved. On the contrary, there is no clear-cut understanding of what the schools should or should not do in this field.

Some people think that the schools should leave religion completely to organized religious groups and to the home. They fear that any consideration of religion in the school will result in dangerous divisions in the community because of the emotional factors with which religion is surrounded; or they believe that the public school in a democratic society cannot handle religion without violating the religious liberty of minority groups.

Many people, however, are convinced that the public school's program of general education becomes distorted and impoverished when all religious references are excluded. They fear that neglect of religion will undermine the very foundations of individual and social morality. In their opinion the Founding Fathers did not intend to exclude religion from the schools when they restrained Congress from any move toward an "establishment of religion." . . .

In 1947 the Committee on Religion and Education issued our first report, *The Relation of Religion to Public Education: The Basic Principles*. . . . Relevant conclusions from that report may be restated as follows:

1. The problem is to find a way in public education to give due recognition to the place of religion in the culture and in the con-

* American Council on Education, *The Function of the Public Schools in Dealing with Religion: A Report on the Exploratory Study Made by the Committee on Religion and Education*, Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1953, Chap. 1, pp. 1-7. By permission. (Contains excellent bibliography.)

victions of our people while at the same time safeguarding the separation of church and state.

2. The separation of American public education from church control was not intended to exclude all study of religion from the school program.
3. Teaching a common core of religious beliefs in the public schools is not a satisfactory solution.
4. Teaching "moral and spiritual values" cannot be regarded as an adequate substitute for an appropriate consideration of religion in the school program.
5. Teaching which opposes or denies religion is as much a violation of religious liberty as teaching which advocates or supports any particular religious belief.
6. Introducing factual study of religion will not commit the public schools to any particular religious belief.
7. The role of the school in the study of religion is distinct from, though complementary to, the role of the church.
8. The public school should stimulate the young toward a vigorous, personal reaction to the challenge of religion.
9. The public school should assist youth to have an intelligent understanding of the historical and contemporary role of religion in human affairs. . . .

The Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association of the United States and of the American Association of School Administrators published its report on *Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools*⁸ in 1951. The commission maintains that the public schools, in discharging their responsibility for the development of the moral and spiritual values which the American people desire their children to hold, can and should teach *about* religion. . . .

The commission says,

. . . when a point about religious opinion or religious practices arises in a classroom discussion the teacher will not brush it aside with a statement that he is not allowed to discuss this matter in the public school.

⁸ Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1951.

Editors' note: For a briefer statement, read William G. Carr, "How Can We Teach Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public School?" *NEA Journal* 40: 177-178, March 1951.

There can be no doubt that the American democracy is grounded in a religious tradition. While religion may not be the only source of democratic moral and spiritual values, it is surely one of the important sources. For this objective reason, if for no other, an attitude of respect toward religion should prevail in the schools. . . .

Under the heading "The Public School Can and Should Teach About Religion" the commission says,

The public schools can teach objectively *about* religion without advocating or teaching any religious creed. To omit from the classroom all references to religion and the institutions of religion is to neglect an important part of American life. Knowledge about religion is essential for a full understanding of our culture, literature, art, history, and current affairs. That religious beliefs are controversial is not an adequate reason for excluding teaching about religion from the public schools. . . .

Our position with respect to the problem under study may be briefly summarized as follows:

The public school is limited, as the private institution is not, in its treatment of religion. The constitutions, statutes, and interpretations thereof in the fifty states, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, make it illegal for the public school to teach religion in the sense of the attempt to inculcate sectarian religious beliefs. Even if agreement could be reached among the religiously minded on a "common core" or set of basic propositions common to and acceptable to Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, there would remain the nonreligious groups in the community who would maintain that their rights were violated by any attempt to inculcate general propositions embodying religious beliefs.

On the other hand, to be silent about religion may be, in effect, to make the public school an antireligious factor in the community. Silence creates the impression in the minds of the young that religion is unimportant and has nothing to contribute to the solution of the perennial and ultimate problems of human life. This negative consequence is all the more striking in a period when society is asking the public school to assume more and more responsibility for dealing with the cultural problems of growth and development.

Therefore, it is vitally important that the public school deal

with religion. There are many ways in which this may be and indeed is being done. Some are good; others, in our judgment, may be dangerous to a greater or lesser degree. All public schools, however, can provide for the factual study of religion both as an important factor in the historical and contemporary development of our culture and as a source of values and insight for great numbers of people in finding the answers to persistent personal problems of living. Religion can, and in our judgment should, be studied in the same way as the economic and political institutions and principles of our country should be studied—not as something on which the American public school must settle all arguments and say the last word, but as something which is so much a part of the American heritage and so relevant to contemporary values that it cannot be ignored.⁹

⁹ Editors' note: Professor I. N. Thut has stated the meaning of religious pluralism in American society in explicit terms. "The Constitutional provisions for religious freedom clearly recognize the limitations in man's ability to know God fully and completely. . . . It is a deep-rooted American tradition that a man's God-theory is his own personal business and that he has a right to keep it as private as his breakfast or his bath. . . . In this atmosphere of freedom, it is small wonder that a multiplicity of God-theories has appeared. There is, for example, the Quaker theory, which looks upon God as a kind, loving father, who walks so closely with each of his children that no man or institution should be permitted to come between them. Then there are the well-known Congregationalist and Unitarian theories which disagree so sharply on the question of whether God has three forms or one. Similarly, the Mormon theory and the Shaker theory lead to decidedly opposite views on the matter of procreation. Some sects picture God as a fearful Being likely to punish violently anyone who dares approach Him without proper credentials. Others look upon Him as a somewhat vague, formless spirit that may be felt in one's heart but may not be known otherwise directly." —I. N. Thut, "Shall the Public Schools Teach Religion?", *Teacher Education Quarterly* (Connecticut State Department of Education), Winter 1951, Vol. 7, pp. 75-79. By permission.

Some Educational Implications of Church-State Separation

2.4 Creeds in Competition*

Leo Pfeffer

THE principle of religious freedom and the separation of church and state . . . [is a] uniquely American concept and experiment . . . [It means] as Lord Bryce put it, [that] religious organizations should be "unrecognized by law except as voluntary associations of private citizens." . . .

The concept of voluntariness in matters of belief has been called the great tradition of the American churches. More properly, it is the great tradition of the American dissenting churches. It is also the tradition of the secular-humanist political leaders who shared in the establishment of our democratic system. . . . Isaac Backus, spokesman for the Massachusetts Baptist Churches at the time of the Revolutionary War and the Constitution, in arguing against the use of tax-raised funds for religious purposes, said: "The free exercise of private judgment and the inalienable rights of consciences are too high a rank and dignity to be submitted to the decrees of councils or the imperfect laws of fallible legislators. . . . Religion is a concern between God and the soul with which no human authority can intermeddle. . . ." And a few years before adoption of the First Amendment, another important seg-

* Leo Pfeffer, *Creeds in Competition*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1958, pp. 29-32, 40-48, 59-63, 74. Used by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated.

The author of numerous books and articles, Leo Pfeffer is a member of the legal staff of the American Jewish Congress, and is a lecturer at the New School for Social Research, New York. Read also Leo Pfeffer, *The Liberties of an American*, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1956 (especially pp. 31-48), and Lawrence Sears, "Liberals and Conservatives," *Antioch Review*, 13: 361-370, September 1953.

ment of American Protestant dissent, the Presbyterian Church, argued against taxation for religious purposes on the ground that

The end of Civil government is security to the temporal liberty and property of Mankind; and to protect them in the free Exercise of Religion—Legislators are invested with powers from their constituents, for these purposes only; and their duty extends no further—Religion is altogether personal, and the right of exercising it unalienable; and it is not, cannot, and ought not to be, resigned to the will of society at large; and much less to the Legislature—which derives its authority wholly from the consent of the people; and is limited to the Original intention of Civil Associations.

The last quotation shows clearly the alliance between Protestant dissent and rationalist humanism, for it reflects the social contract theory of Locke and Rousseau. The theory was widely accepted in the latter half of the eighteenth century and upon it was based the Declaration of Independence and the American libertarian system of democratic government. According to the theory of the social contract, governments, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, "are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." A government, therefore, has only such powers as are granted to it by the governed, and if it seeks to exercise powers not granted to it, it is guilty of tyranny and usurpation.

The rationalists and deists who found their inspiration in the social contract believed that, as Madison put it, "in matters of religion no man's right is abridged by the institution of civil society, and that religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance." The reason for this, they argued, is that matters of conscience are by their very nature inalienable, and therefore jurisdiction over them was not and could not have been delegated to political government in the social contract. The views of this group were epitomized in Paine's statement in *Common Sense*: "As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of government to protect all conscientious professors thereon; and I know of no other business which government hath to do therewith." . . . As Lord Bryce . . . noted . . . in the United States religious associations are merely voluntary as-

sociations of private persons whose activities must be considered by the government as exclusively private and not subject to support out of tax-raised funds. It imposes an obligation of neutrality on government not merely as between different religions but also as between religion and non-religion, and indeed between religion and anti-religion.

That, said the Supreme Court [in the Everson case, 1947], is what the fathers of the Constitution and of the First Amendment intended. And they intended it not because they were hostile to religion; the fact that the deeply pietistic dissenting sects strove for this is conclusive proof that its motivation was not unfriendliness to religion. The fathers of our republic, said the Court, were convinced that the cause of religion could best be served if the government maintained a strict hands-off policy and if it maintained a high and impregnable wall between church and state. They were convinced too that the best way to keep from these shores the religious bloodshed, persecution, and intolerance that had plagued the old world was to maintain such a wall between church and state in the new world. . . .

The domination of our moral culture by the alliance of Calvinism and Protestant dissent, and the domination of our political and social culture by the alliance of Protestant dissent and secular humanism now face their most serious challenge. . . . Today . . . the influence of Catholicism has reached a point . . . where, while it cannot obtain the enactment of every measure it supports (e.g., federal aid to parochial schools, or an ambassador to the Vatican), it can defeat the enactment of any measure that it vigorously opposes (e.g., federal aid to education that excludes parochial schools, or divorce reform). Indeed, within the past few years it has been able almost singlehandedly to obtain the enactment of some Federal measures, such as the adoption of "In God We Trust" as the official national motto, or the inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag.¹⁰ These, it is true, affect our culture only

¹⁰ Editors' note: "Almost singlehandedly" seems a bit exaggerated. Certainly many Protestant groups joined the Catholics in urging the enactment of these measures. Our national anthem, "The Star Spangled Banner," ascribes our independent nationhood to a heavenly "Pow'r" and urges "In God is Our trust" as a national motto. The last stanza of "America" is a prayer, and "God Bless America" is sometimes used for patriotic, sometimes for religious purposes.

slightly and peripherally and, for whatever reason, evoked practically no manifest opposition. Yet they are surely a harbinger of more significant things to come. The future of American culture will have to reckon with Roman Catholicism. . . .

The statements on religious error and religious freedom found in Catholic dogma . . . are based upon papal pronouncements made during the centuries, and the high estate held by respect for authority in the Catholic scheme of things makes it difficult and embarrassing for Catholics to say what they otherwise would say—that these pronouncements are not to be taken too seriously.

Actually, that is what in effect is said by such leading Catholic thinkers as John Courtney Murray and Heinrich Rommen. And they are not merely saying it to the non-Catholic world, but are arguing it eloquently within Catholicism. The papal pronouncements, they say, must be understood in the context of the time, place, and situation in which they were uttered. They are not to be understood nor were they intended to be understood as absolutes, true for all times and in all circumstances. They were promulgated as defensive measures to protect the Church and Catholicism when they were in danger and under attack. They are not to be taken as either required or desirable even in countries which are overwhelmingly Catholic in their population. As Rommen has said, "the modern Bill of Rights and the inviolability of the sincere conscience must be jealously respected by a Catholic civilization, if ever the dream of a wholly Catholic world is to be realized."

It remains true, however, that what is generally considered as authoritative Catholic thought does not go this far. The papal pronouncements are accepted as correct in principle. The authoritative organs of the Catholic Church in America, such as the *American Ecclesiastical Review*, contest the validity of Father Murray's contention that even in a Catholic state freedom to err must be respected. To them, in principle, freedom of worship remains, in the words of the *Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, "the inalienable right of all men to worship God according to the teaching of the Catholic Church." . . .

It is not beyond the realm of possibility that had the Catholic child in the nineteenth century received the same cordial wel-

come from the public school given the Jewish child in the twentieth, and that had the religious conscience of the Catholic child been respected as was the Jewish child's, the Catholic community might have adjusted to the American school system. It might not have expended so large a portion of its worldly goods and income in establishing and maintaining a gigantic separate and parallel school system. . . . Catholic hostility to the public schools arose out of the bitter experiences that Catholic children suffered in them. . . . For refusing to participate in Protestant religious exercises or the reading of the Protestant Bible, Catholic public school children frequently suffered cruel persecution. They were often subjected to physical punishment, expulsion, and other indignities merely because they took seriously the guaranty of religious freedom of which the Protestants so proudly boasted. The transition from Protestant to secular public education, moreover, took place during a period when anti-Catholic bigotry was strong and extensive, when Nativism and Know-Nothingism flourished over a large part of the country. The child of the Jewish immigrant from Russia and Poland came from a background of persecution, discrimination, and bigotry to a [twentieth century] public school of acceptance and equality. The child of the Catholic immigrant from Ireland came from a climate of equality to a public school of persecution, discrimination, and bigotry. The difference in attitudes toward the public school on the part of the Catholic and Jewish communities hardly needs any other explanation. . . .¹¹

Recently, however, the Church has begun to show a growing interest in the public schools. Not that the Church has altered its dogmatic position against non-Catholic education for Catholic children, nor that it has abandoned its goal of placing every Cath-

¹¹ Editors' note: It was not until 1925 that the First Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment, was interpreted to apply to state as well as federal laws. In the nineteenth century, some of the state laws were quite harsh and intolerant. For example, a child could legally be expelled from school if he followed the instructions of his priest to cut public school classes in order to attend Mass on a Holy Day [*Ferriter v. Tyler*, 48 Vt. 444 (1876)]. For other cases of this kind read P. A. Freund, A. E. Sutherland, M. D. Howe and E. J. Brown, *Constitutional Law*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1961, Vol. II, p. 1694.

olic child in a Catholic school. On the contrary, it has embarked on an ambitious school-building campaign to bring that goal nearer to realization. Nevertheless, the Church has lately shown an increasing interest in what happens within the public school classrooms. . . . Catholicism, in its challenge to the Protestant-humanist alliance that has dominated American culture for a century and a half, recognizes that the country's school system has had a decided responsibility for the shaping of that culture. . . . It has seen its own cultural patterns affected by the Protestant-humanist culture, and the curricula, methods of pedagogy and philosophy of its own school system strongly influenced by the competition of the public school system. Catholicism is now ready not merely to halt this process but in some measure to reverse it. . . .¹²

¹² Editors' note: Catholics may also "reverse" their long-standing traditions, established by the Roman Emperor Constantine, concerning the proper relationship between church and state. The traditional Catholic attitude is this: "It may be that under certain circumstances, such as the exceptional good will of the political powers, the Church deems it preferable to acquiesce to a factual separation of Church and State, but in no case will she ever admit that Church and State should be kept separate. Their separation remains an evil even while, for reasons of expediency, it is being tolerated. The same remark applies to the school problem."—Etienne Gilson (ed.), *The Church Speaks to the Modern World: The Social Teachings of Leo XIII*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., (Image D7), Copyright, 1954, by Doubleday & Company, Inc., p. 17. By permission.

In 1948 this view was reiterated as follows (*Time* 51: 70, June 28, 1948): "Is religious tolerance simply a matter of fair play? U.S. Protestants who think so often boil with indignation at the Roman Catholic Church, which accepts the advantages of tolerance in non-Catholic countries but sternly discourages other faiths in areas where Catholics are in the majority.

"One of the newest and clearest statements of the Catholic position appeared recently in Rome in the Jesuits' fortnightly *La Civiltà Cattolica*. Excerpts are quoted in this week's *Christian Century*: 'The Roman Catholic Church, convinced, through its divine prerogatives, of being the only true church, must demand the right to freedom for herself alone, because such a right can only be possessed by truth, never by error. As to other religions, the church will certainly never draw the sword, but she will require that by legitimate means they shall not be allowed to propagate false doctrine. Consequently, in a state where the majority of the people are Catholic, the church will require that legal existence be denied to error, and that if religious minorities actually exist, they shall have only a *de facto* existence without opportunity to spread their beliefs. If, however, actual circumstances . . . make the complete application of this principle impossible, then the church will require for herself all possible concessions. . . .

"In some countries, Catholics will be obliged to ask full religious freedom

for all, resigned at being forced to cohabit where they alone should rightfully be allowed to live. But in doing this the church does not renounce her thesis . . . but merely adapts herself. . . . Hence arises the great scandal among Protestants. . . . We ask Protestants to understand that the Catholic church would betray her trust if she were to proclaim . . . that error can have the same rights as truth. . . . The church cannot blush for her own want of tolerance, as she asserts it in principle and applies it in practice."

On the other hand, the American tradition of church-state separation has been defended by Lord Acton, Jacques Maritain, John Courtney Murray, and many other "liberal" Catholics. Thus a British Dominican priest, Father Victor White, has written: "The transformation of Christianity . . . into the established religion of a sacral society for a millennium after the conversion of Constantine was an anomaly which produced many anomalies, as well as what we call Christian civilization. Not least of these anomalies was the Inquisition and the *De haeretico comburendo*. The anomaly lay not only in the fact that preachers of Divine love found themselves supporting brutal force to ensure conformity in a matter which their theology told them was an affair wholly of gracious election and individual decision: in the very fact of acting as judges of religious orthodoxy on behalf of the secular power, they cannot easily be absolved of the charge of rendering to Caesar the things that are God's.

"Yet the sacral ideal has its attractions, and the medieval ideal of synthesis of Church and State is so impressive that we have been slow to see that it was an anomaly rather than a norm. But its departure should be a matter of rejoicing rather than for the nostalgic regrets of the apologists of the 'Europe is the Faith' school. A pluralistic society is one in which a Christian must be a Christian indeed; in which even the theologian can breathe more freely. . . . For toleration brings intercommunication; wider and deeper knowledge of the variety of the needs of the human soul, and of the mysterious and manifold ways of God with man. . . ."—Victor White, "Religious Tolerance," B.B.C. broadcast, reprinted in *Commonweal*, 58: 531-534, September 4, 1953; discussion, *Commonweal*, 59: 450-452, February 5, 1954; 59: 555-556, March 5, 1954. By permission.

The same viewpoint is found in one of the most influential Catholic books of 1962: "Insofar as the Church is not only a divine institution but also a sociological human structure, insofar as God's holy Church is a Church of men and of sinful men, she, with everything that she is and has, is subject to that word of the Lord which reads 'Do penance and be converted.' Insofar as the Church is deformed, she has to be reformed: *ecclesia reformanda*.

"And insofar as the Church, because of her human frailty and sinfulness, always needs to be better; insofar as she can never sit and bask in the warmth of her own self-satisfaction but must always be pressing on with all the earnest zeal of the penitent—the renewal of the Church is never something finished and done with but is always a permanent duty: and this precisely because she is, and is to remain, the *Holy Church*. Insofar as the Church is constantly, repeatedly deformed, she has to be constantly, repeatedly reformed: *ecclesia semper reformanda*."—Hans Küng *The Council: Reform and Reunion*, New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1962, pp. 35-36. From *The Council: Reform and Reunion* by Hans Küng, © Sheed & Ward Ltd., 1961. Rev. Hans Küng is a German Roman Catholic theologian.

2.5 Five Contemporary Catholic Views Concerning Parochial Education

*Francis M. Crowley: "A Separate School System"**¹

The attitude of the young toward most of life's activities is determined by the home environment. . . . Family education of the right sort . . . must have a foundation in the super-

* Francis M. Crowley, "The Catholic Approach to Religion in America," reprinted from Ernest O. Melby and Morton Puner (eds.), *Freedom and Public Education*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1953, pp. 65-72. By permission. Mr Crowley is Dean of the College of Education, Fordham University. See also Msgr. Paul E. Campbell, "What Makes a Catholic School Catholic?" *Catholic World*, 179: 426-430, September 1954. For a longer treatment, read *The Proximate Aim of Education* by Rev. Kevin J. O'Brien, Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Company, 1958. This first viewpoint is the one probably most widely expressed by American Catholics today.

The most definitive statement of the "official" Catholic position is the 1930 Encyclical letter, *Divini Illius Magistri* ("On the Christian Education of Youth") of His Holiness Pope Pius XI, New York: The America Press, 1936, pp. 2-36; also in *Five Great Encyclicals*, New York: Paulist Press, 1960, pp. 39-60; also in *Philosophy of Education*, H. W. Burns and C. J. Brauner, (eds.), New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1962, pp. 264-288. After describing the three societies (family, state, Church), the encyclical declares: "Consequently, education, which is concerned with the whole man, individually and socially, in the order of nature and in the order of grace, necessarily belongs to all these three societies, in accordance with the end assigned to each in the present order of divine providence."

"And first of all, education belongs pre-eminently to the Church, by reason of a double title in the supernatural order, conferred exclusively upon her by God Himself; absolutely superior, therefore, to any other title in the natural order. . . . By necessary consequence the Church is independent of any sort of earthly power as well in the origin as in the exercise of her mission as educator, not merely in regard to her proper end and object, but in regard to the means suitable to attain that end. . . .

"Hence, every form of pedagogic naturalism, which in any way excludes or overlooks supernatural Christian formation in the teaching of youth, is false. Every method of education founded, wholly or in part, on the denial or forgetfulness of original sin and of grace, and relying on the sole powers of human nature, is unsound. . . . The school . . . if not a temple, is a den. . . .

"From this it follows that the so-called 'neutral' or 'lay' school, from which religion is excluded, is contrary to the fundamental principles of edu-

natural, for religion is necessary to give social charity form and sanction. . . . Society can only be transformed through the individual. At the very moment our problem is "to make America safe for differences." Democracy is after all a religious ideal. A sense of relationship to God, a belief in His Fatherhood and the brotherhood of man contribute greatly to the development of attitudes that will make America safe for differences.

Catholic education provides for the education of the whole man, "soul united to body in unity of nature, with all his faculties, natural and supernatural, such as right reason and revelation show him to be." The Catholic theory is that the effects of original sin—weakness of will and disorderly inclinations—must be corrected and good habits must be developed. This cannot be done by relying solely on the powers of human nature. The mind must be enlightened and the will strengthened by supernatural truth and the grace of God....

The chief purpose of these [parochial] schools is to give to the Catholic child the Catholic training which is his baptismal birthright. . . . In order to achieve the ends of Christian education, it is necessary that the entire program be dominated by the Christian spirit, so that religion may be "the foundation and crown of the youth's entire training at every level of instruction." . . . The only school that is a fit school for Catholic students is a school controlled by the Church, in which religion is the foundation and crown of the youth's entire training, not only in the elementary grades but in the high school and college as well. . . . Numerous pastoral letters of the American hierarchy have dealt with the subject of education, and the Decrees of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore (1884) proclaim in forceful language that the parent must send his child to the Catholic school. The language is quite to the point—in its strictest interpretation the Bishop alone

tion. . . . [Hence] the frequenting of non-Catholic schools, whether neutral or mixed, those namely which are open to Catholics and non-Catholics alike, is forbidden for Catholic children and can be at most tolerated, on the approval of the Ordinary alone, under determined circumstances of place and time and with special precautions. (*Cod. Jur. Can.*, c. 1374)." Reprinted with permission from *America*, the National Catholic Weekly Review, 920 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y.

can approve sending a Catholic child to a public school. . . . The Catholic Church is in favor of any plan which makes it possible to provide for the religious education of Catholic children attending public schools and looks on released-time programs with special favor. Even the perfect program of supplementary instruction, however, would not be considered as a substitute for the Catholic school.

George Reuter and Others: "Shared Time"†

"Shared time" is now being seriously considered as a workable successor to "dismissed time" and "released time" to meet the demand by religious leaders for religious instruction for the young without violating the concept of church-school separation. . . . Industrial arts shops, home economics classrooms, science laboratories could become the meeting ground for the common learning of all the children of all the people. . . .

[For example] in mill-town Braddock near Pittsburgh . . . Roman Catholic St. Thomas High School [students now spend] . . . three hours [each school day] at Forbes [technical school where] . . . the Catholic kids study such nonreligious matters as computer

† The first paragraph is taken from a report by George Reuter and others, "Serious Consideration for 'Shared Time,'" *Phi Delta Kappan*, 43: 337, May 1962. By Permission. The second paragraph is excerpted from a news report, "A.M. Science, P.M. God," *Time*, 80:38, September 21, 1962. Courtesy *Time*; copyright *Time*, Inc. 1962.

However, opponents view this plan as injurious to education: "Modern teaching methods seek the integration rather than the compartmentalization of school subjects. The shared time plan would reverse this trend and set back the course of progress in education. . . . Many communities might very well end up with subjects important for human relations being taught in a multiplicity of separate religious schools, with the public school being used as a common manual training institution, physical science laboratory or gigantic gymnasium. . . ."—excerpt from Leo Pfeffer, "Second Thoughts on Shared Time: A one time defender of the shared time proposal . . . gives his reasons for now opposing that proposal," *Christian Century* 79: 779-780, June 20, 1962. Copyright 1962 Christian Century Foundation. Reprinted by permission from *The Christian Century*. See also Harry L. Stearns, and others, "Shared Time: A Symposium," (Pamphlet), New York: Religious Education Association, 1962.

programming and chemical technology. Then they ride a bus to St. Thomas High for an afternoon of religion, social studies and English in a "God-centered" climate. . . .

George W. Casey: "Separation in High School Only"‡

The simplest [solution] . . . is for us Catholics to put no more of our resources, financially and personnel, into elementary schools. . . . Times have changed. . . . Granted that certain physical and mechanical habits, of neatness, sanitation, table manners and so on can be ingrained in these early years, it is not evident that doctrine and abstract ideas can be. From my observation, graduates of parochial elementary schools lose all trace of their specific style of training after a few months in other schools. . . .

Let us face it, the chief reason for the Catholic school system is the preservation of the faith. And I, for one, have never seen a child lose its faith in the elementary grades, unless the parents lost it for him. But I have seen high school boys and girls lose it on their own . . . where boy meets girl, and where they both meet the Reformation, the Inquisition, Communism, Darwinism, Freudianism. . . .

Furthermore, if we share common schooling with our neighbors of all religions, in the grades where there is almost no danger of defection or of secularism and where the parents' minds are supreme, we will avoid most of the less pleasant by-products of

‡ Monsignor George W. Casey (Parish Priest, Lexington, Mass.), "The Elementary Grades," August 12, 1961 Editorial in *The Pilot*, official organ of the Archdiocese of Boston. By permission. The article was reprinted in *Current*, October 1961, p. 63. Compare the following statement by a Catholic layman: [A newly built Catholic parochial school in Billings, Montana] ". . . has 739 students using ten classrooms (Employing the two rooms in the basement cafeteria ended the hot lunch program). Classes contain as many as 66 pupils. The first three grades go half days. . . . The most optimistic parochial-school chauvinist must admit that the independent school cannot, on this sort of budget, dispense the same standard of education in the profane sciences as the State school."—Robert Lee Kellner, "How to Support Two School Systems," *America*, 107: 288-289, May 26, 1962. Reprinted with permission from *America*, the National Catholic Weekly Review, 920 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y.

separation and inbreeding. We will have a larger stake in the community, a deeper involvement in its affairs and a wider charity for all. . . .

William F. O'Connor: "Abandonment of the Catholic School System"§

There are three choices before the Church in the field of education.

The first is the continuation of the present Catholic school system on inadequate resources. My own experience of twelve years of second-rate, shoestring Catholic education was a most unhappy one; the almost universal lack of funds available to Catholic schools indicates that my experience was not unique; the negligible contribution of Catholic school graduates to the intellectual life of our nation demonstrates that the Catholic system has failed. If the first duty of a school is to its students, the loss of the joy of creativity and productivity in the lives of so many thousands of students must stand as a severe indictment of the system. The continuation of the present unaided system is patently undesirable.

The second possibility is federal aid. The initial steps of the effort to obtain that aid are occurring now [1961] as the bishops exert their pressure upon Congress to upset the arrangement that has by now become so much a part of American life that it is usually expressed in constitutional terms. The Church is becoming one more pressure group; those dedicated to the defensible proposition that

§ William F. O'Connor, "Aid to Education," *Commonweal*, 74: 328-329, June 23, 1961. This is a letter to the editors of *Commonweal*, but does not reflect the viewpoint of *Commonweal*. It is reprinted here by permission of the editors of *Commonweal*.

The second, third and fourth of these five short excerpts, all written by Catholics, show that Roman Catholic thinking is less restrained and less "monolithic" than some critics claim. On this point, read T. L. Westow, *The Variety of Catholic Attitudes*, New York: Herder and Herder, 1963. Read also Thomas J. Fleming, "The Crisis in Catholic Schools," *Saturday Evening Post*, 236: 19-25, October 26, 1963; Jack Star, "Trouble Ahead for the Catholic Schools," *Look*, 27: 37-45, October 22, 1963; Stanley Elam, "What Do Parochial Schools Accomplish?" *Phi Delta Kappan*, 45: 121-122 (also 122-144), December 1963 (bibliography).

public monies should not be used to propagate sectarian doctrines—a proposition which may well be an integral part of our living together as peacefully as we do—are alarmed and that proposition threatened; old antagonisms are resuscitated; the necessary improvement of our public schools is endangered. Is the prize worth winning? That would seem to depend on the third possibility.

The third possibility is the abandonment of the Catholic school system. Again I must refer to my own experience and to my eventual horror when I realized that I had been the victim of a voluntary (voluntary for my parents, not for me) segregation, the effects of which were almost as harmful as those described in *Brown v. Board of Education* [See page 152], that I had been deprived of the stimulation of the superior culture which surrounded our self-defined ghetto, that I had been denied the additional points of reference that might have helped me discover what I was and where I was. It seems to me now that the school system I knew was built in fear by new, unskilled, exploited people in a strange land, a land whose vigorous culture threatened to overwhelm them. It was built for the parents, not for the children; it was built to safeguard the Faith (hardly a proper function of public funds). Is that Faith so feeble a growth that it can flourish only in a hothouse? Might it not now thrive better exposed to the cultural elements outside? If not, it is better to find out now; for those elements are more vigorous and pervasive than ever and no greenhouse can long withstand them.

If the Catholics abandon their separate-but-putatively-equal facilities, they will become at last part of the communities in which they live, partake of their riches, and contribute their own; they can then enjoy fully whatever Federal aid is given to education and work wholeheartedly for the improvement of public education; relieved of the cost of duplicating public services, they can give so much more to their children in fields which public education hardly touches: speech and other therapies, counseling, after-school recreation; they can change their parishes from collection agencies into entities with time and resources to fulfill the spiritual functions so necessary today. As for the Faith—a faith imposed on a person by every agency in his life and protected from the questioning world is not one's faith, whether or not he ever discovers that fact; he

invests more in reinforcing the greenhouse than in strengthening the plant.

The walls of segregation which have imprisoned the Negro and the Catholic are crumbling in the seismic shifts of the day. The Negro leadership is courageously and rightly helping to tear them down. The timid Catholic effort to shore them up seems wrong and worthy of failure.

Perhaps the proper analogy is between Catholic and [racial] segregationist. It is not the proper use of public funds to safeguard the isolation of either. But if federal aid is given to religious schools, the segregationist (also fearful for his children's future) will be able to perpetuate in publicly supported church schools his own cruel system.

Neil A. McCluskey: "Public Funds Should Support Parochial Schools"¶

The public school, at least as presently constituted, has been judged by the American Catholic parent as incapable of providing the kind of education he desires for his child. . . . I respectfully submit that it is in the best interests of the American nation that the church-related schools, which have assumed a generous share of America's educational burden, receive appropriate recognition and support. My two basic reasons are that (1) only in this way can the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion be effectively safeguarded, and that (2) only in this way can the nation's youthful talent be fully realized.

If public benefits are so administered that citizens must do violence to their conscience in order to share in them, then the benefits are discriminatory. . . . It is not the American way simply to dismiss this conscience as a private affair, a Catholic idiosyncrasy, and to let it go at that. Religious liberty and the constitutional prohibition of religious qualifications mean little unless these are related to the distinctive peculiarities of each type of conscience. . . . The last thing our founding fathers intended to do was to put

¶ Rev. Neil A. McCluskey, S. J., "Public Funds for Parochial Schools? Yes!" *Teachers College Record*, 72: 49-56, October, 1960. By permission.

a price tag on the religious liberty protected by the First Amendment that would put it beyond the reach of some citizens. . . .

If freedom is endangered, let me speak in all frankness, the peril lies in the kind of dogmatic liberalism that would make the public school the shrine of a secularist faith in democracy and, in so doing, take away or render inoperative the basic constitutional rights of parent and citizen.

[The courts have applied a rule against discrimination in public welfare, although not always with consistency, to such auxiliary benefits as health services, nonreligious textbooks, and bus transportation for all American school children. Beyond this, it is usually argued, religious schools] cannot expect any public support because *that* would violate the American tradition of separation of church and state. Within the somber shadow of that wall there is no place for further discussion. So the mystical wall remains high, the public conscience is soothed, and each succeeding year the Catholic community feels itself more aggrieved. And yet . . . separation was never conceived [by the Founders of the American Republic] as an end in itself but as something instrumental and subordinate to the great end . . . of religious liberty. . . .

My second reason for suggesting appropriate public recognition and support for church-related schools is that only in this way can the nation's youthful talent be fully realized. . . . During these years, when the nation cannot afford to leave any talent undeveloped wherever available, have not Catholics the right to expect that government-supported programs . . . will include their children in parochial schools? If the Federal Government, in the interests of national defense and world leadership, is going to help local communities to identify, guide, and subsidize student talent, should it not do so in a rational, comprehensive manner?²¹³

²¹³ Editors' note: A recent survey of Catholic schools challenges the view that the federal aid through NDEA (National Defense Education Act) is used by parochial schools mainly for scientific purposes. George R. La Noue found that in church-related schools which had received NDEA support, textbooks in science were larded with specific religious content. Thus a mathematics textbook contained the following problems: "Jim made the Way of the Cross. He liked the sixth station very much. What Roman numeral was written above it?" "There are 37 boys in our room. Each boys says the Rosary every day. How many do we say in 20 days?" In foreign languages such lessons as "Une visite à Jesus" abound. A widely used biology text includes the

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2.6 Public Funds Should not Support Parochial Schools*

R. Freeman Butts

. . . As we face the problem of public and private schools, we all know that the really controversial element in it for over a century has had to do with religion. As Americans sought to create a republican form of society to replace their colonial status, and as they built a public school system to be the main support for a free society, they had to face the religious problem.

During the century of political and religious conflict from 1830 to 1930, the public school idea was hammered out. As we know it and cherish it, that idea involves five basic principles: (1) Uni-

study of angels as a "science" parallel to the study of the natural sciences. See G. R. La Noue, "Religious Schools and 'Secular' Subjects," *Harvard Educational Review*, 32: 255-291 Summer, 1962; 33: 105-115, Winter 1963; 33: 336-359, Summer 1963 (discussion, bibliography). This study is summarized in *Phi Delta Kappan*, 43: 380-387, June 1962, and in a forty-seven page brochure by G. R. La Noue, *Public Funds for Parochial Schools*, published by the National Council of Churches, 475 Riverside Drive, New York. For a pamphlet advocating federal aid to parochial schools read "On Education" by Robert Maynard Hutchins, published in 1963 by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California.

* R. Freeman Butts, "Public Funds for Parochial Schools? No!" *Teachers College Record*, 42: 57-61, October 1960. By permission.

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* R. Freeman Butts, "Public Funds for Parochial Schools? No!" *Teachers College Record*, 42: 57-61, October 1960. By permission.

Professor Butts is author of *The American Tradition in Religion and Education*, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950. See footnote on p. 329.

versal free education must be available for all in common public schools supported by taxation upon everyone. (2) Public schools should be maintained under the authority of the state and administered by local public authorities. (3) In order to protect freedom of conscience, the public schools should not engage in religious instruction. (4) In order to keep church separated from state, public funds cannot be given to religious schools. Finally, (5) the state can compel all children to attend some school, but children cannot be compelled to attend a public school. This idea of public education gave enormous strength, vitality, and unity to American society. It made possible, within a relatively short time, the creation of a democratic American nation out of diverse peoples. . . . The results in economic and technological progress, in political stability, and in strength of loyalty to the processes of a free society have been incalculable.

Now, the question is, "Shall we modify or possibly reverse this general pattern of public education?" An increasing number of voices in recent decades has begun to argue, to plead, to cajole, and to demand that we do so. One of the most dynamic forces in this process has been the Roman Catholic Church. . . . Catholic schools enrolled about 5 percent of the elementary and secondary school total in 1900, and still only 6 or 7 percent in 1940. But during the past twenty years, the rise has been spectacular. While public school enrollments increased 36 percent, nonpublic enrollments increased 118 percent. Today, about 14 percent of all schoolchildren are in Catholic schools, perhaps as much as 16 percent in all nonpublic schools. . . .

For one hundred years, the public school idea was on the march throughout America, but since 1930 or so it has been on the defensive. Piecemeal exceptions to the basic idea began to be made, such as the provision of free textbooks, bus rides, and lunches to parochial school children. "All we want," said the Catholic bishops in 1948, "is cooperation between church and state in education." "All we want," said Cardinal Spellman in 1949, "is public aid for auxiliary services, including health and welfare services." These services will benefit the child, they said, not aid the school; therefore, they are quite within the constitutional and legal limitations of the public school idea.

But since 1950 the character of the campaign has changed radically. The argument for benefits to the child and for the right of the parents to choose the school they desire had been extended to a full-blown theory of private rights in education. In 1955 the Catholic bishops spoke of the *partnership* of private and public schools, each having equal rights to public aid because they both perform a public service. Since that time we have heard more and more of the argument that the rights of parents in the education of their children are prior to the rights of the state. Similarly, the rights of the Church in education are presented as superior to those of the state.¹⁴ . . .

We hear the argument that the only real purpose of taxation for education is merely to subsidize parents and thus aid them to get the kind of education they wish for their children. . . . What this means is that the earlier demand for indirect aid for peripheral welfare services in justice to children has become a demand for direct financial subsidy by government or for at least tax credit as a constitutional right of parents. The *principle* of liberty and of civil rights *requires* the state to subsidize parents by full government support for the education of their children, and if the state refuses such aid, it will be infringing their rights of freedom of conscience under the First Amendment. . . .

We see this same principle being applied in the South. Just as parents who want their children to go to religious schools should have their fair share of state aid, so parents who want their children to go to all-white schools should have *their* share of state aid. . . .

If you accept the principle that the state should subsidize parents rather than maintain a common public school system, why not call on the principle to justify parents' choices on economic,

¹⁴ Editors' note: In 1962 New York's Francis Cardinal Spellman said: "If the Federal Government should favor the public schools and put an additional tax on us, from which we would receive no benefit, then, my dear friends, it is the eventual end of our parochial schools."—*Time* 78: 46, February 16, 1962. Such rash statements are heard in every heated debate. In 1877 the *American Catholic Quarterly* prophesied: "Let the public school system of the free religionists do its unwholesome work ten or twelve years longer and we venture to predict that the United States of America will become a huge mass of corruption." This quotation is found in Mark Mohler, "Converting the Churches to State Education," *Current History*, 28: 47-50, April 1928.

political, social status, or intellectual grounds as well as on religious or racial grounds?

A proper course between voluntarism, or privatism, on the one hand, and totalitarianism, or state monopoly of education on the other, must be based on the right *and the obligation* of a free people, through its free government, to establish and maintain public schools devoted to the promotion of freedom. The people of a free state cannot rightfully create a monopoly for public education by interfering with or destroying private schools, nor can they rightfully create a monopoly for private schools by undermining or destroying their public schools.

A system of free public education is the chief means by which a free society continually regenerates itself. Public education is therefore an integral responsibility of a free and republican form of government. It is a kind of fourth branch of government, as essential to freedom as are responsible executives, elected legislatures, and independent courts. In this sense, the rights of the free people in public education are prior to the rights of individual churches or of individual parents in private education. This is the individual's guarantee that he will have any educational rights to exercise at all.¹⁵

¹⁵ Editors' note: "By 'secular' is not meant a school unfriendly to religion, but rather one under community lay control, not ecclesiastical control. By 'secular' is also meant that the common school is an institution of the whole community, and hence recognizes the members of all its component groups as first-class citizens, irrespective of religious belief or church and synagogue connection. The emergence of the common school therefore is an expression of that tendency which progressively broadened the basis of citizenship in our country from Puritan to Protestant, to Christian, to Christian and Jew, to adherents of all religions, and, finally, to all men."—John L. Childs, "The Future of the Common School," *Educational Forum*, 21: 133–141, January 1957. By permission of Kappa Delta Pi; copyright by Kappa Delta Pi.

*Some Recent Court Decisions***2.7 Public Transportation for Parochial School Students?
Yes.****Hugo L. Black and Others*

A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored churches. The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy. With the power of government supporting them, at various times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with the government of a particular time and place, men and women had been fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for which these punishments had been inflicted were such things as speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-established churches, non-attendance at those churches, expressions of non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support them.

These practices of the old world were transplanted to and began to thrive in the soil of the new America. The very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and companies designated to make the laws which would control the destinies of the colonials authorized these individuals and companies to erect

* Hugo L. Black, majority opinion (5-4 decision), *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1946). Footnotes not included in these excerpts.

religious establishments which all, whether believers or non-believers, would be required to support and attend. An exercise of this authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world practices and persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be in a minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they steadfastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own consciences dictated. And all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters.

These practices became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries and to build and maintain churches and church property aroused their indignation. It was these feelings which found expression in the First Amendment . . . which commands that a state "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." . . .

The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and *vice versa*. . . .

New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of any institution which teaches the tenets and faith

of any church. On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, *because of their faith, or lack of it*, from receiving the benefits of public-welfare legislation. While we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to children attending public schools,¹⁶ we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief.

Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools. It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church schools. There is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by the state. The same possibility exists where the state requires a local transit company to provide reduced fares to school children including those attending parochial schools, or where a municipally owned transportation system undertakes to carry all school children free of charge. Moreover, state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from church schools from the very real hazards of traffic, would serve much the same purpose and accomplish much the same result as state provisions intended to guarantee free transportation of a kind which the state deems to be best for the school children's welfare. And parents might refuse to risk their children to the serious danger of traffic accidents going to and from parochial schools, the approaches to which were not protected by policemen. Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit their

¹⁶ Editors' note: The New Jersey statute in question authorized reimbursement to parents for the transportation of children to and from schools—including payment for transportation of some children to Catholic parochial schools.

children to attend schools which the state had cut off from such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks. Of course, cutting off church schools from these services, so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.

This Court has said that parents may, in the discharge of their duty under state compulsory education laws, send their children to a religious rather than a public school if the school meets the secular educational requirements which the state has power to impose. See *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510. It appears that these parochial schools meet New Jersey's requirements. The state contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.

The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here.

Mr. Justice Jackson, Dissenting:

[The First Amendment] was intended not only to keep the states' hands out of religion, but to keep religion's hands off the state, and, above all, to keep bitter religious controversy out of public life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of public policy or the public purse. Those great ends I cannot but think are immeasurably compromised by today's decision.

This policy of our Federal Constitution has never been wholly pleasing to most religious groups. They all are quick to invoke its protections; they all are irked when they feel its restraints. . . .

But we cannot have it both ways. Religious teaching cannot be a private affair when the state seeks to impose regulations which

infringe on it indirectly, and a public affair when it comes to taxing citizens of one faith to aid another, or those of no faith to aid all. If these principles seem harsh in prohibiting aid to Catholic education, it must not be forgotten that it is the same Constitution that alone assures Catholics the right to maintain these schools at all when predominant local sentiment would forbid them. *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510. Nor should I think that those who have done so well without this aid would want to see this separation between Church and State broken down. If the state may aid these religious schools, it may therefore regulate them. Many groups have sought aid from tax funds only to find that it carried political controls with it. Indeed this Court has declared that "It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes." *Wickard v. Filburn*, 317 U.S. 111, 131.¹⁷

Mr. Justice Rutledge, with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice Burton Agree, Dissenting:

¹⁷ Editors' note: Compare the following statement by Andrew Jacobs, Roman Catholic layman, and (1949) U.S. Congressman from Indiana:

"Religious freedom is a two-way street. We are free to establish and utilize our parochial schools or utilize public schools, as we choose. But the right to establish private schools does not imply the right to public financial support thereof. We have the right to build and maintain our churches, but not to build or maintain them with public funds. Our parochial schools are an adjunct of our religion, established for educational use instead of using public schools, solely for sake of the child's religious training.

"As long as we have the same right to send our children to public schools as anyone else, we are not discriminated against, and as Catholics we do not have a right to a separate publicly supported school system, nor does any other group of people have such right.

" . . . [The] legal right to maintain parochial schools does not establish the right to public maintenance. To so argue is to say with one breath, our parochial schools are in the public school category, for the purpose of public aid; while in the next breath we stoutly maintain our right to parochial schools for the purpose of religiously training our children. However, when we put our parochial schools in the public school category for one purpose, we do so for all purposes, and we must then comply with public school regulations which forbid sectarian religious teachings therein.

"The issue is clear. Either you keep parochial schools and maintain them or take public funds and convert them into public schools, and they will then no longer serve the religious purpose for which they were established."—"On Public Financial Aid to Parochial Schools," Extension of Remarks by Hon. Hugo S. Sims, July 7, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, Vol. 95, pp. A4358-A4359.

Two great drives are constantly in motion to abridge, in the name of education, the complete division of religion and civil authority which our forefathers made. One is to introduce religious education and observances into the public schools. The other, to obtain public funds for the aid and support of various private religious schools. . . . In my opinion both avenues were closed by the Constitution. Neither should be opened by this Court. . . . Here parents pay money to send their children to parochial schools and funds raised by taxation are used to reimburse them. This not only helps the children to get to school and the parents to send them. It aids them in a substantial way to get the very thing which they are sent to the particular school to secure, namely, religious training and teaching. . . .

But we are told that the New Jersey statute is valid in its present application because the appropriation is for a public, not a private purpose, namely, the promotion of education, and the majority accept this idea in the conclusion that all we have here is "public welfare legislation." . . .

Of course paying the cost of transportation promotes the general cause of education and the welfare of the individual. So does paying all other items of educational expense. And obviously, as the majority say, it is much too late to urge that legislation designed to facilitate the opportunities of children to secure a secular education serves no public purpose. Our nationwide system of public education rests on the contrary view, as do all grants in aid of education, public or private, which is not religious in character. These things are beside the real question. They have no possible materiality except to obscure the all-pervading inescapable issue. . . . The public function argument, by casting the issue in terms of promoting the general cause of education and the welfare of the individual, ignores the religious factor and its essential connection with the transportation, thereby leaving out the only vital element in the case. So of course do the "public welfare" and "social legislation" ideas, for they come to the same thing.

We have here then one substantial issue, not two. To say that New Jersey's appropriation and her use of the power of taxation for raising the funds appropriated are not for public purposes but are for private ends, is to say that they are for the support of reli-

gion and religious teaching. Conversely, to say that they are for public purposes is to say that they are not for religious ones.

This is precisely for the reason that education which includes religious training and teaching, and its support, have been made matters of private right and function not public, by the very terms of the First Amendment. That is the effect not only in its guaranty of religion's free exercise, but also in the prohibition of establishments. It was on this basis of the private character of the function of religious education that this Court held parents entitled to send their children to private, religious schools. *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, *supra*. Now it declares in effect that the appropriation of public funds to defray part of the cost of attending those schools is for a public purpose. If so, I do not understand why the state cannot go farther or why this case approaches the verge of its power.

In truth this view contradicts the whole purpose and effect of the First Amendment as heretofore conceived.¹⁸

¹⁸ Editors' note: "Although the Supreme Court in *Everson* ruled that the expenditure of public funds for the transportation of children to parochial schools does not violate the federal constitution, state courts are neither obliged to arrive at the same conclusion with respect to their own constitutions, nor to accept the reasoning upon which the holding was based. . . . The *Everson* case is important here because of its invocation of the "child benefit" theory as a justification for state aid. . . . The "child benefit" theory has persisted, continuing to muddy the waters surrounding the constitutional question of state aid to religious education. Before the *Everson* case, courts in four states [Cal., Ky., Md., N.J.] had adopted it as a method of squaring the provision of transportation of parochial school students at public expense with constitutional prohibitions of aid to private or sectarian institutions; two states [La., Miss.] had done so in regard to textbooks. Four more states [Del., N.Y., Okla., Wis.] had struck down transportation programs on non-constitutional grounds. Since the *Everson* decision, the supreme courts of Washington, Missouri, Connecticut, Alaska, and Oregon have dealt with the constitutional questions involved in either the provision of transportation or textbooks to non-public school students." [In each instance these five state courts ruled against public funds for parochial aid. In 1962 a 4-2 decision of Wisconsin's Supreme Court (in *Reynolds v. Nusbaum*, 115 N.W. (2nd), 791) denied on constitutional grounds that public funds may be used for the transportation of pupils to parochial schools.] —Edward A. Setzler and Ora Linford, "Comment: A Constitutional Analysis of the Wisconsin School Bus Law," 1962 *Wisconsin Law Review* 500-519, May 1962. The article contains numerous footnotes and court citations. By permission.

Another excellent summary of recent developments with respect to the "child benefit" theory, with numerous court citations, is by Roy B. Allen and Robert Marshall, "'Child Benefit' Has Lost Its Glitter," *Phi Delta Kappan*

2.8 Sectarian Religious Instruction with Public Tax Money? No.^o

Hugo L. Black and Others

IN 1940 interested members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and a few of the Protestant faiths formed a voluntary association called the Champaign Council on Religious Education. They obtained permission from the Board of Education to offer classes in religious instruction to public school pupils in grades four to nine inclusive. Classes were made up of pupils whose parents signed printed cards requesting that their children be permitted to attend; they were held weekly, thirty minutes for the lower grades, forty-five minutes for the higher. The council employed the religious teachers at no expense to the school authorities, but the instructors were subject to approval and supervision of the superintendent of schools. The classes were taught in three separate religious groups by Protestant teachers, Catholic priests, and a Jewish rabbi, although for the past several years there have apparently been no classes instructed in the Jewish religion. Classes were conducted

44: 77-79, November 1962. For example: "The difficulty with this [child benefit] theory is . . . that . . . unless it is qualified in some way it can be used to justify the expenditure of public funds for every educational purpose, because all educational aids are of benefit to the pupil."—*Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62c, Oregon City*, 366 p. 2d 533 (1961) 540.

It is not easy to decide which of our moral and religious traditions are "divisive" and which are defensible as aiding the "common welfare." In a 1960 decision, the Court held that as part of a secular holiday, Sunday closing laws are constitutionally valid. The Court said: "To say that the States cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes [i.e., as a day of rest for all citizens] solely because centuries ago such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separation of church and State. . . ."—*McGowan v. State of Maryland* and three other cases dealing with Sunday closing laws, 366 U.S. 420-581 (1960).

^o Hugo L. Black, majority opinion (8-1 decision), *Illinois, ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). Footnotes omitted from these excerpts.

in the regular classrooms of the school building. Students who did not choose to take the religious instruction were not released from public school duties; they were required to leave their classrooms and go to some other place in the school building for pursuit of their secular studies. On the other hand, students who were released from secular study for the religious instructions were required to be present at the religious classes. Reports of their presence or absence were to be made to their secular teachers.

The foregoing facts, without reference to others that appear in the record, show the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council in promoting religious education. The operation of the state's compulsory education system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment....

To hold that a state cannot consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines and ideals does not, as counsel urge, manifest a governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings.¹⁹ A manifestation of such

¹⁹ Editors' note: That the Court is "friendly" to religion was evidenced on April 16, 1962 when the Court, Mr. Justice Black dissenting, refused to review a December 13, 1961 decision of the Rhode Island supreme court which had sustained laws granting tax exemption for buildings, lands and estates which are used for religious purposes. *General Finance Corp. v. Archetto* 176 Atl. (2d) 73 (December 13, 1961).

The Court's definition of "religion" and "religious purposes" is quite broad. A 1961 ruling declared: ". . . We repeat and reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pose laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. (Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others.)"—*Torcaso v. Watkins* 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

hostility would be at war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion. For the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere. Or, as we said in the *Everson* case, the First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State which must be kept high and impregnable.

Here not only are the state's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The state also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the state's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State....

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Concurring:

The Champaign arrangement . . . presents powerful elements of inherent pressure by the school system in the interest of religious sects. The fact that this power has not been used to discriminate is beside the point. Separation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all equally. That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's domain. The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious pressure upon children to attend. Again, while the Champaign school population represents only a fraction of the more than two hundred and fifty sects of the nation, not even all the practicing sects in Champaign are willing or able to provide religious instruction. The children belonging to these non-participating sects will thus have inculcated in them a feeling of separatism when the school should be the training ground for habits of community, or they will have religious instruction in a faith which is not that of their parents. As a result, the public school system of Champaign actively furthers inculcation in the religious tenets of some faiths, and in the process sharpens the consciousness of religious differences at least among some of the children committed to its care. . . .

Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a "wall of separation," not of a fine line easily overstepped. The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart. "The great American principle of eternal separation"—Elihu Root's phrase bears repetition—is one of the vital reliances of our Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people stronger than our diversities. . . .

Mr. Justice Reed, Dissenting:

The phrase "an establishment of religion" may have been intended by Congress to be aimed only at a state church. . . .

Mr. Jefferson, as one of the founders of the University of Virginia, a school which from its establishment in 1819 has been wholly governed, managed and controlled by the State of Virginia, was faced with the same problem that is before this Court today: the question of the constitutional limitation upon religious education in public schools. In his annual report as Rector, to the President and Directors of the Literary Fund, dated October 7, 1822, approved by the Visitors of the University of whom Mr. Madison was one, Mr. Jefferson set forth his views at some length. These suggestions of Mr. Jefferson were adopted and Ch. II, § 1, of the Regulations of the University of October 4, 1824, provided that:

Should the religious sects of this State, or any of them, according to the invitation held out to them, establish within, or adjacent to, the precincts of the University, schools for instruction in the religion of their sect, the students of the University will be free, and expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of their respective sects, in the morning, and in time to meet their school in the University at its stated hour.

Thus, the "wall of separation between Church and State" that Mr. Jefferson built at the University which he founded did not exclude religious education from that school. The difference between the

generality of his statements on the separation of Church and State and the specificity of his conclusions on education are considerable. A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech. . . .²⁰

2.9 Released Time For Religious Instruction? Yes.*

William O. Douglas and Others

New York City has a program which permits its public schools to release students during the school day so that they may leave the school buildings and school grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises. A student is released on written request of his parents. Those not released stay in the classrooms. The churches make weekly reports to the schools, sending a list of children who have been released from public school but who have not reported for religious instruction.

²⁰ Editors' note: Extensive excerpts from Jefferson on this topic may be found in *Crusade Against Ignorance: Thomas Jefferson on Education*, edited by Gordon C. Lee, New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1961.

The basic problem is neatly summarized by Zechariah Chaffee, Jr.: "We have made our choice and chosen the dream of Roger Williams. *It was not a choice between a good dream and a bad dream*, but between a good dream which on the whole works and a good dream which occasionally turned into a nightmare of the . . . hanging of Mary Dyer on Boston Common. Sometimes nostalgia for what we have given up creeps over us. Men sometimes lament, for instance, that our public schools are godless. Suppose we admit frankly that this is a loss to the public schools, that one very important part of our nature has to be wholly neglected in the place where we receive much of the shaping of our characters and minds. It is a price to pay, but we must look at all which we have bought thereby. We cannot reject a portion of the bargain and insist on keeping the rest. If the noble ideal of the Puritan had persisted, there would be no godless schools in Massachusetts and there would be nobody in her churches except Congregationalists. Through the choice which all of the United States has made, it becomes possible for men of many different faiths to live and work together for many noble ends without allowing their divisions in spiritual matters to become, as in the old days, unbridgeable chasms running through every aspect of human lives." Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., *The Blessings of Liberty*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1956, pp. 265-266. (Italics added).

* William O. Douglas, majority opinion (6-3 decision), *Zorach v. Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1951). Footnotes and bibliography not included in these excerpts.

This "released-time" program involves neither religious instruction in the public school classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds. All costs, including the application blanks, are paid by the religious organizations. The case is therefore unlike *McCollum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203, which involved a "released-time" program from Illinois. In that case the classrooms were turned over to religious instructors. We accordingly held that the program violated the First Amendment which (by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment) prohibits the states from establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise.

Appellants, who are taxpayers and residents of New York City and whose children attend its public schools, challenge the present law, contending it is in essence not different from the one involved in the *McCollum* case. Their argument, stated elaborately in various ways, reduces itself to this: the weight and influence of the school is put behind a program for religious instruction; public school teachers police it, keeping tab on students who are released; the classroom activities come to a halt while the students who are released for religious instruction are on leave; the school is a crutch on which the churches are leaning for support in their religious training; without the cooperation of the schools this "released-time" program, like the one in the *McCollum* case, would be futile and ineffective. . . .

There is a suggestion that the system involves the use of coercion to get public school students into religious classrooms. There is no evidence in the record before us that supports that conclusion. (Nor is there any indication that the public schools enforce attendance at religious schools by punishing absentees from the released-time programs for truancy.) The present record indeed tells us that the school authorities are neutral in this regard and do no more than release students whose parents so request. If in fact coercion were used, if it were established that any one or more teachers were using their office to persuade or force students to take the religious instruction, a wholly different case would be presented. (Appellants contend that they should have been allowed to prove that the system is in fact administered in a coercive manner. The New York Court of Appeals declined to grant a trial on this issue, noting, *inter alia*, that appellants had not properly raised

their claim in the manner required by state practice.) . . . Hence we put aside that claim of coercion. . . .

There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with the "free exercise" of religion and an "establishment" of religion are concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths—these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God save the United States and this Honorable Court."

We would have to press the concept of separation of Church and State to these extremes to condemn the present law on constitutional grounds. The nullification of this law would have wide and profound effects. A Catholic student applies to his teacher for permission to leave the school during hours on a Holy Day of Obligation to attend a mass. A Jewish student asks his teacher for permission to be excused for Yom Kippur. A Protestant wants the afternoon off for a family baptismal ceremony. In each case the teacher requires parental consent in writing. In each case the teacher, in order to make sure the student is not a truant, goes further and requires a report from the priest, the rabbi, or the minister. The teacher in other words cooperates in a religious program to the

extent of making it possible for her students to participate in it. Whether she does it occasionally for a few students, regularly for one, or pursuant to a systematized program designed to further the religious needs of all the students does not alter the character of the act.

We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction. But it can close its doors or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction. No more than that is undertaken here. . . .

In the *McCollum* case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the public school was used to promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction. We follow the *McCollum* case. But we cannot

expand it to cover the present released-time program unless separation of Church and State means that public institutions can make no adjustments of their schedules to accommodate the religious needs of the people. We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion.

Mr. Justice Black, Dissenting:

. . . the sole question is whether New York can use its compulsory education laws to help religious sects get attendants presumably too unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do so by the pressure of this state machinery. That this is the plan, purpose, design and consequence of the New York program cannot be denied. The state thus makes religious sects beneficiaries of its power to compel children to attend secular schools. Any use of such coercive power by the state to help or hinder some religious sects or to prefer all religious sects over non-believers or vice versa is just what I think the First Amendment forbids. In considering whether a state has entered this forbidden field the question is not whether it has entered too far but whether it has entered at all. New York is manipulating its compulsory education laws to help religious sects get pupils. This is not separation but combination of Church and State.

The Court's validation of the New York system rests in part on its statement that Americans are "a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." This was at least as true when the First Amendment was adopted; and it was just as true when eight Justices of this Court invalidated the released-time system in *McCollum* on the premise that a state can no more "aid all religions" than it can aid one. It was precisely because eighteenth-century Americans were a religious people divided into many fighting sects that we were given the constitutional mandate to keep Church and State completely separate. Colonial history had already shown that, here as elsewhere, zealous sectarians entrusted with governmental power to further their causes would sometimes torture, maim and kill those they branded "heretics," "atheists" or "agnostics." The First Amendment was therefore to insure that no one powerful sect or combination of sects could use political or governmental power to punish dissenters whom they could not convert to their faith.

Now as then, it is only by wholly isolating the state from the religious sphere and compelling it to be completely neutral, that the freedom of each and every denomination and of all non-believers can be maintained. It is this neutrality the Court abandons today when it treats New York's coercive system as a program which *merely* "encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities." The abandonment is all the more dangerous to liberty because of the Court's legal exaltation of the orthodox and its derogation of unbelievers.

Under our system of religious freedom, people have gone to their religious sanctuaries not because they feared the law but because they loved their God. The choice of all has been as free as the choice of those who answered the call to worship moved only by the music of the old Sunday morning church bells. The spiritual mind of man has thus been free to believe, disbelieve, or doubt, without repression, great or small, by the heavy hand of government. Statutes authorizing such repression have been stricken. Before today, our judicial opinions have refrained from drawing invidious distinctions between those who believe in no religion and those who do believe. The First Amendment has lost much if the religious follower and the atheist are no longer to be judicially regarded as entitled to equal justice under law.

State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy field. It too often substitutes force for prayer, hate for love, and persecution for persuasion. Government should not be allowed, under cover of the soft euphemism of "cooperation," to steal into the sacred area of religious choice.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Dissenting:

The deeply divisive controversy aroused by the attempts to secure public school pupils for sectarian instruction would promptly end if the advocates of such instruction were content to have the school "close its doors or suspend its operations"—that is, dismiss classes in their entirety, without discrimination—instead of seeking to use the public schools as the instrument for securing attendance at denominational classes. The unwillingness of the promoters of this movement to dispense with such use of the public schools betrays a surprising want of confidence in the inherent power of the

various faiths to draw children to outside sectarian classes—an attitude that hardly reflects the faith of the greatest religious spirits.

Mr. Justice Jackson, Dissenting:

As one whose children, as a matter of free choice, have been sent to privately supported Church schools, I may challenge the Court's suggestion that opposition to this plan can only be anti-religious, atheistic, or agnostic. My evangelistic brethren confuse an objection to compulsion with an objection to religion. It is possible to hold a faith with enough confidence to believe that what should be rendered to God does not need to be decided and collected by Caesar.

The day that this country ceases to be free for irreligion it will cease to be free for religion—except for the sect that can win political power. The same epithetical jurisprudence used by the Court today to beat down those who oppose pressuring children into some religion can devise as good epithets tomorrow against those who object to pressuring them into a favored religion. And, after all, if we concede to the State power and wisdom to single out "duly constituted religious" bodies as exclusive alternatives for compulsory secular instruction, it would be logical to also uphold the power and wisdom to choose the true faith among those "duly constituted." We start down a rough road when we begin to mix compulsory public education with compulsory godliness.

2.10 Official Public School Prayers? No.^o

Hugo L. Black and Others

[The New Hyde Park, New York] Board of Education . . . directed the School District's principal to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day:

"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country."

^o Majority (7-1) decision, *Engel v. Vitale* 368 U.S. 1261 (1962). Many footnotes and references in the original decision are here omitted.

This daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of the State Board of Regents, a governmental agency. . . .

We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty. The nature of such a prayer has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this and the trial court expressly so found. . . .

We agree . . . that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. . . .

Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominational neutral, nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitation of the Establishment Clause . . . of the First Amendment [which] . . . rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same history showed that many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied upon the support of government to spread its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion" by a civil magistrate. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand. . . .

It was in large part to get completely away from this sort of systematic religious persecution that the Founders brought into being our Nation, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights with its

prohibition against any governmental establishment of religion. The New York laws officially prescribing the Regents' prayer are inconsistent with both the purposes of the Establishment Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself.

It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, could be more wrong. The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And perhaps it is not too much to say that since the beginning of that history many people have devoutly believed that "More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of." It was doubtless largely due to men who believed this that there grew up a sentiment that caused men to leave the cross-currents of officially established state religions and religious persecution in Europe and come to this country filled with the hope that they could find a place in which they could pray when they pleased to the God of their faith in the language they chose. And there were men of this same faith in the power of prayer who led the fight for adoption of our Constitution and also for our Bill of Rights with the very guarantees of religious freedom that forbid the sort of governmental activity which New York has attempted here. These men knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an end to governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not written to destroy either. They knew rather that it was written to quiet well-justified fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray to. It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.²¹

²¹ There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith

Mr. Justice [William O.] Douglas, Concurring:

The point for decision is whether the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise. Our system at the federal and state levels is presently honeycombed with such financing.²² Nevertheless, I think it is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it takes. . . .

My problem today would be uncomplicated but for *Everson v. Board of Education* 330 U.S. 1 (1946) which allowed taxpayers' money to be used to pay "the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which" the fares of pupils attending public and other schools were also paid. The *Everson* case seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First Amendment. Its result is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy children.

in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this instance.

²² "There are many 'aids' to religion in this country at all levels of government. To mention but a few at the federal level, one might begin by observing that the very First Congress which wrote the First Amendment provided for chaplains in both Houses and in the armed services. There is compulsory chapel at the service academies, and religious services are held in federal hospitals and prisons. The President issues religious proclamations. The Bible is used for the administration of oaths. N.Y.A. and W.P.A. funds were available to parochial schools during the depression. Veterans receiving money under the 'G.I.' Bill of 1944 could attend denominational schools, to which payments were made directly by the government. During World War II, federal money was contributed to denominational schools for the training of nurses. The benefits of the National School Lunch Act are available to students in private as well as public schools. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 specifically made money available to non-public hospitals. The slogan 'In God We Trust' is used by the Treasury Department, and Congress recently added God to the pledge of allegiance. There is Bible-reading in the schools of the District of Columbia, and religious instruction is given in the District's National Training School for Boys. Religious organizations are exempt from the federal income tax and are granted postal privileges. Up to defined limits—15 per cent of the adjusted gross income of individuals and 5 per cent of the net income of corporations—contributions to religious organizations are deductible for federal income tax purposes. There are limits to the deductibility of gifts and bequests to religious institutions made under the federal gift and estate tax laws. This list of federal 'aids' could easily be expanded, and of course there is a long list in each state." Fellman, *The Limits of Freedom*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1959, pp. 40-41.

Yet by the same token, public funds could be used to satisfy other needs of children in parochial schools—lunches, books, and tuition being obvious examples. Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in dissent what I think is durable First Amendment philosophy:

The reasons underlying the Amendment's policy have not vanished with time or diminished in force. Now as when it was adopted the price of religious freedom is double. It is that the church and religion shall live both within and upon that freedom. There cannot be freedom of religion, safeguarded by the state, and intervention by the church or its agencies in the state's domain or dependency on its largesse. The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the state. For when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting. Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by numbers alone will benefit most, there another. That is precisely the history of societies which have had an established religion and dissident groups. It is the very thing Jefferson and Madison experienced and sought to guard against, whether in its blunt or in its more screened forms. The end of such strife cannot be other than to destroy the cherished liberty. The dominating group will achieve the dominant benefit; or all will embroil the state in their dissensions.

What New York does with this prayer is a break with that tradition. I therefore join the Court in reversing the judgment below.

Mr. Justice [Potter] Stewart, Dissenting:

With all respect, I think the Court has misapplied a great constitutional principle. I cannot see how an "official religion" is established by letting those who want to say a prayer say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation. . . .

The Court today says that the state and federal governments are without constitutional power to prescribe any particular form of words to be recited by any group of the American people on any subject touching religion. The third stanza of the "Star-Spangled Banner," made our National Anthem by Act of Congress in 1931, contains these verses:

Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n rescued land
 Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserved us a nation!
 Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
 And this be our motto "In God is our Trust."

In 1954 Congress added a phrase to the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag so that it now contains the words "one Nation *under God*, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." In 1952 Congress enacted legislation calling upon the President each year to proclaim a National Day of Prayer. Since 1865 the words "In God We Trust" have been impressed on our coins.

Countless similar examples could be listed, but there is no need to belabor the obvious. I do not believe that this Court, or the Congress, or the President has by the actions and practices I have mentioned established an "official religion" in violation of the Constitution. And I do not believe the State of New York has done so in this case. What each has done has been to recognize and to follow the deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual traditions of our Nation—traditions which come down to us from those who almost two hundred years ago avowed their "firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence" when they proclaimed the freedom and independence of this brave new world.

I dissent.²³

²³ Editors' note: Compare the following statement by R. Freeman Butts: "I believe that it is an unwarranted leap of logic and of history to say that because we are a religious people or a religious nation, therefore our government rests on religion. This leap is sometimes made deliberately and sometimes unintentionally. So now we as educators should look again at the foundations of our governmental system. Is our Constitution a secular or a religious document? Is our government a secular institution which leaves religion to citizens as individuals or should it become an ally of religious institutions by promoting religion among the people through the schools? Do the Regents and Board of Superintendents who want school children to highlight God in the Declaration of Independence also want the children to read all else its author said about God and Christianity? Does the Congress that made 'One Nation, Under God,' the national motto want children to study the various theological meanings of God under public school teachers in public school classes? . . . Does anyone want a religious test established for public school teachers to make sure that they will promote a 'proper' belief in God in the classroom? . . . Can we possibly use the schools to encourage belief in God or promote religion among the people without persuading students to take religious instruction? . . . I think not.

"To be sure, many Americans have always been religious, more now than at any time in our history. I believe this is a good thing. What it means is

2.11 The Lord's Prayer and Bible Reading as Public School Requirements? No.*

Tom C. Clark and Others

... It is true that religion has been closely identified with our history and government. As we said in . . . *Zorach v. Clauson*, . . . "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Likewise each house of the Congress provides through its chaplain an opening prayer, and the sessions of this court are declared open by the crier in a short ceremony, the

that religion flourishes under separation of church and state more than it did under the established religions which the founding fathers sought to abolish. But does this flourishing of religion give us license to reinterpret our history, or blur the lines between morality and religion, or identify religious individuals as the only good citizens? I think not. Freedom of religion and separation of church and state were indispensable as ingredients in forming our nation. They are even more indispensable today as ingredients in maintaining and preserving our nation."—R. Freeman Butts, "The Relation Between Religion and Education," *Progressive Education*, 33: 140-142, September 1956.

* Tom C. Clark, majority opinion, *School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp; Murray v. Curlett* [Maryland], 83 S. Ct., 1560 (1963); or 371 U.S. 807, 907, 944 (1963).

The Court's decision dealt with two cases, from Maryland and Pennsylvania. These cases involved challenges to state law and to school district policy requiring the reading of Bible verses to the students each morning, and/or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the classes in unison. The 1963 decision makes it quite explicit that such enforced public school religious practices are unconstitutional; but, on the other hand, that other religious elements in public life would not be affected.

It may be noted that the majority opinion is by Justice Clark, a Presbyterian active in the affairs of his church, and that the concurring opinions include statements by Justice Goldberg, the Court's only Jew, and Justice Brennan, the Court's only Roman Catholic. The lengthy opinion by Justice Brennan canvassed the history of the church-state conflict to show long concern in this country about any breakdown of church-state separation. Brennan's opinion concluded: "The principles which we reaffirm and apply today can hardly be thought novel or radical. They are, in truth, as old as the republic itself."

The full decision constitutes an excellent summary of the recent history of the adjudication of constitutional questions regarding church-state-school relationships.

final phrase of which invokes the grace of God. Again, there are such manifestations in our military forces, where those of our citizens who are under the restrictions of military service wish to engage in voluntary worship. Indeed, only last year an official survey of the country indicated that 64 per cent of our people have church membership . . . while less than 3 per cent profess no religion whatever. . . . It can be truly said, therefore, that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people who, in the words of Madison, are "earnestly praying, as . . . in duty bound, that the Supreme Law-giver of the universe . . . guide them into every measure which may be worthy of His . . . blessing. . . ." . . .

This is not to say, however, that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution suffered by our forebears . . . could have planted our belief in liberty of religious opinion any more deeply in our heritage. It is true that this liberty frequently was not realized by the colonists, but this is readily attributable to their close ties to the mother country. . . . However, the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams . . . came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our states. This freedom to worship was indispensable in a country whose people came from the four quarters of the earth and brought with them diversity of religious opinion. Today authorities list 83 separate religious bodies, each with memberships exceeding 50,000 existing among our people, as well as innumerable smaller groups. . . .

Almost a hundred years ago in *Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati*, Judge Alphonzo Taft, father of the revered Chief Justice, in an unpublished opinion stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as one of "absolute equality before the law of all religious opinions and sects. . . . The Government is neutral, and while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages none."

Before examining this "neutral" position in which the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment place our Government it is well that we discuss the reach of the amendment under the cases of this Court.

First, this Court has decisively settled that the First Amend-

ment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Twenty-three years ago, in *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), this Court, through Mr. Justice Roberts, said: "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that [14th] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The 14th Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. . . ." In a series of cases since *Cantwell* the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that doctrine, and we do so now. . . .

Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the establishment clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another. Almost 20 years ago in *Everson* . . . the Court said that "[n]either a state nor the Federal government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another," and Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, agreed: "There is no answer to the proposition . . . that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense. . . . This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its rigidity." . . .

Further, Mr. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton, declared: "The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." . . . The same conclusion

has been firmly maintained ever since that time . . . and we reaffirm it now.

While none of the parties to either of these cases has questioned these basic conclusions of the Court, both of which have been long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed, others continue to question their history, logic and efficacy. Such contentions, in the light of the consistent interpretation of cases of this Court seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises. . . .

It is insisted that unless these religious exercises are permitted a "religion of secularism" is established in the schools. We agree of course, that the state may not establish a "religion of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus "preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe." *Zorach v. Clauson*. . . . We do not agree, however, that this decision in any sense has that effect. In addition, it might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistent with the First Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises, required by the states in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion.²⁴

²⁴ Editors' note: In religion, as in anything else, the proper function of the public schools is not indoctrination, but understanding. On this point, Theodore Powell has suggested that the Supreme Court decisions of 1962 and 1963 may in the long run prove of benefit to religion, for they may lead to a clearer understanding of the specific elements of religion which may, or which may not, be emphasized in public schools:

"Instead of bitter battles to maintain a feeble recognition of religion by means of opening exercises with little meaning or educational effectiveness, school boards should be encouraged to adopt a program based on the proper function of the public schools, not worship or indoctrination, but education. . . . The purpose of the public school is to impart knowledge, not to instill faith. This, in itself, is no small task. Real understanding by pupils of the place of religion in the development of our civilization should be a

Finally, we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a state to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those affected, collides with the majority's right to free exercise of religion.²⁵ While the free exercise clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the right of free exercise to anyone it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the state to practice its beliefs. . . . In the relationship between man and religion, the state is firmly committed to a position of neutrality. Though the application of that rule requires interpretation of a delicate sort, the rule itself is clearly and concisely stated in the words of the First Amendment. . . . [Therefore] we hold that the practices at issue and the laws upholding them are unconstitutional. . . .

Mr. Justice Stewart, Dissenting:

I think the records in the two cases before us are so fundamentally deficient as to make impossible an informed or responsible determination of the constitutional issues presented. Specifically, I cannot agree that on these records we can say that the establishment clause has necessarily been violated. . . .

The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free

goal for every public school."—Theodore Powell, "The School Prayer Battle," *Saturday Review*, 46: 62–64, 77–78, April 20, 1963. By permission.

Compare the following statement by Albert Schweitzer: "Christianity has need of thought that it may come to the consciousness of its real self. For centuries it treasured the great commandment of love and mercy as traditional truth without recognizing it as a reason for opposing slavery, witch burning, torture, and all the other ancient and medieval forms of inhumanity. It was only when it experienced the influence of the thinking of the Age of Enlightenment that it was stirred into entering the struggle for humanity. The remembrance of this ought to preserve it forever from assuming any air of superiority in comparison with thought."—Albert Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1933, p. 236. Compare Albert Guerard, *Bottle in the Sea*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, Chap. 1, "Prove All Things."

²⁵ We are not of course presented with and therefore do not pass upon a situation such as military service, where the Government regulates the temporal and geographic environment of individuals to a point that, unless it permits voluntary religious services to be conducted with the use of government facilities, military personnel would be unable to engage in the practice of their faiths.

exercise thereof. . . ." It is, I think, a fallacious oversimplification to regard these two provisions as establishing a single constitutional standard of "separation of church and state," which can be mechanically applied in every case to delineate the required boundaries between government and religion. . . . A single obvious example should suffice to make the point. Spending Federal funds to employ chaplains for the armed forces might be said to violate the establishment clause. Yet a lonely soldier stationed at some faraway outpost could surely complain that a government which did not provide him the opportunity for pastoral guidance was affirmatively prohibiting the free exercise of his religion. And such examples could readily be multiplied. The short of the matter is simply that the two relevant clauses of the First Amendment cannot accurately be reflected in a stark metaphor which by its very nature may distort rather than illumine the problems involved in a particular case. . . .

As a matter of history, the First Amendment was adopted solely as a limitation upon the newly created national Government. The events leading to its adoption strongly suggest that the establishment clause was primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but would also be unable to interfere with existing state establishments. See *McGowan v. Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 440-441 [1961]. Each state was left free to go its own way and pursue its own policy with respect to religion. Thus Virginia from the beginning pursued a policy of disestablishmentarianism. Massachusetts, by contrast, had an established church until well into the nineteenth century.

So matters stood until the adoption of the 14th Amendment, or more accurately, until this Court's decision in *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In that case the Court said: "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The 14th Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws."

I accept without question that the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against impairment by the states embraces in full the right of free exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment, and I yield to no one in my conception of the breadth of that

freedom. See *Braufeld v. Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 616 [1961] (dissenting opinion). I accept, too, the proposition that the 14th Amendment has somehow absorbed the establishment clause, although it is not without irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave the states free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon their autonomy. But I can not agree with what seems to me the insensitive definition of the establishment clause contained in the Court's opinion, nor with the different but, I think, equally mechanistic definitions contained in the separate opinions which have been filed. . . .

That the central value embodied in the First Amendment—and, more particularly, in the guarantee of "liberty" contained in the 14th—is the safeguarding of an individual's right to free exercise of his religion has been consistently recognized. . . . It is this concept of constitutional protection embodied in our decision which makes the cases before us such difficult ones for me. For there is involved in these cases a substantial free exercise claim on the part of those who affirmatively desire to have their children's school day open with the reading of passages from the Bible. . . .

It has become accepted that the decision in *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 [1925], upholding the right of parents to send their children to nonpublic schools, was ultimately based upon the recognition of the validity of the free exercise claim involved in that situation. It might be argued here that parents who wanted their children to be exposed to religious influences in school could, under *Pierce*, send their children to private or parochial schools. But the consideration which renders this contention too facile to be determinative has already been recognized by the court: "Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." *Murdock v. Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105, 111 [1943].

It might also be argued that parents who want their children exposed to religious influences can adequately fulfill that wish off school property and outside school time. With all its surface persuasiveness, however, this argument seriously misconceives the basic constitutional justification for permitting the exercises at issue in these cases. For a compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life that if religious exercises are held to be an

impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of religion. And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of secularism, or at the least as Government support of the beliefs of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted only in private....

. . . religious exercises are not constitutionally invalid if they simply reflect differences which exist in the society from which the school draws its pupils. They become constitutionally invalid only if their administration places the sanction of secular authority behind one or more particular religious or irreligious beliefs.

To be specific, it seems to me clear that certain types of exercises would present situations in which no possibility of coercion on the part of secular officials could be claimed to exist. Thus, if such exercises were held either before or after the official school day, or if the school schedule were such that participation were merely one among a number of desirable alternatives, it could hardly be contended that the exercises did anything more than to provide an opportunity for the voluntary expression of religious belief. On the other hand, a law which provided for religious exercises during the school day and which contained no excusal provision would obviously be unconstitutionally coercive upon those who did not wish to participate. And even under a law containing an excusal provision, if the exercises were held during the school day, and no equally desirable alternatives were provided by the school authorities, the likelihood that children might be under at least some psychological compulsion to participate would be great. In a case such as the latter, however, I think we would err if we assumed coercion in the absence of any evidence.²⁶

²⁶ Cf. "The task of separating the secular from the religious in education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy. To lay down a sweeping constitutional doctrine as demanded by complainant and apparently approved by the Court, applicable alike to all school boards of the nation . . . is to decree a uniform, rigid and, if we are consistent, an unchanging standard for countless school boards representing and serving highly localized groups which not only differ from each other but which themselves from time to time change

Viewed in this light, it seems to me clear that the records in both of the cases before us are wholly inadequate to support an informed or responsible decision. . . .

QUESTIONS AND READINGS FOR STUDY AND DISCUSSION

Religion in a Democratic Frame of Reference

CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION: PROS AND CONS

What are meant by the following: establishment of religion? multiple establishment? disestablishment? Briefly trace the history of these three church-state relationships from colonial times to the present.

Bendiner, Robert, "Our Right not to Believe," *Saturday Evening Post*, 235: 10-12, February 10, 1962; versus

Graham, Billy, "Our Right to Require Belief," *Saturday Evening Post*, 235: 8-10, February 17, 1962.

Blanshard, Paul, *American Freedom and Catholic Power*, rev. ed., Boston: The Beacon Press, 1958; versus

Creedon, L. P., and Falcon, W. D., *United for Separation: An Analysis of POAU Assualts on Catholicism*, Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1959.

*Brickman, W. W., and Lehrer, Stanley, editors, *Religion, Government and Education*, New York: Society for the Advancement of Education, 1961; versus

*Dondeyne, Albert, *Faith and the World*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963 (especially pp. 260-265).

Butts, R. Freeman, *The American Tradition in Religion and Education*, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950; versus

Kerwin, Jerome G., *Catholic Viewpoint on Church and State*, New York: Hanover House, 1960 (Imprimatur by Francis Cardinal Spellman).

attitudes. It seems to me that to do so is to allow zeal for our own idea of what is good in public instruction to induce us to accept the role of a super board of education for every school district in the nation." *McCollum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203, 237 [1948], (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson).

- Choper, Jesse H., "Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard," 47 *Minnesota Law Review*, 329-416, January 1963; versus
- Kauper, Paul G., "Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court," 61 *Michigan Law Review*, 1031-1068, April 1963; *and/or*
- Cross, R. P., and others (pros and cons), "The Meaning of Religion in the First Amendment," *Catholic World*, 197: 276-317, August 1963.
- Manwaring, David R., *Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962; *and/or*
- O'Dea, Thomas F., *American Catholic Dilemma*, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958; Mentor-Omega, 1962; See also Thomas F. O'Dea, "Five Dilemmas in the Institutionalization of Religion," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 1: 30-41, October 1961.
- Murray, John Courtney, S. J., *We Hold These Truths*, New York: Sheed & Ward, Inc., 1960; versus
- Pfeffer, Leo, *Church, State and Freedom*, Boston: Beacon, 1953; or Murray, A. Victor, *The State and the Church in a Free Society*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
- Shields, Currin V., *Democracy and Catholicism in America*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958; versus
- Sanders, Thomas G., *Protestant Concepts of Church and State—Historical Backgrounds and Approaches for the Future*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964.
- Harrison, Joseph W., "The Bible, the Constitution and Public Education," 29 *Tennessee Law Review*, 1-56 (1962); versus
- Catholic lawyers, "The Constitution and Parochial Schools" (synopsis of NCWC legal-department study), *Catholic Digest*, 26: 16-20, May 1962; or Paul G. Kauper, "Church and State: Cooperative Separatism," 60 *Michigan Law Review*, 1-40, November 1961; the same, condensed in *Phi Delta Kappan*, 43: 331-336, May 1962.

STATE MONEY FOR PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS: PROS AND CONS

Is it possible for the state to give aid to children attending a private or a denominational school (on the "child-benefit" theory), without at the same time providing special benefits to the denomination or private interest which controls that school? The following pro-con bibliography should shed light on this question—though there is real danger that the question will engender more "heat" than "light."

- Blanshard, Paul, *Religion and the Schools: The Great Controversy*, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1963; versus
- Drinan, Robert F., S.J., *Religion, The Courts and Public Policy*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.
- Dykstra, John W., "Holland's Religious Segregation," *Christian Century*, 72: 1207-1208, October 19, 1955; and "Parochial Divisions in American Life," *Christian Century*, 75: 465-467, April 16, 1958; reply, *Commonweal*, 68: 115-116, May 2, 1958; versus
- Blum, Virgil C., "'Freedom of Choice' in Schools," *U.S. News*, 43: 109-110f., October 25, 1957; reply by Glenn L. Archer, *U.S. News*, 43: 134, November 8, 1957. Read Father Blum's more recent *Freedom of Choice in Education*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959.
- Fleming, Arthur S., "The 'Shared Time' Program Is Worth a Try," *Good Housekeeping*, 156: 48B-50, February 1963; versus
- Editorial, "Shared Time Plan Faces Hectic Future," *Christian Century*, 79: 317-318, March 14, 1962, or
- Handlin, Oscar versus Ernest van den Haag, "Federal Aid to Parochial Schools," *Commentary*, 32: 1-11, July 1961.
- Jencks, Christopher, "Catholics and Our Schools," *New Republic*, 146: 21-24, March 19, 1962; versus
- Neff, F. C., "Education—Yes, Metaphysics—No," *Educational Theory*, 13: 59-64, January 1963.
- Thomas, Maurice J., "Voluntary Religious Isolation" versus Vergil C. Blum, S. J., "Tax Support for Independent Education," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 40: 347-353, June 1959; and/or
- Smith, Elwyn A., *Church and State in Your Community*, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963.

Religious Commitment and Scientific Objectivity

BIBLE READING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Although in 1963 the Supreme Court ruled on this topic (see Selection 2.11), the precise meaning and application of the Court's decision will undoubtedly be a live issue for years to come. Can the Bible be read as dispassionately as other books of history or literature? In a community containing Jews as well as Christians, would it be proper to read from the New Testament? In a community containing Catholics as well as

Protestants would it be proper to read a Protestant translation of the Bible? In a community containing agnostics as well as theists, would it be proper to read from Hubbard's *American Bible* (see below)? In a community containing Orientals, how about the *Vedas*, or the sayings of Confucius? Would you admit that all six of the following books are "Bibles"? If not, why not? Would a negative reply to this question help explain why the Court ruled as it did?

The Holy Scriptures (Jewish), Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1959.

The Holy Bible (Roman Catholic—Confraternity edition), New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1950.

The Holy Bible (Protestant—Revised Standard version), New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1952.

Jefferson, Thomas, *The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth* ("The Jefferson Bible"), Boston: The Beacon Press, 1941.

Hubbard, Alice (ed.), *An American Bible*, New York: Wm. H. Wise & Co., Inc., 1946.

Ballou, Robert, *The Bible of the World*, New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1949.

An "Interfaith Bible" for use in public schools is now in process of publication (1963) through the joint editorship of Walter M. Abbott, S.J., Rabbi Arthur Gilbert and Protestant Dr. Rolfe Lanier.

For a general treatment of this topic, read Donald E. Boles, *The Bible, Religion and the Public Schools* (rev. ed.), Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1962. For study of different interpretations that are given to specific chapters and verses of the Bible, read *The Interpreter's Bible*, a twelve-volume work by scholars from many diverse Protestant denominations, and published in 1957 by the Abingdon Press.

MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES

A. What are some of the distinctive values of Western civilization? Numerous references might be cited, but we list only five:

Barr, Stringfellow, *The Three Worlds of Man*, Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1963 (A brilliant summary of our Greek philosophical heritage).

Bewkes, E. G., et al., and Keene, J. C., *The Western Heritage of Faith and Reason*, rev. ed., New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1940, 1963.

- Cogley, John, *Natural Law and Modern Society*, Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1963 (especially pp. 199-276).
- Jones, W. T., and others, *Approaches to Ethics*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962 (especially pp. xvii-xxvi).
- Lamprecht, S., *Our Religious Traditions*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.

B. Discuss the following definition: Moral and spiritual values are values which, when shared, are enhanced rather than diminished.

Make a list of values which should be given especial emphasis in the primary grades; in the intermediate grades; in the upper grades. Which of these can best be taught in parochial schools? Which can best be taught in public schools?

- Ahlschwede, A. M., and others, "The New Frontier between Religion and Public Schools," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 45: 121-144, December 1963.
- Burtt, E. A., "The Value Presuppositions of Science," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 13: 99-106, March 1957.
- Carr, William G., "How Can We Teach Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools?" *NEA Journal*, 40: 177-178, March 1951; "The Role of the Independent School in American Democracy," *America*, 95: 223, May 26, 1956.
- De Wolf, L. H., *The Religious Revolt Against Reason*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1949, pp. 61-69, 108-135 (Commitment versus Objectivity).
- Hartford, E. F., *Moral Values in Public Education* (bibliog.), New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958.
- Miller, William Lee, "The Fight Over America's Fourth R," *Reporter*, 14: 20-26, March 22, 1956.
- Neff, Frederick C., "How Moral is Secular Education?" *Christian Century*, 73: 1323-1325, November 14, 1956.
- Rossi, P. H., and Rossi, S. A., "Some Effects of Parochial School Education in America," *Daedulus*, 90: 300-328, Spring 1961.
- Ryan, Msgr. Carl J., "Democracy as a Religion," *School and Society*, 83: 217-219, June 23, 1956.

RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY: SOME CURRENT ISSUES IN RELIGION: PROS AND CONS

- A. Can religion be taught with the same freedom and objectivity as science or history? To what extent is it necessary for a teacher to under-

stand the major current religious issues before he is qualified either to "teach" religion or to "teach about" religion? Should a child be taught to believe in, and be committed to, his own religion before he learns about other religions? What is the best age-level to introduce students to the diversity of religious and philosophical viewpoints? The following references present pros and cons on some of the viewpoints currently most debated. Be sure to read books or articles representing *more than one* viewpoint.

- Beck, Lewis White, *Six Secular Philosophers*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960; versus
- Stiernotte, Alfred P., *Mysticism and the Modern Mind*, New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959.
- Bronstein, D. J., Krikorian, Y. H., and Wiener, P. P. (eds.), *Basic Problems of Philosophy*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957 (Chap. 7); versus
- Edwards, Paul, and Pap, Arthur, eds., *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957 (Chaps. 7 and 8).
- Brantl, George, *Catholicism*, New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1961; versus
- Dunstan, J. Leslie, *Protestantism*, New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1962.
- Dillenberger, John, *Protestant Thought and Natural Science*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960; versus
- Bronowski, J., *Science and Human Values*, New York: Harper (TB505), 1959.
- Huxley, Julian, *Knowledge, Morality and Destiny*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957; versus
- Maritain, Jacques, *True Humanism*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950.
- Jessop, T. E., *The Freedom of the Individual in Society*, Toronto, Canada: Ryerson Press, 1948 (p. 45f. defend a supernatural foundation of values); versus
- Stace, W. T., in *Mid-Century: The Social Implications of Scientific Progress*, ed. by J. E. Burchard, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950. (Pp. 213-218 defend the naturalistic foundation of values.)
- Johnson, F. Ernest (ed.), *Patterns of Faith in America Today*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957; and/or

- Kuenzli, A. E. (ed.), *Reconstruction in Religion: A Symposium*, Boston: The Beacon Press, 1961; and/or
- Kilpatrick, W. H., and others, "Religion and Education: A Symposium," *Progressive Education*, 33: 129-155, September 1956.
- Klotz, John W., "Evolutionary Theory: Some Theological Implications," *Christianity Today*, 6: 25-27, May 11, 1962; or, Henry M. Morris, *The Bible and Modern Science*, rev. ed., Chicago: Moody Press, 1956; versus
- Kennedy, Gail (ed.), *Evolution and Religion*, Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1957.
- Nicholson, John A., *Philosophy of Religion*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950; versus
- Bettenson, Henry, *Documents of the Christian Church*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- Pelikan, Jaroslav, *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism*, Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1959; versus
- Kerr, W. S., *A Handbook of the Papacy*, New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1951 (an Anglican bishop's critique).
- Schideler, Emerson W., "A Protestant Doctrine of Education," *Christian Century*, 78: 1138-1140, September 27, 1961; and/or
- Scharper, Philip, "The Second Vatican Council: A Roman Catholic View," *Christianity and Crisis*, 22: 161-164 October 1, 1962; E. M. Borgese, "The Ecumenical Council: The Church Embraces the Future," *Nation*, 196: 23-27, January 12, 1963.
- Shapley, Harlow (ed.), *Science Ponders Religion*, Des Moines, Iowa: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960; versus
- Booth, Edwin (ed.), *Religion Ponders Science*, Des Moines, Iowa: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963.
- Smith, Wilbur, *Therefore Stand*, Natick, Mass.: W. A. Wilde Company, 1949; versus
- *Robinson, John A., *Honest to God*, London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1963 (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963).
- Whale, J. S., *The Protestant Tradition*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955 (Part IV); versus
- Janelle, Pierre, *The Catholic Reformation*, Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1949.

- Wilson, Colin, *Religion and the Rebel*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1957; versus
 Wilson, John, *Language and the Pursuit of Truth*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958.

Open Book Exam

- Explain and illustrate the following three meanings of the term "religion":
 - propitiation to the gods (or to God) for help—usually through rites and rituals;
 - a feeling of humility before the unknown and a sense of reverence and awe;
 - moral living.
 Which one of these three meanings most sharply differentiates public from parochial schools? What do you cite as evidence for your conclusion?
- Are "reverence" or "salvation" higher values than "liberty"? Need these values be in conflict? (See T. M. Greene, "Religion and the Philosophy of Education," *Religious Education*, March–April 1954, pp. 82–88; M. R. Cohen, "The Dark Side of Religion" in *The Faith of a Liberal*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1946, pp. 337–361.)
- The following ten attitudes have been listed as values to be cultivated by all educators interested in the improvement of student thinking:

1. Intellectual curiosity	6. Conviction of cause-and-effect relationships
2. Intellectual honesty	7. Disposition to be systematic
3. Objectivity	8. Flexibility
4. Intelligent skepticism	9. Persistence
5. Open-mindedness	10. Decisiveness ²⁷

 Should these be classified as "moral and spiritual values"? Why, or why not?
- In Samuel Johnson's *Erewhon*, sick persons were put in jail, but immoral persons were placed in hospitals. In what respects may an immoral person be considered as a diseased person? Does the normal "bell-shaped curve" apply to "moral education" as well as to the "training of the mind"?

²⁷ W. H. Burton, R. B. Kimball and R. L. Wing, *Education for Effective Thinking*, Des Moines, Iowa: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960, p. 268.

5. In American society does the state exercise a monopoly in providing and maintaining schools? In *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* precisely what authority was given (and denied) to the state? to the church? Is this sound policy for the United States? Why or why not?
6. Distinguish and illustrate the following types of "friendly relationships" of church and state: (a) exemption from taxation; (b) the right to establish non-public (private or parochial) schools; (c) participation in school lunch programs; (d) free textbooks and transportation; (e) complete state financial support by the state of schools whose curriculum is determined by private or church authorities. In your view, what should be the limits (if any) to public support of sectarian education?
7. How would a teacher's views concerning human nature (for example, "In Adam's fall, we sinned all"), or concerning man's ultimate destiny (for example, "salvation," "rewards in Heaven") affect the manner in which he might teach (a) mathematics? (b) music? (c) history? (d) language? Given the same teacher, holding the same views, how would his teaching be different in a public than in a parochial school? Be specific.
8. Prepare a two minute discussion, or write a 200-400 word essay on *one* of the paragraphs below.
 - A. In 1925 the United States Supreme Court in the Oregon case rejected as unconstitutional a state law which could have led to the abolition of all private and parochial elementary schools in the state of Oregon. In terms of your own conception of freedom of religion in America, and of the need for a religious component in education, what are the arguments for and/or against a policy of requiring all children to attend public schools?

OR

- B. What are the arguments for and/or against our policy of tax exemption of properties devoted to religious purposes?
9. Compare and evaluate the following statements:
 - A. "There's no such thing as separation of church and state to any man who believes in God. It's a shibboleth. It's always been a shibboleth. The Constitution doesn't say anything about separation of church and state, but it does state that this is a nation that believes in God. There can't be any separation of church and state unless you want to be a Communist or a materialist—and if you want to, that's your privilege."

"The children in the church schools are children of taxpayers. They deserve just as much consideration [as children in the public schools]."—Francis Cardinal McIntyre²⁸

- B. "Protestant leaders and spokesmen of other religions have repeatedly expressed their hope that the Second Vatican Council define the Church's position on religious liberty. They realize that two distinct views on this matter are taught by Catholic theologians in our century. Some theologians, the representatives of the older school, assert that error has no rights, and that therefore in "Catholic" countries governments should not tolerate Churches teaching erroneous doctrines. In such countries, they teach, the government should protect and advance the true religion. Only when Catholics are in a minority is religious liberty a good to be striven for, since in that situation it will favor the true Church. Other theologians, belonging to the newer school, the majority position today, teach that religious liberty is a good promised by the gospel, to be announced and defended by the Church in whatever situation she finds herself. These theologians reject the idea that "error has no rights," since error is an abstraction and since people who err do have rights. These theologians derive their understanding of religious liberty from the notion of man and the notion of faith revealed in the Scriptures and taught by the Church. Man is created by God to seek him with his mind and heart and this requires freedom; and the very notion of faith, through which man is reconciled and united to his God, implies a free search and a free surrender. Man can be faithful to his destiny only if he follows his good conscience. From this understanding of the gospel, these authors would say that interference and pressure by governments in the area of religion is never legitimate, except temporarily in unusual circumstances, when the exercise of a religion should interfere with the public welfare of society"—
- Gregory Baum²⁹
10. Prepare a two-or three-minute speech, or write a 200–400-word theme in defense of (or in criticism of) the position represented by any one of the following four statements.

²⁸ Francis Cardinal McIntyre, Archbishop of Los Angeles, quoted in *The New York Times*, May 21, 1963, p. 23.

²⁹ Gregory Baum, "Pacem in Terris and Unity," *The Ecumenist* 1:73–75, June–July 1963. By permission.

Gregory Baum is editor, *The Ecumenist: A Journal for Promoting Christian Unity*, New York: The Paulist (Roman Catholic) Press.

- A. "In such a [Catholic parochial] school, in harmony with the Church and Christian family, the various branches of secular learning will not enter into conflict with religious instruction to the manifest detriment of education. And if, when occasion arises, it be deemed necessary to have the students read authors propounding false doctrine, for the purpose of refuting it, this will be done after due preparation and with such an antidote of sound doctrine, that it will not only do no harm, but will be an aid to the Christian formation of youth. . . ."—Pope Pius XI.³⁰

OR

- B. "I would define the freedom of speech as the exclusion of governmental force from the process by which public opinion is formed on public issues. Any governmental action which makes it more difficult or hazardous to take one side of a public issue than to take the other is an abridgment, whether or not this was its avowed purpose. 'Public issues' for this purpose, are not limited to those on which governmental action may be taken, but include philosophy, religion, ethics, esthetics, social sciences, etc.—all these, in other words, on which an enlightened public opinion may be deemed desirable. . . .

"Governmental action which tends to regulate the content of public debate, either directly, or by singling out ideological groups or tendencies for special treatment, is permissible only if it . . . has no unnecessary deterrent effect on unprotected speech. . . ."—Laurant B. Frantz.³¹

OR

- C. "Parents have the primary obligation to educate their children and hence the primary right to choose the means of doing so. The state, like the Church is in the field of school education

³⁰ Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, *Divini Illius Magistri* ("On the Christian Education of Youth"), Dec. 31, 1929, New York: The America Press, 1936; reprinted in full in *Philosophy of Education*, edited by H. W. Burns and C. J. Brauner, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1962, pp. 264-288. Reprinted with permission from *America*, the National Catholic Weekly Review, 920 Broadway, New York 10, N.Y.

³¹ Laurant B. Frantz, "The First Amendment in the Balance," 71 *Yale Law Journal*, 1424-1450 at 1449, July 1962. Frantz' quotation raises this question: Does aid to parochial schools "make it more difficult or hazardous to take one side of a public issue than to take the other" with respect to such controversial problems as "naturalism," "scepticism," "birth control," "divorce"?

primarily to help the family and is the educational agent of the family. Parents who wish instruction in sacred doctrine for their children should have the help of the state in this as in other forms of education. To provide this is not to confuse church and state, since the state acts for the family, not for the Church, and does not itself espouse any religious doctrine. To refuse this help is to deny to the parents who wish it the public assistance in education to which they have a right as citizens."—Herbert Johnson.³²


OR

- D. "The exercise of liberty does not carry with it an option on the public treasury. I am free to go to town; this does not mean that the Government must buy me a bus ticket. I have freedom of speech; this does not mean that the Government must hire a hall for me or put me on a network. If I think the police are inadequate, I am free to hire private detectives; this does not mean the Government must pay their salaries. . . .

"The argument [that grants be made to parochial school pupils for their education] comes to this: 'It is constitutional for the Government to subsidize church schools if the money pauses for at least the moment in the pocket of the parents. It is the channel, not the destination that counts.' This is specious reasoning. The fact that the grant pauses enroute to the clerics cannot obviate the fact that they are its true recipients."—C. Stanley Lowell.³³

³² Herbert Johnson, *A Philosophy of Education*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963, p. 99. Copyright 1963 McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. By permission. Herbert Johnson is Professor of Education, University of Notre Dame.

³³ C. Stanley Lowell, "Shall the State Subsidize Church Schools," *Liberty*: 55: 11–15, October 1960. Reprinted from *Liberty*, a Magazine of Religious Freedom, Review and Herald Publishing Association, Takoma Park, Washington 12, D.C. C. Stanley Lowell is Associate Director, Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Washington 6, D.C. See also Mary Perkins Ryan, *Are Parochial Schools the Answer?* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964.



CHAPTER 3

Desegregation in Public Education

Public Education and National Unity

3.1 Introduction: Racial Segregation and the Democratic Ideal

UNLIKE dictatorial forms of government, democracy has everything to gain and nothing to lose from the intelligence of its citizens. In the words of James Madison:

A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.¹

Democracy is basically a method whereby men and women from all walks of life gain confidence in themselves and in their fellow-humans, and thereby move from force to persuasion, from restriction to liberty, from blind obedience to creative effort.

In any society progress depends on developed leadership. True leadership must be renewed from the ranks of the unknown, not from the small group of families already famous and powerful. If one class possesses all the wealth and education, while the laboring class remains both poor and ignorant, labor will inevitably be servile

¹ James Madison, Letter to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in *The Complete Madison: His Basic Writings*, edited by Saul K. Padover, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1953, p. 337.

to capital, and our society will be divided into distinctive, permanent classes. But if education is widely and equally diffused according to ability rather than wealth, children of all classes may attain their maximum potential, and society as a whole will gain from the fuller use of its human resources.

Democracy holds that there is no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society except in the people themselves. If the people make mistakes, the remedy is not to take the power away from them, but to help them in forming their judgment through better education and more open communication. In his First Inaugural Address, Abraham Lincoln expressed democracy's faith in the people as follows:

Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? . . . Truth and justice will surely prevail by the judgment of the great tribunal of the American people.

Democratic education should develop citizens who are "easy to lead, but difficult to drive; easy to govern, but impossible to enslave."² It should make them easy to lead by bringing out latent talent and leadership, conceived in cooperative terms. It should make them impossible to enslave—and, we would add, intolerant of enslavement—because their education will have emphasized individual self-reliance, free expression, and unthwarted communication.

The democratic citizen will admit that, in specialized areas, there are authorities whose technical knowledge may greatly influence decisions concerning public policy. But in a free society, the citizen should never relinquish his personal freedom, autonomy, and moral dignity. External guidance may be a means, but self-direction is an end in itself. The mature man wants self-confidence, courage to face all difficulties, and the consciousness of being man in the fullest sense of the word.

Such a man is possessed by the wish to see the same inner strength develop in others. As he himself abhors alien rule, neither does he wish to rule over others. He is pleased to see life unfolding itself free and strong in his fellow humans. He finds himself happiest in a circle of equals, not surrounded by slaves. In education, his aim is not to exact

² Lord Henry Peter Broughton, Speech in House of Commons, January 29, 1828.

submissive obedience, but to foster young individuals who in due course will themselves be able to form their own lives with freedom and responsibility.³

Such is the democratic ideal which moved our schools in the effort to mould immigrants from various European nationality groups into one American culture. The opening selection by Henry Steele Commager reviews this inspiring story. But the current scene indicates with stark clarity that this campaign has not yet been fully won. How effectively, how genuinely does this idealism extend to include peoples whose cultural and ethnic backgrounds are non-Western and non-Caucasian? Far more to the point, how readily, warmly, or completely do we welcome into full citizenship those Americans of other races, especially the Negro who, tracing his Americanism back at least to Crispus Attucks, has a compelling authentic claim to democracy's rights and responsibilities? The effort to eliminate educational inequities due to racial prejudice is the theme of this chapter and, as all know, for the United States perhaps the heart of this matter lies in the problem of racial segregation in the public schools.

In *The American Dilemma*, his monumental study of the problem of race relations in the United States, Gunnar Myrdal presents a "white man's rank order of discrimination"—a charting of the discrimination patterns, as he discerned them, in the order of their importance to the white American, North (though somewhat less sharply) as well as South.

- Rank 1. Highest in this order stands the bar against intermarriage and sexual intercourse involving white women.
- Rank 2. Next comes the several etiquettes and discriminations, which specifically concern behavior in personal relations. (These are the barriers against dancing, bathing, eating, drinking together, and social intercourse generally; peculiar rules as to handshaking, hat lifting, use of titles, house entrance to be used, social forms when meeting on streets and in work, and so

³ Alf Ross, *Why Democracy?* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 104. By permission. Compare Harry A. Overstreet, *The Mature Mind*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1949.

forth. These patterns are sometimes referred to as the denial of "social equality" in the narrow meaning of the term.

- Rank 3. Thereafter follow the segregations and discriminations in use of public facilities such as schools, churches, and means of conveyance.
- Rank 4. Next comes political disfranchisement.
- Rank 5. Thereafter come discriminations in law courts, by the police, and by other public servants.
- Rank 6. Finally come the discriminations in securing land, credit, jobs, or other means of earning a living, and discriminations in public relief and other social welfare activities.⁴

The significance of this for the future of integration is crucial. It is apparent that segregation in education is neither the most nor the least important bastion in the defense of "racial integrity." Education seems to stand about midway between the area of most extreme intolerance (marriage and sexual relations) and the area of greatest tolerance (employment and social welfare). It would seem unwise and naive to expect the realization of school desegregation (Rank 3) in states which have not yet accorded to the Negro full political rights (Rank 4). Thus the desegregation of our public schools is but a single part of a larger social revolution. This social revolution came to a climax on May 17, 1954, when the United States Supreme Court, in what many would regard as its most important twentieth-century decision, outlawed the practice of compulsory racial segregation in public schools. Few judgments from our highest court have dealt so squarely with a basic question of

⁴ Gunnar Myrdal, *The American Dilemma*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1944, Vol. I, 60-61. By permission. It is extremely significant to note that this analysis is followed by the observation that "the Negro's own rank order is just about parallel, but inverse, to that of the white man." (Italics added.)

In 1962 Myrdal reiterated the point that removal of economic discrimination is the first and most important step toward solving the race problem; for Negroes are still, for the most part, the "last hired and the first fired." During the coming decades, the most important single factor helping the Negro will be a general reduction of unemployment and a rising standard of living for all Americans. Cf. G. Myrdal, "The Negro Problem: A Prognosis," *New Republic*, 147: 11-12, July 9, 1962.

social tradition, with a conflict between opposed mores and values. Probably no Supreme Court case has been watched as closely by the rest of the world, and its significance for American relations with other countries can hardly be overestimated. Gandhi was once asked by an American visiting India: What can the United States do that would make the greatest contribution to the improvement of the lot of the peoples of the Eastern nations? Gandhi's answer was unequivocal: "Solve your own race problem."

The heart of the decision on school segregation, a judgment prepared and presented by Chief Justice Earl Warren on behalf of a unanimous Court, is contained in the following passage:

. . . Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.

. . . To separate [children in grade and high schools] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas cases by a [lower] court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. . . . Such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.⁵

The contention that this finding was sudden, unannounced, and therefore unexpected belies the antecedent history. This rejec-

⁵ *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

tion of the famous "separate but equal" doctrine⁶ was the logical and inescapable product of changing times and a changing outlook, and an awakened consciousness that racial segregation is incompatible with democracy's basic ideals. Thus, in rejecting the long-standing "separate but equal" doctrine, the 1954 Supreme Court decision compelled many Americans to reexamine their beliefs and prejudices in the light of democratic ideals. The process has not been easy, as the selections in this chapter will show. But we may recall the lines of Kipling:

It is not learning, grace nor gear,
Nor easy meat nor drink,
But bitter pinch of pain or fear
That makes creation think.⁷

3.2 Free Public Schools—A Key to National Unity*

Henry Steele Commager

No other people ever demanded so much of schools and of education as have the American. None other was ever so well served by its schools and its educators.

⁶ In *Plessy v. Ferguson* 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a Louisiana law requiring separate but equal railroad accommodations. The Court held that "If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them on the same plane. . . . [I]f the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority . . . it is not by reason of anything found in the [Louisiana] act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."

Justice Harlan, in a noteworthy dissent, insisted that "in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no caste system here. Our Constitution is color blind."

⁷ Rudyard Kipling, "The Benefactors," Stanza 3, in Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations*.

* H. S. Commager, *Living Ideas in America*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951, pp. 546-548; adapted from a longer article "Our Schools Have Kept Us Free," *Life* 29: 46-47, October 16, 1950. By Permission.

Author of many books, Henry Steele Commager was for many years professor of history at Columbia University, and later at Amherst College.

This article summarizes the remarkable achievement of our public schools

From the very beginning of our national existence, education has had very special tasks to perform in America. Democracy could not work without an enlightened electorate. The States and sections could not achieve unity without a sentiment of nationalism. The nation could not absorb tens of millions of immigrants from all parts of the globe without rapid and effective Americanization. Economic and social distinctions and privileges, severe enough to corrode democracy itself, had to be overcome. To schools went the momentous responsibility of inculcating democracy, nationalism, and equalitarianism.

The passion for education goes back to the beginnings of the Massachusetts Bay Colony; the Law of 1647, for all its inadequacy, set up the first even partially successful system of public education anywhere in the world. Only three universities in Britain antedate those of America, and by the time of independence America boasted more colleges than did the mother country, while the State Universities of the early national period represented something new under the sun.

From the first, then, education was the American religion. It was—and is—in education that we put our faith; it is our schools and colleges that are the peculiar objects of public largess and private benefaction; even in architecture we proclaim our devotion, building schools like cathedrals.

Has this faith been justified? A case might be made out for justification on purely scholarly grounds, for after all the highest of our schools of higher learning are as high as any in the world. But this is a somewhat narrow test. Let us look rather to the specific historical tasks which were imposed upon our schools and which they have fulfilled. The first and most urgent task was to provide an enlightened citizenry in order that self-government might work. It is well to remember that democracy, which we take for granted, was an experiment—and largely an American experiment. It could not succeed with a people either corrupt or uninformed. People everywhere—as Jefferson and the spokesmen of the Age of Reason believed—were naturally good, but they were not naturally en-

in amalgamating European immigrants into a common culture and a new nation. The question remains whether—or how—our schools today can do as well for groups whose racial and cultural origins are much more diverse.

lightened. To enlighten the people was the first duty of a democracy, and an enlightened people, in turn, saw to it that "schools and the means of education" were forever encouraged.

The second great task imposed upon education and on the schools was the creation of national unity. In 1789 no one could take for granted that the new nation, spread as it was over a continental domain, would hold together. Yet Americans did manage to create unity out of diversity. Powerful material forces sped this achievement: the westward movement, canals and railroads, a liberal land policy, immigration, and so forth. No less important were intellectual and emotional factors—what Lincoln called those "mystic chords of memory stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone." These—the contributions of poets and novelists, naturalists and explorers, orators and painters—were transmitted to each generation anew through the schools.

The third task imposed on schools was that which we call Americanization. Each decade after 1840 saw from two to eight million immigrants pour into America. No other people had ever absorbed such large and varied racial stocks so rapidly or so successfully. It was the public school which proved itself the most efficacious of all agencies of Americanization—Americanization not only of the children but, through them, of the parents as well.

A fourth major service that the schools have rendered democracy is that of overcoming divisive forces in society and advancing understanding and equality. The most heterogeneous of modern societies—heterogeneous in race, language, color, religion, background—America might well have been a prey to ruinous class and religious divisions. The divisive forces did not, however, prevail, and one reason that they did not prevail is that the public school overcame them. In the classroom the nation's children learned and lived equality. On the playground and the athletic field the same code obtained, with rewards and applause going to achievements to which all could aspire equally, without regard to name, race, or wealth. . . .⁸

⁸ Editors' note: During the period when our public schools were making good citizens out of immigrants, the industrial revolution made greater and greater demands on education, until today, in the words of Peter F. Drucker: ". . .

School Desegregation in the South

3.3 The Rocky Road to Citizenship*

W. A. Low

Introduction. The story of the American education of the Negro begins with the modern African slave trade. It ends with the education of the Negro as an American. From beginning to end, the story raises the fundamental question of the extent and quality of cultural integration in time—the question, in this instance, of the education and Americanization of the Negro in his transition from slave to citizen....

[Slavery] denied him the right to perpetuate an African cul-

the highly educated man has become the central resource of today's society, the supply of such men the true measure of its economic, its military and even its political potential.... The man who works exclusively or primarily with his hands is the one who is increasingly unproductive. Productive work in today's society and economy is work that applies vision, knowledge and concepts—work that is based on the mind rather than on the hand.... [From this arises the need for educating *all* members of our society.] On the one hand, education has become the central capital investment, the highly educated people the central productive resources in such society. On the other hand, education, but must be general education."—Peter F. Drucker, *Landmarks of Tomorrow*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1959, pp. 114-125. By permission.
* W. A. Low, "The Education of Negroes Viewed Historically," Chap. I of *Negro Education in America: Sixteenth Yearbook of the John Dewey Society*, edited by Virgil A. Clift, Archibald W. Anderson, and H. Gordon Hullfish, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1962, pages 27-59. By permission. W. A. Low is professor of History, Maryland State College.

Some authorities dispute Low's thesis, arguing that there were some Negroes who did *not* come to America as slaves, that there were quite a number of free and indentured Negroes in colonial times and in the early 19th century, and that racism and Jim Crowism came later. This viewpoint may be found in Arnold and Caroline Rose, *America Divided*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948, Chap. 2 (bibliography), and C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955 (bibliography).

ture and homeland; but it did not acknowledge him as an American. Rather, the implication was that the Negro lived in America by sufferance as a caste in a somewhat cultural purgatory, a timeless, nebulous, no-man's land somewhere between Africa and America.

Thus, by an acquiescence enforced upon him, the transplanted Negro in continental America was to lose his spiritual and meaningful orientation to Africa, the meaning of old gods and languages, myths, and legends. Whatever meaningful residues of African cultures were to survive, the remnants were to live in remote patterns and problems of anthropology and sociology. They did not survive as vital, cogent forces in the stream of consciousness of Negro history. *Africa became irretrievably lost; yet this loss, paradoxically, opened the way through the enforced denial of Africa, for the acceptance of America.* . . . The student of history looks in vain for serious manifestations and expressions of any kind of African Zionism or Pan-Africanism in the history of the American Negro. . . . *Herein lies the paradox of the American Negro's life; a historic devotion, allegiance, and loyalty to America in spite of the intense harshness with which he was often treated here. . . .*⁹

⁹ Editors' note: With respect to cultural assimilation, the contrast between the American Negro and some American Indians is quite significant. In an article on "The Right not to Assimilate" (*Social Science Review* 35: 135-143, June 1961, by permission of the University of Chicago Press and of the Phelps-Stokes Fund) Alexander Lesser shows that accommodations and adjustments to our industrial society by many Indian communities is not accompanied by correlated changes in their basic Indian attitudes of mind and personality: ". . . They choose principally what we call material culture and technology and little of our sentiments and values and our philosophy of life. . . . [Many Indians] want and need the freedom to be Indians within the framework of America. . . . The disappearance of our Indian communities by assimilation has a crucial finality that assimilation can never have for other American minorities. Irish, or German, or Scandinavian, or Italian immigrants who become assimilated can still look toward a homeland from which they came, a viable tradition and culture which dignifies their origins. For the Indian, the tribal community is the only carrier of his tradition; if it disintegrates and disappears, his tradition becomes a matter of history, and he loses part of his identity. We are coming to know the importance of this sense of identification with a viable tradition in the meaning of Israel for many American Jews, or of the emergence of free African nations for many American Negroes. . . . [The white man's policy toward the Indians should be] to stop hampering their efforts to work out their own destiny, and especially to stop trying to make them give up their Indian identity. In a world which may be moving toward greater internationalism, in which we hope that peoples, however diverse,

[Skipping 150 years of history, we learn that] The Morrill Act of 1890 . . . was designed to prevent the expenditure of land-grant funds in any state where "a distinction of race or color is made." [However, a 1911 report on federal land-grant institutions revealed] that Negro colleges not infrequently gave instruction on a "grade as low as the 4th or 5th of the public schools." . . .

[In 1895] Booker T. Washington, in a memorable speech, gave permissive sanction to the course of Southern sectionalism in the new South. . . . Looking upon questions of social equality as the "extremist folly," he advised Southern Negroes to "Cast down your buckets where you are," educating the "head, hand, and heart" through "the shop, the field, the skilled hand, habits of thrift, and economy, by way of the industrial school and college." . . . [This policy, called the "Atlanta Compromise"] was also written into law. . . .¹⁰

Despite the sanction of the law, however, some Negro leaders openly opposed the Compromise as a retreat from the principle that Negroes should be educated as free men. . . . The quest for equality, in large measure, represents a reassertion by the Negro of the legal rights granted during Reconstruction. A "new" Negro, far less docile than the post-Reconstruction generation, while aware of his status in contemporary life, sought adjustment through the courts, remembering that he, too, lived within the organic framework of the American democratic heritage. Perhaps in no area of Negro life was the quest more dramatic and significant than in the field of public education, particularly higher education. . . .

Thus in the Gaines' case (1938) the Supreme Court held that the State was bound to furnish "within its borders facilities for legal education substantially equal to those . . . afforded for persons of the white race, whether or not other Negroes sought the same privileges." [And this was but one of a long series of judgments leading straight to Brown.]

There can be little doubt that the acceleration of legal attacks

will choose the way of democracy, we cannot avoid the responsibility for a democratic resolution of the American Indian situation. Our attitude toward the Indians, the stubbornest non-conformists among us, may be the touchstone of our tolerance of diversity anywhere."

¹⁰ Editors' note: See *Plessy v. Ferguson*, footnote 6, Selection 3.1.

upon the system of caste in organized education was helpful in securing increased appropriations and some equalization of teacher salaries, as well as encouraging experiments at regional education and limited legal integration or "mixing" in some public schools, notably in the state of Indiana. The impact of World War II, with the subsequent integration of the armed forces was an important factor, also. Finally, the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court on May 17, 1954, gave legal force and sanction to the educational theory of integration, as opposed to the old doctrine of "separate but equal," reaffirming the living ideas of the American Dream. This decision was the capstone of the Negro's legal attack. Here was another milestone in the larger and the academic education of the Negro in his transition from slave to citizen.

Realizing the American Dream. [This transition—the Negro's Dream—was based on] . . . preponderant values in the Western heritage: the classical and Christian concepts of the worth of the individual; the Reformation concepts emphasizing the equality of all men in the sight of God; the Enlightenment concept that by the application of intelligence man can make progress toward the betterment of himself and society.

Behind the Dream also lay the real experience of the Negro in the American environment, his larger education and integration into the stream of American life. This experience is itself a study of the scope and quality of the Americanization of the Negro. The historic steps in the process, applicable to the Negro's academic education as well, may be summarized as follows:

1. The early decision to give Christian instruction to slaves; the decision was acted upon despite opposition.
2. The instruction of Negroes through religious, civic, and benevolent groups, both before and after manumission.
3. The restraints placed upon the Negro and his education by the slave power of the cotton South, notably after Nat Turner's insurrection [1831].
4. The right of Negroes to be educated as free men, established after the military and political collapse of the slave power in the South.

5. The religious and Northern influence in the establishment and support of Negro institutions during and following the period of Reconstruction.
6. The program of industrial education as symbolized and popularized by Booker T. Washington in the Atlanta Compromise.
7. The advent of public support, premised somewhat upon the principles of the Compromise, wherein segregated institutions and systems eventually flourished and expanded, notably by the time of World War II, under the legal fiction of "separate but equal."
8. The legal protest of the "new" Negro, determined either to make the legal fiction of "separate but equal" more nearly a reality or to replace the fiction altogether with integrated schools. The result, of course, was the May 17, 1954, decision of the Supreme Court against segregation.

It is well to keep in mind that these historic steps in the experience of the Negro took place within the moral order peculiar to the Western heritage, especially colored by the concepts of American democracy. *It may be seen that in each step there was, on one hand, the question of the existence of American ideals; while, on the other hand, there was the question of the existence of specific situations in which the ideals were in some part, if not fully, denied. Herein lies the historic moral dilemma surrounding the existence of the Negro in American life.* If there is to be a "solution" to the so-called Negro "problem" in America, this dilemma has to be resolved; the gap between ideals and practices has to be closed.

The problem is an American one and history has revealed a trend toward its solution, despite the resistance of anti-democratic forces. For example, the question in 1700 of the Christianization of slaves no longer existed in 1800. Again, the question of the abolition of slavery, already on the horizon in 1800, had disappeared by 1900. Further, the question of the education of the Negro as a free man, an anti-climax in 1900, was hardly a grave one for the nation at the time of the decision against segregation in May of 1954.

Thus, inasmuch as the crux of the problem is moral in nature, solutions are to be sought within the moral confines of American democracy, of conduct in American life which results in bringing

undemocratic practices into harmony with democratic ideals. This hope has been the essence of the Negro's thinking, feeling, and being, even the very gospel of his religion. The Negro, along with other Americans, has held the faith and hope that democracy would become progressively a more living and meaningful reality for all. This has been his continuing dream, despite the necessary compromises dictated by adverse political, economic, and social conditions. The devotion of the Negro to this aspiration constitutes a tribute to his moral stamina.¹¹

¹¹ Editors' note: We bring this survey up to 1963 with two excerpts, the first from *The Report to the President by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Freedom To Read, 1863-1963: Century of Emancipation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), which concludes as follows:

"In the South, the problem [of desegregation] may be characterized generally as resistance to the established law of the land and to social change. . . . progress is slow and often painful, but it is steady and it appears to be inevitable. In the North, the issue is not one of resistance to law. It is here that segregation and discrimination are usually *de facto* rather than *de jure*, and it is here that the last battle for equal rights may be fought in America. The "gentlemen's agreement" that bars the minority citizen from housing outside the ghetto; the employment practices that often hold him in a menial status, regardless of his capabilities; and the overburdened neighborhood schools, which deprive him of an adequate education, despite his ambitions—these are the subtler forms of denial and the more difficult to eliminate. . . ."

"We have come a far journey from a distant era in the 100 years since the Emancipation Proclamation. At the beginning of it, there was slavery. At the end, there is citizenship. Citizenship, however, is a fragile word with an ambivalent meaning. The condition of citizenship is not yet full-blown or fully realized for the American Negro. There is still more ground to cover.

"The final chapter in the struggle for equality has yet to be written."

Hoke Norris has listed a series of events which are gradually changing the attitudes of whites toward Negroes:

"Industrialization, the ease of travel, labor unions, the arrival of many new people from other sections and the departure of many Southerners for other places, the return of Army and Navy veterans who have seen the world, the force of outside opinion, the knowledge that the suppression of a colored race makes poor propaganda for the South and for the nation in a world predominantly colored, the impact of television programs that bring un-Southern voices and un-Southern ways into the very living rooms of the Southerners (the unmistakably white Richie Ashburn shakes hands with the unmistakably black Ernie Banks when he completes a home run circuit, and all the nation sees)—these are the changes, they are preparing the way for changes, they are themselves making changes. . . ."

"And so, now, many Southerners find themselves in what must at times seem an insoluble dilemma. They don't want desegregation and are powerless to oppose it. It is coming in such a fashion that they can't oppose it in any way

3.4 Patterns of Southern Resistance to School Integration*

Guy H. Wells and John Constable

Economic Pressure. The WCC (White Citizens Councils) initially publicized the fact that its chief weapon against desegregation would be the use of economic pressure; but after this tactic was condemned by newspapers and met by counter-pressure from Negro groups, the WCC disavowed organizational responsibility for economic reprisals. WCC leaders now claim that economic pressure by white persons arises "spontaneously" in areas where the segregation system is threatened.

Regardless of the degree of direct responsibility which may be attributed to the WCC, both economic and social pressures have been widely used against advocates of desegregation. The hardest hit have been the Negro farmer and small businessmen. Negroes have been denied credit and sometimes white retail merchants even refuse to sell them goods for cash. Negro merchants have been boycotted by wholesale distributors, and Negro teachers and other employees have been discharged with no reason other than their support of desegregation, membership in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, or registering to vote for the first time.

Although to a lesser degree, white persons also have been subjected to economic threats and pressures. White families have been

that will not penalize them, or make them ridiculous, or lead them into lawlessness and violence, or all three. In the resulting paralysis, desegregation is making its way toward completion, as it will continue to do, slowly, perhaps, but certainly and implacably."—*We Dissent*, edited by Hoke Norris, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1962, pp. 192-193, 196.

* Guy H. Wells and John Constable, "The Supreme Court Decision and Its Aftermath," Chapter VII of *Negro Education in America; Sixteenth Yearbook of the John Dewey Society*, edited by V.A. Cleft, A.W. Anderson and H.G. Hullfish, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc, 1962, pp. 201-234. Copyright © 1962 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., and reprinted with their permission. Footnote references to primary sources here omitted. By permission. Guy H. Wells is former President, Georgia State College for Women, Milledgeville, Georgia, and former Executive Director, Georgia Council on Human Relations. John Constable is author of several books and articles on school integration.

ordered to move by angry groups of neighbors. Whites also have lost jobs or have been threatened with the loss because of their support of desegregation. . . . Now, however, white businessmen have learned that economic pressure is a two-edged sword. . . . The 1960-1961 student "sit-ins" and subsequent "selective buying" campaigns aptly demonstrate the importance of the Negro buying power on desegregation.

No one can accurately foretell just how widespread economic reprisals will become in the South's fight against desegregation or what effect this ultimately will have on the Southern economy. Two facts are clear at this point, however: Negroes are not the only ones to suffer and such reprisals cannot preserve segregated facilities indefinitely.

Violence. Violence in connection with the desegregation movement has increased steadily since the May 17, 1954, decision of the Supreme Court [from 50 cases in 1955 to 530 in 1959]. . . . Violence likely will continue to plague efforts to desegregate schools, but recent preventive efforts by law enforcement officers and increased convictions in court have lessened the danger of such occurrences.

Propaganda. Propaganda, in addition to economic pressure and violence, has been a weapon of the pro-segregationist. An abundance of literature is available from the groups ranging from vulgar diatribes distributed by handbills to articles in national magazines. Much of this literature is based on a foundation of half-truths and distortions, and some of these propaganda exhibits have been proven to be downright frauds. . . . Although WCC units and other pro-segregation groups have brought about an extended delay in the desegregation process, many of the resistance leaders admit that their efforts are at best merely delaying tactics. . . .

Political Action. . . . State pro-segregation measures have been both large in number and varied in approach, but they have fallen roughly into the following categories:

1. Abolition of public schools. As mentioned, school closing laws not only have been passed by a number of the states but have been put into effect in Arkansas and Virginia. The federal courts have ruled that a state cannot close one school or a portion of a school and allow other schools in the state to remain open. This

leaves the alternative of an entire state without public schools or some desegregation.

Various "private school" plans have been formulated to take the place of closed public schools. Most of the school closing laws make some provision for "private" education usually based on tuition grants. . . . A federal court did prevent the turning over of the Central High School physical plant in Little Rock to a private school group. [However,] Prince Edward County in Virginia closed its public schools in 1959 and the community established private schools for white children. The private schools operated on purely private funds until the 1960-61 term of school when state and local tuition grant fees were utilized. . . .¹²

2. Pupil Assignment Laws. This type of law has become the chief weapon of Southern states, not necessarily to delay desegregation, but to minimize the total effect. Pupil-assignment laws vary from state to state, but generally are based on such intangible factors as character, health, and welfare. . . .¹³ During the 1960-1961 session of school, the Little Rock School Board, operating under a pupil-assignment plan, was ordered to speed up desegregation; but this was not a clear rejection of the pupil-assignment device. Pupil assignment in regard to the Negro likely will be before the courts for many years to come unless dedicated educators finally are allowed free decisions as to the educational systems.

Many educators look at the assignment law, as applied in the South's desegregation cases, with a skeptical eye. It is generally admitted that pupil assignment tests within a particular school to determine learning levels have merit, but only since the Supreme Court decision has the device been widely used for the general admission of students to a particular school plant.

3. Non-support of desegregated schools. This type of law was designed to enable the state to forestall desegregation on the local

¹² Editors' note: Since then, the federal courts have ruled that such segregated facilities are unconstitutional. See Benjamin Muse, *Virginia's Massive Resistance*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961. For specific court cases, read 1961, 1962, and 1963.

¹³ Editors' note: See Ralph L. Smith, "The South's Pupil Placement Laws," *Commentary*, 34: 326-329, October 1960; and Paul M. Rilling, "The South's New Resistance," *Progressive*, 26: 9-12, March 1962.

level by a willing school board. The law was declared unconstitutional in 1960 as it was applied by the state to two New Orleans' schools.

4. Coercive measures. The Deep South states and Virginia took the lead in this field with legislative attempts to punish persons advocating desegregation. Laws of this type generally have been aimed at teachers and other state employees who are members of the NAACP. Although federal courts generally have ruled out such coercive measures, some of these laws are still being fought out in the courtroom.

5. Interposition and nullification. The doctrine of interposition was originated in the nineteenth century on the theory that a state had the right to challenge a court decision which it felt violated the constitutional division of powers. This measure generally has been a propaganda device since most students of constitutional law have held that interposition has no legal force. Little Rock, Arkansas, was a clear answer to the question of the effectiveness of interposition and nullification. Despite mob action and moves by Governor Orville Faubus, federal court orders are being observed.

It should be reemphasized that the massive resistance, either legal or otherwise, to the Supreme Court decision was by no means spontaneous or complete. Resistance even in the Deep South was slow; and immediately following the Court decision, many schools moved quickly toward desegregated systems. . . .¹⁴

¹⁴ Editors' note: Effective resistance has been accomplished, not merely by hard-core conservatives, such as the White Citizens Councils, but also by moderates whose "moderation" consists in doing next to nothing. These "moderates," writes the Southern novelist Lillian Smith, ". . . are suffering from temporary moral and psychic paralysis. They are working harder to be moderates than they are working to meet the crisis. . . .

"[They are] the big middle group [who] turn away and try not to see, whispering 'We must above all be moderate. We must not get worried. We must not mind when innocent people are hurt and brave people lose their jobs and lives. Someday it will all settle itself, somehow.' . . .

"[But] what kind of price are they paying and compelling the rest of us to pay for their moderation, for this desire of theirs to keep things as they are?

"It is a hidden price; it is not yet too obvious; but it is a high price. . . . The white people of the South are giving up their freedoms. What freedoms?

"Let me name a few:

"a. The freedom to do right. There are white Christians in the South who know segregation is morally wrong. They want to do right. But they are not

3.5 The Slow Pace of Desegregation[°]

Walter G. Davis

. . . Although few persons today question the wisdom of the 1954 decision reaffirming the constitutional right of Negroes to equal education, many people have never understood that school segregation is an integral part of a larger problem. The larger problem involves the complex interrelationship between segregated housing, inadequate education facilities in Negro areas, limited employment opportunities and general mis-information about the needs and desires of the Negro community. To discuss the education problem by itself is to ignore the larger background

free to do right. Every day they do what they know in their hearts is contrary to their Christian beliefs.

"b. The freedom to obey the law. The Supreme Court has spoken. But the law-abiding people in the South are not, at present, free to obey the law. Instead, we obey our dictators. These are sometimes our governors; sometimes they are business employers, or our Board of Regents, or our school superintendents, or our Boards of Trustees of the churches.

"c. The freedom to speak out, to write, to teach what one believes is true and just. We have almost lost this basic freedom now in the South. Teachers are compelled to sign statements that virtually strip them of their freedom to speak their honest beliefs. . . .

"d. And, having lost those three big freedoms, the precious ones that we Americans say we cherish, we are also losing our freedom from fear. In old Reconstruction days, white people were afraid of freed Negroes, or so they said. Today, they are afraid of each other and themselves. . . .

"The risk is too big, people say. I say this: "The time has now come when it is dangerous not to risk. We must take calculated risks in order to save our integrity, our moral nature, our lives, and all that is rich and creative in our culture. We must do what we do with love and dignity, with nonviolence and wisdom, but we must do something big and imaginative—and keep doing it until we master our ordeal."—Lillian Smith, "The Price of 'Moderation,'" ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) *World*, February 1957—excerpts from a speech presented before the Montgomery, Alabama, Improvement Association. By permission. For a more recent discussion of this issue, read "Racism in the United States: The Agony of the Moderate South," *Current*, November 1963, pp. 31-41.

[°] Walter G. Davis, "The Slow Pace of Desegregation," *The American Federationist* 69: 6-9, November 1962. By permission. Walter G. Davis is Assistant Director of the AFL-CIO Department of Civil Rights.

since racial segregation permeates all institutions in the society. Thus the problem must be viewed broadly in order to place the school problem in proper perspective.

The actual facts of school desegregation have to be examined to measure the progress since the laying of the legal foundation.

In December 1961, the Southern School News reported that of the total Negro enrollment in the public schools of the South, only 7.3 percent were attending schools with whites. Surveys made during the period indicated a total Negro enrollment of 3,210,724, with 233,509 attending bi-racial schools in the 17 southern and border states.

Of these 233,509 Negro students, 97 percent or 226,606 live in the border states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma and West Virginia. The remaining 3 percent, or 6,903, were spread over 8 states having 60 percent of the region's Negro enrollment. They are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. These 8 states have a total Negro enrollment of 1,927,401.

The three remaining states—Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina—have 25.7 percent of the region's total Negro enrollment or 825,005 Negro students attending completely segregated schools.

Statistics gathered since the Court's implementation decision of 1955 clearly show a willingness on the part of the border states to comply with the mandate of the court. For example, 99.6 percent of the increase of 14,605 Negro students in 1961 over the 1960 total occurred primarily in the 6 border states and the District of Columbia.

In contrast, only 60 Negro students were admitted to white schools in 7 southern states while none were admitted in the "hard core" states of Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina.

Viewing the situation on a broader scale, 897 of the region's school districts were moving toward compliance in varying degrees while in 5,476 school districts there was no movement whatsoever.

It should be understood that these figures do not represent total defiance of the court decision. In many of the school districts included in the 5,476 figure the housing pattern precludes any actual integration at this time. In several other districts there are pending lawsuits brought by the National Association for the Advancement

of Colored People to move the compliance process along. These actions should somewhat modify the present figures since the court decisions have been consistent in ordering school boards to present plans for desegregating schools within their jurisdictions. Federal district court calendars, however, now show an increased load of pending cases which might very well develop into a logjam and thus cause further delay.

In the North and West, Negro and other minority group children are denied an education equal to that of whites because of their confinement to segregated sections of the community and the operation of the "neighborhood" concept. The neighborhood approach to pupil placement, according to many school officials, is reasonable and proper since it reduces the burden of travel for the pupils. It would be difficult to quarrel with this argument if the education program in all schools were identical in all respects. The basic problem, of course, is they are not.

This is why the Court recognized the inequities existing in the Negro schools. Evidence of the traditional attitudes on what was considered adequate in the area of education for Negroes has remained. In many areas throughout the country the Negro school curricula falls far short of the curricula of all-white schools. Counseling of Negro students traditionally has discouraged any preparation for careers and jobs which were considered "for whites only." And Negro schools have been handicapped by a lack of well-trained teachers, by inadequate funds for equipment and by textbooks left obsolete by the nation's entry into the atomic and space age. All this exists ironically during a period in which America needs the full educational development of all of its citizens.

The Court recognized the importance of education to all American citizens. It therefore pointed out:

"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship."

This democratic principle spelled out by the Supreme Court

unfortunately has had little impact so far on the community level. The expressions of intent on the part of local school boards have been good but, generally speaking, there has been a woeful lack of imagination in translating policies into action. In many cases, local school boards in the South have succumbed to state political pressures, which in turn encourage the citizenry to defy federal laws.

The progress of school desegregation varies between and within regions.

In the 17 southern and border states, according to statistics in Southern School News, the picture ranges from no progress to slow progress. Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina still have no districts desegregated; however, two cases in Alabama are pending before the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and a court suit by nine families in Jackson, Mississippi, is awaiting decision. Delaware, Missouri and West Virginia have desegregated all districts as a matter of policy although in-fact desegregation is incomplete. Kentucky, which has 169 districts with both Negro and white pupils, had desegregated 134 by 1961 and added five more with the 1962 school year. In Atlanta, Georgia, 44 additional Negroes were enrolled in ten white schools as the city entered its second year of desegregation.

In the northern and western states where the policies of school boards concur with the law, eight public school districts announced plans to voluntarily desegregate their classrooms. This occurred in Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. It is noteworthy because it represents affirmative action brought about without the pressure of court action. However, outside the southern and border areas, Negroes in 62 communities in 15 states have filed protests or are investigating discriminatory practices in public schools. Nineteen court suits have been filed in connection with these protests, according to the Southern Education Reporting Service. These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Washington. The problems presented in these states relate primarily to segregated housing patterns and the neighborhood enrollment concept. Thus "de facto" segregation in the North has to be corrected and treated with the

SCHOOL DISTRICTS

State	Total	Negroes & Whites	Deseg. as of 1961	Additional Deseg., 1962	Total To Date
Alabama	114	114	0	0	0
Arkansas	418	228	10	1	11
Delaware	92	92	92*	0	92
Dist. of Col.	1	1	1	0**	1
Florida	67	67	5	5	10
Georgia	198	196	1	0	1
Kentucky	209	169	134	5	139
Louisiana	67	67	1	0	1
Maryland	23	23	23	0	23
Mississippi	150	150	0	0	0
Missouri	1,692	214	203*	0	203
N. Carolina	173	173	11	5	16
Oklahoma	1,232	240	195	0	195
S. Carolina	108	108	0	0	0
Tennessee	154	143	13	8	21
Texas	1,483	890	148	12	160
Virginia	131	129	19	9	28
W. Virginia	55	44	44*	0	44
TOTALS	6,368	3,048	900	45	945

* All desegregated as matter of policy.

** Now facing problem of re-segregation.

Editors' note: *Southern School News* reported in June, 1963 that in the 17 Southern and border states and the District of Columbia, there were 9,298 more Negroes attending public schools with white children in 1963 than in 1962. Of the areas' total, 3,326,398 Negro pupils, the increase represents about three-tenths of one percent. Most of the 9,298 increase occurred in Maryland, where the number rose by 7,026.

same sense of urgency as in the South if the principle of equality of educational opportunity is to be fulfilled.

The factual record shows the nation has been making painfully slow progress toward the goal of school desegregation. . . .

Race, Poverty, and Urban Segregation

3.6 Poverty and Slums in Our Affluent Society*

Michael Harrington

THERE once was a slum in American society that was a melting pot, a way station, a goad to talent. It was the result of the massive European immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That flood of human vitality came to an end after World War I when the nation established quota systems, but the tradition of the ethnic groups survived for a generation. Symbolically, the tenements in which these newcomers lived had been built for them and had not been trickled down after the middle class found them inadequate. The neighborhoods were dense and the housing was inadequate, yet the people were not defeated by their environment. There was community; there was aspiration. . . . As Oscar Handlin wrote in *The Newcomers*, "The ethnic community supplied its members with norms and values and with the direction of an elite leadership." Tenements did not prevail against people.

A slum is not merely an area of decrepit buildings. It is a social fact. There are neighborhoods in which housing is run-down, yet the people do not exhibit the hopelessness of the other Americans. Usually, these places have a vital community life around a national culture or a religion. In New York City, Chinatown is an obvious example. Where the slum becomes truly pernicious is when it becomes the environment of the culture of poverty, a spiritual and

* Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962. Excerpts from pp. 140-147, 158-162, 186-187, 190. By permission. Michael Harrington is a Yale Law School graduate, formerly associated with the Catholic Worker movement.

personal reality for its inhabitants as well as an area of dilapidation. This is when the slum becomes the breeding ground of crime, of vice, the creator of people who are lost to themselves and to society....

[Viewing the problem broadly, in the 1960's the] poor in America constitute about 25 per cent of the total population. They number somewhere between 40,000,000 and 50,000,000, depending on the criterion of low income that is adopted.

The majority of the poor in America are white, although the nonwhite minorities suffer from the most intense and concentrated impoverishment of any single group.

A declining number and percentage of the poor are involved in farm work, and although rural poverty is one of the most important components of the culture of poverty, it does not form its mass base.

In addition to the nonwhite minorities, the groups at a particular disadvantage are: the aged, the migrant workers, the industrial rejects, children, families with a female head, people of low education....

In New York City, as one would expect, the minorities form an important part of the slum population. The Public Assistance recipients in the fifties included 31.3 per cent whites, 40.0 per cent Negroes, and 28.7 per cent Puerto Ricans. New York, with an estimated two million Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the metropolitan area, would show minority participation in the slum culture more dramatically than most cities....

[In Robert Lampman's study of the 32,000,000 most impoverished Americans] 8,000,000 were sixty-five years or older; 6,400,000 were nonwhite; 8,000,000 in consumer units headed by women; 21,000,000 were in units headed by a person with an eighth-grade education or less. . . . In his low-income population of 32,000,000, there are 8,000,000 individuals over sixty-five—and 11,000,000 under eighteen. The young are thus one-third of the total....

Perhaps the most spectacular and visible effect of [these alienated individuals and uprooted lives.] . . . is in juvenile delinquency. In his study of the New York gangs, Harrison Salisbury quoted a police estimate that there were 8,000 young people actively engaged in violent antisocial conduct, and another 100,000 who lived on the

verge of this underworld, shuttling between it and the rest of society. Significantly, the gangs Salisbury described were often integrated, for this interracialism is regularly a basic component of these neighborhoods of transience.

Thus, the new form of the old slum. If the ethnic slum had been a narrow world of a single religion, language, and culture, it was also a goad toward the outside world. This new type of slum groups together failures, rootless people, those born in the wrong time, those at the wrong industry, and the minorities. It is "integrated" in many cases, but in a way that mocks the idea of equality: the poorest and most miserable are isolated together without consideration of race, creed, or color. They [are practically] forbidden any real relationship with the rest of society. . . .

[As for family life, the] pattern of the slums of the sixties is "serial monogamy" where a woman lives with one man for a considerable period of time, bears his children, and then moves on to another man. In a National Education Association study, Walter B. Miller estimated that between a quarter and a half of the urban families in the United States are "female based." This holds most strongly in these slums.

For that matter, Miller and his colleague, William C. Kavarceus, speak of a lower-class culture in the United States that embraces between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of the people. Not all of them are poor; not all of them are slum dwellers. But they share a common alienation from the middle-class norms of the society. . . .

. . . in defining poverty one must also compute the social cost of progress. One of the reasons that the income figures show fewer people today with low incomes than twenty years ago is that more wives are working now, and family income has risen as a result. In 1940, 15 per cent of wives were in the labor force; in 1957 the figure was 30 per cent. This means that there was more money and, presumably, less poverty.

Yet a tremendous growth in the number of working wives is an expensive way to increase income. It will be paid for in terms of the impoverishment of home life, of children who receive less care, love, and supervision. This one fact, for instance, might well play a significant role in the problems of the young in America. It could mean that the next generation, or a part of it, will have to pay the

bill for the extra money that was gained. It could mean that we have made an improvement in income statistics at the cost of hurting thousands and hundreds of thousands of children. If a person has more money but achieves this through mortgaging the future, who is to say that he or she is no longer poor? . . .

[The most distinguishing mark of the new slum dweller is his sense of hopelessness.] Like the Asian peasant, the impoverished American tends to see life as a fate, an endless cycle from which there is no deliverance. Lacking hope (and he is realistic to feel this way in many cases), that famous solution to all problems—let us educate the poor—becomes less and less meaningful. A person has to feel that education will do something for him if he is to gain from it. Placing a magnificent school with a fine faculty in the middle of a slum is, I suppose, better than having a run-down building staffed by incompetents. But it will not really make a difference so long as the environment of the tenement, the family, and the street counsels the children to leave as soon as they can and to disregard schooling.¹⁵

On another level, the emotions of the other America are even more profoundly disturbed. Here it is not lack of aspiration and of hope; it is a matter of personal chaos. The drunkenness, the unstable marriages, the violence of the other America are not simply facts about individuals. They are the description of an entire group in the society who react this way because of the conditions under which they live. . . .

In short, being poor is not one aspect of a person's life in this country; it is his life. Taken as a whole, poverty is a culture. Taken

¹⁵ Editors' note: A number of writers have insisted that the education of maladjusted children (of whom slums contain an oversupply) is such a complex problem that it cannot be handled by the schools alone. Dave Berkman sums up his views as follows: "There is a solution to this problem of meaningless slum school education; but it is a three-part solution, each component of which is necessarily antecedent to the next. First, society must tear down the ghetto walls and lessen the economic pressures. Then, with escape possible and the immediate economic pressures relieved, the family, which is the second component, will see that there is real hope, and that this hope can best be realized by taking advantage of the opportunity for schooling. When the parents instill this understanding in their children so that the children want to be educated, then, and only then, can education perform its function adequately."—Dave Berkman, "You Can't Make Them Learn," *Atlantic* 210: 62–67, September 1962. By permission.

on the family level, it has the same quality. These are people who lack education and skill, who have bad health, poor housing, low levels of aspiration and high levels of mental distress. They are, in the language of sociology, "multiproblem" families. Each disability is the more intense because it exists within a web of disabilities. And if one problem is solved, and the others are left constant, there is little gain.

One might translate these facts into the moralistic language so dear to those who would condemn the poor for their faults. The other Americans are those who live at a level of life beneath moral choice, who are so submerged in their poverty that one cannot begin to talk about free choice. The point is not to make them wards of the state. Rather, society must help them before they can help themselves....

The Two Nations. The United States in the sixties contains an affluent society within its borders. Millions and tens of millions enjoy the highest standard of life the world has ever known. This blessing is mixed. It is built upon a peculiarly distorted economy, one that often proliferates pseudo-needs rather than satisfying human needs. For some, it has resulted in a sense of spiritual emptiness, of alienation. Yet a man would be a fool to prefer hunger to satiety, and the material gains at least open up the possibility of a rich and full existence.

At the same time, the United States contains an underdeveloped nation, a culture of poverty. Its inhabitants do not suffer the extreme privation of the peasants of Asia or the tribesmen of Africa, yet the mechanism of the misery is similar. They are beyond history, beyond progress, sunk in a paralyzing, maiming routine....

These, then, are the strangest poor in the history of mankind.

They exist within the most powerful and rich society the world has ever known. Their misery has continued while the majority of the nation talked of itself as being "affluent" and worried about neuroses in the suburbs. In this way tens of millions of human beings became invisible. They dropped out of sight and out of mind; they were without their own political voice.

Yet this need not be. The means are at hand to fulfill the age-old dream: poverty can now be abolished. How long shall we ignore

this underdeveloped nation in our midst? How long shall we look the other way while our fellow human beings suffer? How long?

3.7 Slums and Schools*

Christopher Jencks

FOR more than a century the rural poor have been pouring into American cities. Up to World War I they came mainly from the overpopulated European countryside to cities which needed unskilled industrial labor. Since World War II they have come from the now-overpopulated American countryside to cities so mechanized and even automated that unskilled labor has little market value. But still they come—Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the East, Spanish Americans and Indians in the West, marginal farmers and hillbillies everywhere, all trying to jump in a single generation from the Eighteenth Century to the Twentieth. Often they fall short. Unable to adapt themselves to the requirements of a post-industrial economy which mainly values the bureaucratic virtues, they fill the jails and mental hospitals, crowd the unemployment offices and relief rolls, blight housing and recreation facilities. Not only do they threaten to bankrupt the metropolis, but they (and their children and grandchildren) make it uninhabitable—for themselves as well as for the middle classes which originally shaped it.

Nor do the slums in question show very many signs of disappearing, or even diminishing. Urban renewal may move them away from the commercial center of the city—from the West Side to Newark and from the East Side to Queens. Public housing may even change the physical face of the slum beyond recognition. But the impoverishment and disorder which are the essence of a slum seem to remain. They can only be eliminated when the slum dweller himself changes.

* Christopher Jencks, "Slums and Schools," *The New Republic* 147: 19-22, September 10, 1962; and 147: 13-16, September 17, 1962. By permission. © 1962 by *The New Republic*.

Christopher Jencks is contributing editor to *The New Republic*.

Some would disagree, but it appears to me that the urban poor change only when they acquire respectable and responsible jobs. So long as they spend eight or ten hours a day in repetitive, soul-destroying work they have neither the courage nor the energy to fight the loneliness, the squalor, and the impulsive hedonism which make the slum so appalling—and so vibrant. Fortunately the number of jobs a man can do without losing touch with himself is steadily increasing, and the number which turn their occupants into automatons decreasing. In the years ahead we will need more teachers and fewer charwomen, more chemists and fewer miners, more auto salesmen and fewer auto workers, more IBM executives and fewer filing clerks.

The only difficulty is that while the economy is changing in a way which makes the eventual liquidation of the slums at least conceivable, young people are not seizing the opportunities this change presents. Too many are dropping out of school before graduation (more than half in many slums); too few are going to college (less than twenty percent in many areas). As a result there are serious shortages of teachers, nurses, doctors, technicians, and scientifically trained executives, but 4.5 million unemployables.

What is the trouble? Fundamentally, it is that the technologists are transforming work faster than educators can transform workers. The slum school is now being asked to do in one generation what it formerly did in three, and it can't do it. Instead of making the first generation off the farm into literate but unskilled factory workers, making their children into craftsmen, office employees, and small businessmen, and their grandchildren into professional and managerial experts, the slum school must complete the whole cycle at once....

How big is the problem? In recent years an average of 1.5 million people a year have been leaving the farm. Some of them, of course, are the children of commercial farmers, and head for the cities with a good deal of formal education and with the predominantly small business mentality of their parents. But the majority of the emigrants from the farm come from subsistence farms, and theirs is the outlook of the peasant rather than the entrepreneur. They are usually jacks of all trades (a little carpentry, a little plumbing, a little auto mechanics), but have neither the

formal education nor the cultural agility needed to fit into the highly specialized urban job market. When they arrive in the city they join others equally unprepared for urban life in the slums—a milieu which is in many ways utterly dissociated from the rest of America. Often this milieu is self-perpetuating. I have been unable to find any statistics on how many of these migrants' children and grandchildren have become middle-class, but it is probably not too inaccurate to estimate that about 30 million people live in urban slums, and that about half are second generation residents. . . .

[Can] the slum school do what the rural school cannot: show its pupils how to live within the highly organized corporations and professions which increasingly dominate America?

For better or worse the school is, almost by its very nature, just such an organization. It provides the lower-class child of limited experience with almost his only image of middle-class "work." Unfortunately, it often shows such work at its worst rather than its best. His experience at school, and especially his observation of his teachers, often makes the slum child think that middle-class work is in essence clerical, not professional. The child comes to believe that success in the "respectable" world depends only on doing an infinite succession of meaningless jobs, which he has no part in planning. He assumes, in many cases correctly, that the only difference between school work and adult work is that at the latter one is given adding machines to abet the boredom, and filing cabinets to put the "homework" in. In both cases the reason for doing the job is not the hope of personal satisfaction from its completion but the necessity of earning a wage of grades, credits, and promotions.

When this is the essence of slum education, and of the menial white collar world to which it seems to lead, it is hardly surprising that many slum children rebel. Why should they be on time to work when there is no urgency, or even apparent consequence, in getting the work done? . . . [Why] should they make themselves tools of other people's ambitions? . . . [This means that teachers in these schools must] be strong enough and admirable enough so that the child can, at least in part, try to become like them. The importance of this cannot be overestimated. . . .

Classes in slum schools must also be reorganized, so that those who are in open rebellion against education are not allowed to obstruct the teacher's efforts to instruct the rest. It is all very well to have heterogeneous classes in a suburban school where the norm is to do assigned work and pass prescribed exams. Then the bright students help educate the dullards and curb the delinquents. But in a slum school the heterogeneous class has exactly the opposite effect: the dullards and delinquents form a majority and help suppress any eccentric who wants to hear what the teacher says or try to master the work she assigns. No child, no matter how ambitious, can learn much in a classroom with 40 pupils when five are seriously disturbed, 25 are indifferent, and the noise level never drops low enough so that you can hear the teacher from the back of the room....

In my observation the most important single factor in shaping an alumnus of a school is neither the physical facilities, the content of the curriculum, the erudition or imagination of the teachers, nor the size of the classes, but the habits and values of the pupil's classmates. Students learn most of what they know informally rather than formally, and they learn from one another rather than from their elders. Their lives are organized not by the official administrative machinery but by the ebb and flow of what sociologists call "the student culture."....

If I am right about the importance of the student culture, the quality of education depends largely on the spontaneous interplay of habits, interests and ideals which each group of classmates brings from its homes, partly on the ingenuity of teachers and administrators in controlling this interplay, and hardly at all on the quality of the formal instruction offered by the teachers. It seems to follow, moreover, that if you want to improve the education available to a child from the slums the most important thing to improve is the attitude of his classmates toward adults, toward "brains," and toward work generally.

Slum children come to school with a pattern of habits and values of which even the most tolerant teacher can hardly approve. They are usually obsessed with physical prowess, contemptuous of ideas and books. They are also likely to be infatuated with the outward symbols of success—money, ostentation, and publicity—

without any apparent respect for the technical skill and craftsmanship which makes success possible for most people. Perhaps because their parents live up to neither lower-class ideals of strength and loyalty nor to middle-class standards of respectability, most slum children regard not only their parents but all adults as knaves and fools.

The only way to keep such a child from growing up into another of the unlovable and unemployable adults he scorns is to make him change in fundamental ways. He will not do this simply because his teachers urge him to do so. The teacher's approval isn't that important to most slum children. The thing that counts—that makes his day-to-day life either tolerable or intolerable—is the opinion of his classmates. . . . To put it another way, a lower-class pupil is unlikely to become middle-class unless he has potential middle-class friends in his class; friends who will support him when his streetcorner playmates make fun of his new respectability. . . .

[We could accomplish this in four ways.] We could send middle-class children to slum schools; we could abolish slum schools and distribute their pupils among middle-class schools in the city; we could open suburban schools to outsiders and provide scholarships to pay the bills; or we could set up private schools with generous scholarship funds.¹⁶ Are we likely to do any of these things?

¹⁶ Editors' note: The method employed in the Higher Horizons Project of New York City is as follows: "We select two groups of schools—those schools which are 90% or higher Negro and/or Puerto Rican. . . . We call them 'sending schools.' Schools which are 25% or less Negro and/or Puerto Rican, we call 'receiving schools.'

"We permit any child in a sending school, upon the request of his parent, to be transferred to a receiving school. We have certain controls. The receiving schools, by the way, must also be 90% or less utilized, so that we do not introduce an overcrowding situation. To the extent that we have room in the receiving schools, these transfers take place. This is what we call our open enrollment program."—Frederick H. Williams, in Conference Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: *Fourth Annual Education Conference on Problems of Segregation and Desegregation of Public Schools*, Washington, D.C., May 3-4, 1962, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962, p. 128.

However the "voluntary segregation" of white pupils into suburban or into urban private and parochial schools, makes it very difficult for public school authorities to implement an effective program of integration. In Washington, D.C., for example, the public schools in 1953 contained about 45,000

No realist familiar with the mood of either Congress or the country, can really think we will. The haves are far too complacent, and the have-nots far too wretched, for radical educational reform to appear likely....

What is really likely to happen? My guess is that in the short run things will go on about the way they have since 1945. The rural poor will keep pouring into the cities for at least another generation, by the end of which time most subsistence farmers will probably have disappeared. Meanwhile, the slum schools will siphon off the more educable children into the suburbs, while the majority remain untouched. This majority will become increasingly unemployable, and will live more and more by the grace of public agencies. Unemployment and relief benefits will expand as politicians bid for restless votes, and so too will subsidized public housing and public hospitals. The time may even come when, from a physical viewpoint, people can live fairly tolerably without being employed.

But psychologically the situation will grow more and more intolerable. The unemployed will be more and more alienated from society, not only because they feel useless but because they will be unable to participate in an increasingly middle-brow culture shaped by the fact that more and more people hold complex professions and managerial jobs. One of the ironies of automation and bureaucratization is that while many people become unemployable, the rest devote more and more of their time and interest to their work. As jobs become increasingly professionalized, occupation may even supercede religion, income and ethnic ties as the chief shaper of an American's sub-culture. The man who has no occupa-

white pupils as against 59,000 Negro pupils (57% Negroes). But in 1962 the public schools of Washington D.C. contained 22,280 white pupils as against 112,095 Negro pupils (83% Negroes). The influx of Southern rural Negroes into urban centers accounts for part of this. But during this period many white pupils had either moved to exclusive suburban districts, or had enrolled in private and/or parochial schools. Similar trends may be noted in most other large cities.

Here we may recall a statement by Woodrow Wilson: ". . . no instrumentality less universal in its power and authority than Government can secure popular education. . . . without popular education, moreover, no government which rests on popular action can long endure."—cited on p. 79 of U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, *Education*, Washington, D.C., 1961.

tion, or who moves rapidly from one to another, may become a man without an identity. . . .

3.8 Current Trends against de Facto Segregation*

In 1960 most of the 77,000 citizens of New Rochelle, N.Y., viewed school segregation as a disease confined to the distant likes of Little Rock, Ark. The town's ethnic mix—14% Negro, 30% Jewish, 45% Irish and Italian Catholic—was so faithfully reflected in the high school that the Voice of America once touted it as a shining example of integrated education. Only a year later, New Rochelle became the "Little Rock of the North," convicted in a federal court of gerrymandering to promote segregation. Case in point: Lincoln Elementary School, 94% Negro.

More in hurt than anger, New Rochelle defended Lincoln as a typical "neighborhood school" that, like topsy, just grew that way. The trial told a different story. Back in 1930, the school board redrew lines to make the Lincoln district match the Negro area. It also allowed whites to transfer out—and they did. By 1949 the school was 100% Negro.

The board tried to bring resident whites back to the school by revoking transfers. Instead, whites switched to private and parochial schools or moved away, making the district more Negro than ever. By 1960 Lincoln's pupils in general were academically behind every other elementary school in town. The board, nobly it thought, got a city-wide vote to build a fine new Lincoln on the same spot. Negro parents countered with a federal suit on then-novel grounds: it is just as unconstitutional to compel Negroes to attend a *de facto* segregated school in the North as a *de jure* segregated school in the South.

Federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman did not decide that question (nor has any other federal court so far). He ruled only that gerrymandering had violated equal protection under the 14th Amendment. The outcome jogged white minds all over the North.

*Newsreport, "The Facts of De Facto," *Time* 82: 30-31, August 2, 1963. Courtesy *Time*; copyright Time, Inc., 1963.

Given free access to other schools, Lincoln's pupils on the whole did better, except for some who landed in a white school that overwhelmed them. Because two-fifths of Lincoln's pupils chose to remain, New Rochelle is now [1963] closing the 65-year-old building, assigning the children to balanced schools, and launching an extensive bus service to help keep the entire city desegregated.

On the Attack. The experience of New Rochelle is a case history in a development that is spreading across the Northern U.S.: a movement against *de facto* segregation of schools. Victory in New Rochelle spurred the N.A.A.C.P. to a successful attack on *de facto* school segregation last year in a dozen Northern communities, from Coatesville, Pa., to Eloy, Ariz. This summer it is "mobilizing direct action" in 70 cities throughout 18 Northern and Western states. School boards are responding, and many a change will have been made by September. All kinds of tools are being tried. Samples:

Open Enrollment. The most widely used method so far, it modifies the neighborhood-school concept enough to let students of mostly Negro schools transfer to mostly white schools that have sufficient room. Open enrollment was pioneered in New York City, is used or will be starting in some form next September in Baltimore, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, San Francisco and many smaller cities. Usually only a fraction of the eligible Negro students take advantage of it.

Rezoning—which is often the same as ungerrymandering. In San Francisco, mostly white Grant School lies near mostly Negro Emerson School in a rectangular area cut by a horizontal attendance line; made vertical, the line would integrate both schools. New York City's school zoning boss, Assistant Superintendent Francis A. Turner, a Negro, is such a skilled mixmaster that balanced schools are rapidly increasing.

The Princeton Plan, so called for the New Jersey town that devised it. Formerly segregated schools are rematched, so that one school accommodates all children of perhaps three grades, a second school the next three, and so on. This works well in small communities, might do in big cities by clustering each grade group in several nearby schools to avoid long bus trips.

Recombination. An example: A Negro elementary school can be turned into a junior high school serving a wider area, or into

a school for gifted or retarded children, while the original pupils are sent to other schools.

School Spotting. New schools are built only in areas of integrated housing. For fast-changing big cities, the latest idea is "educational parks," putting all new schools in one or several central clusters. Last week a New York City board of education member suggested a perfect site: the World's Fair grounds, where after 1965 an education center could accommodate 15 public schools and a teachers' college, enrolling a total of 31,000 students.

Fears and Illusions. All these changes, stir deep fears and emotions. Negroes, demanding more than token integration, have lately attacked *de facto* segregation by street-marching protests in Los Angeles and Philadelphia, "study-ins" at the white schools of Englewood, N.J., sit-ins at the boards of education of New York and Chicago. Whites envision their neighborhood schools being flooded with poorly prepared Negro pupils, or their own children being forced to "integrate" Negro slum schools. A feeling of "discrimination against the majority" has sparked reactions like that of white parents in Montclair, N.J., who filed a federal suit under the 14th Amendment, claiming that Negro children were allowed free transfers while theirs were not. The long-honored concept of the neighborhood school—a homey place that children can walk to, a living symbol of local pride and progress—seems in danger.

Yet behind the stresses and strains is a consensus, by many school authorities, some courts and most Negroes, that *de facto* segregation must go. The problem is to break the low-income Negro's vicious circle of slum birth to slum school to bad education to low-paid job and parenthood of more slum children. The widely accepted premise is that the circle can and must be broken at the school stage. Equally important is that segregated neighborhood schools refute the original aim of Horace Mann's "common school," strengthening democracy by serving all races, creeds and classes. Integrationists believe that schools can help to heal U.S. race relations by returning to Mann's ideal. . . .

Big-city Problems. While small Northern cities may attack the situation in the manner of New Rochelle, big cities, with miles of Negro ghettos, have problems that range up to hopeless. Washington, where even the most civil-righteous New Frontiersmen are

prone to send their children to private schools, can hardly give classes a desegregated look when 85% of public school students are Negro. Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia are marking time. . . .

New York is trying to make slum schools so good that Negroes can rise more easily into an integrated society. It devised the famed Higher Horizons program, heavy on culture and counseling, which now involves 64,000 students in 76 schools. At state level, New York's Commissioner of Education James E. Allen Jr. recently requested school boards to report by September on what steps they intend to take to balance schools with more than 50% Negro enrollment. . . .

And in California, the state supreme court in June came close to outlawing *de facto* segregation. Where it exists, ruled the court, "it is not enough for a school board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory conduct." No exact racial ratio is required, but schools must take "corrective measures."

The ideal integration situation, says Psychiatrist Robert Coles, after studying Southern schools, is apparently a middle-class school with diverse ethnic groups and high teaching standards. In a forthcoming report, sponsored by the Southern Regional Council and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Coles adds that young children mix naturally, ignoring adult tensions. Teen-agers take longer, but in the course of a year begin to see "them" as individuals to be judged on personal merit. As for standards, both races generally work as hard as ever. Says Coles: "We have yet to hear a Southern teacher complain of any drop in intellectual or moral climate in a desegregated room or school."

While the pressures for integration bring a troublesome measure of controversy, reaction and disillusionment, it is a fact that every sensible effort to desegregate school—alarmists to the contrary—is likely to improve the general level of U.S. education.

3.9 Rights Imply Responsibilities*

John Fischer

WHAT follows may sound offensive to a good many Negroes and to some white people. Nevertheless it needs to be said.

This is a proposal for a new Negro organization—a First Class Citizens' Council. Its purpose is the genuine integration of Negroes into the normal stream of American life. . . . Its slogan: "Let's Make Every Negro a First Class Citizen." Its goal: not

*John Fischer, "What the Negro Needs Most: A First Class Citizens' Council," *Harper's*, 225: 12-19, July 1962. © 1962 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. Reprinted from *Harper's Magazine* by Permission of the Author.

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See also Thomas R. Waring, "The Southern Case Against Desegregation," *Harper's*, 212: 39-45, January 1956; *U.S. News and World Report*, 50: 66-71, May 22, 1961; and 51: 86-87, December 4, 1961. Also relevant is the following from Murray Friedman, "The White Liberal's Retreat," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 211: 42-46, January 1963 (By permission):

"The heavy exodus of Negroes from the South since World War II has, to a large degree, shifted the center of the race problem to the metropolitan areas of the North and West. The Negro is no longer an abstraction to the white liberal but a concrete reality—in many instances, a potential or actual next-door neighbor, a classmate of his child's, a coworker at office or workbench. This confrontation very often points up the gap between the worlds of the Negro and the liberal white. . . .

"Liberal whites are, consequently, caught in the dilemma of believing in equal rights for Negroes and even of working for them, while at the same time attempting to escape from the real and fancied disadvantages of desegregation. In recent years, they have helped put on the books of many cities and states laws banning discrimination in the sale or rental of housing, yet they themselves have been moving to the farthest reaches of the cities and to the suburbs. They have pushed up the enrollment at private and parochial schools, shut their eyes to the widespread practice of gerry-mandering of school district lines to avoid integration, and helped to create pressures for separating slow from rapid learners in the public schools, a process which often results in keeping middle-class white children apart from Negro and Puerto Rican youngsters. . . . The result is that many liberals, while opposed to color lines, are helping to make these lines stronger and tighter. . . . In other words, to the Negro whites are increasingly responding 'later.' But the Negro will accept nothing short of first-class citizenship, now. It will call for a great deal of patience and understanding among those who make up the civil rights coalition if racial progress is not to be seriously jeopardized."

merely to win the full rights which belong to every American, but to make sure that these rights are used—that the average Negro is both willing and able to carry the full responsibilities of good citizenship. Once he does, he may be surprised to see how fast white prejudice begins to melt away. . . .

The first task of the First Class Citizens' Council will be to find honest answers to three questions:

1. What are these white people afraid of? Why do they begin to move out of a neighborhood as soon as any considerable number of Negroes move in? Why are so many desegregated schools becoming "resegregated," as white parents withdraw their children? (In Washington, for example, where desegregation was originally carried out with surprising success and good will, nearly 82 per cent of the students are now Negroes—although the population of the city is only 54 per cent colored. White families with children of school age have either moved to the suburbs in large numbers, or have sent their youngsters to private schools.)¹⁷

¹⁷ Editors' note: Although laws may prevent public schools from excluding pupils on the basis of race, laws cannot prevent voluntary (*de facto*) segregation. Indeed, in the big cities of the North and West, the exodus of whites from Negro districts has become so widespread that sociologists have described it in terms of the "tipping mechanism": "The process by which whites of the central cities leave areas of Negro in-migration can be understood as one in the social-psychology of 'tipping a neighborhood.' The variations are numerous, but the theme is universal. Some white residents will not accept Negroes as neighbors under any conditions. But others, sometimes willingly as a badge of liberality, sometimes with trepidation, will not move if a relatively small number of Negroes move into the same neighborhood, the same block, or the same apartment building. Once the proportion of non-whites exceeds the limits of the neighborhood's tolerance for interracial living (this is the 'tip point'), the whites move out. The proportion of Negroes who will be accepted before the tip point is reached varies from city to city and from neighborhood to neighborhood. . . .

"In the high school situation in New York City the experience seems to be that, as the percentage of Negroes in the student population approaches 30, the white group starts to withdraw *en masse*. When the white pupils start withdrawing, the better students of the Negro group also leave, so that the school is left with a greatly reduced student body, frequently composed of youngsters with various problems of adjustment. One school (Wadleigh) had to be closed as a high school because of such a development. Two others (Benjamin Franklin and Boys High in Brooklyn) are rapidly facing similar predicaments. There may be others which are unknown to this writer.

"At the neighborhood level, the elementary schools make out better. Here proportions of Negroes to whites seem to make little difference up to and well

2. How much of this fear is rational, and how much is simply blind, unreasoning prejudice?

3. What can be done to remove the rational, valid reasons for such fear? Once they are gone, the purely irrational suspicions ought to be easier to cope with.

Nobody, so far as I can discover, has yet attempted a serious examination of these questions. White sociologists have shrunk away from them, for fear that they might be suspected of racism, or might give aid and comfort to the white supremacy fanatics of the Deep South. Most Negroes have refused to look at them at all; it is easier—and more popular in the Negro community—to blame everything on white prejudice. (A few Negro leaders, as we shall note in a moment, are exceptions.)

A candid, careful investigation would show (I think) that many white people are afraid—with some reason—of four things:

1. Crime. As the proportion of Negroes in a community increases, the crime rate usually rises sharply. The police chief of the District of Columbia has estimated that Negroes are responsible for 80 per cent of the serious crimes there, although they make up only a little over half the population. In Chicago, when Negroes were 17 per cent of the population, they accounted for 65 per cent of the jail inmates; in Philadelphia, the comparable figures were 21 and 80 per cent; in Detroit, 19 and 58.

A few weeks ago a friend of mine—a middle-aged book editor—had to catch a train at the 125th Street station in Harlem. As he was walking up the stairs inside the station, he was slugged on the back of the head with a blackjack or some similar weapon. While he sprawled semi-conscious on the steps, his assailant snatched his wallet, and then kicked him violently in the face. (If the kick had landed an inch higher, it would have destroyed his right eye.) None of the scores of people in the station, mostly Negroes, made any effort to catch the criminal. None made any

beyond the 50 per cent point. Stable and sustained mixed elementary school populations are achieved in most neighborhoods with little difficulty."—Earl Raab, editor (Morton Grodzins, Dan W. Dodson, and others), *American Race Relations Today; Studies of the Problems Beyond Desegregation*, Copyright © 1962 by Earl Raab. Reprinted by permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc. This inexpensive paperback (A318) is recommended as a supplement to this chapter.

effort to help the dazed and bleeding man. As it happens, this editor has always been a quiet, effective fighter for Negro rights. He has never had a trace of racial bias, and has none now. But he may think twice before he catches another night train at 125th Street; and he might feel a little uneasy if he had to live in a neighborhood with a large Negro population. Can you blame him if he wonders whether those people in the station behaved like first-class citizens? . . .

2. Neighborhood deterioration. The commonest fear among white families is that their neighborhood will go downhill if many Negroes move in.

Sometimes this fear is plainly unjustified. A number of my Negro friends are as house-proud as anybody I know; one of them has made his home and garden into a town showplace. Nor is this true merely of the relatively wealthy "black bourgeois." A Negro home I visit fairly often is a single room in a slum district, but it always is spotlessly clean, tidy, and comfortable.

Yet this is not always true. A neighborhood where I once lived in Washington is now occupied almost entirely by Negroes; it has indeed gone downhill, swiftly and unmistakably. In part this is due to overcrowding, and to incomes so low that the owners can't afford to keep their places up properly. But it is also partly due to plain old don't-care. Garbage, broken bottles, and old bedsprings accumulate in many a backyard . . . a loose porch board goes unfixed for weeks, though all it needs is one nail and two licks with a hammer . . . broken window-panes get stuffed with rags. Moreover, the same families that can't find money for a bucket of paint or a pane of glass somehow manage, surprisingly often, to drive fancy cars and buy a fifth of whiskey every weekend.

Similar examples can be cited in almost any American city. Still—nothing about this matter is simple—I know of communities in Atlanta and the San Francisco Bay area which have improved, rather than deteriorated after an influx of Negro families. They prove a basic point: There is nothing inherently bad about Negro occupancy. Given ambition, energetic leadership, and a little elbow grease, it can result in neighborhoods as attractive as any. So the job of the First Class Citizens' Council is by no means hopeless; it is just overdue.

3. Civic Apathy. A kindred fear is that Negro newcomers will not pull their weight in the community boat. Few of them seem willing to invest time and effort in the web of civic, political, and voluntary organizations which holds every American community together. . . . Louis Lomax, in his notably outspoken book, *The Negro Revolt*, published this spring, noted that about 200,000 Negroes of voting age live in the Harlem district represented by Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, the most popular and flamboyant Negro politician in the country; yet he normally polls only about 40,000 votes, while his opponents seldom get more than 10,000.

"One reason why Negro leadership organizations think several times before launching highly publicized voter-registration drives," Lomax said, "is that they know Negroes simply will not go to the polls and register."

So, too, with many civic organizations. Negro parents are usually quick to complain (at least in Northern cities) about any covert—or even accidental—segregation in local schools. But how many attend the meetings of their Parent-Teachers Association? How many help collect for the Community Chest or offer to lead a Girl Scout troop?

4. Moral Irresponsibility. White people also are bothered by the casual attitude of many Negroes about sex, and about their family responsibilities.

Such worries are seldom discussed out loud—maybe because so many whites know that their own morals aren't exactly impeccable. But they do have some statistical justification. About 2 per cent of the white babies born each year are bastards; among Negroes the illegitimacy rate is above 20 per cent. And even when they are married, Negro fathers tend to abandon their families with light-hearted frequency. About 8 per cent of the white families with children under eighteen are broken homes: for nonwhites, the comparable figure is 21 per cent.¹⁸

¹⁸ Editors' note: "Negro girls in slums have an illegitimacy rate about ten times as high as that of Negro girls in middle-class residential communities."—S. K. Weinberg, *Social Problems in Our Time*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960, p. 234.

In an excellent discussion of "The City and the Negro" (*Fortune*, 65: 89-92f., March 1962) Charles E. Silberman points out that approximately twice

One result is a heavy burden on the relief rolls, and a growing resentment among white taxpayers; nobody likes to support somebody else's bastards. Another result is that hundreds of thousands of Negro children grow up without a man in the family, to provide discipline and example; which in turn means a steady rise in delinquency. A third is the reluctance of white parents to keep their children in schools with a high proportion of Negroes—not because they are afraid of inter-marriage, but because they worry about the habits and attitudes their youngsters might pick up.

Is this blind prejudice? Can a man who won't support his children call himself a first-class citizen?

To all of these complaints, the traditional Negro leaders have a ready answer. The Negro's shortcomings, they argue, are the inevitable consequence of three hundred years of slavery and discrimination. When you hold a man down for that long, he can't spring upright over-night when the pressure is removed. He won't vote because he doesn't yet really believe that he can have any influence on government. He won't attend civic meetings because he has never been welcomed or listened to—and he is still afraid he will be insulted, or at best ignored. Broken families and promiscuity were forced on the Negro during slavery, and the resulting pattern takes a long time to change.

Crime, so the explanation continues, is largely a result of the Negro's low place on the economic totem poll. "Most Negroes would rather work than steal," as Lomax puts it. "By the same token they would rather steal than starve." And so long as many jobs are closed to them—by their educational handicaps, or by union or employer discrimination—those are the stark alternatives. . . . Much Negro crime, as Lomax points out, "has to do with getting back at white people."

These are valid explanations. For white people, they mean that

as many Negro girls as boys go to college. (Among white students this proportion is reversed.) "Negro women frequently find it easier to get jobs—e.g., as domestics—than Negro men, thus making them the financial center of the family. The inability of Negro men to find jobs that confer status and dignity, together with the servility required of them in the South, have led Negro men to sexual promiscuity, drinking, and violence as means of asserting their masculinity." In general, a slum boy has no male model to follow, and he has little reason to hope that education will offer a way out of the slum.

Negroes need a great deal more help than they have yet had, to overcome the cultural lag that has been imposed upon them. They need—and deserve—the same concentration of money, talent, and organization that we are devoting to underdeveloped people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Given the best teachers, the best social workers, special attention to vocational education and job placement, an extra share of understanding and patience, most Negroes will be able to close the cultural gap surprisingly fast. The experimental Higher Horizons program in New York City's schools has already demonstrated how quickly they can move ahead, with a little encouragement and special attention.

For the Negroes, however, these same explanations can be dangerous. It is all too easy to use them as an excuse for despair. And they offer no solutions. So long as the Negro blames his plight entirely on circumstances, history, and the white man, he is going to stay in that plight. He will get out of it only when he begins to change his circumstances, make new history, and shoulder a bigger share of responsibility for the fix he is in.

For example, a Negro minister in a New York suburb recently called on his congregation to picket a dairy, on grounds that it had never hired a Negro deliveryman. The dairy replied that it had never had a Negro applicant.

"I'll have a half-dozen at your office tomorrow morning," the minister said. Not one showed up. The dairy then began a systematic effort to recruit Negro employees; after about six weeks it found one—just one—who was willing to take on the responsibilities of a milk route. A few months later he quit, apparently because the psychological burdens of the job were too much for him.¹⁹

Nor is this an isolated instance. For the last five years the National Urban League has been opening up more job opportunities for Negroes in "white" industries than it can find Negroes to fill. The industry I know best—publishing—has been open to qualified Negroes for many years; a substantial number have risen to positions of considerable responsibility. Many more would be

¹⁹ Nevertheless this story has a happy ending. The dairy refused to accept his resignation, and found another assignment for him inside a processing plant—not a menial job, but one requiring a fairly high degree of technical skill. He has learned to handle it to everybody's satisfaction, and the firm is continuing its efforts to recruit more Negro help.

welcome—particularly secretaries, bookkeepers, and computer operators—if qualified applicants could be found. Why they can't is something of a mystery, because the schools in New York and a dozen other big cities are presumably turning out thousands of Negro youngsters with the necessary training.

Maybe the answer lies in a parable frequently told by Dr. Benjamin E. Mays, president of Morehouse College in Atlanta. A zoo lion spent years pacing back and forth in his cage. Then one day somebody left the door of his cage open; but the lion still kept pacing back and forth.

So the job of the First Class Citizens' Council will be to convince American Negroes that the door of their cage is at last open—not all the way yet, but wider than most of them realize. And each one who pushes through that door can help open it a little further for those who lag behind. Or, if he doesn't use his new opportunities well, he can make it harder for the next man to get through the door. . . .

Some of the more courageous Negro leaders are at last beginning to speak up—though not yet very loudly or often. The Reverend Martin Luther King has called on his followers "to admit that our standards do often fall short" and to do something about it. "Even the most poverty-stricken among us," he has written, "can purchase a ten-cent bar of soap; even the most uneducated among us can have high morals. . . . By improving our standards here and now we will go a long way toward breaking down the arguments of the segregationist." . . .

Such men are not content just to demand their rights. They insist on carrying their responsibilities too. That's how you get to be a first-class citizen—as Crispus Attucks knew when he marched to his death in the Boston Massacre. The first man to die in the American revolution, he was a Negro who knew that citizenship is earned, not given. He might well be the Permanent Honorary President of the new Council.²⁰

²⁰ Editors' note: Perhaps this is a carry-over from the slave mentality, but, unlike other minority groups, public services are done *for* Negroes, and sometimes indirectly *because* of Negroes, but hardly ever *by* Negroes. Today it is the Black Muslims, unfortunately not only the most militant but also the most violently anti-white organization, which seems to be most successful in rousing the Negro from his traditional apathy and lethargy. The Black Muslims stress

QUESTIONS AND READINGS FOR STUDY AND DISCUSSION

There is probably no issue in the 1960s that is more volatile than the issue of racial desegregation. Tremendous changes are occurring at the very moment this chapter is being written. The reader should realize that we have said nothing concerning some of the most significant events of

the importance of work, discipline, self-control, chastity, self-discipline and public service.

But Black Muslim leadership may well lead to strife and violence. Surely education is a more rational and peaceful approach—a more democratic, and in the long run a more fruitful approach—toward Negro responsibility and self-reliance. But the schools can perform their task better with students who are ill-prepared than with students who are badly behaved or poorly motivated.

"I am very frank with my Negro boys and girls," says [Kansas City Central High School's] English Teacher Ida Maude Kite, who is white herself and came to Central in 1928. "When I get someone who isn't doing the work he could do, I say to him: 'You wanted integration. Now you have it. What are you going to do with it? You have certain new responsibilities, and one of them is to maintain a standard you said you wanted.' I appeal to their nature, their potential, their pride and their sense of obligation. They respond."

"Central totted up the response with a dramatic report, a 1961 crop of college-bound graduates bigger than in some all-white years. Despite its falling socio-economic level, Central's youngsters are marching not only into junior colleges, but also to Yale, Smith, Vassar, Oberlin and Chicago. . . ."—*Time*, 78: 38, July 28, 1961.

Today there is a shortage of competent professional and technical skill in many industries; but employers willing to hire Negroes have difficulty finding Negroes to hire. In the words of Dr. Whitney Young, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, "It is one thing to eliminate barriers, and quite another to get a previously depressed people to take advantage of the new opportunities." During the past forty years the number of Negro physicians has not kept pace with the increase in Negro population. The National Scholarship and Service Fund for Negro Students recently reported that there are five times as many places available in northern colleges as there are Negroes to fill them. It is because they are technically and educationally so ill-equipped that Eli Ginsberg wrote, "If the color barrier could be eliminated overnight, that fact alone would not materially improve the position of the Negroes."—(Eli Ginsberg, *The Negro Potential*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1956). Yet, says Ginsberg, the Negro potential is tremendous, and Americans must learn to look upon the Negro community as if it were an undeveloped country waiting to be pioneered and developed.

We close on a note of optimism. A 1963 study of 9000 students aided by the National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students indicates that talented ". . . Negro students, aspiring for integration, overwhelmingly succeed in graduating [from college] despite the fact that they are less well prepared academically and financially."—*Time*, 82: 34-35, December 20, 1963.

1963: Birmingham, the University of Alabama, the University of Mississippi, Clemson, sit-ins, demonstrations, the White House Conference on Civil Rights, the march on Washington, the Civil Rights bills, and so forth. By the time this book is off press many other equally significant events undoubtedly will have transpired. So we conclude by urging the reader to bring this chapter up to date by consulting books and magazine articles of 1963 and thereafter dealing with this topic of racial desegregation.

Liberty, Fraternity, Equality—and Segregation?²¹

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²¹ With one exception, this brief bibliography is limited to books or articles published in 1962 or 1963. The student should also consult more recent references, as well as some of the standard works on the subject written before 1962.

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Federal Scholarships, Federal Aid, and Federal Support

INTRODUCTION

Federal aid is not a single issue; it is a complex of at least five distinct issues. First, should federal aid go only to racially integrated schools? A negative answer to this question prevented passage of bills in the late '40s and early '50s. Second, should federal aid be granted to parochial as well as to public schools? A negative answer to this question prevented passage of bills in the late '50s and early '60s. Third, should a larger portion of political power be shifted from the states to the federal government? Since "conservatives" generally answer this question in the negative, their vote has made it possible for the first two questions also to receive negative votes. Fourth, should a federal scholarship program provide help to students with outstanding talent in areas of especial importance to national defense (for example, language, mathematics, science)? Here the answer has generally been "Yes." Finally, the main reason for federal support is to get better teaching more equitably distributed throughout the country—and thus the problem of federal aid also anticipates some of the issues to be considered in Chapters 5 and 6.

Before presenting the bibliography it may be well to note the following distinction between "federal aid" and "federal support":²²

"Federal aid legislation has one or more of these characteristics:
1. It is intended to stimulate educational activity rather than to underwrite it for a long period of time.

²² John M. Lumley (Director, NEA Division of Legislation and Federal Relations), "Trends in National and State Legislation" pp. 85–99 of *Education: Intellectual, Moral, Physical*, edited by Helen Huss, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961, p. 88.

2. It is usually directed to a special area rather than to general educational purposes.
3. It tends to be remedial rather than fundamental.
4. It tends to deal with emergency situations rather than long-range problems.
5. It is usually small in amount of funds authorized.

"Federal financial support for education has these characteristics:

1. It is an underwriting by the federal government of local and state financing of an adequate education program.
2. It is directed to the general school operation rather than to specific subjects or functions.
3. It attacks the fundamental problem of the financial need of our schools.
4. It involves a long-range commitment on the part of the federal government.
5. It provides substantial annual appropriations."

THE WISDOM OF MORE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

Explain why the financing of education is quite different today than it was a generation or two ago. Let your discussion include such factors as (a) increased migration from one state to another, (b) new methods of taxation, (c) federal matching-funds for highways as a competitive factor.

Defend or oppose the thesis that the financial burden of education should be divided approximately equally between (a) local, (b) state and (c) federal governments. Will federal financial support lead to a "nationalized" educational system? Will it lead to federal control?

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Benson, Charles S., *The Economics of Public Education*, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1961 (Chap. 4) (bibliography);
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Freeman, Roger, *Financing Public Schools*, Washington, D.C., Institute for Social Science Research, 1960 (2 volumes);
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Open Book Exam

1. Identify the particular aspects of the desegregation issue which are most acute (a) in the Deep South, (b) in the Border States, (c) in Northern and Western urban areas. Should the issue be considered one, or many? Which aspects are common to all areas? Which ones are local or unique? What does this suggest with respect to the management of schools and school districts?
2. Compare and contrast the particular problems which face various racial and national minority groups, for example, the American Indian, the Negro, the Puerto Rican, the Mexican, the Chinese, the Nisei, and so forth.
3. To what degree is desegregation a racial issue, and to what degree is it a social-economic issue? How have social and technological changes (for example, from rural to urban) during the past few decades affected the status of youth in American society? What educational readjustments do these changes require? Be specific.
4. Is every child entitled to an education? If his parents or church cannot pay for it, should the state foot the bill? If so, does this give the state authority to determine what the schools teach? Or, should

the content of the child's education be left in the hands of his parents or of his church, or of his racial group?

5. Define "Race." List some good and bad features for each of the following two definitions:

A. In Latin America whoever is not black is white.²³

B. In the United States there are states where everybody having a known trace of Negro blood in his veins no matter how far back it was acquired—is classified as a Negro.²⁴

FREEDOM OF CHOICE LAWS

6. Defend one or the other of the following two points of view:

A. "The freedom of speech includes the right of silence, the freedom of religion includes the right not to go to church, the freedom of assembly includes the right to stay home. Hence any freedom of association must include the right not to associate. . . . Everyone has the right to go to, and associate in, parks. Also, people can stay home from parks. Or if one does go to a park and finds associations there not to his liking he can march right out and go somewhere else. This must account for the Southern acceptance of the desegregation of parks. But the negative right to stay home or not to associate, present in the case of parks, is not present in the case of schools. A child is ordered to a school and forced to stay there—for six hours a day, nine months of the year, ten or more years. . . .

"A great many people, including a few judges, have the impression that some sort of compulsory race-mixing is now the law of the land, or, at the least, a Supreme Court purpose. A little reflection would indicate that this could hardly be the case. The Court has no such affirmative power. The compulsion in the case

²³ James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910, Vol. II, p. 555.

²⁴ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1944, p. 113.

Contrast also the following references:

Putnam, Carleton, *Race and Reason: A Yankee View*, Washington, D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1961. (One of the very few books arguing that the Negro is inferior, not merely because of economic or cultural backgrounds, but because of inherited racial traits.)

versus

Snyder, Louis L., *The Idea of Racialism*, Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962 (paperback); or Kroeber, A. L., *Anthropology, Biology and Race*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962 (paperback).

of school integration comes, not from the Court, but from state laws that compel attendance at public schools. Change these laws and whatever tension is aroused by this coercion might be relieved. . . . [Hence since 1958] Virginia is offering to every child—of whatever color, or whatever means—the choice of either attending a public school or obtaining a per capita scholarship for use in any other public school or qualified, nonsectarian private school. . . ."²⁵

- B. "Proponents of freedom of choice attempt to avoid the 'public' dilemma by calling the exercise of the choice entirely private. Drawing on analogies to the G.I. Bill of Rights and welfare fund payments they say that it is not the state's concern how or where the money is spent so long as it is directed toward a general end that the state approves. Education is surely such an end. Since the state can encourage education, it can do so through grants to be spent as a matter of private choice. . . . [But] If the capacity to exercise the choice depends on public funds and if the impact of the choice affects public values, then it is difficult to see how the state can remain indifferent to the exercise of the choice, no matter how it is labeled. . . . It is one thing for the state to encourage private schools by granting tax exemptions and police and fire protection. But it is quite another thing for the state . . . to launch a positive program of state tax support. . . . [For] surely discrimination enters when parent A is taxed to support school B which A's children cannot enter. . . ."²⁶

What similarities and differences, if any, are there between voluntary choice of schools on the basis of race, and on the basis of religion?

CULTURAL CONTRASTS AND CONFLICTS

7. Discuss, as time will allow, any *one* of the following statements:
- A. "The school is challenged under the American faith to develop integration and unity within our diverse society; to develop persons possessing, in terms of their capacities, cultural insight, standards, taste, and above all moral responsibility; persons committed to the democratic process in our national life and in the world. . . .

²⁵ Leon Dure, "The New Southern Response: Anatomy of Two New Freedom," *The Georgia Review* 15: 401-415, Winter 1961. By permission. (Reprinted in *Current*, May 1962, pp. 49-51.) Compare footnote 12.

²⁶ Henry Cross Dillard, "Freedom of Choice and Democratic Values," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 38: 410-435, Summer 1962. By permission.

"[American school teachers are] drawn largely from the middle class. . . . Many teachers simply cannot communicate with lower class children and have no idea of the beliefs and motives of these children. The children in turn trying to communicate are abashed at criticism of their language and behavior which is quite acceptable within their own social group. . . .

"Many lower class children simply do not value the objectives and processes of the school, hence do not try. The school immediately dubs these children "unintelligent," "uncooperative," or "stubborn." . . . The school does not give its typical rewards generally to lower class children. . . . The middle class regime simply does not socialize the lower class children. They are neither believers nor participants in the cultural heritage of middle class society. . . ."²⁷

OR

- B. "As long as the [Mexican] Indian continues to believe that natural phenomena result from supernatural agencies, that drought and rain, insect plagues, and disease are consequently of divine whim and affected only by his piety with the priest as intermediary, it will be almost impossible to rouse him from his apathy, to make him self-reliant, dependent on his own initiative, to secure his cooperation, to lessen the terrible infant mortality, to make him, in short, a civilized member of a modern Community."²⁸

OR

- C. "Anglo-Americans fight against circumstances. They raise huge sums of money to control devastating diseases. They dam up undamnable rivers. It takes them a week to do the improbable, and a little longer to do the impossible. Their folk heroes are men who rose to high places through overcoming odds: Washington, the farmer, who became a great general; Lincoln, the rail-splitter, who became President; Franklin, the printer, who became

²⁷ W. H. Burton, "Education and Social Class in the United States," *Harvard Educational Review* 4: 243-256, Fall 1953. By permission.

²⁸ Jose Vasconcelos, cited in N. L. Whetan, *Rural Mexico*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 476; Copyright 1948 by the University of Chicago. Cited also by W. S. Stokes, in *Responsible Freedom in the Americas*, edited by Angel Del Rio, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955, pp. 361 f. For a more charitable statement of the need to free religion from ignorance and superstition, read David O. Moberg, *The Church as a Social Institution*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, pp. 11, 339f.

the "First American." The so-called typical American reserves his deepest admiration for those who never say die.

"Spanish Americans are resigned to fate and circumstances. They often irritate health workers because they will not willingly participate in campaigns to control disease. Employers describe them as docile, evidencing passivity toward those in authority. It is not that the Spanish American has no need for self-assertion, but his manifestations of assertiveness are unlike manifestations among Anglos—bursts of temper, oratory, and emphasis on masculinity. This kind of personal individualism makes it often impossible for the Spanish-speaking person to develop loyalty to an impersonal job. The Anglo can be loyal both to a job and an organization, and expect no individual recognition. The Spanish-speaking person can be loyal only to a person. . . ."²⁹

8. Discuss the following examples of "circular reasoning":

Negroes are too ignorant to learn, therefore they should not go to school;—they do not go to school, therefore, they are too ignorant to learn! Negroes are shiftless, therefore they are unable to find jobs;—they are unable to find jobs, therefore they are shiftless! Negroes are poor and destitute, therefore they do not respect middle-class moral standards;—they do not respect middle-class moral standards, therefore they are poor and destitute!

How can we escape these vicious circles? The answer is that "Negroes" and "they" are vague and indefinite terms—terms which refer to "some" but not to "all" members of the group. The solution to the problem will come as we concentrate on the "some," and give special help to those among the destitute and down-trodden who show reasonable promise of rising to higher social, economic and cultural levels. The number having such potential may not be large; but with persistent effort we may have hope and confidence that the number will gradually increase, until finally as large a proportion of Negroes as of whites may realize their full potential.

9. Discuss the following statements:

For over a hundred years the public school has been the primary means whereby the democratic ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity have been transformed into living realities. Of all issues facing contemporary education, the most crucial questions seem to be these:

²⁹ Gladys A. Wiggin, *Education and Nationalism*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962. Chap. 13, "Establishing Schools for Spanish-Americans in New Mexico," pp. 434-435. Copyright 1962 McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. Used by permission.

Is the American public school to continue as a melting pot whereby children of all races, creeds and classes are fused into a common culture? Or, is the public school to become merely a dumping ground for children whose parents do not belong to some special-interest group?

PART 2

The Quest for Excellence

PROLOGUE

The Idea of Excellence*

John W. Gardner

Taking the whole span of history and literature, the images of excellence are amply varied: Confucius teaching the feudal lords to govern wisely . . . Leonidas defending the pass at Thermopylae . . . Saint Francis preaching to the birds at Alviano . . . Lincoln writing the second inaugural "with malice toward none" . . . Mozart composing his first oratorio at the age of eleven . . . Galileo dropping weights from the Tower of Pisa . . . Emily Dickinson jotting her "letters to the world" on scraps of paper . . . Jesus saying, "Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do." . . . Florence Nightingale nursing the wounded at Balaclava . . . Eli Whitney

* John W. Gardner, *Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too?*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961, pp. 130-134, 85-86. Copyright © 1961 by John W. Gardner. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated.

John W. Gardner is president of Carnegie Corporation and of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. He was chief draftsman of the Rockefeller Brother's Fund Report, *The Pursuit of Excellence*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958. More recently, he has written *Self-Renewal: The Individual and the Innovative Society*, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1964.

These excerpts from John Gardner's 1961 book obviously were not intended as an introduction to Part 2 of the 1964 revision of *Crucial Issues in American Education*, but because Gardner's ideas are so beautifully expressed and so perfectly in accord with our own, we use them here to introduce Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

pioneering the manufacture of interchangeable parts . . . Ruth saying to Naomi, "Thy people shall be my people."

The list is long and the variety is great. Taken collectively, human societies have gone a long way toward exploring the full range of human excellences. But a particular society at a given moment in history is apt to honor only a portion of the full range. And wise indeed is the society that is not afraid to face hard questions about its own practices on this point. Is it honoring the excellences which are most fruitful for its own continued vitality? To what excellences is it relatively insensitive; and what does this imply for the tone and texture of its life? Is it squandering approbation on kinds of high performance which have nothing to contribute to its creativity as a society?

If any one among us can contemplate those questions without uneasiness, he has not thought very long nor very hard about excellence in the United States.

A conception which embraces many kinds of excellence at many levels is the only one which fully accords with the richly varied potentialities of mankind; it is the only one which will permit high morale throughout the society.

Our society cannot achieve greatness unless individuals at many levels of ability accept the need for high standards of performance and strive to achieve those standards within the limits possible for them. We want the highest conceivable excellence, of course, in the activities crucial to our effectiveness and creativity as a society; but that isn't enough. If the man in the street says, "Those fellows at the top have to be good, but I'm just a slob and can act like one"—then our days of greatness are behind us. We must foster a conception of excellence which may be applied to every degree of ability and to every socially acceptable activity. A missile may blow up on its launching pad because the designer was incompetent or because the mechanic who adjusted the last valve was incompetent. The same is true of everything else in our society. We need excellent physicists and excellent mechanics. We need excellent cabinet members and excellent first-grade teachers. The tone and fiber of our society depend upon a pervasive and almost universal striving for good performance.

And we are not going to get that kind of striving, that kind

of alert and proud attention to performance, unless we can instruct the whole society in a conception of excellence that leaves room for everybody who is willing to strive—a conception of excellence which means that whoever I am or whatever I am doing, provided that I am engaged in a socially acceptable activity, some kind of excellence is within my reach. . . . As I said in another connection: "An excellent plumber is infinitely more admirable than an incompetent philosopher. The society which scorns excellence in plumbing because plumbing is a humble activity and tolerates shoddiness in philosophy because it is an exalted activity will have neither good plumbing nor good philosophy. Neither its pipes nor its theories will hold water." . . .

We cannot meet the challenge facing our free society unless we can achieve and maintain a high level of morale and drive throughout the society. One might argue that in any society which has spread prosperity as widely as ours has, morale will be universally high. But prosperity and morale are not inseparable. It is possible to be prosperous and apathetic. It is possible to be fat and demoralized. Men must have goals which, in their eyes, merit effort and commitment; and they must believe that their efforts will win them self-respect and the respect of others.

This is the condition of society we must work toward. Then, unhampered by popular attitudes disparaging excellence, we can dedicate ourselves to the cultivation of distinction and a sense of quality. We can demand the best of our most gifted, most talented, most spirited youngsters. And we can render appropriate honor to that striving for excellence which has produced so many of mankind's greatest achievements.

It is important to bear in mind that we are now talking about an approach to excellence and a conception of excellence that will bring a whole society to the peak of performance. The gifted individual absorbed in his own problems of creativity and workmanship may wish to set himself much narrower and very much more severe standards of excellence. The critic concerned with a particular development in art, let us say, may wish to impose a far narrower and more specialized criterion of excellence. This is understandable. But we are concerned with the broader objective of toning up a whole society.

This broader objective is critically important, even for those who have set themselves far loftier (and narrower) personal standards of excellence. We cannot have islands of excellence in a sea of slovenly indifference to standards. In an era when the masses of people were mute and powerless it may have been possible for a tiny minority to maintain high standards regardless of their surroundings. But today the masses of people are neither mute nor powerless. As consumers, as voters, as the source of Public Opinion, they heavily influence levels of taste and performance. They can create a climate supremely inimical to standards of any sort.

I am not saying that we can expect every man to be excellent. It would please me if this were possible: I am not one of those who believe that a goal is somehow unworthy if everyone can achieve it. But those who achieve excellence will be few at best. All too many lack the qualities of mind or spirit which would allow them to conceive excellence as a goal, or to achieve it if they conceived it.

But many more can achieve it than now do. Many, many more can *try* to achieve it than now do. *And the society is bettered not only by those who achieve it but by those who are trying.*

The broad conception of excellence we have outlined must be built on two foundation stones—and both of them exist in our society.

1. *A pluralistic approach to values.* American society has always leaned toward such pluralism. We need only be true to our deepest inclinations to honor the many facets and depths and dimensions of human experience and to seek the many kinds of excellence of which the human spirit is capable.

2. *A universally honored philosophy of individual fulfillment.* We have such a philosophy, deeply embedded in our tradition. Whether we have given it the prominence it deserves is the question which we must now explore. . . .

CHAPTER 4

Liberal Education for a Scientific Age

4.1 Introduction: Humanistic Values and Technical Skills

WHAT type of liberal education best fits the needs of an industrial age? Is there a cleavage in our culture between the scientific and the technical, on the one hand, and the liberal and the humanistic, on the other? If so, what measures may be taken to reunite these two major strands of our civilization? Can we find a core of common learnings to cement our people into one fraternal group?

There are some who view the issue as one between "science and humanism":

Science is organized knowledge of the law for thing. Efficiency is the result of the use of this knowledge. Humanism is insight into the law for man; enrichment of life, enlargement of spirit is the fruit of this insight. Science advances by experiment; humanism builds on experience. We experiment with what happens outside ourselves; we experience what happens within. Science through controlled experiment builds the knowledge that is power; humanism through controlled experience creates the power that is character. Science as opposed to empiricism is controlled experiment; humanism as opposed to temperamentalism is controlled experience. Humanism builds up personality by enriching it with the experience of the past. This enrichment of personality by vicarious experience is culture.

The conflict between the so-called cultural and the scientific type of higher education cuts to the very core of human nature, because man belongs to two worlds—the world of things and the world of experi-

ience, the world of fact and the world of faith, the world of matter and the world of mind, the world of sense and the world of spirit. The primary business of education is the unification of the two worlds in each individual.¹

Certainly there is much concern today because the modern industrial revolution is drawing men away from traditional patterns of thought and action. In this change, many feel that we may be losing more than we gain. Speed becomes an end in itself. Like a child with a new toy, say the critics, we are so busy making time-saving gadgets that we have time for little else. We know the price but not the value of things. We develop every kind of control except self-control. Pursued by the telephone, phonograph, radio, T.V., caught in the clamor of the factory and the uproar of the streets, we are projected through time and space like human Sputniks. Meanwhile our inner life is reduced to the level of the dime store, the comic strip, the latest music fad. The three B's of music—Bach, Beethoven, and Brahms—give way to Blues, Bebop, and Boogie-woogie. The three R's of traditional educational discipline give way to the three P's of progressive education—Painting, Pasting, and Puttering. Shakespeare and the Bible stand on our shelves while we watch Westerns or read pulp magazines. In short, our outer life is killing the inner. Vulcan is killing Apollo.

The late Peter Marshall, Chaplain of the United States Senate, expressed the sentiment that progress in material things has been emphasized to the neglect of spiritual understanding:

. . . For we have improved means, but not improved ends. . . . We need . . . to do something about the world's true problems—the problem of lying, which is called propaganda; the problem of selfishness, which is called self-interest; the problem of greed, which is often called profit; the problem of license, disguising itself as liberty; the problem of lust, masquerading as love; the problem of materialism, the hook which is baited with security.²

¹ John Duncan Spaeth, "Science and Humanism in University Education," an address delivered at the 69th Commencement of Washington University, June 10, 1930, St. Louis, Mo., Washington University Studies, m.s., 1930. By permission. Mr. Spaeth was the Murray Professor of English Literature at Princeton University and, from 1936 to 1938, served as president of the University of Kansas City.

² The Reverend Peter Marshall, cited in *Time*, 52: 59, July 12, 1948.

The easy assumption that science deals with means, not with ends, is coupled with many misunderstandings. It is true that science tells us that certain configurations of events *invariably* result in certain outcomes. But this is a half-truth; for it fails to note that science also tells us how *different* combinations of events lead to *different* outcomes. Science does not limit itself to fixed, immutable sequences of natural events; rather, science is mainly concerned with variety and diversity. Thus, water freezes at about 32° F., but *salt* water freezes at a lower temperature.

In short, science does not deny human freedom. But it does insist that human freedom is never total. It is freedom *within* the world; and this world can be understood in terms of sequences of events, some of which are invariant, others of which may be altered to suit human purposes. It is because he is able to exploit potentialities that are *in* nature that man is free; and his freedom consists in the adaptation of natural means in terms of humane ends.

Freedom, then, is not freedom *from* the world (as some Gnostics and some transcendentalists have affirmed); it is freedom *within* the world, where every option represents a mixture of features, some good and some bad. In choosing alternatives within this imperfect world, man attains the good life. And, as Carl Rogers has said, "The good life is a process, not a state of being. It is a direction, not a destination."³

For societies, as well as for individuals, changing times bring new opportunities—and new dangers—so that men are forever confronted with situations which must be studied anew. Thus, slavery was accepted as part of "natural law" by Aristotle, St. Paul, St. Augustine and other great moralists of the past; but it is no longer accepted today. Nor is a democratic society less in accord with "natural law" than an aristocratic, hierarchical order. In moral and spiritual choices, no less than in scientific ones, we are continually confronted with living options—options which can be resolved only by the living thoughts of living men. For each generation of men, as well as for each individual person, the existential

³ Carl R. Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1961, p. 186.

For a development of the thesis that human freedom is not *from* the world, but only *within* the natural world, read S. P. Lamprecht, "Man's Place in Nature," *American Scholar*, 7: 60-77, Spring 1938.

situation is unique. This is the meaning of the long-standing tradition that man is free. Man, to some degree, is "on his own."

It is in this sense, too, that the human situation is "ever the same, yet ever changing"—*eadem sed aliter*, to borrow a medieval adage—and it is in this sense only that the past may serve as a guide to the future. It is man's creative spirit which is "ever the same"; but man's patterns of thought and society's forms of social organization are "ever changing." Because traditionalists are so frequently confused on this point, they cannot properly interpret the past. And because their minds are confused, such men display a conspicuous failure of nerve, and look upon man as a feeble creature whose chief virtue is humble resignation before the inevitable.

Submission and impotence may have been justified in an age when life was hard, hope scanty, and possibilities of improvement slight. But should not modern man assert his faith in a more positive manner? "The worship of God is not a rule of safety," said Alfred North Whitehead, "it is an adventure of the spirit, a flight after the unattainable. The death of religion comes with the repression of the high hope of adventure."⁴ "Faith," wrote John Dewey, "is the power of intelligence to imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent the instrumentalities of its realization is our salvation."⁵ "Not fear and submission but love and the assertion of one's own powers are the basis of the mystical experience," says Erich Fromm. "God is not a symbol of power over man but of man's own powers."⁶ Such ideas are not new; nor are they heretical. While critics of "pragmatism" and "relativism" are to be praised for their efforts to join American thought onto the mainstream of European philosophy, such efforts have been largely misspent because they have generally been based on the mistaken assumption that the European tradition is a static

⁴ Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936, conclusion of Chapter 12. Read also Whitehead's *Adventures in Ideas*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944, pp. 125-126.

⁵ John Dewey, *Creative Intelligence*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1917, p. 17. Compare Harry L. Hollingworth, *Psychology and Ethics*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949, p. 162.

⁶ Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, p. 49. Compare Rabbi Joshua Loth Liebman, *Peace of Mind*, New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1946, pp. 172f.

one. They forget the warning of the ancient prophet, "Say not thou, 'What is the cause that former days were better than these?'"⁷ The future, says Raymond B. Fosdick, belongs to the irresistible power of things that can grow:

That is why democracy, rightly interpreted, is the last best hope of earth. It is rooted in the principle of growth; it is adaptable to new concepts of social justice. It is built, not on a fixed creed or on a system of regimented ideas, but on the sure knowledge that frontiers are never stationary, that the thrust of events is steadily forward, that there are no privileged ideas around which magic circles can be drawn to protect them from competition. It is only free men who dare to think, and it is only through free thought, freely expressed, that the soul of a people can be kept alive.⁸

Obstacles exist to be overcome, it is now believed, and therefore they are overcome. New frontiers await discovery, it is believed, and therefore new frontiers are discovered. When Daniel Boone's frontier is gone, Thomas Edison's frontier appears. The wider the sphere of man's knowledge, the greater its contact with the unknown; and if man will hold firm his faith in his own divine nature, the process knows no limit.

The question arises: Is it necessary for an ideal to be eternal,

⁷ Ecclesiastes 7:10. Compare Hebrews, Chapters 11 and 12; *I Samuel* 4:9.

Editors' note: from Locke to Dewey, liberals have often been branded as "nominalists" or "relativists" whose ideas are "contrary to natural law." Perhaps a new climate of opinion will occur when such critics discover their own confusion—a confusion clearly stated by the great contemporary Neo-Scholastic, Father Dondayne: ". . . there are two fundamental ways of conceiving the natural law.

"1. Natural law may be conceived as a whole of abstract, ever-present rules that are found among all peoples. This 'greatest common denominator' theory constantly decreases in content as ethnology progresses.

"2. Natural law may be conceived as the standard, the ideal which positive legislation must pursue in relation to a particular development of civilization, in order that its laws may be worthy of man and just. In the first sense, right to work, right to education can hardly be considered as a part of the natural law; but they are such in the second sense of natural law."—Albert Dondayne, *Faith and the World*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963, p. 232. See also John Cogley (ed.), *Natural Law and Modern Society*, Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1963 (especially pp. 199–276).

⁸ Raymond B. Fosdick, "We Must Not Be Afraid of Change," *New York Times Magazine*, April 3, 1949; slightly revised to become Chapter 3 of *Within Our Power* by R. B. Fosdick, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1952.

or for an idea to be infallible, in order that the will may be firmly attached to it? Liberals do not think so. A 1925 car owner may have been as attached to his "Model T" as in 1950 he becomes attached to his "V-8"; and he is not in the least dismayed because new and better models appear. Our medieval ancestors attained an integrated view of the world and of man's place in it, when they supposed that the earth was flat and stationary, and that intellectual and moral absolutes were indispensable. But twentieth-century thinkers attain an equally integrated and satisfactory viewpoint, knowing that the taboos of one culture may be accepted practices in another one without harmful consequences, and believing that ours is a spinning planet whose human inhabitants must learn to apply tentative, reconstructive thinking to ethical beliefs as well as to scientific theories. In short, intellectual theories and cultural climates of opinion are subject to change and revision, but our emotional attachment to them may be very genuine.

Perhaps the current conflicts between liberal and vocational, general and special, classic and modern, are most clearly understood in the light of history. Christopher Dawson offers the following in partial explanation of the persistence of this pervasive dichotomy:

It is usual to blame the Renaissance and the one-sided development of classical studies for [secularism] . . . but these are responsible only in part. The basic cause seems rather to be found in the medieval tendency to make study a monopoly of the clergy, so that the layman had no place in the medieval university and in the organization of higher scholarship. Hence the rise of a new lay educated class brought with it an independent ideal of lay culture.

The consequent division of culture into two halves corresponded to the social division between clergy and laity. While the clergy studied the Bible and the Fathers, the laity studied the classics; while the clergy studied the history of the Church, the laity studied the history of the State; while the clergy studied the traditional Christian philosophy, the laity studied the philosophers of pagan antiquity and the new natural science. . . .⁹

In the middle ages, almost the only educated persons were

⁹ Christopher Dawson, "Schism in Education," *Commonweal*, 74: 35-37, April 7, 1961. See also Gustave Weigel, S.J., "American Catholic Intellectualism," *Review of Politics*, 19: 275-307, July 1957. See also George H. Tavard, "Theology in the Catholic Colleges," *Commonweal*, 78: 273-275.

priests, lawyers or doctors; and there arose a sharp dichotomy between the ruling class whose *vocation* was that of priest, doctor, or ruler (lawgiver)—and those whose *vocations* had few, if any, academic requirements. This aristocratic class structure of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance antedates the printing press and the rise of modern science and democracy, and it should be obvious that we here speak of a bygone age. Yet patterns of "liberal" education, inherited from these earlier eras, persist to such an extent that Sir Charles Snow was impelled to complain in the year 1960 of *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*:

I believe the intellectual life of the whole Western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups. . . . at the one pole we have the literary intellectuals—at the other, the scientists. Between the two, a gulf of mutual incomprehension [exists]. They have a curious distorted image of each other. Their attitude is so different that, even on the level of emotion, they can't find much common ground.¹⁰

The selections in Chapter 4 regarding this cleavage in our culture deal with questions such as the following. If our schools are to be a source of democratic fraternity, what traditions should be emphasised so that all citizens may have a core of common understandings, common sentiments, and common ideals? In an era of universal education, what can be done so that *all* students may find their formal schooling psychologically interesting, morally uplifting, and vocationally worthwhile? Admitting to the growing emphasis on science and technology in modern life, can these newer courses be taught in a manner that will make them less narrow and technical, more liberal and humanistic? Is philosophy *inherently* more liberal than chemistry? Latin than journalism? History than

¹⁰ C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 2-4. Three years later Sir Charles clarified and elaborated his original statement in "The Two Cultures: A Second Look," *London Times Literary Supplement*, No. 3215, pp. 839-844, October 25, 1963. Snow's two essays may both be found in a paperback, *The Two Cultures*, New York: New American Library, 1964. Commentaries on Snow's thesis may be found in *Current* magazine, July 1960, pp. 42f; January 1961, pp. 57f; November 1961, pp. 58f; December 1961 (the selection by H. M. Dowling, included in this chapter); February 1962, pp. 64f; and April 1962, pp. 61f. See also G. H. Bantock, *Education in an Industrial Society*, London: Faber & Faber, 1964, and especially Aldous Huxley, *Literature and Science*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963.

contemporary events? Or are these traditional subjects more liberal only because the newer subjects are not yet taught in a liberal manner?

The Two Cultures and The Role of the School

4.2 Today's Intellectual Challenge[°]

Gerald Holton

Every great age has been shaped by intellectuals of the stamp of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Leibnitz, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Jefferson, and Franklin—all of whom would have been horrified by the proposition that cultivated men and women could dispense with a good grasp of the scientific aspect of the contemporary world picture. This tradition is broken; very few intellectuals are now able to act as informed mediators. Meanwhile, as science moves every day faster and further from the basis of ordinary understanding, the gulf grows, and any remedial action becomes more difficult and more unlikely. . . .

We must consider the full implications of the discovery that

[°] This excerpt is from a long article by Gerald Holton (Professor of Physics at Harvard University): "Modern Science and the Intellectual Tradition," *Science*, 131: 1187-1193, April 22, 1960. Copyright 1960 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Read also Kirby Mather, "The Scientist's Responsibility for the Interpretation of Concepts to Laymen," *Science*, 119: 299-300, March 5, 1954; Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Philosophy of Science in Scientific Education," *Scientific Monthly*, 77: 233-239. November 1953; James B. Conant, *Science and Common Sense*, (rev. ed.), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963 (paperback). Conant's book is recommended, along with that of C. P. Snow, as a supplement to this chapter. Compare also the following.

"Some specialists in the humanities may shudder at the prospect, but it will not be long before ignorance of things scientific becomes as revealing a mark of cultural illiteracy as ignorance in Latin and Greek or 19th century poetry was in times past."—John Pfeiffer, in a review of Isaac Asimov's *The Intelligent Man's Guide to Science*, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960; reviewed in *The New York Times*, November 3, 1960.

not only the man on the street but almost all of our intellectual leaders today know at most very little about science. And here we come to the central point . . . the chilling realization that our intellectuals for the first time in history, are losing their hold of understanding upon the world. . . .

One kind [of ignorance] is ignorance on the basic level, that of *facts*—what biology says about life, what chemistry and physics say about matter, what astronomy says about the development and structure of our galaxy, and so forth. The nonscientist realized that the old common-sense foundations of thought about the world of nature have become obsolete during the last two generations. The ground is trembling under his feet: the simple interpretation of solidity, permanence, and reality have been washed away, and he is plunged into the nightmarish ocean of four-dimensional continua, probability amplitudes, indeterminacies, and so forth. He knows only two things about the basic conceptions of modern science: that he does not understand them, and that he is now so far separated from them that he will never find out what they mean.

On the second level of ignorance, the contemporary intellectual knows just as little of the way in which the main facts from the different sciences fit together in a picture of the world taken as a whole. He has had to leave behind him, one by one, those great syntheses which used to represent our intellectual and moral home—the world view of the book of Genesis, of Homer, of Dante, of Milton, of Goethe. In the mid-20th century he finds himself abandoned in a universe which is to him an unsolvable puzzle on either the factual or the philosophical level. Of all the bad effects of the separation of culture and scientific knowledge, this feeling of bewilderment and basic homelessness is the most terrifying. Here is the reason, it seems to me, for the ineffectiveness and self-denigration of our contemporary intellectuals. . . .

To restore science to reciprocal contact with the concerns of most men—to bring science into an orbit about us instead of letting it escape from our intellectual tradition—that is the great challenge that intellectuals face today.¹¹

¹¹ Editors' note: Another professor of physics has commented on this issue thus: "Each area of human knowledge requires, in order to remain useful and alive, a continual reinterpretation of its 'basic information.' For example, each generation must reinterpret for itself the histories of past and present civiliza-

4.3 Scientific Study Should Be Liberal^o

H. M. Dowling

[During] the second half of the nineteenth century . . . a dichotomy was set up between the humanities which dealt with human nature and the sciences and technology which dealt with nature. It is a dichotomy which has persisted ever since so that,
• H. M. Dowling, "Science and Culture: A False Antithesis," London: *New Scientist*, 11: 727-729, September 21, 1961. Mr. Dowling is headmaster of the Crewe County Grammar School, England. By permission.

tions. This need applies equally well to the social sciences, to the arts, and to philosophy. In science too, new discoveries always require reconsideration of the principles previously developed; in fact, it is perhaps trite to point out that the principles of science cannot be proved, they can only be disproved. For those principles which continue as relevant to current interpretation of natural phenomena, new discoveries lead only to a further substantiation of principles or to a more precise formulation; but not to final proof. The dynamics of Einstein is an extension of that of Newton. The electromagnetism of Maxwell includes that of Faraday and Coulomb. The flexibility of scientific knowledge in response to new discoveries is peculiarly derived from its precise use of definition, its careful formulation of concepts and its ability to use an exact language, namely, mathematics. But the attitude of science towards its own extension and its own growth is not essentially different from the attitudes of many other disciplines that represent man's intellectual development.

"If a free society is to maintain itself and to support adequately the intellectual efforts which extend it, there must be an understanding of its history, of its political organizations, of its outlook on life, of its artistic insights, and of its scientific developments. In this respect, all disciplines stand on essentially equal ground and stand or fall together.

"Human knowledge, therefore, in all areas is flexible and creative, undergoes continual re-evaluation, benefits mankind and seeks a common understanding. A major role of education is to promote these efforts. . . ." Frank Verbrugge (Associate Dean, Institute of Technology, University of Minnesota), "Science and Liberal Education," in *Higher Education Tomorrow: Challenges and Opportunities for the University of Minnesota*, edited by Robert H. Beck and Robert C. McClure, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962, pp. 64-69. Copyright 1962 by the University of Minnesota.

Although to a scientist it is trite to point out that the scientific method is one of doubt, there are persisting ("perennial") philosophies and theologies that repudiate doubt and "scepticism" as opposed to "faith." Morris R. Cohen has clearly stated why scientific "doubt" is so frequently condemned:

"Man's ability to question that which he has from childhood been taught or accustomed to accept is very limited indeed unless it is socially cultivated

no less than the great Victorians, we have failed to grasp and exploit the cultural possibilities of what for a majority is now not merely the "new learning," but the only learning.

Writing forty years ago in his *The Aims of Education*, Alfred North Whitehead disposed of the fallacious antithesis [between a liberal and a technical education]: "There can be no adequate technical education which is not liberal," he said, "and no liberal education which is not technical; that is, there is no education which does not impart both technique and intellectual vision." He distinguished three different roads to culture—the literary . . . the technical . . . the scientific. . . . Whichever of these three courses a student selected, it should give him [said Whitehead] "a technique, a science, an assortment of general ideas, and esthetic appreciation,

and trained. It is a very rare individual who can perceive things for himself and trust his own experience or reason so as to question the currently prevailing views. For the typical Mohammedan child growing up in Central Arabia, there is no effective doubt possible as to whether Allah is the true God, and Mohammed his prophet. It is only when his community ceases to be homogeneous, when he comes into contact with those who do not believe in Mohammed, that doubt can take root and begin to flourish. Thus travellers, merchant adventurers, cosmopolitan cities, and the mixing of peoples having diverse traditions, play a predominant role as leaven in the intellectual life of mankind.

"As the state of doubt is intensely disagreeable, communities try to get rid of it in diverse ways, through ridicule, forcible suppression, and the like. The method of science seeks to conquer doubt by cultivating it and encouraging it to grow until it finds its natural limits and can go no further. Sober reflection soon shows that though very few propositions are in themselves absolutely unquestionable, the possibility of systematic truth cannot be impugned. . . . Any contention that the whole body of scientific or demonstrative knowledge is false will be found to be in the long run humanly untenable, i.e., incapable of being held consistently with other propositions that claim to be true. Science can be challenged only by some other system which is factually more inclusive and, through the demand for proof, logically more coherent. But such a system would simply be science improved. Science must always be ready to abandon any one of its conclusions, but when such overthrow is based on evidence, the logical consistency of the whole system is only strengthened.

"Progress in science is thus possible because no single proposition in it is so certain that it can block the search for one better founded. . . ."—Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1930, pp. 83-86. By permission. See also M. R. Cohen, *The Faith of a Liberal*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1946, pp. 337-361; and Alan Wood, *Bertrand Russell, the Passionate Sceptic*, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1957.

and each of these sides of his training should be illuminated by the others."

Obviously such views as these have great relevance to the debate now going on concerning the proper way to teach science and technology. Are we in our teaching exploring and exploiting to the full the cultural resources of scientific and technical subjects? Accepting specialization as necessary and inevitable, as I think we must, have we really grasped the idea that this specialization could become the avenue to a deep and wide culture? Have we considered, moreover, that for many students in this modern age science or technology may, in fact, be the best and most acceptable road to culture, since it accords with their aptitudes, inclinations and ambitions? . . .

The fact is that a science like chemistry or physics, or a technical subject like metallurgy, or a craft like woodwork or metalwork, can be taught in one of three different ways. It can be taught simply as a technique, a way of doing something practical; or it can be taught as both a technique and a science; or it can be taught as a technique, a science *and a culture*. If it is taught as a culture as well as a technique and a science it will certainly include a way of doing things (technique) and a systemized body of facts and principles (science), but it will also allow scope for such intellectual, esthetic and even social ideas as would if not impeded, arise naturally from a serious study of the subject. . . .

Now it is certain that much of our science and technology is not being taught in this way. Recently I asked a man who had gained a doctorate in chemistry whether he thought his subject could be made a cultural medium. He was obviously startled by the question, and immediately afterwards confessed that he had never thought of his subject in that way. Obviously his university courses in chemistry had given him no insight into its wider and deeper cultural potentialities. He had learned chemistry purely as a science (a systemized body of fact and principle) and as a technique.

It is essential, of course, that our science and technology should continue to be taught at this high and exacting scientific and technical level. But it is a pity, nevertheless, that other intellectual

and esthetic areas which properly belong to a liberal study of the subject, should remain altogether unexplored and undeveloped. Similarly, crafts like woodwork and metalwork are often taught on a purely technical level, with little, if any, reference to their scientific basis and their intellectual and esthetic implications. This is a tragedy, because for many people the learning of a craft may be the very best introduction to the realms of science and esthetics.

It would be foolish and unfair, of course, to blame individual teachers for this situation. The fault lies in the whole tradition in which scientific and technical training has been conceived and practiced.

May I crystallize the present argument in two statements which may seem dogmatic, but which I am convinced express important truths?

1. No technical process ought to be taught at any educational level without some reference to the science (that is, the organized body of facts and principles) involved in it. *Technical training not based on science is illiberal.*

2. No science or technical subject ought to be taught without reference to the general ideas—for example, in the fields of history, esthetics, economics—which a generous treatment of the subject would naturally evoke. *Science or technology without general ideas is illiberal. . . .*

Frankly it terrifies me to think that the vast expansion of technical and scientific education to which we are now being committed may be implemented in largely noncultural terms, and without any serious effort to explore its liberal potentialities. Thousands of men and women may learn their science and technology simply on the plane of technique or narrowly specialized knowledge, without that lifting and liberalization of the mind which a wider exploration of the subject is bound to encourage. Some idealists will hope that a bit of poetry or philosophy twined round the edges will make these students cultured men and women. It will do nothing of the sort.

We cannot afford to go on outlawing science and technology to the noncultural wilderness. In our school, college and university courses we must ensure, by reform and coordination of syllabuses, that whether the student is learning elementary metalwork or de-

gree physics he is acquiring a technique, a science, a collection of general ideas and esthetic appreciation.

Liberal and Vocational Education

4.4 Progressive Education versus Regressive Education*

Arthur Bestor

Certain intellectual disciplines are fundamental in the public school curriculum because they are fundamental in modern life. Reading, writing, and arithmetic are indispensable studies in the elementary school because no intellectual life worthy of the name is possible or conceivable without these particular skills. Science, mathematics, history, English, and foreign languages are essentials of the secondary school curriculum because contemporary intellectual life has been built upon a foundation of these particular disciplines. Some, but by no means all, of these studies can be described as "traditional." This fact, however, has next to nothing to do with the case. It is not tradition, but a realistic appraisal of the modern world, that points out these disciplines as fundamental. . . .

In the twentieth century the sciences, the other branches of scholarship, the various professions, and the whole realm of tech-

* Reprinted from *The Restoration of Learning* by Arthur Bestor, by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Copyright 1955 by Arthur Bestor.

Formerly at the University of Illinois, Dr. Bestor is now professor of history at the University of Washington. One of the most forthright critics of nonacademic trends in contemporary education, he was also a founder of the Council for Basic Education.

For an extensive review of *The Restoration of Learning*, see "‘Redeeming’ American Education?" in the *Saturday Review* 38: 30ff., September 10, 1956. The review is followed by a pro and con discussion of the book by Albert Lynd, author of the similarly oriented *Quackery in the Public Schools*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1950, and Maurice R. Ahrens, professor of elementary education at the University of Florida. For a well-balanced approach to the problem, read W. H. Cowley, "Three Curricular Conflicts," *Liberal Education*, 46: 467-483, December 1960.

nology have undergone changes that are undeniably profound. The radical reconstruction of the curriculum in the American public schools has not, however, been an adjustment to these changes in intellectual life. In point of fact, the direction advocated for the schools by many American professional educationists has been a direction precisely opposite to that which has been characteristic of the intellectual history of the twentieth century in its higher reaches. Far from bringing the schools into accord with modern life, the proposals of the dominant group of professional educationists today would divorce the public schools more completely from contemporary intellectual life than they ever have been before.

A simple glance at two or three of the most obvious developments in the life and thought of the twentieth century will show the direction in which the school curriculum ought to be developing. So far as the experience of the ordinary man is concerned, the most spectacular development has been the application of advanced scientific knowledge to the things of everyday life. Electronics (that is to say, advanced physics) has entered the living room with radio and television. Chemistry has become part of the household with detergents and synthetic fibers and plastics. Biochemistry and physiology are affecting the daily regimen of all persons who make use of vitamins and antibiotics. None of these matters can be understood except in terms of concepts vastly more complicated and abstract than those required to explain the operation of the devices with which our grandfathers were familiar. If present-day scientific and technological developments mean anything for the public school curriculum, they mean that an intensified emphasis upon the theoretical principles embodied in the basic sciences is essential in a modern school.

Equally significant in the twentieth century has been the application of precise quantitative thinking to an ever wider range of human affairs. From the Bureau of the Budget to the Bureau of Standards, mathematics and statistics have entered more pervasively than ever before into practical life. The implication for the school is that the simple-minded conception of mathematics as primarily a matter of making change and figuring out how many cups of punch can be dipped from a gallon bowl is completely outmoded, and that algebra, trigonometry, and calculus have now become

essential elements in the education of any citizen who expects to be well-informed in the modern world.¹²

It is a truism, finally, that modern communications have thrown the various peoples of the world, willy-nilly, into more intimate contact with one another than ever before. A knowledge of foreign languages can no longer be looked upon simply as an ornament. For an ever-increasing proportion of the residents of our once-isolated continent, such knowledge has become for the first time an extremely practical need. The implication for the public school curriculum is obvious.

The kinds of studies in which American high school pupils are engaged have changed markedly in the last half century. But the changes have *not* been in the direction the preceding paragraphs have indicated; they have been in a completely contrary direction. . . . In its most recent study of *Offerings and Enrollments in High School Subjects*,¹³ the federal Office of Education discusses, with evident approval, the alterations that have taken place. "For the most part," reads its summary, "the changes are in the direction of more functional education. They represent efforts to meet life needs of increasingly diverse bodies of pupils." The summary then goes on to report: "Enrollments in both mathematics and foreign languages in the past 4 years of high school . . . were smaller percentages of the total pupil bodies in 1949 than in 1934," and "Percentage enrollments in algebra, geometry, physics, and Latin have shown progressive decreases in all investigations since 1915." It is

¹² Editors' note: "A competent Renaissance mathematician, if he were to come back to earth from whatever Valhalla he has been enjoying for the past 300 years, could teach your child the mathematics which is now being taught in most schools in the United States. This fact is not so much a tribute to the omniscience of our imaginary seventeenth-century scholar as a reflection on the secondary mathematics courses, which by and large have taken little notice of what has happened to the subject over the years." These are the opening words in a report on the activities of the College Entrance Examination Board's Commission on Mathematics, "Teaching Math in the Twentieth Century," which considers some of the more significant developments in the teaching of mathematics over the last few years. The report appeared in the *Quarterly* of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Vol. VI, No. 2, April 1958, pp. 6-8.

¹³ U.S. Office of Education, *Biennial Survey of Education in the United States, 1948-1950*, Chap. 5, "Offerings and Enrollments in High School Subjects," pp. 26, 27 (paragraph 5), 29 (paragraph 13).

a curiously ostrich-like way of meeting "life needs" to de-emphasize foreign languages during a period of world war and postwar global tension, and to de-emphasize mathematics and physics at precisely the time when the nation's security has come to depend on Einstein's equation $E = mc^2$

The school program that the twentieth century received from the nineteenth did not depend upon tradition for its principal support. It was based upon a realistic analysis of the intellectual needs of the modern world, and an extraordinarily prescient forecast of what the great issues and concerns of succeeding generations were likely to be. It was a curriculum not for the year or the decade, but for the century that was about to commence.

The curriculum of the twentieth-century school, thus soundly conceived and tested, was to consist essentially of disciplined study in five great areas, carried progressively through the grades and continued and elaborated in college. First was study directed toward command of the student's mother tongue. It began, of course, with the rudimentary skills of reading and writing, it proceeded to the systematic study of grammar, and it continued uninterruptedly with the reading and analysis of increasingly difficult examples of literature and with incessant practice in writing under competent guidance and criticism. Second was study of mathematics, commencing with the simple process of counting, and proceeding systematically through arithmetic to the abstract reasoning represented by algebra and geometry and even, where possible, the calculus. Third was study of the sciences, at first rather diffusely, then as organized into the systematic branches of biology, chemistry, and physics. Fourth was continuous study of history, beginning with scattered narratives, but continuing into methodical study of its great chronological and geographic divisions, and especially of the political and constitutional aspects sometimes called, in public school jargon, "civics." Finally, the program called for systematic study of at least one foreign language, begun early enough to ensure real mastery before the end of secondary schooling. . . .

In my judgment, the principal task that devolved upon twentieth-century American educators was to devise the means of bringing to full realization the potentialities of the modern and realistic curriculum which the united effort of educators, scholars, and

thoughtful citizens had created.¹⁴ Much remained to be done to convert the ideal into actuality. The high schools (and there were many) which fell far below the standards that this curriculum implied had to be improved, and large numbers of new secondary schools had to be created on the same high level. Teachers needed to be far better trained than ever before in the fundamental disciplines they were supposed to teach. Because so many more students were coming from homes of limited intellectual background, pedagogical techniques required continual improvement. Remedial programs had likewise to be developed so that slow learners could be brought along the same path as far as their abilities would take them. To the solution of these problems the professional educationists of the United States ought to have given their undivided attention, instead of diverting it so frequently into foolish and irresponsible tampering with the fundamental curriculum. Had the full resources supplied by the American people been devoted to the

¹⁴ Editors' note: Many who are essentially in accord with this assessment would yet argue that any such humanistic approach to the curriculum must take more explicit account of certain additional factors if it is to be truly modern and realistic. In the words of George Sarton:

"The New Humanism . . . is different from the old one in two ways.

"In the first place, it elucidates and defends the ideals for Eastern peoples as well as those of the West. The old humanists had been so completely hypnotized by the writings of classical antiquity and of the Old Testament that they were unable to conceive the existence of any other culture. It was necessary to show them that the Greek, Latin, and Hebrew writings, however important, were not the only ones which deserve to be considered; and their tradition would have been lost or delayed without the Arabic intervention. Moreover, other forms of beauty and wisdom were revealed in Sanskrit, Chinese, and Japanese books. It was necessary to study these books, if one wanted to be a man of the world, a full humanist.

"The second way is the history of science. As long as the teaching of science is concerned only with the latest results and deals with them impersonally, that teaching is practical enough but almost inhuman. Yet science is a creation of the human spirit, just as much as religion, art, or literature; it is thus an essential part of the humanities. The new humanists fully realize the spiritual importance of scientific achievements and try to emphasize them.

"The New Humanism is thus a fight on many fronts: . . . against the pseudohumanists who would kick science out of the humanities: . . . against the bigoted Westerners who reject Oriental ideas and Oriental religions; . . . against the narrow-minded technicians who do not appreciate spiritual values. . . ."—George Sarton, "The Old World and the New Humanism," in *Man's Right to Knowledge, First Series: Tradition and Change*, New York: Muschel, 1954, p. 66. By permission. Trained in Europe, the late George Sarton was for many years professor of the history of science at Harvard University.

orderly carrying out of the program that had been so responsibly developed by the beginning of this century, educational progress in the United States during the past twenty-five or fifty years would have been so unmistakable that the present widespread discontent with the schools could hardly have arisen.¹⁵

4.5 Higher Learning and the Work of the World*

Francis H. Horn

Setting vocational education against liberal education goes back to Aristotle, who regarded all paid employment as degrading. Liberal education was that education suitable for free men, men of

¹⁵ Editors' note: "But one objection can be taken to Bestor's position. He implies, and occasionally even says, that the people (you know, 'the people') have regularly supported his kind of education. Therefore, since the public is innocent, the educationists must bear all the guilt, and Bestor heaps it on them. They emerge in his books as double-dyed villains, forcing their watered stock onto a victimized populace. But surely these educationists are not as unique, or as bad, as Bestor paints them. If, as he charges, they have let the schools share a bit in anti-intellectual currents, still they did not invent those currents...."

"Nobody had to force Americans to want what is 'practical.' No intimidation was needed to get them to look for what is called new, modern, temporary, and progressive. No educationists had to interlock in a directorate their laboratories and workshops. This is the American inclination."—William Lee Miller, "The Wastelands Revisited," a review of Arthur Bestor's *The Restoration of Learning*, which appeared in *The Reporter*, October 6, 1955, and again in *The Key Reporter*, 21: 6, January 1956, from the latter of which this excerpt is taken. By permission. Mr. Miller was for several years a college teacher and a member of the staff of *The Reporter*. He is now on the faculty of the Yale Divinity School.

For a similar observation, with historical elaboration, by another critic who shares many of Professor Bestor's views, see I. L. Kandel, *American Education in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 150ff.

* Francis H. Horn, "Liberal Education Reexamined," *Harvard Educational Review*, 26: 303-314, Fall 1956. By permission. From 1953 to 1958 Dr. Horn

leisure; vocational education was designed only for slaves. This dichotomy has existed ideologically ever since. In practice, however, at the level of higher education the conflict between liberal education and vocational education has not been serious until modern times, because liberal education was actually the education needed for certain higher vocational pursuits. As former President Coffman of the University of Minnesota once wrote, "The 'liberal' studies of each age have been the practical studies of that age."¹⁶ Rashdall's monumental study of the medieval universities, for example, clearly indicates that these universities were vocational schools, established because the monastic and cathedral schools of the time were not providing the trained doctors, lawyers, theologians, and administrators needed by society. Their curriculum was strictly utilitarian, "too practical,"¹⁷ Rashdall states, and not at all concerned with teaching the cultural heritage, which is so important to contemporary liberal education....

Most of what constitutes a liberal education today was unknown three hundred years ago, when Harvard College was founded, let alone two thousand years ago. Each accretion to the liberal arts curriculum has had to fight for acceptance against the bitterest opposition. The objection today to vocational courses—to business, journalism, education, for example—was paralleled yesterday by objection to the study of Greek, chemistry, and international relations. There are no studies which have *always* been esteemed as the key to "all true academic achievement."

This attitude concerning the fixed nature of the curriculum has produced another misconception which needs re-examination—the identification of certain specific content or subject matter with a

was president of the Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, N.Y. Since 1958 he has been president of Rhode Island University.

For a longer discussion of the issues raised here, read T. R. McConnell, *A General Pattern for American Public Higher Education*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962. Read also Glenn E. Seaborg, "Education for the Third Revolution" in *Current Issues in Higher Education*, Washington, D.C.: NEA Association for Higher Education, 1963, pp. 3-12.

¹⁶ Lotus D. Coffman, *The State University, Its Work and Problems*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1934, pp. 159-160.

¹⁷ Hastings Rashdall, *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (3 vols.), Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1936, III, p. 456.

liberal education. President Chalmers of Kenyon College, whose volume *The Republic and the Person*¹⁸ is one of the ablest presentations of the liberal arts point of view, has stated that a liberal education "consists of history, mathematics, biology, language, literature, philosophy, and religion."¹⁹

A liberal education is no such thing. Such studies, properly taught and understandingly learned, should contribute to a liberal education. But a liberal education is primarily a way of looking at things, an education that frees the mind, that, as Cardinal Newman wrote, "gives a man a clear, conscious view of his own opinions and judgments. . . ." and "teaches him to see things as they are. . . ."²⁰

. . . Another item in my bill of complaint against the spokesmen for liberal education is their unproved assumptions regarding the results of a liberal education—defined in their narrow terms of certain specific traditional liberal arts content—and their glib pronouncements about the lack of comparable attainments by all those other individuals who have come to adulthood without benefit of these subjects which for two thousand years "have been esteemed as the key to the good life as well as to all true academic achievement." The contention has little basis in fact. Engineers and home economists, business administration graduates and journalists, these and the products of the American university's "array of vocational schools of incredible variety and insignificance,"²¹ to use Hutchins' words, are assumed to be uneducated—that is, to be culturally illiterate, politically inept, and lacking in critical powers. . . .

I know of no incontrovertible evidence that demonstrates that engineers and journalists, for example, can't think as well as individuals who have majored in literature and history, that they aren't as good citizens, or that they fail to have as broad interests. On the contrary, the psychologists have long since disproved the

¹⁸ Gordon Keith Chalmers, *The Republic and the Person*, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952.

¹⁹ Chalmers, in *Interpreting Education to the Public; remarks at the Fourteenth Annual Forum on Education of the Tuition Plan*, New York, February 10, 1954, New York: *The Tuition Plan*, 1954, p. 25.

²⁰ John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University*, London: Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., 1931, p. 173. (First published 1852.)

²¹ Robert Maynard Hutchins, *The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1953, p. 98.

theory that certain subjects such as mathematics and languages teach the individual to think more effectively; but most liberal arts people have never heard of the evidence or have conveniently put it from their minds. . . .

I suggest that they really cannot . . . produce what the advocates of liberal education imply it produces. Senator Fulbright complained that engineers and business men, doctors and lawyers, "do not talk up and down and across the whole range of human experience, stimulating and stimulated by that experience, to perfect the spirit of their age in the light of the spirit of all ages."²² Few individuals ever could—perhaps an Aquinas, a Bacon, a Goethe, in our day, a Schweitzer. But it is no longer possible to take all knowledge for one's province, as Bacon did, because there is too much of it. As for complete understanding, not just knowledge, I doubt that even Bacon achieved it.

We do wrong to suggest that any educational system can in four, or ten times four, years, produce the kind of person Mr. Fulbright wants. . . . It is time for educators and laymen alike to stop speaking about a liberal education's being acquired in a college course of 120 weeks duration. A truly liberal education is the product of a lifetime of learning, study, reflection. Even then few people attain it. The best the college can do is to lay the foundation for a liberal education, to inculcate the habits of mind, breadth of interest, and enlargement of spirit, which, when continued and enriched during the later years, can result in a true liberal education.

The final objection I have to the current criticism of American higher education by the liberal arts enthusiasts is their failure to recognize the importance in our society of vocational and specialized education. Only a person oblivious to the facts of modern life would doubt the need of vocational education today. Specialization, which is just as much vocational education when it is designed to produce a nuclear physicist as it is when designed to produce a pharmacist or dietitian, is the key not only to our material and technological progress, but also to our survival in a divided world. While specialized knowledge may not be enough for ultimate survival, there is indeed no hope without it. The future demands more, not less, of such education. . . . Throughout the world disease will

²² Quoted in *The New York Times*, February 23, 1955, p. 29.

be conquered, poverty overcome, and peace achieved, not by broadly educated persons, men of good will though they be, but by specialists—men and women who are experts in sanitation and antibiotics, in demography and agronomy, in Soviet psychology and the Chinese economy.

But I would be the first to admit that just as liberal education by itself is not an adequate preparation for today's world and contemporary living, neither is vocational or specialized education enough by itself. The tragedy . . . of the bitter conflict within higher education over liberal and vocational—or technical or specialized—education results from the failure to recognize that both society and the individual need both. I use the term "liberal" here in the more usual restricted sense to which I have objected earlier: those subject-matter areas within the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences which in our time are thought of as the liberal arts. I wish to point out, moreover, that though I have suggested that all subjects can and should be taught liberally and that no single subject is innately liberalizing regardless of how poorly or how well it is taught, I do not accept the sometimes expressed viewpoint that since these things are so, it makes little difference which subjects a student takes. I believe in a hierarchy of subjects if you will; that is, equally well taught, some subjects will inculcate better than other subjects those values we recognize as characteristic of a liberal education . . . engineering drawing, well taught, will open "windows of the mind," but literature or philosophy, equally well taught, will open many more.²³ The more windows opened for the

²³ Editors' note: This point is eloquently made by John W. Gardner, President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching: "Can it be said that there is an indispensable content to a liberal education? Of course not. It is shallow to seek to be precise about such matters. It is possible, however, to say that there is a range of subject matter which has proved itself *more* useful than other subject matters in the pursuit of a liberal education. This range of subject matter is the liberal arts: languages, literature, philosophy, the creative arts, the social sciences, mathematics, and the natural sciences. It is easier to move toward the objectives of a liberal education through a course on philosophy than through a course on business correspondence. It is possible to conceive of a course in business correspondence under the guidance of a teacher so inspired that it would contribute to a liberal education; it is also possible to conceive of a course in philosophy or history so stultifying as to be devoid of liberal education values. But—other things being equal—certain content is superior for the purposes of liberal

individual the better, for man does not live by bread alone.

But he does live by bread. My major quarrel with the liberal arts people, I suppose, is their failure to recognize this fact. They skip over, as if it didn't exist, the major dilemma of higher education in our day. That dilemma is this: how can the colleges and universities provide graduates prepared for the thousands of specialized tasks which must be carried on in our technological civilization, and at the same time prepared for the demanding responsibilities of intelligent and informed citizenship—including satisfying personal living—in our democratic society?

I suggest that it is time to end this current battle of the books of liberal and vocational education, general and specialized knowledge, culture and training. We must . . . recognize first that the individual and society need both types of education; second, that the problem, both for the student and for the college is the right relationship between the two; third, that the relationship will not be the same for all individuals . . . or for all institutions . . . ; and fourth, that the diversity of curricula and schools within American higher education resulting from these different approaches to the relationship of liberal to vocational education is a matter of strength, and efforts to force a common pattern, especially the pattern of the traditional four-year curriculum in the liberal arts, must be resisted.

. . . [Thus] I believe . . . that each person, within the period of his formal schooling, should have as much liberal education as possible, consistent with the requirements of his particular vocation and the time he can devote to his schooling. But I also believe—and here I part company with all the liberal arts people—that the vocational preparation must take precedence over the liberal education. . . .²⁴ If an individual can give seven years to his higher education,

education."—John W. Gardner, *Liberal Education: A Summary of a Discussion by the Trustees of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching*, from the 1955-1956 Annual Report, New York: The Carnegie Foundation, 1956, p. 9. By permission.

²⁴ Editors' note: It is significant that the "liberal arts people" have been joined in this debate, by a number of leaders from business and industry in recent years. Clearly taking issue with President Horn is Clarence B. Randall, former chairman of the Board of the Inland Steel Company. "It is from the point of view of society as a whole that the advantage of a general education is most readily made apparent. Long before Aristotle, men must have sensed that

the liberal part of this education will exceed the professional part. But if he has only four years to give to college—and he wants to be an engineer or a cattle breeder for example—the larger proportion of his program will be vocational.

. . . Regardless of how much liberal education a person gets in his formal schooling, it is a great mistake to have it concentrated as preprofessional or prevocational education. This, however, is the normal pattern of higher education in this country.

I believe that all these standard patterns are undesirable. They contribute to the idea that the liberal arts part of one's education is something to be completed and forgotten; a hurdle which, once surmounted, leaves the individual to devote himself to the really im-

broad cultivation of the mind makes for good citizenship and the collective well-being of the community.

"But for a particular individual the situation is never quite so clear. The young men and young women who approach that time of life when they must make a choice as to the intellectual discipline which they will pursue as they undertake higher education are often souls in torment. . . .

"Inevitably . . . short-term considerations too often influence the selection of the institution and the choice of intellectual discipline to be followed. The mind of the incoming freshman is ordinarily focused intently upon the job that he hopes to get upon graduation, and too frequently he selects those courses of instruction which he believes will most immediately bear upon the getting of a job, and his ultimate advancement in that job. Not sensing the deep satisfactions in the art of living that a general education will bring, to say nothing of its specific value as a training for business, he tries to determine in advance the precise job that he wants, and to take those courses which he believes will make him most attractive to his prospective employer.

"But actually, how can a young man know what job he is best suited for? Granted all the advances that have been made in vocational guidance, and the amazing new skills which the psychologists are bringing to this important subject, the fact still remains that the incoming freshman knows but little about himself. In fact, is it not one of the principal functions of higher education to teach him about himself?

"And if by some miracle he could feel absolutely sure of that for which he is best suited, how could he possibly be certain that his life would so unfold as to offer him precisely that opportunity? . . . Often his life must be lived in the pattern of his second, or even his third, choice.

"With all of these uncertainties about the future, ordinary prudence might suggest to a young man that there is a great risk in locking one's life in too early within the barriers of a specialty; that on the contrary there is actually more assurance, instead of less, in undertaking an all-purpose education which could lead to many types of employment, rather than risking all on a single focus."—Clarence B. Randall, "A Businessman Looks at the Liberal Arts," *The 1956 Fund for Adult Education Lectures*, White Plains, N.Y.: January 1957, pp. 17-19. By permission.

portant part of his education, the vocational part. I contend that liberal and vocational education should be intermingled at every stage of a student's career, unless he happens to be someone who is still uncertain in his choice of occupation. Then a broad exploratory program exclusively in the liberal arts is desirable. . . .

But that is not enough. One of the unsound arrangements in our educational system is the failure to carry liberal arts courses—outside the student's field of specialization—into graduate and post-baccalaureate professional schools. The most important thing to remember about liberal education is that it is the achievement of a lifetime. . . .

The liberal arts people are shortsighted in not recognizing this. Instead of lamenting a necessary and inevitable decline in what has been considered to be liberal education, they should recognize the golden opportunity for some truly effective teaching of the liberal arts at the adult level. The potential number of students to be reached is tremendous—our whole adult population. . . .

The need for this continuing liberal education for adults will grow as our work grows more complex, its problems more difficult, its meaning more elusive. It offers, therefore, a future for teaching the liberal arts that will make the liberal arts teaching of the past insignificant in amount. Educators of the liberal arts persuasion should . . . be rejoicing in their great opportunities which lie ahead.

4.6 The Common-sense Purposes of Progressive Education*

Raymond P. Harris

The progressive education movement originated as an attempt to reform the traditional curriculum by the introduction of changes based upon studies of the school in its society. The move-

* From Raymond P. Harris, *American Education: Facts, Fancies, Folklore*, New York: Random House, Inc., 1961. Excerpts from pages 226–242 and 273. © Copyright 1961 by Raymond P. Harris, Reprinted by permission of Random House, Inc. Raymond P. Harris is director of secondary education, Mount Vernon, New York.

ment began shortly before 1920. At that time, three factors of great importance to public education had already been identified. One was the rapid rate of change in American culture, symbolized by the appearance of the airplane and automobile. Another was increased knowledge of the processes of learning. The third factor was the changing composition of the secondary school population.

Consideration of these factors led to grave doubts of the suitability of traditional teaching methods and content for the educational needs of American children and youth. From such doubts came the impetus to change. The direction of that change has been guided throughout by scientific studies of learning, teaching, and cultural changes. The movement has been a thorough-going search for progress in American education.

But progress in general terms requires specific changes in procedures. . . . The list below presents five fundamental changes which have been urged in the name of progress in education on which most professionals would agree. Each proposed change is presented in contrast to the traditional educational practices against which it has been a reaction:

1. To provide learning experiences which appeal to the natural interests of children, and lead to the development of additional desirable interests, instead of presenting a fixed, unvarying content.
2. To permit children to share in planning their own learning experiences instead of limiting them entirely to adult-chosen activities.
3. To vary instruction for individual children and groups of children to serve their studied and understood needs, instead of teaching the same content at the same pace to all of them.
4. To teach with the aim of promoting a better understanding of the relationships among subjects and to the home and community, instead of separating the subjects completely from each other and from life outside the school.
5. To teach through a variety of learning experiences, instead of through the single experience of studying a textbook.

These are exactly the kind of common-sense proposals that most parents approve in their conversations with teachers and in community conferences on education. The majority of parents are pleased when their children participate in learning activities such

as those listed. . . . [because] innovations such as those described above are wholesome expressions of the finest American ideals. They convey to students the promise of more opportunities for the exercise of personal initiative, independent judgment, and creative thinking. These are the qualities that made the United States a great democratic nation. They are also the qualities necessary for it to continue to grow in greatness and in democracy. . . .²⁵

Science, Humanism, and the “Great Books”

4.7 Great Books Constitute the Core of Liberal Education*

St. John’s College Faculty

No one would dispute that a technological civilization like ours requires many trained specialists and technicians; but the need for these, urgent as it may be, should not blind us to the

²⁵ Editors’ note: Compare the following paragraph from a history of the progressive education movement: “Compulsory school attendance marked a new era in the history of American education. The crippled, the blind, the deaf, the sick, the slow-witted, and the needy arrived in growing numbers. Thousands of recalcitrants and incorrigibles who in former times might have dropped out of school now became public charges for a minimum period. And as the school-leaving age moved progressively upward, every problem was aggravated as youngsters became bigger, stronger, and more resourceful. The dreams of democratic idealists may have resided in compulsory-attendance laws, but so did the makings of the blackboard jungle.

“Had there never been a progressive movement, had there been no social settlements, municipal reform associations, country life commissions, or immigrant aid societies, no William James, Stanley Hall, Edward Thorndike, or John Dewey, the mere fact of compulsory attendance would have changed the American school. . . .”—Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education 1876–1957*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1961, pp. 127–128. By permission. Read also Carleton Washburne, “An Eighty-Year Perspective on Education,” *Phi Delta Kappan*, 45: 145–150, December 1963.

* Excerpted from *The St. John’s Program: A Report*, Annapolis, Md.: St. John’s College Press, 1955. By permission. Read also David Boroff, “St. John’s Col-

even more urgent need for reasonable and well-educated men. Specialized work should be sustained and criticized by minds able to view specific problems in a context of general principles and related theory. If these conditions are not met, specialized work becomes routine and uninspired technique, pedantry, or pretentious nonsense. . . .

The useful arts, in the final analysis always the application of general truths and theories to concrete problems and situations, require a foundation of theory before they become very useful, or at least before they become other than hit-or-miss empirical procedures. . . .

The intellectual arts have a utilitarian dimension, but this does not make the end of the liberal college a utilitarian one. A liberal education concentrating upon instruction in the proper use and understanding of linguistic and mathematical symbols possesses a truly universal significance. . . . An earlier faculty report says:

It is an integral part of the American dream that each man in our society may and must perform the highest functions. These functions consist in the intelligent free choice of the ends and means of both our common and individual life. This is a most glorious and most difficult proposition to which we are dedicated. Among other things it means that each man must have his measure of liberal education, since choices can be neither free nor intelligent without relevant training and understanding. These trainings and understandings are parts of the liberal arts and sciences. Professional and vocational schools study, or should study, their respective minimal amounts of theoretical science. But there are basic trainings and understandings common to all vocations and therefore common necessities of all free men. . . .

The Great Books in the Curriculum. . . . It has been said that the authors of these books are the real St. John's faculty. If so, they are subjected to more severe standards of selection than most facul-

lege: Four Years with the Great Books," *Saturday Review*, 46: 58-61, March 23, 1963.

Compare also the following statement by Plato: "In heaven, methinks, there is laid up a pattern of the good city which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether it exists or ever will exist on earth is no matter, for the wise man will live after the manner of it, having nothing to do with any other."—Plato, *Republic IX*, 592 (Jowett translation).

ties. Furthermore, they are never granted tenure. To be selected for the curriculum, a book must meet the following requirements:

First, it must be a masterpiece in the liberal arts. The author must possess and his work must exemplify those intellectual arts and habits the student is supposed to acquire—rigorous and honest thinking, imagination, an effort to transcend the merely factual and historical, and, above all, the direction of these to the end of learning and communicating the truth.

Second, it must be a work of fine art. It must possess a clarity and grace that tempt the mind of a reader to yield willingly to the discipline of its logic and to explore the intricacies of its thought.

Third, it must have many possible interpretations. From the first two criteria it follows that a great book can be understood on a certain level without the support of commentary and is thus immediately intelligible. On other levels different interpretations may be equally valid, and the texture of possible meanings develops as the book finds its place in the context of an intellectual tradition. It is endlessly provocative.

Fourth, it must raise significant questions, even though it may not answer them. These questions and the answers we make to them are the essential aspects of our individual and social lives. In facing them the author must be conscious of the limits of human analysis and exposition; and he must be willing, where necessary, to follow reason to these limits.

Fifth, each book, in addition to its independent contribution, must be related to the other books in the curriculum. Whether the relations are those of agreement or opposition does not matter. In this way the understanding of any one book is cumulative and corrected by the reading of the others.

It would seem legitimate to describe books conforming to the above criteria as "great books." . . . St. John's believes that such books provide the best possible material for students to work with. . .²⁶

²⁶ Editors' note: Here is a brief criticism of "Great Books" as the core of a curriculum: "That we should read 'great books' rather than poor ones is a venerable truism; that we should make them the core of a liberal education is not quite so obvious. . . Books do not grow in a vacuum, and books do not grow purely out of other books. At all times, the essential relation is between book and book, but between book and life. A revolution in

4.8 The Inspiration of Great Books*

Gilbert Highet

Three Errors . . . there are three errors which help to account for the weaknesses of contemporary education.

The first is the mistaken idea that schools exist principally to

literature is part of a general revolution in thought, itself inseparable from a change in social conditions. . . . Certain immense changes, of the utmost importance to mankind, never were recorded in commensurate books. The Industrial Revolution had incalculable consequences; but even if James Watt had happened to write a book, it might well not have deserved to be considered a world classic. And in the mounting tide of socialism for the last century and a half, no single book, however mighty, can be treated even as an adequate symbol. . . .

"But the chief ambiguity in selecting the Hundred Best Books results from the effort to combine two criteria, the intrinsic (artistic or scientific) and the social: books that live because of their beauty and truth, books which once were events in the history of mankind. When the two criteria happen to be in agreement, it is little short of a miracle. The most miraculous case of all is that of Plato. St. Paul, in rare passages, reaches supreme heights of spiritual and literary power; Jean Jacques Rousseau was not merely a portent, but, once in a while, a poet. But as a rule, the scales are not the same. . . . If *Hamlet* had never been written, mankind would have been deprived of a jewel; but, because Luther nailed his ninety-five theses on the church door at Wittenberg, the lives of millions were transformed. There is an abyss between a classic and a document. . . ."—Albert Guerard, *The Education of a Humanist*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949, pp. 128–132. By permission. Professor Guerard is an authority on "great books" having authored *Preface to World Literature* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1949) and numerous books on literature and humanism.

For further criticisms of "great books" read Dwight McDonald, "Book-of-the-Millennium Club," *The New Yorker*, 28: 171f., November 29, 1952; F. R. Leavis, "Great Books and a Liberal Education," *Commentary*, 16: 224–232, September 1953.

The next two selections also deal with this issue. Gilbert Highet points out the value of "great books"—though he does not consider the attendant problems that occur in secondary education when difficult classics are assigned to dull or mediocre students. Everett Kircher is aware of these problems, but is also aware of the value of "great books" for students who are able to read them.

* Gilbert Highet, *Man's Unconquerable Mind*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, paperback 1960, pp. 75–78, 40–45. By permission.

The editors recommend this inexpensive paperback as a supplement to this chapter. Gilbert Highet is professor of the classic languages at Columbia University.

train boys and girls to be sociable, "integrated with their group," "equipped with the skills of social living," "adjusted to family and community co-operation," and so forth. Obviously that is *one* of the aims of schooling, sometimes neglected in the past though usually emerging as a by-product. It was a necessary and valuable function of school and college at the most recent stage in American history to create a more or less uniform pattern of culture for the new middle class, and a stable social order in which the children of the unparalleled flood of immigrants who reached the country between 1880 and 1920 could find their place as Americans. But another aim of education, equally important or more important, is to train the individual mind as intensely and to encourage it as variously as possible—since much of our better and our more essential life is lived by us as individuals, and since (in the advancing age of mass-culture) it is vital for us to maintain personal independence.

The second of these three errors is the belief that education is a closed-end process, which stops completely as soon as adult life begins. . . . It is like learning music for nearly a decade, and then never going to a concert or playing a single note. Here the schools, colleges, and teachers are surely to blame. Too many teachers (especially in college) seem to limit the interest of their students by implying that their own true and central aim is to train professional scholars, and that amateur interest in their subject is to be deprecated.

The third error which limits the use of knowledge in the Western world is the notion that learning and teaching always ought to have immediate results, show a profit, lead to success. . . . The result is that important and long-fruitful subjects tend to be squeezed out of education, neglected, even ignored and deformed. For instance, English literature is one of the finest literatures in the entire world: a thing to be proud of and to enjoy. To be brought up speaking and reading English is to be presented with the key to a massive and incorruptible treasure. Our literature from Chaucer to Eliot contains enough to make a man happy, thoughtful, and eloquent through an entire lifetime. And yet many unfortunate boys and girls in the English-speaking countries are being denied that opportunity. Their teachers tell their parents that language is a "tool"; and instead of showing them how to read and appreciate the

best fifty of those miraculous books, they instruct them in a dreary pastiche sometimes called "language arts," which is to literature as finger painting is to the National Gallery. Year by year, more youngsters go to high school and to college. Year by year, standards go down and down—and not because there is an inevitable degradation in admitting large crowds into our educational system, but simply because we are recklessly ready to waste both the minds of the young and the rich inheritance of the past. . . .

Training the Thinker. . . . We can never tell how great minds arise, and it is very hard to tell how to detect and encourage them when they do appear. But we do know two methods of feeding them as they grow.

One is to give them constant challenge and stimulus. Put problems before them. Make things difficult for them. They need to think. Produce things for them to think about and question their thinking at every stage. They are inventive and original. Propose experiments to them. Tell them to discover what is hidden.

The second method is to bring them into contact with other eminent minds. It is not enough, not nearly enough, for a clever boy or girl to meet his fellows and his teachers and his parents. He (or she) must meet men and women of real and undeniable distinction. That is, he must meet the immortals. That brilliant and pessimistic scoundrel Plato died just over 2,300 years ago, but through his books he is still talking and thinking and leading others to think; and there is no better way, none, for a young man to start thinking about any kind of philosophical problem—human conduct, political action, logical analysis, metaphysics, aesthetics—than by reading Plato and trying to answer his arguments, detect his sophisms, resist his skillful persuasions, and become both his pupil and his critic. No one can learn to write music better than by studying *The Well-tempered Clavier* of Bach and the symphonies of Beethoven. A young composer who does so will not, if he is any good, write music like Bach and Beethoven. He will write music more like the music that he wanted to write. A man may become a routine diplomat by following the rule book and solving every problem as it comes up, but if he is to grow into a statesman he must read his Machiavelli and consider the lives of Bismarck and Lincoln and Disraeli. The best way toward greatness is to mix with the great.

Challenge and experiment; association with immortal minds: these are the two sure ways of rearing intelligent men and women. And these two opportunities for greatness are, or ought to be, provided by schools and colleges and universities. "But," you will ask, "do schools exist only to train geniuses?" No, but they do not exist only to train the average and to neglect or benumb the talented. They exist to make the best of both. One of the heaviest responsibilities in education is to do justice to exceptional minds, remembering that they may emerge in any place, at any time, and in any body—even a clumsy and misshapen frame may hold a brilliant mind. It must be a strange experience to teach in a little country school, the same subjects year after year to the same families, and then to find a gifted young engineer or a born dramatist among one's pupils. Disconcerting. Difficult. Difficult to know how to encourage without patronizing; difficult not to be a little jealous. Yet the history of knowledge is filled with true stories of teachers who recognized outstanding gifts in a pupil and gave him all he needed to set him on his way to eminence: touching and encouraging, these tales. Such is the story of the Spanish peasant boy who was drawing with charcoal on a plank when a teacher saw him, started training him, and helped to make the artist Goya. Such is the tale of the thin sensitive undersized London schoolboy whose schoolmaster's son gave him the run of his private library: it was among those shelves and as a result of that kindness that the youngster wrote a poem called *On First Looking into Chapman's Homer*. Behind every great man there stands either a good parent or a good teacher.

Education in America and in the other countries of the West is an inspiring achievement: all those light, healthy schools, those myriad colleges, so many youngsters having a fine time and not working too hard. . . . Schools do exist for the average. They also exist to serve the distinguished. America was built both by a multitude of common men and women and also by a few eccentrics, heroes, and giants. . . .

The life of every teacher is partly dedicated to discovering and encouraging those few powerful minds who will influence our future, and the secret of education is never to forget the possibility of greatness.

We owe them reverence, the great minds of the past and

present and future. It is inspiring and delightful even to scan their names. One shines on another, receiving light in return. It is like looking at the stars, when the eye travels from the Bear to Orion, from Aldebaran to Sirius and Vega, from glory to glory. . . . To read the life of even one such thinker is to renew one's faith in humanity, one's sense of duty to the world. To move freely among the captain minds of any one great age—say the seventeenth century, or the century that produced Cicero, Lucretius, Vergil, Horace, and Livy, or the nineteenth century—is to be perpetually astounded at the depth unplumbable, the infinite variety of the human mind, and to repeat the words of the Greek tragedian:

Wonders are many, but none,
none is more wondrous than man.

4.9 Two Blind Spots in Contemporary Education*

Everett J. Kircher

Great books are for the able, not for dull or mediocre students. . . . Forgetting the simple truth that a small and clumsy mind cannot engage a great idea or a subtly rendered complex emotion and that one without some significant dimension of emerging greatness cannot hold conversation with the great, we act, in deference to our "democratic faith" as if this were not so; and we become involved in a myriad of teaching devices unwittingly designed to subvert the educative process. . . . We [utopian humanists and classicists] are losing leadership in our profession because we refuse to face the fact that students vary tremendously in ability and must be educated differently. . . . As Conant has said, "I am not sure that educators anywhere have found a solution to the

* Excerpt from E. J. Kircher, "Broudy's Educational Aspirations: Reality or Utopia?" *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 2: 241-258, Summer 1962. By permission of the Executive Editor, College of Education, University of Toledo, Toledo 6, Ohio. (Professor Broudy's position, which was discussed at length in the article from which this excerpt was taken, is quite similar to the one stated above by Gilbert Highet.)

Everett J. Kircher is professor of education, Ohio State University.

problem of the kind of education suitable for a slow learner through twelve years of schooling."²⁷

There is nothing one can do with Stephen Vincent Benet, Carl Sandburg, Tolstoy, or Shakespeare to make them suitable for below average students. Shakespeare, for one, has been rewritten in simplified language for the young and the less able; but *Shakespeare* is gone. They are nice little stories, but they are no longer value exemplars. . . . No work of art, whether painting, music or literature, can be tampered with in an over-all way, taking out the higher order abstractions or intricate details of design or subtle nuances and remain an exemplar. Exemplars are great because they are demanding. We must rise to them, they cannot be brought down to us. . . .

The blind spot of the classical realist lies in his failure to realize that this heritage [of great books and other classics] can . . . do inestimable harm when forced upon those not equipped to receive it. . . . Such students live in a dim and confusing world. They are hounded by failure and fear which slowly turns into rebellion. The student comes to detest the school, the teacher, and finally himself. The number of juvenile delinquents that teachers following this outworn faith have driven into lives of crime must be tremendous. . . .

The blind spot of those attacking it [the attempt to bring great classics into the school curriculum] lies in their failure to realize that withholding it from those with the intellectual and imaginative power to benefit from it would result in cultural disaster. A hallowed place must be made for the humanistic disciplines in the junior-senior secondary schools of tomorrow. . . .²⁸

²⁷ J. B. Conant, *Slums and Suburbs*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961, p. 53.

²⁸ Editors' note: Dr. Conant's Comprehensive High School, briefly summarized in the next selection, may be considered as an attempt to remove the blind spots described by Professor Kircher.

4.10 The Comprehensive High School*

James B. Conant

When I began my studies of secondary education, I wanted to find one or more widely comprehensive schools that, in my estimation, were satisfactorily fulfilling three functions: (1) providing a sound general education for all students, (2) providing suitable elective courses for students interested in developing marketable skills, and (3) providing suitable elective courses for students with academic talents and interests. As you know, I did find schools fulfilling these functions except in regard to foreign language instruction and the guidance of bright girls. I concluded that no radical change was needed in the structure of American secondary education, provided that high schools were of sufficient size.

I have spoken about the general education courses required of all students. The determination of the right elective courses for the right students is more complicated and controversial. Especially as one goes down the ladder of academic ability and talks about the bulk of the students, specifically with respect to the elective program, it is more difficult to achieve and, perhaps, less desirable. So much depends upon the nature of the community, the hopes and aspirations of both parents and youth. In a medium-sized industrial community, there is generally considerable interest in the development of skills marketable on graduation. In my view, education

* J. B. Conant, "Another Look at the Comprehensive High School," *Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals*, 46: 273-287, May 1962. Reprinted by permission from the *Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary-School Principals*, May 1962. Copyright: Washington, D.C.

The second section of this paper on "Vocational Education" is from James B. Conant, *Slums and Suburbs*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961, pp. 35-47. By permission.

Among the recent writings of Dr. Conant are three significant surveys: *The American High School Today*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1959; *Education in the Junior High School Years*, Princeton, N.J.; Educational Testing Service, 1960; *The Education of American Teachers*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963.

Selection 6.5 by George D. Stoddard and selection 6.6 by R. Freeman Butts are closely related to this selection by James B. Conant.

cannot be considered apart from employment, and, in a community like this, the relevance of high-school work to future employment is obvious to both the boys and the girls. In the practical courses, the students are usually highly motivated, and this attitude is carried over to the required general education courses. In such a community, perhaps the bulk of the students will spend roughly half their time in vocational elective courses. In a college oriented suburban community, the situation will be quite different, as many of you are well aware. In other words, there is no use raising the question of the ideal elective program for the average or below average high-school student. There is no national answer to this question. It all depends on the individual, the family, the community, and the school. . . .

I have repeatedly urged that every pupil who has the ability to study effectively and rewardingly the following subjects should be urged to do so: four years of mathematics, four years of one foreign language, and three years of science. These subjects are in addition to the required four years of English and three years of social studies. This program adds up to a minimum of eighteen academic courses in grades 9-12. Notice the phrase "effectively and rewardingly." This program is not meant for pupils who will not gain from the instruction. I have estimated on the basis of my school visits that something like 15 to 20 per cent, on a national basis, fall into the category of pupils who can handle this program with profit. This is not to say that there is a sudden cut-off point below which pupils are incapable of doing the job, nor is this to say that these pupils are equally adept in all these subjects. It is to say that the chances are very good that, in the top 15 to 20 per cent on a national basis, there will be found pupils with a cluster of talents that will enable them to study these subjects with profit. The presumption is that students whose test results and past record indicate that they have these talents ought to be urged by the guidance counselors to elect at least by grade 9 these sequential academic programs. If a boy or girl, subsequently finds excessive difficulty in any one of the subjects—language, math, or science—he or she should be guided into something less arduous.

But why should bright students study these subjects? . . . Let me give three justifications I do *not* claim:

1. Training the mind: I have never likened the mind to a muscle that can be trained, nor remotely suggested that a study of any particular subject, geometry, for instance, enables one to think logically in solving problems of everyday life. I am well aware of the complex area of mental discipline and transfer of training.

2. Tough subjects: Likewise, I have not advocated certain courses because they are tough and somehow are supposed to build character. For many pupils, they are hard, but this fact is irrelevant to the argument. Latin is tough also, and Greek is perhaps tougher. I have recommended neither.²⁹

3. College preparation: I have deliberately avoided the term "college preparation" because it has little meaning. I think I am safe in saying that any high-school graduate, no matter what his high-school program, can go to college somewhere in the United States....

The purpose of studying a four-year sequence of mathematics and a modern foreign language and a three-year sequence of science is to achieve proficiency in these disciplines. The reason for developing this proficiency or skill is quite simple. Unless a boy or girl takes a wide academic program in high school, many doors at the college level are closed. In the student's and nation's interest, these doors should remain open. From these top 15-20 per cent will come the future professional people who will be our teachers, doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists. We have been recently reminded that the Soviet Union is outproducing the United States in the training of engineers and scientists at the rate of between two and three to one. This is an unpleasant fact we cannot ignore. The bright boy who fails to take mathematics beyond geometry is unlikely to become an engineer or scientist. The girl who takes only two years of French is not likely to become a foreign language teacher. In short, by restricting his academic elective program, a pupil thereby restricts those careers later available to him. By narrowing down his academic program in high school, he has made a negative career decision. All roads are not completely blocked,

²⁹ Editors' note: For a defense of the view that Latin and mathematics are ideal subjects for improving intelligence, read Charles D. Hardie, *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory*, New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1942 (paperback edition 1962), pages 90-96.

for by dint or hard work in college, he may accomplish what he might have done in high-school. But in so doing, he misses courses unavailable at the high-school level. . . .

The idea that a large proportion of students on a national basis can carry with profit the program I have in mind is just plain contrary to the facts. If standards are to be upheld in mathematics, science, and foreign languages, it just is not possible for many boys and girls with average or less than average ability to carry the load I am prescribing for the academically talented. Given the best will in the world, carrying both mathematics and foreign languages for four years is beyond their capacity. . . .

One does not say that a given student is incapable of handling a certain program at the secondary level if standards are maintained. What one says is that the chances are that, based on tests and past record, the student with low specific aptitude and low IQ would have to spend an inordinate amount of time on each lesson. Remember . . . that the time allotted for the advanced academic electives in the senior high school is geared to the fast or bright student. . . .

The regular courses in mathematics, science, and foreign languages are given in such a way that only those with high aptitude can keep up. To reduce the pace so that those with low specific aptitude could handle the work would mean that neither in depth nor breadth could the year's work be accomplished. No one would advocate slowing down the tenth-, eleventh-, and twelfth-grade courses to accommodate those with average ability for mathematics, science, and foreign language. What is possible and is often done is to recommend that some students elect only one or two academic courses each year in addition to English and social studies. For some students from a certain type of family, it may be well worth while for the average student to elect mathematics through grade 11 and four years of a foreign language, for example. There is a variety of such reduced academic loads which may be worth while for many students in suburban high schools.

Another way of answering this problem, which has been tried in some schools but deserves more attention, is the special presentation of the conventional courses at a much slower rate. . . . I reserve judgment in this whole area until we have more evidence of

the degree of success attained—as measured by the competence of the twelfth-grade students. . . .

Vocational Education. I should like to underline four points I made in my first report [on *The Comprehensive High School Today*] with respect to vocational education. First and foremost, vocational courses should not replace courses which are essential parts of the required academic program for graduation. Second, vocational courses should be provided in grades 11 and 12 and not require more than half the student's time in those years; however, for slow learners and prospective dropouts these courses ought to begin earlier. Third, the significance of the vocational courses is that those enrolled are keenly interested in the work; they realize the relevance of what they are learning to their future careers, and this sense of purpose is carried over to the academic courses which they are studying at the same time. Fourth, the type of vocational training programs should be related to the employment opportunities in the general locality. This last point is important because if high school pupils are aware that few, if any, graduates who have chosen a certain vocational program have obtained a job as a consequence of the training, the whole idea of relevance disappears. Vocational training which holds no hope that the skill developed will be in fact a marketable skill becomes just another school "chore" for those whose interest in their studies has begun to falter. Those who, because of population mobility and the reputed desire of employers to train their own employees, would limit vocational education to general rather than specific skills ought to bear in mind the importance of motivation in any kind of school experience. . . .

I submit that in a heavily urbanized and industrialized free society the educational experiences of youth should fit their subsequent employment. There should be a smooth transition from full-time schooling to a full-time job, whether that transition be after grade 10 or after graduation from high school, college, or university. . . . In a few school districts one finds a link between school and job [in the] Smith-Hughes. . . . "diversified occupations" program . . . the "distributive education" programs . . . adult education courses. . . . [and] work-study programs. . . . [However] It is not often realized to what degree certain trades are in many com-

munities closed areas of employment, except for a lucky few. One has to talk confidentially with some of the directors of vocational high schools to realize that a boy cannot just say, "I want to be a plumber," and then, by doing good work, find a job. It is far more difficult in many communities to obtain admission to an apprentice program which involves union approval than to get into the most selective medical school in the nation. . . .

I am deeply disturbed by the implications that widespread unemployment among the youth of our big cities has for the future of our society.

Although the causes of juvenile delinquency are complex and there is no one solution, employment opportunities are clearly important. A youth who has dropped out of school and never has had a full-time job is not likely to become a constructive citizen of his community. Quite the contrary. As a frustrated individual he is likely to be anti-social and rebellious, and may well become a juvenile delinquent. The adverse influence of the street is largely a consequence of gangs of such youths, out of school and unemployed. I doubt if anyone familiar with slums would deny that, if all the male youth by some miracle were to find employment, the social climate would change dramatically for the better. Some juvenile delinquents would remain, gangs might not wholly disappear, but the attitude of the neighborhood would alter in such a way as to make more effective the teacher in every classroom.

Unemployment is bad anywhere. Adult unemployment, especially in rural areas, towns, and small cities, is grievous because it usually involves the loss of support for an entire family. In such cases, one might say that solving the unemployment of adults has the top priority. But in the slums of the largest cities, the reverse is true. The great need is for reduction of unemployment of male youth under twenty-one. . . .

To my mind, *guidance officers, especially in the large cities, ought to be given the responsibility for following the post-high school careers of youth from the time they leave school until they are twenty-one years of age.* Since compulsory attendance usually ends at age sixteen, this means responsibility for the guidance of youth ages sixteen to twenty-one who are out of school and either employed or unemployed. This expansion of the school's function will

cost money and will mean additional staff—at least a doubling of the guidance staff in most of the large cities. But the expense is necessary, for vocational and educational guidance must be a continuing process to help assure a smooth transition from school to the world of work. The present abrupt break between the two is unfortunate. What I have in mind suggests, of course, a much closer relationship than now exists among the schools, employers, and labor unions, as well as social agencies and employment offices. . . .

Under present employment circumstances, it does seem that a high school diploma is an asset for virtually all students. However, realistically one must face the fact that not all will remain in school long enough to graduate. For the many slow learners, it may actually be worse to stay in school and endure constant academic frustration than to leave school and to find a satisfying job, if such a job can be found. Boys in this group have much more difficulty finding a job than girls. I am not impressed by the holding power of a school as a criterion of its quality, but neither am I impressed by the argument that a boy who fails to get along in school ought to drop out. It all depends. The situation in which a boy drops out of school only to walk the streets is quite different from the situation in which a boy drops out and finds satisfactory employment. Full-time schooling for certain youths through grade 12 may be good or bad, depending upon the employment picture. . . .³⁰

³⁰ Editors' note: About the time the Conant report first appeared, Paul Woodring in *A Fourth of a Nation* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957) upheld the view that a substantial portion of the high school student body is incapable of fruitfully completing the normal academic requirements demanded for college entrance. Woodring and Conant thus dealt with questions such as these: What shall our schools do with these low-ability students? Shall we simplify the traditional academic subjects? Shall we add "shop," "home economics," and other "consumer education" courses? Shall we remove nonacademic students from the school room to some CCC program, or workstudy program?

Quick to reject the proposals of Conant and Woodring, and their supporting assumptions, was Mortimer Adler, long a vehement and influential spokesman for the classical-humanist approach to education, especially as typified by the famous "Great Books" program. Mr. Adler, currently Director of the Institute for Philosophical Research in San Francisco, wrote to the editors of *Life* (44: 19, May 12, 1958) as follows (reprinted by permission): "The reference in your editorial to Conant's and Woodring's 'schemes' requires me to tell you that I think that both of them are dismal confessions of failure to understand the educational problem a democracy must try to solve. Both admit defeat

QUESTIONS AND READINGS FOR STUDY AND DISCUSSION

Some New Dimensions for Education

EDUCATION FOR LEISURE

Consider the following quotation, and use some of the bibliographical references to help evaluate it:

"Unless men can somehow be freed of workaday life or sometimes raise themselves up from it, they will not receive or marvel at the world but try to subdue it. If they have designs on the world, if they aim to move it, reduce it, explode and exploit it, flatten it, to control, to manipulate or to trick its persons, beasts and objects, and work on them and experiment on them, they will get to know many things about the world, but never what really matters: They will never understand it. Only if they can occasionally lift their heads from work and appreciate what it means to be able to keep their heads up, only then will they get a world where work is not dominant [and where] philosophy and art and ideas can take hold. . . .

"In the world today, the deserving are those who work. A man unable to work can only be sick, old, unemployed or imprisoned. Present-day democracy and socialism alike combine the universal duty of work (or the paradoxical "right" to it) with the doctrine of equality, thereby making everybody a worker. The concept of work that cut a victorious path from the nineteenth century succeeded eventually in building a society around work. The result was a Work Society.

before they start. Conant is much worse than Woodring—much more frankly and unashamedly undemocratic or worse, antidemocratic. No one has tried to give, or even thought about the problem of giving, all the children the same quality of liberal—and I mean purely liberal—schooling at the secondary level. Yet both of them proceed as if that alternative were really impossible, and offer shoddy substitutes for the lower two thirds of the school population.

"The facts of individual differences of all sorts—in native gifts, in home backgrounds, in future occupational status—do not justify or require us to overlook the fact that all the children are human beings, all are destined to be politically and economically free men, to be citizens with ample free time for leisure activities, etc. On the basis of the Conant program how could we possibly expect two thirds of our future citizens to use their free time constructively and profitably in the liberal activities of leisure? How could we expect them to be good citizens? Or live a decent human life?"

See also Casper Green, "What Shall We Do with the Dullards?" *Atlantic*, 197: 72–74, May 1956.

"That work shall be with man as long as man is mortal is a view we may well accept. That it follows from this that life should be organized into a Work Society is another matter. . . .

"The benefits of leisure are ultimately the benefits of cultivating the free mind: creativeness, truth and freedom. They are benefits of which our nation and our civilization stand in constant and pressing need; nor are we conspicuous for their cultivation."—Sebastian de Grazia³¹

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PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPHASIS ON HUMILITY, REVERENCE, AND AWE

Some educators believe that a major objective of education is to make students aware of the limitations of their own beliefs, which include freedom from *blind* acceptance of traditions. The earth does not become fruitful until torn up by the plow; nor does the mind of a student develop until challenged by new ideas. The following short quotations emphasize the value of "acknowledged ignorance." Traditionally, this value was emphasized in courses in philosophy and religion. But can a sense of humility, and a feeling of awe and reverence also be taught in the physical sciences? in the biological sciences? in the social studies? in music, literature and art? in vocational courses? Do all students respond

³¹ Sebastian de Grazia, "On the Work Society," *Country Beautiful*, 2: 8-16, 63, June 1963. Copyright 1963 by *Country Beautiful* Magazine. Reprinted by permission. (The last paragraph is from a review of de Grazia's book, which appeared in *Country Beautiful*.) For an expansion of these ideas read Sebastian de Grazia, *Of Time, Work, and Leisure*, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962.

alike to all areas of knowledge? Read the following quotations; then discuss these questions.

"The educated man appreciates both the capabilities and the limitations of the mind in the universal scheme of things. Recognizing his powers, he develops dignity, integrity, and responsibility. Realizing his limitations, he cultivates tolerance, humility and reverence.

"The unknowable, the incomprehensible, the insoluble is not merely in the heavens; it is close to us. We experience its effect in our daily lives. Inability to cope with it causes fear, superstition, frustration, suspicion, crime, and war. The education of the future, therefore, must deal with man's attitude toward the unknowable as well as his treatment of the knowable. It must put in finer balance reason and faith. It must place in truer perspective the material and the spiritual."³²

"Only those teachers are worthy of their calling, or vocation, who have a profound respect not only for truth, in all its inexhaustible breadth and depth, but for the equally unfathomable personalities of their students and of all men everywhere. This respect is, in moments of heightened awareness, so tinged with awe as to be very close to authentic religious reverence. . . ."³³

THE STUDY OF NON-WESTERN CULTURES

Henry T. Heald, President of the Ford Foundation, has written that "with only a few exceptions, little has been done to educate American students about the cultures of Asia, Africa, and the Near East—areas with two-thirds of the world's population. The average college student knows something about Plato, Shakespeare, the French Revolution, Beethoven, and the Treaty of Versailles. But his mind is apt to be blank about the Bhagavad-Gita, the Lord Buddha, Suleiman the Magnificent, the Man-

³² George W. Gobel, professor of law, University of Illinois; cited by William Britton, "Objectives of Higher Education," AAUP *Bulletin*, 42: 256-267, Summer 1956. By permission. See also M. C. Otto, "Scientific Humanism," *Antioch Review*, Winter 1943, pp. 530-545 at 541-542; reprinted in *Science and the Moral Life*, New York: New American Library, 1949, p. 166. Read also Irving Kristol, "Einstein: The Passion of Pure Reason: The Cosmic Religion of the Mathematician," *Perspectives USA*, 14: 276-291, Winter 1956. Compare also Job, Chaps. 38-42; *Isaiah* 25, 26, 55; *Psalms* 8, 40, 50, 90, 92, 100, 107, 145, 147, etc.

³³ Theodore Meyer Greene, "Religion and the Philosophies of Education," *Religious Education*, New York: Religious Education Association, March-April 1954, pp. 86-88. By permission.

chu Dynasty, and the Meiji Restoration. . . . It is up to our colleges and universities to try to adjust their curricula—particularly on the undergraduate level—to erase the abysmal ignorance of even educated Americans about the traditions, institutions, and aspirations of non-Western peoples. . . . As American education once rose to the challenge of a young and expanding democratic society, so must it rise today to the challenge of a world thirsting for brotherhood, knowledge, and hope.³⁴

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The Dropout Problem and Juvenile Delinquency

THE DROPOUT PROBLEM

In outline form, prepare a list of reasons why children drop out of school. For which of these reasons is the school primarily responsible?

³⁴ Henry T. Heald, "American Education's New Dimension," *School and Society* 88: 173-175, April 9, 1960. By permission.

Which of them depend on factors beyond the school's control? The following quotation, and brief bibliography, should indicate the dimensions of this problem.

"Some 15 per cent of young people do not grow up in a satisfactory way. This group has been identified in several studies. It has been called by various names—the uneducables, the nonlearners, the hard-to-reach, the alienated. The "alienated" is an appropriate name for this group, because it expresses the fact that they are somehow alien to the larger society in which they live. Such youth have been unsuccessful in meeting the standards set by the society for them—standards of behavior, of learning in school, of performance on a job. By the time they reach adolescence these boys and girls are visible as the misfits in school. Either they are hostile and unruly, or passive and apathetic. They have quit learning and have dropped out of school psychologically two or three years before they can drop out physically. . . ."—Havighurst and Stiles (see reference below).

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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Define "juvenile delinquency." Is the "alarming increase" in juvenile delinquency and in crime attributable to more inclusive definitions? Or is the problem really more serious today than in previous decades?

More than half the inmates of our prisons for adults were once juvenile delinquents. "Given proper treatment when they were still young, these men and women might have become responsible citizens, able to contribute their share to society." Is this sentence in quotation marks true? Or is the problem one about which we can do nothing?

Assuming something can be done, is it a task for the local community? The state? The nation? Should it be handled by parents? By policemen and judges? Or by the school? Should it be a joint effort of every agency available?

Is there any correlation, negative or positive, between juvenile delinquency and membership in religious organizations? The reading of comics? The watching of T.V.?

So far as the public schools are concerned, is juvenile delinquency a result of "secularism"? Of "soft discipline"? Of "poor teacher training"? Is it caused by maladjustment to rigid courses of study? By harshness and lack of understanding? By "overintellectual" curricula, and by failure to "teach the whole child"? By large classes? By lack of personal guidance and lack of individual attention? What can the schools do to alleviate the situation?

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and F. T. Flynn, *Social Problems*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938, p. 471: "There is no scientific evidence regarding the effect of religion as such on crime."

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Open Book Exam

1. Choose any particular profession or vocation, and analyse carefully various ways in which it has been affected by technological changes. What corresponding changes, if any, would this imply for the schools' preparatory work?
2. Explain what is meant by the contention that the "liberal" education of today is simply a carry-over of the "professional" or "vocational" education of bygone ages. Is this generalization justified?
3. Should the "organization" of any subject of study be found (a) in the subject matter being studied, or (b) in the learner's interests, needs and purposes. Give examples where the answer would be (a). Give other examples where the answer would be (b).
4. Discuss the following statement: There should be some general (or liberal) education, and also some specialized (or vocational) education, at every level from the kindergarten through graduate school, and every student should partake of both.
5. Do all subjects in the curriculum have aesthetic values? practical uses? liberal outcomes? Do all subjects have these values for all students? Do they have them in equal degree for any individual student? What distinctions do you draw, and on what basis?
6. Discuss the following quotation by John Dewey (a) in its own right, and (b) as an example of an ideal which "progressive education" is said to have ignored.

"While it is not the business of education to prove every statement made, any more than to teach every possible item of information, it is its business to cultivate deep-seated effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses and opinions;

to develop a lively, sincere and open-minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded and to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves. No matter how much an individual knows as a matter of hearsay and information, if he has not attitudes and habits of this sort, he is not intellectually educated. He lacks the rudiments of mental discipline. And since these habits are not a gift of nature (no matter how strong the aptitude for acquiring them); since, moreover, the casual circumstances of the natural and social environment are not enough to compel their acquisition, the main office of education is to supply conditions that make for their cultivation. The formation of these habits is the Training of the Mind."—John Dewey, *How We Think*, (first ed.) New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1911, pp. 27-28.

7. Discuss *one* of the following:

- A. It is widely held that *all* children (save the genuinely mentally retarded) should, in the course of their elementary-secondary schooling, become acquainted with, for example, Homer, Shakespeare, and Beethoven. What position do you take on this matter, and what do you regard as the most compelling arguments for the stand you take?

OR

- B. Many secondary schools are including (some are requiring) in their curricula courses in automobile driving. This is expensive and time consuming, but some studies show a direct correlation between such instruction and reduced traffic accident rates. Is this a justifiable function for the high school? Why or why not?

CHAPTER 5

The Schooling of the Gifted

5.1 Introduction: Education for an “Elite” in the “Century of the Common Man”

THE superior student in the modern American school wastes half of his time in the typical classroom—the genius wastes it all! Such, it is widely felt, is the lot of gifted children in our society. These constitute what many would consider the most “underprivileged” group in America, the upper five or ten percent of the school-age population. Prominent in almost all serious criticism of contemporary American education is the belief that the foremost shortcoming of today’s schools is inadequate concern for youth of outstanding intellectual ability.

Today the number of young people now in high school is well over ten times the figure for 1890, and college enrollments represent an even more startling increase. But *over one-half* of our ablest boys and girls do not enter college. Of those eighteen-year olds who are in the top quarter in intelligence, approximately 40 percent graduate from high school but do not go on to college or university. Another 20 percent of this group do not even finish high school! While a major element in this situation is financial need, only slightly less critical is the matter of providing the kinds of educational opportunities for these able youth which would encourage them to continue their schooling. “Nothing could do more to improve the basic supply of high quality manpower than wholesale improvement in the opportunities afforded our ablest young people at every level of school and college to develop their potential to the fullest.”¹

¹ Fund for the Advancement of Education, *Teachers for Tomorrow*, New York: The Fund, 1955, p. 34. It is revealing to note the estimate that, of the more than one million children of truly superior intelligence, fewer than 25,000

The question arises: How is it that the schools of a great and wealthy democracy confront such a situation? A large part of the answer lies in the very democratic traditions of which the public schools are the exponents. Not until well into this century did the country grant unreserved recognition to the truly central place of public education in the national life. The public school, which throughout the nineteenth century was an enterprise for the most part devoted only to the rudiments and beyond that designed for a select few, has become an institution of far broader compass intended to serve everybody. Schooling ceased to be regarded as privilege and took on the cast of right—nay, obligation—for with full acceptance of the element of compulsion (the last state to enact a compulsory school attendance law was Mississippi in 1918), American education caught up in fact with certain of the theoretical implications of the democratic creed. The principle of universality replaced the practice of selectivity as the primary consideration in secondary education, and inevitably the move to make education equally available to all accentuated the problem of making genuinely adequate provision for the able few. The issue today is simply that of giving *all* young people the sort of education which their *capacities* require, of seeing to it that universal availability of education also means opportunities commensurate with talent and potential.

That this is wise public policy, as well as incumbent in principle, is in these times strikingly evident. The words of the then principal of one of America's most respected secondary schools—Morris Meister of New York City's Bronx High School of Science—eloquently tell the story. We must, he insists,

. . . face up to the idea that the intellectual human resources of any nation are finite; that not more than a third of the individuals in an age group can be educated for intellectual work; that from this segment of the population come nearly all of our scientists, scholars, lawyers, teachers, writers, inventors, artists, musicians, etc.; that individuals from the top

are presently in special school programs designed to capitalize upon and develop that capacity. See Florence N. Brumbaugh, "Intellectually Gifted Children," *The Intellectually Gifted*, Boston: Porter Sargent, 1956, p. 3, and "Our Youngest Intellectuals Thirteen Years Later," *Exceptional Children*, Vol. 21, No. 5, February 1955.

third contribute to civilization out of all proportion to their number; that manpower shortages have developed in almost every professional and technical field; and that these shortages are a real danger to our way of life. Our great concern for the proper education of high-ability youth stems from the critical need for conserving human talent and resources.²

The dependence of society upon this top group, and the crucial importance of the quality of the education which it receives, can hardly be exaggerated.

But should a person who believes in the brotherhood of man, who is brought up in the tradition of liberty, equality, and fraternity, strive to excel, to surpass his fellow men? To be different? To become one of society's elite? Or do our traditions imply that we are all so many peas in the democratic pod, that it is the *common* in "commonwealth" which must receive priority?

We all know Jefferson's famous words in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal. . . ." But in a letter to John Adams, in 1813, Jefferson wrote: "There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. . . . The natural aristocracy I consider the most precious gift of nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society." Jefferson agreed with Adams that there is a natural aristocracy among men; but he was careful to differentiate the natural aristocracy based on virtue and talent, from the artificial ones based on occupation, wealth, birth, race or religious creed. In working for the more "general diffusion of knowledge," a prime aim of any school or college is to discover those who are "really wise and good," to uncover, from the children of *all* classes, those who may develop into the true leaders of an open society; in short, to promote "democracy's aristocracy." It is entirely consonant with our democratic ideals that persons of quality and talent raise themselves above the commonplace. Indeed, such superior individuals are both the fruit and the seed of our free society.

² From Robert G. Andree and Morris Meister, "What Are Some Promising Programs for Gifted Students?" *Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth National Convention, National Association of Secondary School Principals Bulletin*, April 1954, p. 314. For a detailed analysis of this matter, see Dael Wolfe, *America's Resources of Specialized Talent*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1954.

Clearly, genius is the possession of a talented few. But in an equally genuine sense, genius exists in each of us, and manifests itself wherever there is natural growth, wherever there is a full, free play of natural faculties. Booker T. Washington was right when he said that American society will not prosper until it puts worth and dignity into the common occupations of men.

One function of democratic education, then, is to help talented youth find their way into the more demanding professions—to climb higher on the social and professional ladder. But an equally important function is to add worth and dignity to the common occupations. These two functions are realized when mind and body, science and art, labor and leisure, education and recreation, are governed by a single vision of excellence and a continuous passion for achieving it.

Thus, on the one hand, we have the American ideal that there are not merely five or ten "higher" professions, or five or seven "liberal" arts; but rather, that every occupation is worthwhile, and that there are thousands of arts. Or, rather, there is one art—the art of life manifesting itself in every work of man; where all have learned to give in kind for what they receive, and every man becomes a true enrichment of others.

On the other hand, it is simply untrue to say of *all* American citizens that immaturity yields to maturity, rudeness to culture, self-indulgence to self-control. In any society, the fullest human potentialities are realized by very few men and women. Earlier sections of this anthology have emphasized the fact that no criterion (ideological, religious, racial, or financial) should be permitted to make second-class citizens of any members of our democratic community. But emphasis on *equality* should not blind us to the need for *quality*. American education will not serve society well enough until all students with high potential—democracy's aristocracy—receive an education which brings out their special talents to the fullest measure. The problem, as Will French neatly put it, is to find "the means for creating social unity without crushing individuality and for developing individuality without cultivating social cleavages. . ." And perhaps no issue is more crucial for, in the words of Eugene Sayers: "If it is possible to teach genius instead of merely

hoping it will come along, the future will belong to the society which first discovers how."

The Identification of the Talented

5.2 Changing Attitudes with Respect to Gifted Children^o

Willard Abraham

. . . many centuries ago Plato talked about IQ and giftedness, without using these words, when he said, "We must watch them from their youths upwards and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way."

That was a promise of good times for the gifted, but the years between have been rugged. Off and on until around 1850 the bright child was admired, much was expected from him, and he was frequently even held in awe. *There* lay the danger, for anything that is awesome may easily become suspect and strange; to many of us anything "different" warrants the jaundiced look out of the corner of our eye. Sociologists know this as they report on communities where prejudice against certain religious and racial groups hits the top—communities where *no* members of the race or religion even live! From 1850 until early in this century, child prodigies and other bright children fell into increasingly bad repute. Neurotic psychotic, abnormal, queer—these words or their equivalents represented a growing attitude.

"Ripen early and rot early" was the underlying theme, and for the so-called average person it was a consoling thought. "Their

^o Willard Abraham, *Common Sense About Gifted Children*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958, pp. 17-20, 40, 28, 190, 68. By permission.

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child may be smart *now*, but just watch what happens to him when he grows up!" or "So he's bright—but he can't hit a ball, or run, or jump like mine can" were ideas that many took for granted. It may have been good for their mental health to think that way, but studies since then have shown how far off the track such conclusions were....

More than 35 years ago Dr. Lewis Terman paved the way for much of our current thinking on gifted children. He rebelled against the suspicions attached to giftedness, and in his exhaustive study of 1500 children, plus the numerous follow-ups to that study, he has concluded that these children are a possession in which we should find both pride and happiness. When compared with a group of so-called average children, these surpass them in physique, health, and social adjustment. Character tests show their moral attitudes are superior.... Here are some of Dr. Terman's other conclusions from his investigations of gifted children:

No significant sex differences in intelligence were found.

They came mainly from urban professional, semiprofessional, business and skilled families, but there were many others too.

Their parents averaged four or five years more schooling than the average parents of their generation.

Their homes possessed more than the average number of books. Their family incomes were above the average.

The incidence of broken homes was below the average.

Nearly half learned to read before starting school.

They were interested in large, scientific collections.

They read widely.

Their play performances showed interests two or three years beyond their age norm.

However, a gifted child need not necessarily have these factors in his background. If that were so we could frequently look right into the home, forget all about the child, and assume we were on the right track. That is far from the whole story! . . .

Sometimes the bright child will do what he can to be just like the rest, even to the point of not seeming to know the answers in examinations or class discussions. In an effort to subdue an inferiority he might feel because he is different in a way which is not

readily accepted by the others, he may deliberately feign either stupidity or averageness.³ Although he believes the games and conversations in which others participate are foolish, he will pretend enjoyment of them in order to be "one of the gang." For some children solitariness is a natural and enjoyable state, but for most the companionship of those with similar interests is more to be desired.

To the gifted child the choice may resolve itself in this way: "The kids my own age are silly, and the older ones won't let me play with them. But the worst thing is playing alone. Since I can't fake my size and age, the least I can do is to pretend I don't know and am not interested in so many things. Then maybe the ones as young as I am will let me play with them." . . .

[In summary] *There is no such thing as an accurate composite of a gifted child.* Tall or short, fat or thin, leader or follower, athlete or not—he can be on either side of the fence as an *individual* and still be among the gifted as a *group*. He's entitled to his individuality, just as is the mentally retarded child, the sight or hearing handicapped youngster—or the so-called, and impossible to find, "average" child. He is entitled to be discovered and be taught and be guided as all of us are in a democracy which respects the individual and says each one should receive an education in accordance with his ability to profit from it. . . .

Does it bother us that gifted students are more retarded in achievement in relationship to their ability than any other group? Does it concern us that we speak of "individual differences" and then proceed to neglect them? Are we worried because our gifted so frequently drop out of school because we bore them? Until the answer becomes "Yes" . . . [we face] the unbendable threat as stated by Alfred North Whitehead: "In the conditions of modern life, the rule is absolute: the race which does not value trained intelligence is doomed."

³ Editors' note: "Adjustment, if the term is taken to mean getting-along, is something that most of the gifted seem to have mastered—better than their duller agemates. With them, however, adjustment may mean, as it does for many in our culture, conforming attitudes rather than creative ones. When we give our best grades to the docile child, and fail to credit originality and individuality, we are showing the gifted that it pays to conform and, perhaps, are teaching little else."—Elizabeth Monroe Drews, "What About the Gifted Child?" Michigan State University College of Education Quarterly 3: 3-6f., October 1957.

5.3 Why Are Gifted Children Overlooked?*

Ralph W. Tyler

IN the first place, many have little or no opportunity for demonstrating their superior abilities. Parents differ markedly in the degree to which they encourage their children to show achievements in the presence of adults. Many children have limited opportunities for demonstrating abilities in school. . . .

In the second place, we often overlook gifted children because we adults are not sensitive to some of the signs of giftedness. For example, the child who works out by himself the relationships among number combinations, rather than simply repeating the arithmetic facts we give him, may seem slow to us rather than being recognized as a child who has given a sign of awakened curiosity and superior mathematical ability.

In the third place, a gifted child or youth may have characteristics which are disliked by many adults and this fact makes it difficult for us to perceive his giftedness. The young gifted child is often one who . . . asks "Why?" again and again . . . as he seeks to develop a chain of explanation in his thinking. Busy adults may find these continuing questions distracting and irritating and thus fail to recognize the child's unusual abilities. Then, too, gifted children often seek to test their developing ideas and skills at levels beyond those commonly expected for their age group. A budding "scientist" blows up his home laboratory, or a highly motivated child "artist" tries to paint a mural on his bedroom wall. Such efforts are less likely to be interpreted as indications of giftedness than as signs of "cussedness."

In the fourth place, some gifted youth are overlooked because they have exceptional abilities in certain areas only and in other areas show no superior abilities. The artistic child who has difficul-

* Ralph W. Tyler, "Meeting the Challenge of the Gifted," *The Elementary School Journal*, 58: 76-77, November 1957. By permission.

Professor Tyler, an eminent educational psychologist, was for many years on the faculty of the University of Chicago and is presently director of the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.

ties with reading and arithmetic is not likely to have his artistic gifts recognized by his teacher. . . .

Finally, many gifted children and youth are overlooked because they come from working classes, from families where many parents are not looking for genius and where teachers are likely to anticipate learning problems rather than giftedness. . . .

5.4 The Impossibility of Standardization*

Walter W. Cook

WHEN a random group of six-year-olds enters the first grade, two percent of them will be below the average four-year-olds in general mental development, and two percent will be above the average eight-year-old. Disregarding the extreme two percent at either end, there is a four-year range in general intelligence. By the time this group has reached the age of twelve (seventh grade level), the range will have increased to almost eight years. As long as all the children of all the people remain in school, the range continues to increase. When the educational achievement of a typical sixth grade class is measured, we find a range of approximately eight years in reading comprehension, vocabulary, arithmetic reasoning, arithmetic computation, mechanics of English composition, and other forms of achievement. In almost any sixth grade class will be found a pupil with first or second grade reading ability, and another with eleventh or twelfth grade reading ability. In any grade above the primary level will be found the complete range of elementary school achievement. . . .

When the *General Culture Battery*, consisting of achievement tests in general science, foreign literature, fine arts, and social studies, was administered to high school and college seniors in Pennsylvania, it was found that the upper ten percent of high school seniors

* Walter W. Cook, "The Gifted and the Retarded in Historical Perspective," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 39: 249-256, March 1958. Footnotes omitted. By permission.

Until his death in 1963, Walter Cook was dean of the College of Education, University of Minnesota.

were above the college senior median and could have been given B.A. degrees without lowering the intellectual standards of such degrees. It was also found that the lower ten percent of college seniors were below the high school senior median.

Although these facts should be basic data in educational thinking and call for revision of our postulates, they are largely ignored. The idea that the process of schooling *must* consist of homogeneous groups of pupils receiving uniform instruction by mass educational techniques from uniform textbooks is the axiom which prevents constructive approaches to the problem of variability in the classroom. It leads to the further assumptions that grade levels should signify rather definite states of educational achievement; that the course of study for a grade is the prescribed academic requirement, to be administered uniformly to all pupils; that a pupil should not be promoted to a grade until he is able to do the work outlined for that grade; that when individual differences are provided for by good teaching, all pupils can be brought up to standard; that maintaining a passing mark results in homogeneous instructional groups; and that when relative homogeneity does not prevail, it is a result of poor teaching or lax standards. These assumptions underlie most of the criticisms of public education. These assumptions are contrary to fact. . . . The range of ability in the classes of the elementary and high school is so great that if the slow learner in the eighth grade were demoted to the fourth, he would still be a slow learner in the fourth, and below the median of the class. If the top pupil of the fourth grade were accelerated to the eighth, he would still be a bright pupil in the eighth, and above the median of that class. . . .

Our conclusion must be that the more effective the instruction—the more adequately we meet the needs of all pupils—*the more heterogeneous groups become*.

The central problem of meeting the needs of the slow pupil and the gifted pupil, as well as the average pupil, is how best to meet the needs of individuals in groups of widely varying ability. Since all instructional groups vary widely in interests and ability, it seems wiser to attempt to develop techniques for meeting the needs in such groups instead of constantly striving for a homogeneity which cannot be achieved. This calls for changes in beliefs, attitudes,

and understandings which will result in more defensible administrative and curriculum policies. Let us suggest some of them.

The administrative policy should have two purposes: (1) to make it possible for the teacher to know the pupil well enough to meet his needs and (2) to provide instructional material with a range of difficulty and interest appeal commensurate with the needs of the instructional group:

A. The size of classes must be reduced to not more than twenty-five pupils. The practice of giving each elementary teacher a class of from thirty to forty pupils and having the high-school teacher meet from 150 to 250 different pupils a day, with instruction based on a uniform textbook, precludes the possibility of meeting individual needs.

B. A systematic testing program revealing status and growth in the basic intellectual skills and abilities (not facts) required for optimum adjustment in the culture must be instituted, with the results for each pupil from kindergarten to college graphically portrayed. The purposes of these tests are not the traditional ones—those of holding teacher and pupils to standards or as a basis for promotion or marking; the purpose is rather to enable the teacher to know more about the pupil, the books he can read, the type of problems he can solve, the amount of improvement that can be expected—in short, to know the educational experiences that he needs.

C. A permanent record folder, containing in addition to the superimposed profiles of the test results, the health record, samples of handwriting, creative written work, and other evidences of achievement showing the pupil's development from kindergarten on, should be in the hands of each teacher.

D. Each teacher should have an opportunity for a personal conference with the parents of each pupil not less than twice each year in order that both the parents and teacher may understand the pupil better.

E. The primary basis for grouping children should be physical and social development (probably best indicated by chronological age), since these are the most obvious criteria of status in childhood groups. A child should live and work with the group he most obviously belongs with—one which accepts him and which he accepts.

F. There must be grouping within classes on the basis of status

and needs in specific learning areas. These groups should be flexible as to size and duration and specific in purpose.

G. The practice of labeling school books by grade should be discontinued. A code number indicating to the teacher the difficulty of the material is sufficient.

H. In both the elementary and high school, the practice of having a teacher instruct the same group of pupils from three to six years should be encouraged.

I. At the high school level there should be special honors courses for students who demonstrate unusual ability in mathematics, science, language, and other subjects.

J. In the high school the practice of integrating English and the social studies in a four-to-six-year coordinated sequence with two- or three-hour daily periods in a laboratory workshop should be encouraged.

K. A wealth of instructional material should be provided in each classroom. It should have a range of difficulty, interest appeal, and content commensurate with the range of abilities and interests of the class. It must be placed in the classroom and not in the library or other special room. Perhaps the best way to meet the needs of the potential geniuses in our classes is to place them in intellectual contact with the geniuses of the ages. This can be done through books. This should be an item of first priority in any school system. The most serious indictment that can be brought against public education today is its failure to furnish the teacher with adequate books and instructional materials and to surround every pupil with a wealth of reading materials of both a literary and a factual nature. Textbooks are necessary, but they are far from sufficient as instructional material....

5.5 Creativity and Intelligence*

Jacob W. Getzels
and Philip W. Jackson

How are we to encourage and support persons of exceptional creative ability in our society? How are we to foster the development of venturesome thinking and creative ability among all persons, whether potential poets, scientists, or workaday citizens? Clearly the two questions are related. To the extent that a favorable attitude toward inquiry and originality—toward constructive thinking as well as acquisitive thinking—is nurtured in the general population, we shall have little to worry about in recognizing the talented child and providing a climate in which he can flourish.

These two questions do imply that we are not now doing enough to support and encourage such attitude either in the general population or in the schools, an observation that has been amply documented in the current commentaries on the American scene, from Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* to Whyte's *Organization Man*, from Wheelis' *Quest for Identity* to Packard's *Status Seekers* and Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd*. . . .

Our argument then is this. Giftedness in children has most frequently been defined as a score on an intelligence test, and typically the study of the so-called gifted child has been equated with the study of the single IQ variable. Involved in this definition

* J. W. Getzels and P. W. Jackson, *Creativity and Intelligence*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962, pp. 124-132, 6-8, 120-121, 159. By permission. Footnote references and supporting research data are here omitted. This book has been reviewed as follows: "The research behind Getzels and Jackson's *Creativity and Intelligence* may well go down in educational history as one of this century's most powerful spurs to educational change. At one fell stroke, their study did much to expand concepts of giftedness, to outmode concepts of over-and under-achievement as gauged by intelligence quotients, to stimulate unprecedented interest in the development of creative talent in education, and to dramatize one of the more serious defects of life-adjustment education."—E. Paul Torrance, "Essay Review: 'Creativity and Intelligence,'" *School Review* 7: 112-115, Spring 1963. Copyright 1963 by The University of Chicago. Professors Getzels and Jackson teach at The University of Chicago.

of giftedness are several types of confusion, if not of outright error. First, . . . the term "gifted child" has become synonymous with the expression "child with a high IQ," thus blinding us to other forms of excellence. And second, within the universe of intellectual functions themselves, we have most often behaved as if the intelligence test represented an adequate sampling of all mental abilities and cognitive processes. . . . The term "creative child," in becoming synonymous with the expression "child with artistic talents," has limited our attempts to identify and foster cognitive abilities related to creative functioning in areas other than the arts. . . .

We may present the issues most simply by citing a number of relevant distinctions—distinctions, we may add, that have implications for further research on thinking and learning, as well as for parents and teachers.

1. We need to distinguish further between intelligent thinking as measured by the IQ (and other such procedures) and creative thinking. . . . If we recognize that learning involves the production of novelty as well as the remembrance of course content—*discovering* as well as *recalling*—measures of creativity as well as IQ become appropriate defining characteristics of giftedness.

Thurstone put the issue as follows.

To be extremely intelligent is not the same as to be gifted in creative work. This may be taken as a hypothesis.

It is a common observation in the universities that those students who have high intelligence, judged by available criteria, are not necessarily the ones who produce the most original ideas. All of us probably know a few men who are both creative and highly intelligent, but this combination is not the rule.

The confusion between intelligence and creative talent is common. For example, Quiz Kids are often referred to as geniuses. They would undoubtedly score high in memory functions, including incidental memory and rote memory. But it is doubtful whether they are also fluent in producing original ideas. . . .

This does not mean that there is not a relation between intelligence and creativity over the whole range of creative endeavor. Indeed, . . . there is a positive correlation between IQ and each of our creativity measures. It signifies rather that a certain amount of

intelligence is required for creativity, but that intelligence and creativity are by no means synonymous.

2. We need to distinguish between independence and unruliness, between individuality and rebelliousness. We have seen that our creative students were quite superior in scholastic achievement. Despite this the teachers showed no special preference for them as students, whereas they did show a special preference for the high IQ students of similar scholastic achievement. The creative students may indeed be more difficult to get along with. But it must be realized that their behavior may have its source in independence of thought rather than in malice. Since their values differ from the values of other adolescents, they are likely to view objects and events differently than other students. Their wit may be seen as threatening and perceived as hostility. But it may be an expression only of their own deep struggle to reconcile their image of the world with the more conventional image. And, may not the feeling of threat and the perception of hostility be as much our fault as their intent? In any event, it is necessary to distinguish honest difference from malicious disruption, individuality from rebelliousness, independence of thought from unruliness. If we wish to foster intellectual inventiveness, we may have to risk granting the creative student greater autonomy, and perhaps even to reward behavior that fails to comply with what we were prepared to reward. . . .

[However], we need to distinguish between honest appreciation of creative behavior in the school situation, and mere sentimentality toward the "cute" and the "precious" without reference to standards of intellectual merit. the one leads to respect for creative functioning and the integrity of the individual, the other leads to manipulating children's behavior for exhibitionistic purposes bearing only "Kids-Say-the-Darndest-Things" results. . . .

3. We need to distinguish between healthy solitude and morbid withdrawal, between preferred separateness and compulsive isolation. The emphasis in the classroom today is too often on what has been called "togetherness," "other directedness," "group dynamics," the "enforced interactions of one with all." The most common term of opprobrium is that the child is an "isolate." But it hardly needs to be argued that intellectual inventiveness and

creative performance do not inevitably involve groupiness. On the contrary, it is certain that some kinds of creative performance require permitting the person to set his own problem, to proceed at his own pace, to cogitate on the issues in his own way, to play with his own ideas in his own fashion. . . . [We should encourage] able students to work on their own interests, even if it means working alone. . . .

Our current educational literature suggests that greater welcome is given the student who is adjusted than the student with character. If this is so, it calls for serious concern. For just as cognitive excellence may take many forms, so might psychosocial excellence be more broadly defined than the currently popular criterion of "adjustment" would have us believe. The student whose deep moral convictions and attitudes of independence set him apart from many of his classmates is certainly as worthy of consideration, to say nothing of admiration, as the student whose adjustive skills contribute to the interpersonal harmony of the classroom. The question here, as with the highly creative and the highly intelligent students, is not which is better but how can we provide for both. . . .⁴

4. We need to distinguish between tolerance for ambiguity and irresolution, between ability to delay a choice and indecisiveness. We have seen that our highly creative students have more varied and sometimes perhaps even "unrealistic" career choices. Many of their expressions of occupational preference include such statements as "music or law," "art or teaching." These may be interpreted as reflecting irresolution and indecisiveness. But they may as well be a function of a greater capacity to delay choice, to

⁴ Editors' note: "The fundamental problem of the highly creative individual in maintaining his creativity is in learning how to cope with the discomfort which arises from divergency—of so often being a minority of one. Of the problems which arise in this process some of the more important ones include: coping with the sanctions of society against divergency, the alienation of one's friends through the expression of a talent, pressures to be a well-rounded personality, divergence from sex-role norms, desires to learn on one's own, attempts at tasks which are too difficult, searching for a purpose, having different values and being motivated by different rewards, and searching for one's uniqueness. Running throughout all of these problems, of course, are factors which lead to psychological estrangement from others—parents, teachers, and peers."—E. Paul Torrance, *Guiding Creative Talent*, © 1962, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., p. 124. By permission.

tolerate ambiguity. The creative student may also have many more specific abilities and skills, to say nothing of interests, from which to choose. He is tempted quite realistically by the possibility of several different careers. . . .

There is ample evidence that the criteria of factualism and usefulness—if you will, of vocationalism, although it may seem silly to use this term at so early an age—are being insinuated into many childhood experiences once viewed as the happy hunting ground for “childish” play and imaginative activity. Rumpelstiltskin and Goldilocks on the child’s bookshelf are being shouldered aside by Nurse Nancy and Mr. Fixit. Journeys to the Land of Oz and the World of Pooh are being displaced, even at the kindergarten level, by “real” educational visits—as they say—to the airport and the municipal sewage disposal plant. Even that last bastion of the child’s private world—his box of toys—is being taken over by the press of practicality. Here too the key adjectives are “realistic” and “educational” or at the very least “readiness-producing,” instead of “imaginative” or “exciting” or even just plain “enjoyable.” . . .

5. We need to distinguish between remembering and discovering, between information and knowledge, between the fact-filled quiz kid and the educated student. Possessing isolated facts is not the same as being broadly educated (either over a whole range of subjects or in one subject). To be well-informed we need only a good memory, to be knowledgeable we must also be able to discover. The merely informed person holds on irrevocably to a once conceived fact. The educated person deals flexibly with presently conceived facts in the full realization that today’s fact was yesterday’s fancy, and today’s fancy may very well turn out to be tomorrow’s fact. . . .

The relevant educational issue might well be: are there certain areas of instruction in which opportunities are provided for “discovering” as well as for “remembering”? Is there provision in the curriculum for playing with facts and ideas as well as for repeating them? Can we teach students to be more sensitive to the nature of problems? Can we teach them that a problem may have several different interpretations and solutions? Even if there is only one right answer, as in a mathematics problem, can the student solve the problem in a number of different ways? As Guilford says:

. . . With the information that most of the creative-thinking abilities are in the divergent-thinking category, the teacher can seek opportunities to call for divergent thinking. In transmitting our culture to the younger generation, we naturally stress conventional answers to problems, hence we emphasize convergent thinking. In urging that we need more emphasis upon divergent thinking on the part of students, I am not advocating that we attempt to create a generation of young rebels. It should be possible to teach appreciation for those things from the past that are good as well as to encourage students to see how things might be done better. . . .

If we are to encourage divergent thinking as well as convergent thinking, reward discovery as well as memory, we need achievement tests that are appropriate to these outcomes. And if the best we can do is essay tests, then essay tests that can be scored consistently it must be. The alternative is to say that since we cannot measure these educational objectives by short-answer tests, we will avoid the measurement dilemma by not worrying about these objectives, however desirable. We would agree with Guilford, who suggests that if we are to educate for creativity, "It almost goes without saying that the kinds of assessment of achievement should be different from those provided by most current marking practices."⁵ . . . In the long run, for the procedures and practices to be truly effective, boldness in thinking, free rein to the imagination, and creativity in performance must have support not only in the school but in the community and culture at large.

⁵ Editors' note: In "The Tyranny of Multiple-Choice Tests," *Harper*, 222: 37-44, March 1961 Banesh Hoffman argues that such tests are defective because:

1. They deny creative students a chance to demonstrate their creativity.
2. They penalize students who perceive subtle points unnoticed by less perceptive people, including the test-makers.
3. They tend to be superficial, because genuinely searching questions do not readily fit into the multiple-choice format.
4. They often degenerate into subjective guessing games, in which the examinee does not answer on the basis of objective information, but on the basis of his judgment as to what he thinks the examiner may consider the best answer. This criticism is compounded because the tests often employ undefined, but ambiguous terms.
5. They neglect skill in disciplined expression.

For a fuller elaboration of these points read Banesh Hoffman, *The Tyranny of Testing*, with a foreword by Jacques Barzun, New York: The Crowell-Collier Publishing Company, 1962.

Guiding Creative Talent

5.6 Three ways to Help Talented Children*

D. A. Worcester

ACCELERATION⁶

. . . Skipping is, administratively, the easiest method—with the exception, perhaps, of early entrance—of adjusting to children of advanced mentality. It is the method which has been used most. When it is used with care, the children who have skipped make good progress and are well adjusted. The danger of gaps in knowledge and skill must be kept in mind. If other methods of acceleration are not available, the bright child should skip a grade. . . .

[One value of] acceleration [is that it] recognizes the facts of life. Children do differ from each other markedly. Some develop much more rapidly than do others. Usually those of greater aca-

* D. A. Worcester, *The Education of Children of Above-Average Mentality*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1956, pp. 30-34, 42-49 *passim*. By permission. Footnotes to research references cited in the original article are omitted here.

At the time of this writing, Mr. Worcester was professor of education at the University of Nebraska. He is currently on the faculty of the University of Arizona.

⁶ Editors' note: "The most common concession to the gifted is still that of special promotion. Only here and there, as, for instance, in the Hunter College Elementary School, of New York, have they been given the benefit of special programs and teachers. . . . Compared with the tremendous effort to help those at the bottom of the human ladder, the enterprise on behalf of those on its highest rung is surely feeble. Thus, while more than thirty states exact special requirements of their teachers of the subnormal, only one state issues a special certificate to its teachers of the bright. Furthermore, while over a hundred colleges and universities give special preparation to teachers of the handicapped, only two have seen fit to arrange a sequence of courses for teachers of the gifted. Meanwhile, however, research and experimentation continue under full draft."—Adolph E. Meyer, *An Educational History of the American People*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1957, pp. 312-313. By permission.

demic potentialities are also more mature socially and emotionally and fully as well-developed physically.

[Moreover] failure to accelerate involves dangers. There is evidence to show that gifted children who are held back with those of their CA (chronological age) are more likely to develop behavior and personality problems than are those who are accelerated. There is danger also of producing lazy and careless work habits among those who are educationally beyond their classmates but who are held back with them. . . .⁷

The time saved by acceleration is important. . . . Let us assume that there are 34,000,000 school children in the United States. Ten percent of these should, according to our evidence, be able to save a year of time. But assume that only three percent of them could save a year each. Then our country would have gained for its use more than 1,000,000 years of its best brains in a single generation. Don't we need these brains?

[Acceleration can mean] financial saving. . . . If a million children went to school for only eleven years instead of twelve, the saving to school budgets would be considerable. . . .

ENRICHMENT

Enrichment should be provided for all children who can profit from it whatever type of program they are in.⁸ The accelerated child

⁷ Editors' note: For talented students, acceleration usually acts as a challenge and added incentive. Dale B. Harris has written: "There is an increasing conviction among psychologists that early and intense stimulation of a varied nature has something to do with the actual level of, or quality of, the organism. Not only does the appetite for learning of gifted children require opportunity for exercise in order to be developed, but possibly the appetite itself can be cultivated if children quite early are subjected to a fairly intense degree of academic, abstract, conceptual stimulation. . . . We must not let our very worthy concern with the expansion of education for all children any longer continue to blind us to the need to make special provisions for highly talented youngsters."—Dale B. Harris, "Acceleration," in *Talent and Education*, The Modern School Practices Series #4, edited by E. Paul Torrance, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960, pp. 131-132. Copyright 1960 by the University of Minnesota.

⁸ Editors' note: Natural ability may be less significant than motivation as a factor of success: "Within the upper 1 or 2 percent of the population, based on intellectual ability, it appears that success in life and contributions to society depend more on motivational factors than on variations in intelligence. This conclusion is borne out by Anne Roe's studies of distinguished American

should have enrichment. Indeed, if it *be* enrichment, acceleration in the sense of becoming more and more separated from the average group is inevitable, whether or not it is recognized by name, and whether or not the individual meets classes in another school building. . . .

If [the program is] truly enriching, it has to be of value. In small schools where there may be only one gifted child at a particular educational level, or in schools with limited facilities but good teachers, or in schools where there is prejudice against acceleration, enrichment is particularly needed.

At the senior high school-freshman college level, much of the present overlapping could be obviated by planned enrichment. . . .

SELECTED CLASSES

Classes designed for gifted or mentally advanced children have been variously named. The more common general titles have been *segregated*, sometimes *partially segregated* or *special*. This writer prefers the word *selected*, as proposed by Hildreth. . . . The present trend is toward more of these classes.

Where the school is so large that there is more than one class of a given grade in the same building, it is relatively easy to put the brighter ones together unobtrusively. In the secondary school, divisions can be made among those who show differences in competence in particular subjects. There is no implication of superiority-inferiority difference in the fact that one student is studying algebra and another general mathematics, or that one is doing more advanced mathematics than another. Some people just like mathematics. . . .

[Selected] classes are feasible only in those school systems whose enrollment is large enough to justify a special room and a special teacher. While such classes may combine more than one grade level—although in large systems this might not be necessary

scientists. [See Anne Roe, *The Making of a Scientist*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1953.] She found several of these fifty-nine outstanding men to be only moderately above average in intelligence. Above a certain level, intelligence is a poor predictor of performance."—R. F. DeHaan and R. J. Havighurst, *Educating Gifted Children*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1957, pp. 129-130.

—perhaps twelve pupils of approximately the same educational level will be the minimum requirement. There are those who think this minimum too low. However, when one thinks of the willingness to provide special instruction for the physically handicapped and the mentally retarded in classes of this size, and when he thinks of the stupendous contributions which society may expect from the finest training of its finest minds, he becomes eager to see what can be done when a teacher really has time to devote to the needs of a few outstanding pupils. Possibly the maximum size of such a class may be as high as twenty, but it must be remembered that time for attention to individual pupils is of first importance.

[Many ask:] Are selected classes democratic? A democratic society selects individuals for all kinds of special purposes. In school we select for the band, the school paper, the football team. So long as the selection is based upon ability and no one is excluded because of race, social or economic status, or other factors not related to ability, there can be no basis to the charge that selected classes are undemocratic. . . .

It is sometimes feared that these classes will result in their members' thinking too highly of themselves. Much careful observation has been given to children in selected classes with the almost 100 percent conclusion that such fears are groundless. Children are working together in groups and on individual projects. In group activities they find others who are their equals or superiors. They learn to respect the knowledge which each possesses concerning his own project. . . .

It is much more likely that an attitude of superiority will develop, if the gifted child is in a mixed class. Here he is almost always right—he knows the answers and the others know that he does. He may constantly compare himself with those who do not have the answers. He is frequently resented by the others.

An exceedingly common practice, and one far more likely to produce snobs than a selected class, is to have those in a single classroom divided into fast learners, slow learners, and, perhaps, a middle group. No situation could be devised which is better adapted to making the bright feel superior and the slower one believe he is "dumb." . . .

When upper grades are reached there may be selected classes

in special subjects. For example, a group interested in mathematics, science, or literature may be formed which will not only cover the regular work in the subject but roam far afield in it. This is one of the best ways of encouraging talent. Where there are not enough children for a class, laboratory or library facilities or special correspondence courses may be made available to an individual. . . .

Some schools organize what are usually called partially segregated classes. The children of high ability are kept together . . . for their academic work but are undifferentiated from other pupils for social activities, music, and the like. . . .⁹

This type of class is almost always employed as an enrichment procedure. It usually *assumes* that the gifted children are like, or ought to be like, others in all except "intellectual" matters. The assumption is of doubtful validity. However, when a well-organized program of work is provided, children in these classes do profit substantially, and the lack of social contact with other children . . . is lessened. . . .

⁹ Editors' note: "Separating gifted students from other students for part or all of their educational experience has evoked conflicting opinions. . . . The commission, weighing all factors, believes that some grouping of students by ability is desirable policy.

"A strong practical argument in favor of special grouping is that it greatly facilitates both enrichment and acceleration. In a class consisting entirely of gifted pupils it is much easier—and therefore much more likely to happen in actual practice—for the teacher to provide enriched learning experiences than when a wide variety of assignments is required in a heterogeneous class. Also, an all-bright group can be accelerated smoothly without the disadvantage of sudden grade jumps that skip important learning experiences, as sometimes happens when acceleration is an individual matter. *Every pupil, however, should have some experience in ungrouped classes.*"—Educational Policies Commission, *Manpower and Education*, Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1956, pp. 104–105. By permission. Italics added.

Catherine Cox Miles makes the point that genuinely gifted students are seldom snobbish: "Crucial for the development of talent in a democracy is a democratic attitude toward it, and a democratic attitude of the talented toward themselves. Outstanding talent is greatly to be desired and its emergence causes rejoicing. But if the talented feel a vain superiority, the talent sours. The most effective of the gifted are those least touched by a sense of their otherness. Absorbed in living the life of talent, they share their knowledge, their skill, their interest, and their enthusiasm in the cooperative business of living and learning and doing."—Catherine Cox Miles, in *Talent and Education*, The Modern School Practices Series #4, edited by E. Paul Torrance, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960, p. 64. Copyright 1960 by the University of Minnesota.

It is unfortunate that we have no good studies which reliably compare the merits of various methods of caring for the needs of the gifted. Apparently *any* scheme which tries to do something for them yields value. . . .

5.7 The Case for Special Education for an Intellectual Elite^o

Douglas Bush

[It is widely and devoutly assumed that] to exclude anyone from college is undemocratic and un-American. These are potent words for annihilating anything one does not agree with; they operate automatically upon the uncritical, and more effectually than the Queen of Hearts' "Off with his head!" Unfortunately, God does not seem to be a good democrat or a good American, since He continues to distribute intellectual endowments unequally. That is a plain, stubborn fact of biology and psychology and everyday experience that everyone knows—and nothing can alter it. The educational democrats who keep up the cry of equality accept inequality as a matter of course in every other area; they do not pick a doctor, a dentist, a plumber, or a carpenter out of the telephone book; they choose the best they can find. Education, it appears, is the only area of life in which standards and selectiveness have no meaning; there, anything goes. Training for all is one thing, a necessary thing; education is, in its essence, something else, and not all can go very far. If a large proportion of people are not qualified for higher education (or for the higher grades of school), and if all must go through the motions, something has to give, and education must be brought down to the level of the multitude.

We were not always committed to such absurdity. Once the democratic principle was "Elementary Education for all," and no one would question that. Then it became "High school for all,"

^o Douglas Bush, "The End of Education," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 38: 163-166, February 1957. By permission.

Mr. Bush is a professor of English and Walter Channing Cabot Fellow at Harvard University.

and the results were soon visible; everybody had to be taken in, everybody had to be promoted, everybody had to be graduated, and every graduate was entitled to enter a state university. Recent years have brought the newest and most vicious slogan, "College for all." The notion that Americans have a special reverence and craving for education is one of our complacent fallacies (if we had, we would pay more respect and more money to our teachers); a great many young people certainly want to go to college, but how many of these want to become educated? Motives are often more social and economic than intellectual. The consequence is that, just as many high schools became elementary schools (or social service stations), so many colleges and universities have become in part high schools. The downward pressure of the past half-century will of course be greatly strengthened by wholesale admission to college during the next fifteen years.

It would seem that the hallowed phrase, "the century of the common man," is to be understood as the acceptance and even worship of commonness. Popular prejudice against the cultivated intelligence has had many manifestations, some comic, some sinister; witness all the "egghead" jokes, or the anti-intellectualism fomented by political demagogues in the last few years. And we might observe that the popular support that campaign received was no tribute to the efficacy of our high schools, though they have supposedly been devoted to nourishing good citizenship. This spurious offshoot of democratic sentiment is nowhere more manifest than in education.¹⁰

¹⁰ Editors' note: "Unfortunately, our social mores always have been hostile to the concept that children of superior mentality ought to be educated apart from those of average ability. In our democratic society we are committed to the basic assumption that there is no person who can claim to be an indispensable man. We proceed from this entirely correct assumption to the incorrect conclusion that neither does a democracy have indispensable men. This is obviously erroneous. A moment's reflection will show that no society can function without its indispensable men. By this I mean the men who because of natural endowment and careful training possess the intellectual, artistic, and moral abilities to carry forward the momentum of civilization."—Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN, "Let's Stop Wasting Our Greatest Resource," *Saturday Evening Post*, 229: 19f., March 2, 1957. By permission of E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. See also H. G. Rickover, "What's Wrong with American Schools?" *U.S. News and World Report*, 43: 86-91, December 6, 1957; "The Talented Mind," *Science News Letter*, 71: 170-173, March 16, 1957; *Education and Freedom*, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1959; *American Education—A National Failure*, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963.

I myself, for asserting that not everyone has a right to be in college, have been called a Piltdown man, a snob, and a Fascist.

One familiar slogan has lately been reaffirmed by the chairman of the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School: "This country will never tolerate the nurturing of an intellectual elite." Mr. Josephs, it is clear, was not merely stating a fact, he was laying down a principle. . . . Translated into more practical terms . . . the principle means: "Let us abandon the substance and standards of decent education and wallow together in ignorance and mediocrity." To quote a wise editorial in the *Boston Herald* (Nov. 25, 1956): "The truth of the matter is that an intellectual elite formed the concept of democracy, kept it alive, and is, moreover, responsible for nearly every progression we have made in science, art, and human relations."

Or, if I may . . . [quote and paraphrase] from a notable utterance of Walter Lippman some sixteen years ago:

The men who wrote the American Constitution and the Bill of Rights were educated in schools and colleges in which the classic works of Graeco-Roman-Christian culture were the substance of the curriculum. In these schools the transmission of this culture was held to be the end and aim of education. Modern education, however, is based on a denial that it is necessary, or useful, or desirable for the schools and colleges to continue to transmit from generation to generation the religious and classical culture of the western world. And with what is the vacuum filled? It is filled with the elective, the eclectic, the specialized, the accidental and incidental improvisations and spontaneous curiosities of teachers and students. . . .

Because the public schools have so largely watered down the curriculum and put in any kind of occupation or entertainment for the unintellectual, colleges and especially the state universities have had to devote a more or less large proportion of their effort to high school work. Even the best private colleges have to teach the rudiments of expression, including spelling and grammar. Only the exceptional students have read anything that matters; as a nation, we are not given to reading books. Schools, to be sure, cannot be made responsible for all deficiencies, yet, instead of trying to elevate mass civilization, they have surrendered to it. In the *New Republic* of November 19 [1956] Randell Jarrell had a piece contrasting the

great literature in old school readers with the guff in some modern ones, and a correspondent—very typical of our time, country, and educational outlook—protested against “an education designed for young aristocrats in a feudal world.” That is the kind of “thinking” that has directed our public education. As one hears on all sides the “democratic” demand that everybody shall be admitted to college and of course the B.A. degree, one may recall Bernard Shaw’s peroration at a mock-trial once upon a time: “Does the court think that an upright and intelligent jury is going to be influenced by such a thing as evidence?” Perhaps the next amendment to the Constitution will declare the B.A. the inalienable birthright of every American citizen. . . .

But, it will be said, these millions of young people are almost upon us; what is to be done with them? However immediate and heavy the pressure, I do not think this is a time for further surrender to debased values or for short-range remedies. Administrators need to re-think the educational philosophy they have grown up with and not assume that it has proved its worth; it hasn’t. We need high schools that are real high schools, colleges that are real colleges, universities that are real universities, and diplomas and degrees that mean something. We need to face the facts of human mentality and not twist “democratic” into the fantastic notion that everyone is intellectually capable of a four-year college course (or even a full high school course). Everyone ought to have as much education and/or as much vocational training as he or she is able to absorb; but selection must be made all along the line. Those who can and do profit from genuine secondary and higher education must be encouraged and enabled to pursue it; the annual number given as at least 100,000—an appalling waste. Those who are not qualified must be weeded out. Many would be better in vocational or technical schools, or junior colleges, all of which need to be more numerous than they are. Many would be better off if they left school and took jobs; remaining in school, where they cannot or will not do the work they should, they only do harm to themselves and others and impose a grievous burden upon teachers. State universities as well as private colleges should have the right to select their students and not open their doors to all comers. Entrance to

any college or university should be based on rigorous examination, including much better tests of literacy than we now seem to have. In short, education beyond the junior high school is for those who can be educated. Provision for those who cannot is a social and economic rather than an educational problem. This doctrine will no doubt be called ruthless; it may be thought mere common sense. . . . Where there is no elite, the people perish.

5.8 The Meaning of Academic Excellence*

Earl J. McGrath

IN the present situation it may appear boorish to dub a few discordant notes into the popular theme of academic excellence. Yet that is what circumstances require to arouse a keener awareness of the significance and direction of certain developments in higher education today. Current discussions tend to be preoccupied with subject matter, students, buildings and finance, and negligent of matters of basic social and educational philosophy. Too often they completely overlook two tenets of American higher education.

The first is the revolutionary idea that all citizens in a democracy should have the opportunity to develop their abilities to the fullest, not only as a personal right but as a social necessity. In applying this principle to higher education we differ from other nations which until very recently have largely reserved the privileges of advanced learning to the social and the intellectual elite.

The other equally uncommon doctrine holds that institutions of higher education have a responsibility to create and disseminate knowledge related to all aspects of modern man's multifaceted world. Hence, unlike other nations which limit instruction to the

*Earl J. McGrath, "Observations on The Meaning of Academic Excellence," *Liberal Education*, 48: 214-231, May 1962. By permission. Formerly United States Commissioner of Education and president of the University of Kansas City, Earl J. McGrath is now executive officer of the Institute of Higher Education at Teachers College, Columbia University.

See also Joseph Justman, "The School and the Intellectual," *Educational Forum*, 25: 27-34, November 1960.

liberal arts and the older professional disciplines, our colleges and universities offer a great variety of instruction and conduct research in agriculture, business administration, pharmacy, home economics, accounting, medical technology, food marketing and dozens of other fields. . . .

A basic fact on which any realistic discussion of academic excellence in American higher education must rest is, therefore, the uncurbable determination of our people to open wider the doors of higher education. Accordingly, as far as our nation is concerned, academic merit cannot be defined in terms of the intellectual capacities of ten or fifteen per cent of the population. In this connection it is instructive to observe that Western European countries are almost without exception moving away from their earlier selective policies toward American practice.¹¹

In any event no useful social purpose will be served by envisaging a program of American higher education in terms of a narrowing of the abilities now represented in institutions of higher education as a whole, because our citizens have irrevocably decided otherwise. . . .

[Commenting] on selective practices in institutions of higher education, Christopher Jencks, in discussing a "suitable" education for American youth observes that:

. . . In many cases "suitable" is merely a euphemism for "intellectual" or "bright." The advocates of such plans would emulate the Europeans by confining higher education to those who have already demonstrated their academic gifts. Yet research has repeatedly shown that great numbers—perhaps a majority—of the most talented young people show very little scholastic promise while still in high school. Hence if every American college accepted the definitions of suitability which govern admission to Yale, Caltech, or Bryn Mawr, a very substantial proportion of our country's intellectual man-power would go down the drain.¹²

¹¹ See Lionel Elvin, "Reform in West Europe's Post-Primary Education," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 43: 50-53, November 1961.

Editors' note: See also Sir Eric Ashby, F. R. S., "Investment in Man," *Advancement of Science*, 59: 202-213, September 1963.

¹² Christopher Jencks, "The Next Thirty Years in the Colleges," *Harper's Magazine*, 223: 122; October 1961. © 1961 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated.

Moreover, recent research on recipients of National Merit Scholarships shows that many do not possess unusual imagination or creativity. Conversely, some of the most successful practitioners of the various arts and sciences, having IQ's of 120 or above, did not stand in the upper levels of their high school, college or professional school classes. These contrasts in scholastic ability and originality of mind suggest that even those who satisfy all the requirements for distinction may lack some of the essential qualities for creative intellectual endeavor, a quality which should carry a high premium in all phases of contemporary life. . . .

Current proposals to raise the intellectual level in colleges and universities may result in more competent engineers, physicists, historians, medical technologists, businessmen and social workers, though some thoughtful educational leaders doubt even this outcome. But efforts to strengthen and improve higher education by raising standards of performance within traditional patterns can hardly be expected to meet the larger social needs of our time.

The difficulty in enlarging the concept of academic excellence arises out of the lack of reliable measures of growth in qualities other than knowledge and a limited range of intellectual abilities. Hence, advancement up the ladder of achievement in the world of learning depends largely on the types of performance relatively easy to appraise. An immense amount of research is required on the whole complex of faculties, traits and motivations which make up various forms of human excellence. If only an infinitesimal portion of the funds now being spent on a projected excursion to the moon were available for the needed research, the concept of academic and human excellence could be clarified and the lot of mankind incalculably improved. . . .

What is intellectualism? . . . Generally, intellectualism is equated with scholastic accomplishment, and the latter with test scores, grades in course, class standing and membership in honor societies. And in spite of the broader coverage of intellectual qualities included in the more recently devised instruments of academic evaluation, they still excessively reward those with the capacity to recall specific knowledge and to solve problems by the mechanical application of accepted formulas. Too many examinations penalize the non-conformist, original, inventive student who can

visualize a variety of solutions to a given problem, or who sees the impossibility of giving any clear-cut answer to the questions as they are stated.

The greatest weakness in present evaluations of the outcomes of education relates to a trait not closely connected with the capacity to absorb knowledge—an abiding interest in things of the mind. Some of the so-called late bloomers, the students with mediocre or poor high school records, who were intellectually awakened by an interested and inspiring college teacher, dramatically highlight the need to appraise the outcomes of such teaching. . . .

Though the factors involved in genuine intellectualism cannot now be described with precision, prominent among them is a compulsive interest in ideas, in things of the mind, in all aspects of the world and of man. Perhaps the *sine qua non* in the mosaic of intellectualism is an interest in ideas and their consequences in the history, the present condition and the future welfare of mankind. Other facilities and qualities which deserve analysis and assessment include: (1) the unremitting urge to pursue new knowledge; (2) the capacity to perceive subtle relationships between seemingly unrelated facts or events; (3) an impulsion to play with ideas, unrestrained by the tenebrious forces of pedantry and the intimidating pontifications of established authority; (4) the ability to suspend judgment in all situations in which one is intellectually not at home; (5) a reasonably wide acquaintance with basic theories, principles and key ideas in the major branches of learning, and (6) the ability and the desire to read steadily and widely throughout life. A review of even this incomplete catalogue of traits indicates that though no one can be an intellectual without possessing average intelligence and a body of reliable knowledge, learning and intelligence should not be confused with intellectualism. . . .

5.9 Open-mindedness—A *Sine Qua Non* for Teachers*

Edward C. Weir

If the individual is to learn he must personally feel a need to learn. Most educators recognize and accept this proposition. There is more to it than this, however; he must sense that there is something available to his learning that might help him to meet his need. *He must be aware that alternatives to his present pattern of thought and behavior are present in the learning situation.*

The learner may feel intensely involved in the on-going life activity in which the need for learning arises, but if he does not sense the presence of alternative lines of thought and action, he cannot engage himself in the activities of choosing a new way of thinking and behaving; he cannot learn. . . .

The attitude that "maybe there's a better idea, a better way of doing things" is the attitude that leads to learning, as is the frame of mind that keeps one alert to the freshness of experience, sensitive to the newness of a changing world and inquisitive as to what the newness means. The learner must be tolerant of ambiguity, able to live with assurance in the presence of uncertainty. He must be able to accept with zest the challenge of questions to which there are as yet no "final" answers and of "final" answers about which there are many questions.

If we accept the proposition that awareness of alternatives is essential in learning, then what does this mean for the teacher? We submit that, above all, it means that *the teacher himself will be receptive to the alternative ways of thinking of the students in his classroom.* The student who is hesitant or fearful of expressing his

* Edward C. Weir, "The Open Mind: An Essential in Teaching and Learning," *Educational Forum*, 27: 429-435, May 1963. By permission of Kappa Delta Pi; copyright by Kappa Delta Pi.

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Read also Arthur W. Combs, and others, *Perceiving, Behaving, Becoming*, Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, ASCD Yearbook, 1962.

own idea or who can only express his idea in aggressive attack on another person is a student for whom the possibilities of learning are seriously limited. A classroom where the prevailing orthodoxy of the teacher's ideas proscribes the expression and consideration of the ideas of students is a classroom in which little significant learning can occur. On the other hand, the student who is able to say what he thinks because he knows that his ideas will be given respectful consideration, however unorthodox or faultily expressed they may be, is the student who can learn to think more deeply and realistically and to speak more thoughtfully. No longer required to expend his psychological energies in maintaining his defenses against a situation of threat to his own self-concept, released from the desperate need to keep his inner self hidden from the revealing and critical glare of the teacher's and fellow students' scrutiny, he can become increasingly capable of new experience, increasingly aware that ideas other than his own may have potential for him. If he finds that his own ideas are accepted as legitimate simply because they are his ideas, if his ideas are treated with the same objective respect as the ideas of anyone else in the classroom—including the teacher—it is likely that he will begin to behave more thoughtfully with regard to ideas which are alternative to his own. He will begin to see the ideas of others not as something to be feared, hated or ignored, but as resources upon which he can draw to enrich the meaningfulness of his own living. . . .

The teacher's receptivity to the ideas of his students does not by any means imply passivity in the presence of sloppy thinking. Some ideas expressed at a particular time are irrelevant and disruptive to the choice-making process. Some ideas are more valid than others; more consistent with logic and reality, more pertinent to the problem at hand. The students must learn to make judgments about the validity of the ideas they are considering. The teacher has a very positive role to play in guiding the thought processes of his students, in helping to develop the very difficult skills of critical intelligence. But there are times when he must withdraw himself into the background, when his guidance must become subtle rather than direct. He must speak little and listen much. He must do this with the intent of making it possible for the students themselves to become aware of the sloppiness and the irrelevancy of *their own*

thinking. He must quietly but continuously help them to move in the direction of developing their own discipline, so that eventually they will begin asking themselves, "Does this idea contribute or disrupt our efforts to solve our problems? . . .

The teacher who is receptive to the ideas of his students and who offers his own idea as one alternative to be examined along with many others is likely to experience increasing receptivity to the ideas he holds to be beautiful and good. He has created an atmosphere wherein all ideas are welcome, and he has begun to lead his students into the thought of mankind. In the freedom of all to express their ideas in the classroom lies the freedom of each to inspect ideas and choose among them. In the freedom to speak lies the freedom to think. In the freedom to think lies the freedom to learn and to grow in personal adequacy. This applies not only to the students, but to the teacher as well. Insofar as the teacher keeps himself open to the alternatives present in the experience of his students, he enhances his own potential for professional and personal effectiveness. . . .

QUESTIONS AND READINGS FOR STUDY AND DISCUSSION

Giftedness, Selectivity, and Universal Democratic Education

AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PRINCIPLES OF SELECTIVITY

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GIFTEDNESS AND CREATIVITY

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Open Book Exam

1. Is the modern American school or college overly "academic"? Are we neglecting what Hans Rosenhaupt, Director of the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation, has called the "intellectual middle class" in favor of stress on the education of minorities at either

extreme of ability? Rosenhaupt and others warn of the possibility that an over-emphasis upon academic brilliance will stultify creativity, fail to provide the college-level preparation required for a host of vital occupations, and produce a "disenfranchised and malcontent middle class" analogous to that which supported Adolf Hitler. (For the Rosenhaupt statement, see "In Defense of the Average," *Education, USA*, National Education Association, October 4, 1962, p. 19.) How valid are these concerns and what are the preeminent school reforms or modifications they seem to require?

2. Increasing numbers of able students are enrolling in "advanced placement programs" or in special college level classes while still in high school. Does the experience of such programs offer any evidence to suggest that, for such persons, college itself should come earlier, and high school be shortened by one or two years? Are the benefits claimed for a longer period in high school outweighed by other advantages associated with graduation from school a year or two sooner?
3. Some critics argue that special public education for the gifted is inherently undemocratic and is inevitably tantamount to unequal educational opportunities. The concern is that such separate treatment tends to isolate the potential leaders from the larger society and to restrict their intimate association with most of those with whom, or for whom, they will ultimately have to work as adults. Is there any evidence to support these contentions, in whole or in part? Is there any evidence to indicate that the schooling of the average student (and the below-average) is enhanced by the removal of the more able students from the regular classroom?
4. Examine the relative merits and demerits of each of the following types of "segregation," i.e., educational classification. Let your discussion consider the problem (a) in the elementary grades, (b) in the secondary schools, and (c) in the colleges and universities.
 - (1) Segregation by sex versus coeducation.
 - (2) Segregation on the basis of economic or social status versus universal education.
 - (3) Segregation by age levels (as in the typical graded school) versus the "one-room school."
 - (4) Segregation by talent or ability versus "automatic promotion for all."
 - (5) Segregation into religious denominations versus common or "secular" schools.

- (6) Segregation by race versus desegregation.
 (7) Segregation of child "workers" (for example, "C.C.C. programs") versus academic students.

Does this examination lead you to recommend any basic changes in the present approach to or organization of American education?

5. Discuss the relative educational merits of (a) drill (habit formation), (b) understanding (comprehension, insight), and (c) appreciation (emotional responsiveness). Should talented students be allowed to neglect (a) in favor of (b) or (c)? Should these three aspects of learning be joined together in every unit of study? Your discussion should consider different age levels and different subject fields.
6. Criticize or defend the "drill now, think later" theory, or criticize or defend the following statement by Jerome S. Bruner:

"There has been much written on the role of reward and punishment in learning, but very little indeed on the role of interest and curiosity and the lure of discovery. . . . Good teachers know the power of this lure. Students should know what it feels like to be completely absorbed in a problem. They seldom experience this feeling in school."¹³

7. Give one or two examples illustrating the truth or falsity of the following statements:

- A. "There is a great danger that the current 'quest for excellence' will turn into an emphasis on the education of the easily educable. . . . A decade ago, the line of least resistance was to organize a program so easy that nobody could get mad at the superintendent because his child was flunking. Today, the line of least resistance is to work only with children who don't need much work." —Martin Mayer, *The Schools*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961, p. 156.
- B. "Herman H. Horne lists among 'misfits' in the schools these students: Darwin, Linnaeus, Napoleon, William Seward, Patrick Henry, Isaac Newton, Samuel Johnson, Jonathan Swift, Wordsworth, R. B. Sheridan, Robert Fulton, Heinrich Heine, Pasteur,

¹³ Jerome S. Bruner, *The Process of Education*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 50. See also David Mallery, *High School Students Speak Out*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962. For wider implications of Bruner's viewpoint, read Stephen Toulmin, "Science and Our Intellectual Tradition," *The Advancement of Science*, 20: 28-34, May 1963; Jerome S. Bruner, *On Knowing*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.

George Eliot, Walter Scott, John Hunter, Hegel, Lord Byron, Huxley, Schiller, James Russell Lowell, Oliver Goldsmith, Wagner, Goethe, Henry Ward Beecher, William C. Bryant, Thackeray, Shelley, John Adams, Coleridge, David Hume, Pierre Curie, Froebel, Emerson, Daniel Webster, Gladstone, James Watt, Herbert Spencer, Ibsen. The question now arises as to whether these students—or the programs of study provided for them—were the ‘misfits.’ If, through compulsory attendance laws, we require the child to go to school, we are in a position similar to that of the parent who might compel his child to wear shoes instead of going barefoot but who disclaims the responsibility of getting shoes that fit the child, insisting that if the shoes purchased happen to be of the wrong size, then the child, not the shoe, is to be considered a misfit.”—Douglas E. Lawson, *Wisdom and Education*, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961, pp. 123–124. The reference is to Herman H. Horne, “An Idealistic Philosophy” in *Philosophies of Education*, 41st Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, p. 176.

8. What is “creativity”? How important are “preparation” and “incubation” to “creative insight”? How important is “verification”? Let your discussion of these questions consider the following quotations (see also John W. Haefele, *Creativity and Innovation*, New York: Reinhold Publishing Corp., 1962):
 - A. “. . . the most vital part of the [scientific] method, the growth of creative ideas, cannot be submitted to methodological exposition.”¹⁴
 - B. “It is an erroneous impression, fostered by sensational popular biography, that scientific discovery is often made by inspiration—a sort of *coup de fondre*—from on high. This is rarely the case. Even Archimedes’ sudden inspiration in the bathtub; Newton’s experience in the apple orchard; Descartes’ geometrical discoveries in his bed; Darwin’s flash of lucidity on reading a passage in Malthus; Kekule’s vision of the closed carbon ring which came to him on top of a London bus; and Einstein’s brilliant solution of the Michelson puzzle in the patent office in Berne, were not messages out of the blue. They were the final co-ordinations, by minds of genius, of innumerable accumulated facts and impressions which lesser men could grasp only in their uncorrelated isolat-

¹⁴ G. B. Brown, *Science: Its Method and Its Philosophy*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1950, p. 137.

tion, but which—by them—were seen in entirety and integrated into general principles.”¹⁵

- C. “. . . a scientific friend of mine . . . lay in bed one night trying to place together certain puzzling results of an experiment. Suddenly, like a flash, he had it. The whole thing lay clear before his eyes. He could hardly wait till he got to his laboratory the next morning to try out a test of his insight. Sure enough the first test was exactly what he had hoped for, and so was the second one. But every experiment he made after that went the opposite way. For months he worked on the problem, and finally disproved his original idea! As he said to me, the only thing that was wrong with that flash of insight was that it wasn’t correct.”¹⁶
9. As subjects to be taught in school, how are the so-called “creative arts” distinguishable from the “cumulative knowledge” of science? The following statement by Joseph Kerman may stimulate discussion of this question.

“Like the scientist, the artist deals with experience and tells about it. But unlike the scientist, he is not primarily concerned with observation or speculation; in the work of art, he expresses his reaction to experience, articulating and conveying to others his sense of what it feels like to be alive. We speak correctly enough of the “message” of a great symphony, even though it is a message that we cannot write on a telegraph form. And though a book of poetry does not give us factual information as a textbook does, nonetheless it conveys a definite attitude, a mood, or interpretation set down by the poet. Art, then, is the depository of a kind of knowledge—knowledge not of things and ideas but of emotional and spiritual states. To spread this knowledge is part of the business of basic education. . . .”—Joseph Kerman (Associate Professor of Music, University of California, Berkeley); in James D. Koerner (ed.), *The Case for Basic Education*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1959, p. 218. See also Francis T. Villemain, “Democracy, Education and Art,” *Educational Theory*, 14: 1–14, January 1964.

¹⁵ Hans Zinsser, *As I Remember Him*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1940, pp. 331–332. (A biography of Claude Bernard.) See also Hans Hahn, “The Crisis in Intuition” in *The World of Mathematics*, Vol. 3, edited by James R. Newman, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1956, pp. 1956–1976; R. S. Woodworth and H. Schlosberg, *Experimental Psychology* (rev. ed.), New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1954, Chap. 26, “Problem Solving.”

¹⁶ George Humphrey, *Directed Thinking*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, Inc., 1948, pp. 134–135.

CHAPTER 6

New Perspectives for the Teaching Profession

6.1 Introduction: The Need for Better-Qualified Teachers

PART 1 of this anthology stresses *freedom* as democracy's most cherished goal; Part 2 emphasizes *excellence*. To transform these ideals into living realities, surely the most crucial educational issue of all has to do with the quality and adequacy of the teaching corps. And since, in the day-by-day tasks of teaching, means and ends are inseparable, the question of this final chapter may be stated thus: How can we find or develop teachers who themselves are both free and capable, and who thereby can inspire American youth in the quest for liberty and the quest for excellence?

This problem is especially acute today because, in the modern world, ordinary citizenship requires far greater resources of information and understanding than ever before; and in the emerging world society the so-called "common man" in a modern democracy is called upon for decisions beyond the wildest imaginings of his forefathers. In myriad ways, as science and technology advance, man's daily life grows more complex and more demanding; even increased longevity and greater leisure bring monumental social problems in their wake.

In such a time and under such circumstances, the role and responsibility of education grows ever more central and indispensable, and the function and character of teachers become of supreme importance. This section undertakes briefly to consider the present state of the teaching profession in America and to

illuminate certain recent developments bearing upon the conduct of teaching. As crucial issues, two questions are paramount: First, what are the attributes of effective teaching? Who, then, is a "good" teacher? Second, how adequately does teaching attract and command such people?

Nearly everyone will claim to have known at least one remarkable teacher. Of what did his remarkable ness consist? The list of characteristics is endless; the desirable qualities are universally respected, yet the definition always eludes us. We speak of the teachers of English and professors of history we have known, and we pay tribute to their knowledge of the subject at hand. Surely, this had much to do with his effectiveness—but not all. Teachers in the fullest sense of their calling are essentially models of the spirit; they represent far more than they present. It is here that their genius, or at least their talent, will lie—and it is this that frustrates any explicit discussion of the ultimate in the art of teaching.

Very well, you say, but why are there so few such teachers? Why are so many, the vast majority, so decidedly otherwise? What must we do to bring more of these artist-teachers into the classroom and onto the campus? Here we are on more solid ground; the answers are not so nebulous. In any age, in any field, the true artists are scarce—and perhaps rarest of all is that artistry of which Emerson was speaking when in his essay on "Education," he wrote:

Nature provided for the communication of thought, by planting with it in the receiving mind *a fury to impart* it. 'Tis so in every art, in every science. One burns to tell the new fact, the other burns to hear it. See how far a young doctor will ride or walk to witness a new surgical operation. I have seen a carriage-maker's shop emptied of all its workmen into the street, to scrutinize a new pattern from New York. So in literature, the young man who has taste for poetry, for fine images, for noble thoughts, is insatiable for this nourishment, and forgets all the world for the more learned friend,—who finds equal *joy in dealing out his treasures*. (As quoted in Robert Ulich, *Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947, p. 589. Italics added.)

Today the competition for the best minds, the most skillful people, is unprecedentedly intense, not only among institutions

within the U.S. but for service around the world. Moreover, as emerging nations sense their needs for literacy, technical skills, and professional sophistication, the demand for education—and therefore for teachers—must mount still higher. Paul Woodring neatly epitomized the basic problem in his perceptive discussion of *New Directions in Teacher Education*. The truly "liberally educated man" (he wrote)

is one who can make wise decisions independently. He can choose between good and bad, truth and falsehood, the beautiful and the ugly, the worthwhile and the trivial. His education will improve his ability to make ethical decisions, political decisions, decisions within the home and on the job. It will enable him to choose and to appreciate a good book, a good painting, or a good piece of music. It will free him of provincialism and prepare him to understand cultures other than his own. It will enable him to make the many decisions necessary in planning a good life and conducting it properly. This education should be common to all, and independent of vocational choice.¹

This, of course, is the sort of person who should be teaching our children. But (says Woodring in the same work):

Unless the quality of people drawn into the teaching profession is maintained and projected on an increasingly higher level, the education of our children is bound to deteriorate. The long-range welfare of our society requires that a reasonable proportion of our ablest young people invest their lives in the development of succeeding generations.

The question facing the schools is how to attract more of the ablest men and women into the profession, how to provide them with the best possible education for the important work they are to do, how to utilize their talents most effectively in the classrooms and laboratories, and how to retain them in the face of competition from other professions.

¹ Paul Woodring, *New Directions in Teacher Education*, New York: Fund for the Advancement of Education, 1957, pp. 8, 14.

The American Teacher Today

6.2 The Current Status of the Teaching Profession[°]

T. M. Stinnett

ONE of the basic truths in education is that the quality of education depends largely upon the the quality of the teacher. . . . Some idea of the rate at which professions have grown may be obtained from the facts that in 1850, professional workers constituted only 1.9 per cent of the total labor force and in 1900 only 3.8 per cent [whereas in 1950 they constituted 6.4 per cent]. To state the development in another way, the total working force of the United States increased 8 times between 1850 and 1950, but professional workers increased 26 times. . . . Flexner enumerates six criteria of professions:

1. They involve essentially intellectual operations.
2. They derive their raw materials from science and learning.
3. They work up this material to a practical and definite end.
4. They possess an educationally communicable technique.
5. They tend toward self-organization.
6. They are becoming increasingly altruistic in nature.

To the list above, Lieberman would add two criteria of great significance:

[°] T. M. Stinnett, *The Profession of Teaching*, Washington, D.C.: The Center for Applied Research in Education, 1962. Excerpts from pages V, 2-3, 5, 38-41, 52-57, 84-85, and 99. Bibliography and most footnote references here omitted. By permission.

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We may recall Flexner's brief definition of a profession. "The essence of professions resides in the application of free, resourceful, unhampered intelligence to the comprehension of problems."—Abraham Flexner, *Universities—American, English, German*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, p. 29.

1. A broad range of autonomy for both the individual practitioners and for the occupational group as a whole; and
2. An acceptance by the practitioners of broad personal responsibility for judgments made and acts performed within the scope of professional autonomy. . . .

Since the professions are regulated by the states, the matter of licensure (admission to practice) and of revocation of license (expulsion from practice) is vested in boards. Professional control over these vital matters is usually secured by control of the respective boards and by securing legislation providing that membership be made up of practicing members of the professions involved. For virtually all professions except teaching this is the case. Lieberman's analysis (from 1952 data) of the composition of these boards found that all or a majority of the membership of them except for teaching were members of their respective professions. The listing with the number of states providing for professional boards (numbers in parentheses refer to states for which information was not available) is as follows: Attorneys 48; Physicians 48; Dentists 48; Pharmacists 46 (2); Optometrists 46 (2); Registered Nurses 44 (1); Barbers 42 (3); Accountants 41 (5); Beauticians 38 (4); Architects 34 (6); Chiropractors 34 (4); Chiropodists 31; and Teachers 5 (1). . . .

Lieberman also states that "there is no guarantee of professional control unless the profession itself has the power either to select the [licensing] board members or at least to veto the selection of members unacceptable to it. If the members of the licensing board are selected without reference to the wishes of the profession, professional control may be lacking. . . ."

Probably the greatest single obstacle to the achievement of professional status and recognition has been the inferior role accorded elementary school teachers. Traditionally, the public thought they needed to know only a little more than the little children they taught. Even the teaching profession itself accepted or acquiesced in this notion until recent years. Only in 1930, did the first state require the bachelor's degree for beginning elementary school teachers; and not until 1948 did the profession, through the National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards, enunciate the policy of equal preparation standards for elementary

and secondary school teachers. This policy is not yet fully operative, but it is virtually universally accepted.

Another serious obstacle to the professionalization of teaching is the predominance of women in teaching positions. This has been true of all professions in which a relatively large proportion of the practitioners were women; the reason is, of course, biological and not inferior ability. The interruption of careers, or the termination of them, for child bearing and rearing and family duties, inevitably dictate an in-and-out role for women. Not only does this cause instability in the teaching staff, it creates other adverse factors. Low pay, large turnovers, a high leaving rate, pressures for mass production instead of excellence in teacher education, and indifference to professional status and growth tend to result from the predominance and impermanence of women in teaching.

Still another drawback to full professional recognition for teaching is the reluctance of college and university teachers to be classed as teachers, or at least to be classified alongside the teachers in the lower schools. There are, of course, vast differences in the histories of the two groups, differences in origin, preparation, and prestige. Generally, the higher education teacher categorizes himself as a scholar, or as a mathematician, a scientist, a humanist, a historian, and not as a teacher. By regarding himself first as a professional in his subject area and only incidentally or reluctantly as a professional in teaching, the college teacher tends to create and perpetuate a gulf between himself and teachers at the lower school levels. . . .

With the growth of urbanization and the consequent removal of the teacher from close, day-by-day contact with parents, the regard in which teachers are held has become increasingly difficult to pinpoint. There are, to be sure, constant pronouncements about the indispensable importance of teachers in our society, but these pronouncements find all too little substantiation in public policy. This point is underscored in the President's Commission on National Goals:

One way to discover what are considered to be important professions is to ask which professional schools receive highest priority in university planning. It would be a rare campus on which the school

of education ranked first. Yet in terms of our national future, teaching is the most important. . . .

Mayer has summed up in severe language his evaluation of the status of teachers:

And among 1,400,000 people [teachers in the United States] there are going to be all sorts. There are stupid teachers and brilliant teachers, motherly types, sour spinsters and sarcastic straw bosses, dedicated agitators and bedraggled timeservers . . . it is important to know that teachers all over the world are drawn mostly from the lower-middle stratum of society—from the children of farmers, skilled workers and clerks, rather than from the children of ditch diggers and doctors. Though the status of teachers is low in nearly all countries, most teachers as individuals have moved up in the social scale—and their children . . . will move up further.²

Perhaps, in varying degrees, the same wide-ranging statement could be made about most professions. The major difficulty in evaluating the social origins and status of teachers is the lack of comparable information regarding members of the other professions. . . . In 1958, the average earnings of all public school teachers were only 51.1 per cent of the average earnings of the 17 other professional groups. The average earnings of women teachers in the public schools were 94.9 per cent of the average earnings of women in the other 17 professional groups. But for men teachers, average earnings were only 57.6 per cent of those of men in the other groups.

Still another significant comparison of the economic status of teachers with other professional groups is starting salaries. Endicott reported average starting salaries, for men college graduates in 1961 as follows:

<i>Field</i>	<i>June 1961 Graduates</i>	<i>June 1960 Graduates</i>
Engineers	\$6,240	\$6,120
Accountants	5,496	5,352
Sales	5,412	5,280
General Business Trainees	5,268	5,136
Average All Fields	5,640	—

By comparison, the median starting salary of teachers with the bachelor's degree in 1960, in cities in the population group 30,000 to 100,000 was \$4,250. . . .

² Martin Mayer, *The Schools*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961, p. 19.

It is well known that teachers' salaries have not kept pace with advances of those of other groups. What is not well known is that teachers have lost even more ground in the area of nonsalary or fringe benefits. Since 1930, employer payments for pension and welfare funds have increased percentagewise more than seven times as much as salaries. It is obvious that both teachers' salaries and nonwage benefits must be stepped up drastically to compete for qualified personnel....

Admission to practice in a profession now almost exclusively depends upon the completion of prescribed, specialized college and university courses. . . . The reasons for this universal development among the professions are many, but there are two basic ones: (1) the staggering proliferation of knowledge has simply made the casual, informal study and learning-on-the-job approach obsolete; and (2) the complexity of society forces the assignment of highly specialized functions to expert groups or institutions. Intellectual training and testing, as measures of competence, have emerged as the distinctive characteristics of professions. An additional consideration of great importance is the relative ease of administration and the assurance of a high degree of uniformity, or evenness of preparation.

The programs of professional preparation are, thus, at the very heart of competence and professional status. Consequently, an extraordinary concern for the quality of these programs, and a zealous safeguarding of their integrity are marked in each professional group.

McGlothlin has enumerated the two basic aims of professional education: (1) providing professionally educated entrants to the professions in adequate numbers; (2) maintaining or increasing the quality of entrants to the professions to satisfy society's needs; the first aim is quantitative, the second qualitative.³

Haskew has identified the difference between professional education and nonprofessional education as threefold. (1) Professional education does not leave to chance the cultivation of those attributes—ethics, disciplines, methods of thought, allegiances—which make the professional fit to assume the trusteeship which

³ William J. McGlothlin, *Patterns of Professional Education*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960, pp. 2-4.

society entrusts to him. (2) Professional education focuses upon the person as an individual who is to practice and seeks to broaden his human—that is, his mental, moral, and emotional—capacities. (3) Professional education simply cannot stop short of performance; it cannot accept without unmistakable proof the dictum that knowledge alone is power....⁴

Perhaps the single greatest need of teaching—to achieve recognized professional status—depends upon raising minimum preparation levels to those of the other professions. This movement is underway with goals of five years preservice preparation for classroom teachers for elementary and secondary school teachers, and of six years for special-school-service personnel. These plans are generally endorsed by the profession and have been implemented already in some states. In addition to extending the years of preparation, there are equally important goals of achieving more rigorous and selective admission requirements and of improving the quality of the preparing programs. The fact that responsibility for a good teacher education program is being assumed by the entire faculties of colleges and universities, rather than simply by the education or teacher training departments, indicates that the job of providing teachers has been accepted by the higher education institutions as an endeavor of first importance.

6.3 A Short History of Teacher Education in the United States*

Paul Woodring

. . . One hundred years ago there were no teachers' colleges; universities had not yet established schools or departments of education; and the subject of "education" would have been

* L. D. Haskew, "Planning Institutional Programs," *The Education of Teachers: Considerations in Planning Institutional Programs*, Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards, NEA, 1960, pp. 44-47.

Paul Woodring, "A Century of Teacher Education," *School and Society*, 90: 236-242, 211, May 5, 1962. By permission.

Paul Woodring, Professor of Education at Western Washington State

difficult if not impossible to find in the course listings of American colleges. Edgar Wesley has observed that, in 1859, "Colleges, academies, and upper schools of various kinds had existed for two centuries in America without making any noticeable contribution to the training of teachers."⁵

After the Civil War, a few universities and colleges, mostly in the Middle West, established chairs of "pedagogy" or "didactics." Usually, these were found within the department of philosophy, which at that time also included whatever psychology was taught. But the state universities of Iowa and Michigan created departments of education during these years, and Teachers College became a part of Columbia University in 1892. Most of our university schools and departments of education, however, did not come into being until after the close of the century.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, it was the normal schools and institutes that carried the responsibility for teacher education and both focused their attention on preparing teachers for elementary rather than secondary schools. Neither was a part of *higher* education. The nineteenth century normal school usually accepted students with only an elementary education and institutes often had no admission requirements. Yet, both these institutions made very important contributions to teacher education and they set the pattern for much that was to follow.

Institutes offered short courses of a few days or a few weeks, taught by itinerant speakers or local school administrators who gave instruction in schoolkeeping and inspirational lectures. The poorest institutes were probably better than none at all because they brought teachers together for a discussion of mutual problems; and when Horace Mann came to speak, or when William James came to deliver his "Talks to Teachers," as he did in many parts of the country in the 1890s, the institute must have reached a high peak of excellence.

Before the Civil War, normal schools were established in at least 10 states, but enrollments were small and it is doubtful that

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⁵ Edgar Wesley, *NEA: The First Hundred Years*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1957, pp. 79-80.

more than two or three per cent of the teachers had attended them. During the last third of the century, however, normal schools spread rapidly across the country and enrollments rose dramatically. . . . Wesley estimates that normal school enrollments grew from 10,000 in 1870 to nearly 70,000 at the end of the century. . . .⁶

Since their founding, there has been a great deal of debate about the quality of education provided by the normal schools. Perhaps the reason is that there was a tremendous range in quality among the different institutions and the debaters were not talking about the same schools. At its worst, the normal school was a shabby little institution with a single teacher who taught courses in pedagogy with perhaps a little time for a review of the elementary subjects. At its best, however, it was a very substantial professional school, headed by an able educator who was assisted by a devoted faculty. In addition to courses in pedagogy and a period of supervised practice teaching, the best of the normal schools offered an academic curriculum comparable to that found in the better academies of the day and probably not greatly inferior to that found in the first two years of the liberal arts colleges. . . .

After the turn of the century, the number of private normal schools declined because these institutions were unable to face the competition from publicly supported ones that charged no tuition. The number of state normal schools continued to increase until about 1920 and their enrollments grew rapidly. By 1900, the growth of public high schools made it possible for many normal schools to require a high school diploma for admission. This enabled them to reduce their attention to secondary school subjects and to take steps toward transforming themselves into four-year degree-granting teachers colleges. Nineteen state normal schools made this transition between 1911 and 1920, sixty-nine between 1921 and 1930, and most of the others did so between 1931 and 1950,⁷ by which time the normal school had become almost obsolete.

The state teachers colleges, however, had a short life. Within twenty years after they had emerged out of the normal schools, they began transforming themselves into general state colleges or state universities which granted liberal arts and other degrees, as

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

⁷ Wesley, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

well as the B.S. in Ed., which was usually the only degree offered by the teachers college. This change came first in the Middle West and the Far West; it came more slowly in the northeastern section where powerful private colleges and universities bitterly resisted the efforts of the teachers colleges to take on new responsibilities.

In California, the state normal schools became teachers colleges in 1921 and general state colleges in 1935. . . . In New York, the normal schools did not take the next step until 1961. At the end of 1961, public teachers colleges were found in only fifteen states.

The changes have not been in name only; a new kind of college has emerged which continues to prepare many teachers but also provides a general or liberal education at modest cost for many who do not plan to teach. The academic courses offered in these colleges and the professors who teach them have the same strengths and weaknesses as are found in other undergraduate colleges, both public and private.

Since 1900, universities have accepted a growing proportion of the responsibility for teacher education. During the first two or three decades of the twentieth century, most of the major universities established schools or colleges of education and the others established departments of education. The number of professional courses offered for teachers and administrators in a typical university grew from two or three in 1900 to several hundred in 1960, and this led to charges that the courses had proliferated beyond the available intellectual content and that there was much duplication of content in courses with different titles and numbers. The reply that proliferation could be found in other departments, too, was true but was not accepted as a sufficient justification.

In 1958, 25.3 per cent of all beginning teachers came from public universities and another 10.3 per cent came from private universities. Many of those who attended other colleges as undergraduates later went to universities for graduate work.

Today, all the major state universities and many land-grant colleges and municipal universities maintain large schools or colleges of education. Most of them offer courses at both the undergraduate and graduate levels and grant bachelors' degrees for beginning teachers and masters' and doctors' degrees for teachers,

supervisors, specialists, administrators, and college teachers of education.

In some state universities, all undergraduates planning to teach are encouraged to enroll as freshmen in the college of education. In many others, the college of education enrolls only those who plan to teach in elementary school and those who plan to teach physical education, home economics, agriculture, etc., in high school, while those who plan to teach the academic courses at the secondary level enroll in, and earn their degree from, the liberal arts college of the university, taking only such professional work in the school of education as is required for certification. But even when the prospective teacher is enrolled in the college of education, he usually takes the major portion of his academic work from professors in their liberal arts colleges; and if our teachers today do not know their subjects, or are not liberally educated, the responsibility must be accepted by the academic professors who failed to teach them properly.

Some large private universities maintain undergraduate and graduate schools of education similar to those found in state institutions. Many, however, including such renowned institutions as Harvard and Chicago, have graduate schools of education only, while Princeton and Yale have neither schools nor departments of education. Teachers College of Columbia University has become in recent years almost entirely a graduate school.

Today, American teachers are prepared, to the point of initial certification, in more than 1100 different colleges and universities, and, inevitably, the range in quality among these varied institutions will be enormous. Unfortunately, the colleges with the highest entrance standards and the highest standards of instruction do not turn out their fair share of teachers because they draw their student bodies from socio-economic classes in which parents as well as students do not look upon teaching as a sufficiently satisfactory, remunerative, and "prestige" profession, particularly for men.

But, although the talents of the students and the quality of instruction varies greatly among the colleges that educate teachers, there is a fair amount of uniformity in the courses studied—a uniformity resulting in considerable part from state certification requirements.

Of the 52 certification authorities (50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), 51 now require the bachelor's degree for beginning high school teachers and 44 require it for elementary teachers as well. Nine states require high school teachers to complete a fifth year of college during the period of initial certification and three require a fifth year for beginning secondary teachers.⁸

The required course nearly always includes a period of general education approximately two academic years in length, plus two more years during which the time is divided between a major in an academic discipline (or, in the case of elementary teachers, a "field" major which may include several disciplines) and a sequence of professional courses. For elementary teachers, the professional requirements range from 16 to 36 semester hours in the different states, with a median of 21 hours. For secondary teachers, the range is 12 to 29 hours, and the median is 18. Many colleges, however, require more professional hours than the state requirement for certification.

An important departure from the standard or conventional program for teachers is that which leads to the Master of Arts in Teaching degree. This newer program was originated at Harvard in 1936 at the suggestion of James B. Conant, who then was president of the University. Dean Keppel of the Harvard Graduate School of Education estimates that today "at least thirty AMT (or MAT) programs are known to be in existence, plus fifty other programs that award different degrees but try to solve the same problems in the same way."⁹

⁸ W. Earl Armstrong and T. M. Stinnett, *A Manual on Certification Requirements for School Personnel in the United States*, Washington D.C.: NEA, 1961.

⁹ Francis Keppel, "Master of Arts in Teaching," *Saturday Review*, 44: 53-65, June 17, 1961.

Editors' note: Compare the following 1963 news report: "The 'education major' is doomed in California. In what Thomas W. Braden, president of the state board of education, calls a deathblow to 'educationese,' the state is drastically upgrading its teacher certification requirements. Ultimately, California will turn down all applicants whose sole or chief training is in the methodology of teaching. Instead, it will demand degrees in academic subjects, stressing substance over technique."

"So sweeping is the change, says Braden, that if used to gauge California's current teachers, the new standards would disqualify 20 per cent of high school teachers, 75 per cent of junior college instructors, and 90 per cent of elementary school teachers. 'Professional education' is no longer an ac-

The MAT program selects liberal arts graduates who have strong majors in the academic disciplines and offers them a year (or more) of instruction at the graduate level. In a typical program, the student takes a summer's work in educational psychology and educational philosophy, followed by a semester's internship in a public high school. During this semester, he takes part in a weekly seminar on the methods and materials for teaching his subject and his teaching is closely supervised; in some cases he participates as a member of a teaching team. During the second semester, he returns to the university for graduate-level courses in his teaching field and, sometimes, an additional course or semester in education. Many of those who have worked with this program are convinced that it should and probably will become the standard program for the preparation of secondary teachers of the academic subjects. . . .

Today . . . there is widespread agreement that any sound program for teacher education must include: a substantial program of general or liberal education, representing not less than two years of work beyond high school; a knowledge of the subject or subjects to be taught, which, in the case of the secondary school teacher, should be provided by a strong academic major at the undergraduate level plus some graduate work in an academic discipline; a knowledge of the contributions of philosophy, history, psychology, and the other social and behavioral sciences to an understanding of the place of the school in the social order and the processes of learning; and a period of practice teaching or an extended internship during which time the prospective teacher tries out various methods of teaching under competent supervision.

ceptable major. Would-be administrators will have to major in academic fields, from science to humanities. New teachers must minor or major in those fields, although they may also take degrees in nonacademic subjects such as home economics or industrial art. All must have a working knowledge of a foreign language.

"*Extra Schooling.* A fifth year of college will be required of all school teachers, although elementary teachers can take it while working. In contrast to past practice, schools will not let teachers teach outside their academic fields—will no longer plunk an English teacher in French class to save money, for example. The so-called 'Einstein clause' is in full force; able artists or writers are welcome to teach in California public schools even if they never had a day's formal education. . . ."—"We Want Teachers Who Are Educated," *Time*, 81: 74, May 10, 1963. Courtesy *Time*; copyright Time, Inc., 1963.

There is still, in 1962, widespread disagreement about the proper organization and content of professional courses for teachers and about the place of these courses in the curriculum. There is also disagreement about whether the internship should come during the undergraduate years or after the student receives the baccalaureate. It seems clear, however, that in the years ahead, teacher education will not be a thing apart, provided by separate institutions for teachers, but will be a part of the mainstream of higher education in America.¹⁰

6.4 Teacher Education: Liberal and Pedagogical^{*}

Hugo Beck

The conflict on the content of teacher education has been discussed in many terms. Writers have seen the issue as a contest between liberal education and professional education, between academic discipline and professional discipline, between academic tradition and professional tradition, between liberal arts and pedagogical methodology, between content and method, between content and process, between liberal arts professors and educationists, proceeding thence to less charitable terms.

¹⁰ Editors' note: Compare the following statement by Theodore M. Blegan, former dean of the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota: "The time has come in American education for the scholars of subject-matter specialization and those who profess professional education to find common ground and to grapple unitedly with the problems of education that are crucial to the oncoming generations of our people. Misunderstandings, where they befog the scene, should be swept away. Weakness, where it is discerned, should lead, not to epitaphs, but to efforts to build strength. Bases for mutual confidence and co-operation should be looked for. If there is alignment into enemy camps, why not mutually explore assumed reasons for hostility and make sure that we have, in truth, picked the right enemies to fight."—Theodore M. Blegan, Excerpt from a 1953 address, cited in *The Education of Teachers*, by G. H. Hodenfield and T. M. Stinnett, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: © 1961 Prentice-Hall, Inc. By permission.

* Hugo Beck, "An Approach to the Teaching of Secondary-School Teachers," *School Review* 69: 437-448, Winter 1961. Copyright 1961 by the University of Chicago. Footnote references and bibliography here omitted.

Hugo Beck is administrative co-ordinator of the Master or Arts in Teaching Program at the University of Chicago.

Writers who state the issues in teacher education in dualistic terms make certain assumptions. First, they assume that at least two types of education are possible for the future secondary-school teacher. One type of education deals with content subjects and courses that have a "proven" body of knowledge and lead to a liberal education; these are the subjects that secondary-school teachers teach. The other type of education deals with pedagogical methodology, or the most effective ways of transmitting the content subjects. This area of education includes such courses as educational psychology, educational philosophy, educational administration, curriculum, tests and measurements, with special emphasis on the adjective *educational*. These are the courses taught by educators, the courses designed to teach teachers how to teach the content subjects. In this article we shall refer to the first type of education as liberal and the second as pedagogical.

Writers who see teacher education as a conflict between liberal and pedagogical education assume that the conflict can be resolved only by a realignment or a readjustment in quantitative terms. Add a year's work to the liberal arts program, some urge; combine liberal and pedagogical education in a four- or five-year pattern, others advise; change the sequence, still others recommend. But in all these proposals, the basic dualism of content and method, liberal and pedagogical remains. . . .

In this article . . . we propose to suggest certain variables that must be controlled if we are to deal effectively with the problem of the fragmentation of subject matter, if we are to resolve the dilemma between liberal and pedagogical education, and if we are to provide for interchange of ideas among the academic disciplines, the field of education, and the secondary school.

It is not our intention here to define a sound liberal education. We assume that every liberal arts graduate has been exposed to the four domains of knowledge; physical science, biological science, social science, and humanistic studies. Further, we hope that every liberal arts graduate is familiar with the methods of inquiry developed in each domain, methods that account for discovering, testing, revising, extending, and communicating knowledge in that area.

In our approach to the education of secondary-school teachers,

the undergraduate program would be the responsibility of the liberal arts college, since the education of future teachers is similar in content to the education of students in other professions. Beyond the point of undergraduate education, however, the training of future teachers begins to develop in specialized areas.

The first area is competence in education as an academic discipline in its own right with its own identifiable subject matter. Education is but one field of knowledge in the larger context of the social sciences. It takes its place along with sociology, political science, anthropology, and economics as a field that attempts to study some aspect of society and the relationships of the individual within that particular area of concern. Specifically, education is inquiry into the way in which society transmits the culture and the accumulated wisdom of that culture to each new generation. Education is the study of the transformation of the individual from a dependent, immature being into one who, by communication with his fellow men, comes to understand the natural forces in his environment and is able to exercise more and more control over that environment. Even if there were no departments of education in the conventional sense and no pedagogical methodology, education would still have a legitimate place in the curriculum of the social sciences.

The secondary-school teacher also needs competence in the specialized subject-matter fields he plans to teach. Whether his field is biology, history, English, or foreign languages, he must be thoroughly conversant with the methods of inquiry of that field. Competent scholars in these fields can assist the teacher-scholar in developing criteria for the selection of materials that are crucial for course content for secondary-school students.

Third, the secondary-school teacher must have facility in areas of education that are germane to the teaching-learning situation. He must have insights into theories of learning, into motivation, evaluation, individual differences, group influence, the structure of social organizations, the effect of the social and the natural milieu—all areas grounded in and developed through the liberal arts tradition and of special concern to the behavioral sciences. An interdisciplinary approach is needed so that each department does not perpetually rediscover the wheel. The lines of communica-

tion must be kept open so that when knowledge is discovered in one discipline that has relevance to another the knowledge may be readily shared.

Fourth, the secondary-school teacher must have competence in the technological and the technical aspects of education. This area includes the methods of teaching a specific subject, the development of learning materials, the use of audio-visual techniques to supplement and complement the teacher's role. In short, we are concerned here with the teaching process. If these areas are taught in teacher-education institutions as accumulated folklore, as tried and true practices, as recipes for action, or as "seat of the pants" judgment, the academician may validly object that education courses lack a scientific approach. But this area of pedagogy can be taught, and in a few departments of education is being taught, with as much rigor and as much dedication to a theoretical rationale as any of the social sciences.

The education of teachers has still one more dimension: the art of teaching, which is a synthesis of the four areas described here and which culminates in the actual teaching-learning situation that the teacher meets in the classroom. In the art of teaching, insights and concepts gleaned from all four of these areas are brought to bear on the child to facilitate his learning. The blending of these insights and concepts into a meaningful approach is a task that calls for personal inquiry and reflection, a task that the teacher must do for himself. No one can do it for him. Many sources of competent assistance are available, however: scholars from the great categories of human knowledge, scholars in the field of education, intelligent schoolmen who are skilled practitioners, and master teachers under whose direction the beginning teacher observes and teaches. Here again responsibility must be shared. A department of education, in isolation, cannot by itself enable the teacher to develop the art of teaching. All who are involved in the advancement of learning need to share this responsibility, which, in the past, academic scholars and practitioners have often shirked.

If the rationale that has been developed has any validity, the relevant question is not which of the four areas described is in the domain of the liberal arts and which is in the domain of pedagogical education. The answer to that question makes rela-

tively little difference. But it seems to me that the following questions are relevant:

How is knowledge discovered, developed, tested, revised, extended, and communicated in all areas of special concern to secondary-school teachers?

What methods of inquiry are inherent in these areas?

What type of organizational structure can be designed to bring about smooth interchange and interaction between academic scholars, pedagogical scholars, and skilled practitioners?

If both camps—liberal and pedagogical—are committed to rigorous pursuit of inquiry, how can we develop mutual respect for the contributions each can make so that we may put an end to the bickering and get on with the task of improving the quality of instruction at all levels?

How can we better assess the effects of teacher competency on the learning behavior of children? . . .

The faculty for this approach would consist of members from three fields of endeavor: members of academic departments in the university, members of the education department, and skillful practitioners in the field. . . . They would respect one another's competencies, realizing that there are many "ways of knowing" and arriving at "truth." All three groups would share the responsibility of developing the total program of teacher education, of guiding its development, and of evaluating its progress. . . .

The approach to teacher-education we have sketched would not replace a liberal education. It would be an extension of a liberal education. It would combine the talents of a variety of scholars. It would present the opportunity for members of academic departments in colleges and universities and members of the teaching profession in the field to assume a more vigorous role in the education of teachers. Whether this program can resolve the basic dilemma in teacher education remains to be seen. It may carry the seeds of a better plan for developing the inquiring teachers desperately needed in our schools today.

Education is not the sole concern of a single department. It depends on a variety of disciplines for insights and concepts. It is a fruitless task to try to determine which portion of the education of teachers belongs to the education department and which belongs

to the academic tradition. Teacher education is an invitation to inquiry that embraces all disciplines.¹¹

The Reorganization of Classroom Teaching

6.5 Generalists and Specialists in the Elementary School*

George D. Stoddard

IN American education, the idea of a school grade is only about a century old. As in other nations the earlier forms of organization were less structured. On the whole, the grade may

¹¹ Editors' note: For examples of education as an art, or as a craft, read Stanley L. Clement, "Seven Principles of Learning," *Clearing House*, 36: 23-26, Sept. 1961; also W. E. McPhee, R. A. Granger, and others, in *Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary-School Principals*, 45: 80-93, December 1961.

The foregoing essay by Hugo Beck is concerned with the preparation of teachers for secondary schools and may suggest, by implication, that the preparation of elementary school teachers must be conceived in fundamentally different terms. But there is a growing body of professional and scholarly opinion, reflected in selection 6.5 by George D. Stoddard, to the effect that the elementary school teacher too must be an expert in some field. Recent developments in the study of the teaching of mathematics and physics, for example, indicate that the primary grades may be the best places to introduce fundamental mathematical or physical principles. To be sure, this instruction will be in suitably elementary terms, but it means that at least some primary teachers should have been mathematics majors—and, of course, that all primary teachers will have carried their study of mathematics farther than is presently customary. And who more than the elementary teacher requires a broad, liberal education?

* G. D. Stoddard, *The Dual Progress Plan*, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961, pp. 2-4, 20-21, 35-41, 64, 151, 155, 222. Copyright © 1961 by George D. Stoddard. Reprinted with the permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated. Read also G. D. Stoddard, "Creativity in Education," Chapter 12 of *Creativity and its Cultivation*, edited by Harold H. Anderson, New York: Harper, 1959. See also "A Critical Look at Team Teaching," *The Instructor* (70th Anniversary issue), 71: 33-42, October 1961 (bibliography).

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be regarded as a good invention, but like so many other inventions it has become obsolete. To the extent that a grade embodies appropriate attention to individual differences, is based on common cultural demands, and is capable of being competently taught, it is a useful device. It is consistent with other guideposts of maturity such as age, size, weight, and mental maturity.

When the grade idea was applied only to common learning (i.e., the three R's), it was closer to its ideal that it is now. We have no common learnings in abstract mathematics, science, music, or art; in these areas not much is expected of the American adult, even by way of appreciation. On the other hand, a great deal is expected of the adult in terms of the language arts and social studies, *so much so, that they form practically the whole content of our standardized tests of intelligence*. Tests of general mental ability scarcely get beyond reading comprehension; they make only a bow to science or the arts, or to originality in any form.

Somehow there has developed throughout the grade system a distrust of the specialist. Perhaps there was felt to be little need for specialized training. Engineering and other technologies scarcely entered into the planning of the elementary school; before the Land-Grant College movement, such studies were not the general rule in higher education. The average American child, while often adept in mechanical manipulation, remains essentially indifferent to pure science. This indifference is not a necessary by-product of his nervous system; it is more often a result of his schooling. . . .

The Education of Teachers for the Dual Progress Plan. Paul Woodring has written a compact account of the course of teacher education in the United States, with emphasis on the proliferation which has taken place in the last few decades. He shows how a perversion of the teachings of John Dewey led to the false assumption that the teaching of the whole child did not require excellence in subject matter or any consistent philosophy of education. . . .

[But the new age demands much more than schooling in the three R's; for the explosion of knowledge results in] what might be called *the insurmountable task* of the all-purpose teacher:

Being responsible for the teaching of all subjects taught in the elementary school, she [the ideal teacher?] should command a scholarly knowledge of mathematics, literature, history, science, geography, gov-

ernment, music, and art. An elementary knowledge of these fields is not sufficient, for in each sixth-grade class there will be a few children with mental ages of sixteen, eighteen, or higher and some of these will have marked aptitudes in special fields. The ideal teacher must have advanced knowledge in all areas if she is to provide maximal learning opportunity for gifted children. She would be an expert in the teaching of reading and able to diagnose reading difficulties. She must teach handwriting, spelling, and many more skills. She should have a thorough grasp of language and should know how to teach children to use it effectively, both in speech and in writing. Probably she should know some language other than her own for foreign language instruction is increasingly becoming a part of the elementary curriculum.¹²

All that on the side of subject matter! As a result, we have accepted teachers who can do *something* in all these fields, propped up by a few specialists and the ever-ready textbooks and canned examinations; we have, at least, demanded a humane person who generally likes children and gets along well with people. Clearly, the problem is to combine learning in depth (by restricting the content spectrum) with the humane and proficient approach, on the ground that good intentions are not enough. I feel that the team approach, together with specialization fed by a strong program in the liberal arts, in the future, will be looked upon as so rational a combination as to make students wonder what the mid-century conflicts in teacher education were all about. . . .

[In the Dual Progress Plan] a *home teacher* is placed in charge of *two rooms*, on a half-day basis for each. She is responsible for registration and counseling; she teaches reading and the social studies. The other half-day is assigned to special teachers who teach mathematics and science, music, arts and crafts, recreation and health, and—beginning with grade five—an optional sequence in a foreign language. The special teachers in each subject or cluster of subjects offer the work on a longitudinal basis straight through the elementary grades, and in a combined school throughout the twelve grades. Thus the special teachers, as a team, are in a good position to judge the quality of special aptitudes and their course of growth throughout the child's school life. Test scores, profiles,

¹² Paul Woodring, *New Directions in Teacher Education*, New York: The Fund for the Advancement of Education, 1957, pp. 71-72.

ratings, and sample items furnish a continuous comprehensive record. All special teachers are to encourage pupils to form social clubs based on content interest that cut across the grades.

Generally a pupil's grade standing will be determined by his home teacher, but he will be free to pursue avidly a specialty according to his aptitude. A fifth-grade pupil may play in the high school band or orchestra, and a pupil gifted in mathematics or science may be brigaded with like-minded students in more advanced grades.

The home teacher (usually a woman) is in charge of both sections of her grade. Since one of her functions is to be concerned with pupil orientation, she concentrates on knowing the pupils, the families, and the neighborhoods, linking this knowledge [to that of the subject-matter specialists who work closely with her].

[To see how the Dual Progress Plan operates, let us consider mathematics. Analogous principles and procedures would apply to art, music, and the sciences. The importance of early instruction has been well stated by] John R. Dunning, dean of the School of Engineering of Columbia University:

. . . If we are to wipe out scientific illiteracy and mathematical illiteracy, we must start in our elementary schools. For just as the child who does not want to read is more incurably illiterate than the child who does not know how to read, so the child who misses the point of science is more ignorant than the child who lacks information about science; and it is in the first few years of school that we are now almost systematically crushing that lovely combination of wonderment and shrewd inquiry which is the real point of science.

There is no such creature as a child too young for science. In fact, since toddlers are more interested in discovering the world outside themselves than in probing their own psyches or their interpersonal relations (unless they are pretty sick toddlers), the beginning of all rational intellectual activity lies in the realm of elementary science and mathematics. . . .¹³

Under the Dual Progress Plan, it will be better, after full testing, *to allow the mentally backward child to abandon mathematics beyond the commonest skills*, in order that he may concentrate on what surely will be demanded of him, namely, an optimum profi-

¹³ New York Times Magazine, November 29, 1959, p. 80.

cency in the language arts and social studies. He can improve, however slowly, in reading comprehension and general information; through such means, as far as subject matter can help, he will best be able to achieve personal satisfaction and vocational fitness. After all, his need of science will be no more than a modicum, thus placing him, if we were to be cynical about it, near the average rating of adults in the mid-twentieth century. Any special talents may help to take up the mathematics-science slack; they can be emphasized, in school and out. There is more "low-level" reading, performing (in sports or art), and deciding (in family affairs) than "high-level." It is no part of scholastic virtue to force upon a pupil standards which he is truly unable to meet. It is better to have a child's resources fully mobilized toward a modest success than to have them continually serve receding, impossible goals.

In short, when necessary it is all right to "take the heat off," especially for content outside the cultural imperatives, provided we know what we are doing. This is different from "relaxing standards"; it is, rather, a reaffirmation of the basic principle of individual differences in ability. In the Dual Progress Plan standards of achievement should rise, for each pupil is expected to perform at his highest potential level. . . . [If we can] discover the slow, the average, and the fast learners, and adjust their programs accordingly . . . [we may] put an end to the concept of average ability for a class, calling for average performance under average teaching effectiveness. This means a playing up of the spread of talent as a means of reducing, on the one hand, the nagging of the dull and, on the other, the indefensible neglect of the gifted. . . .

As we move from the self-contained classroom to the Dual Progress Plan, we should not entertain the thought that the specialists in the ungraded section are more praise-worthy than the teachers in the core section devoted to the language arts and social studies. In fact, the latter also become specialists, though the range is broad. We might with justice say that in the new plan all teachers are both specialists and generalists. . . .

If we are given teacher specialization superimposed upon a sound basis of the liberal arts and child development, and hold to clear but not fixed ideas as to what is imperative and what is elec-

tive in our society, it seems to me we are well prepared to design the school of the future. . . .

6.6 The New American High School[°]

R. Freeman Butts

FIFTY years ago the American high school was largely a college preparatory institution designed for relatively few young people in the total population. In 1900 about 10 percent of all youth of high school age actually attended school, and 75 percent of high school graduates went on to college. Then the nature of the high school changed radically. Increasing numbers of youth flooded into the high schools after World War I, the curriculum expanded rapidly, and the college preparatory function was submerged, because it was assumed that most high school graduates would *not* go on to college. So commercial courses, home economics, and trades and industry courses multiplied, aided by federal programs, especially the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. The academic courses and studies multiplied, too, as the explosion of knowledge began in the arts, sciences, social sciences, and technical fields. Subjects and courses proliferated in the high school, just as they were proliferating in the colleges and universities, but what is often forgotten is that the student population had also proliferated until it included a vast majority of youth of high school age. By 1950 more than 80 percent of all youth aged fourteen to seventeen were attending high school, and consequently only 25 percent of high school graduates were going on to college. Critics of the high school curriculum who deplore the low standards in American high schools seldom take these revolutionary trends into account.

Conversely, many professional educators have been so intent on taking care of the non-college-bound students that they have not

[°] R. Freeman Butts, "Scholarship and Education in a Free Society," *Teachers College Record*, 61: 279-289, March 1960. By permission.

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realized that a second revolutionary trend has begun in the past ten years. The college preparatory function of high schools promises again to be a major, if not the major, function of high school education. In the thirty years from 1929 to 1959 the high school enrollment has almost doubled (4,800,000 to 9,200,000), but college enrollment has more than tripled (from 1,100,000 to 3,700,000). We must recognize the growing necessity for a larger body of highly trained persons in all fields and the increasing aspiration and intention of the American people that more and more young people shall continue their education beyond high school. . . .

We must not be apologetic for the college preparatory function of the public high school. We must improve the academic courses in English, mathematics, science, and foreign language. We must encourage the able girls as well as the able boys to take the courses in mathematics and science. General science and general mathematics for the non-college-bound students should also be improved. Both types of science and mathematics courses are extremely important, and creative teaching can be achieved in both, but each requires better training of teachers for these specific purposes. The two should not be confused.

The lack of emphasis on study of foreign languages should be remedied as quickly as competent teachers can be found. Students and society will be short-changed unless this is done. . . .

In social studies, I believe that much more attention should be given to international and world affairs at the senior high school level. This is extremely important for the years ahead and should be required of all students. I would recommend that at least an entire year or semester in social studies be devoted to foreign relations and the peoples and problems of the world. Much more attention should be given to world geography. Most students do not study much geography after the seventh or eighth grade. The stress should be upon human and cultural geography.

More attention should be devoted to examination of critical public issues and to government, economics, and social problems. More attention should be given to significant citizenship activities dealing with community and national issues in government, economy, housing, health, and the like.

More attention should be devoted to public education itself

as a subject of study and as an institution of great importance to all citizens. Education is one of the largest and most important enterprises with which they will be concerned throughout their adult lives. It deserves systematic study along with other major social institutions.

I am convinced of the importance of the creative arts and music for the general education of all persons, and of the vocational studies as specialization for the non-college-bound students who will go directly into an occupation. The public high school must continue to be equally concerned with both types of courses and both types of students. The vocational arts and sciences should be re-examined to see if they are appropriate to the demands of the new technological age or whether they are geared to a society that no longer exists.

I believe the comprehensive high school is better suited to American culture and education than is the separate or segregated high school designed for students of different talents or socio-economic classes or races or religions. All groups in a democratic society need to learn to work together on common problems of citizenship. They should therefore have the opportunity to associate in the life of the school and in as many of the studies of the curriculum as appropriate, principally in social studies, creative arts, practical arts, and extracurricular activities. We have been rightly concerned to give special attention to the academic preparation of the scholastically talented, and the comprehensive high school should do this by sectioning students subject by subject in the academic courses.

But we must not neglect the values of common association among those of different levels and kinds of ability. It is important to have the academically talented students see and appreciate the leadership qualities displayed by the less scholastically talented as they engage in social, artistic, athletic, and student government activities. It is also extremely important for the less scholastically talented students to have constantly before them the leadership qualities of the more academically talented. How can we develop respect for intellectual achievement in separate schools where only the less privileged are huddled together to work on purely non-intellectual enterprises? This will only perpetuate an indifference

to or disdain for intellectual achievement, too long a part of the American scene.

A Look to the Future. Now what does this mean for the future? Just this: that all of us must bring to bear our deepest resources of energy and creativeness as individuals, as teachers, and as a people.

To begin with we must make experimentation the keynote of our efforts in the years ahead. Try new ideas, explore new practices, test the novel, retest the established, create an atmosphere of hospitality to the original, and expose to the glare of searching criticism the destructive jibes of self-appointed public experts or the defensive pontifications of thoughtless standpatters. Honor the ferment of ideas. Every school in America should have some experimentation of some kind going on all the time. Don't let the weary know-it-alls discourage you.

I realize that experiments are hard to live with and disturbing to the ego. Every experiment is an implied or explicit criticism of someone's present practice, and that hurts. But the stakes are so important and the potential rewards so great that we cannot afford to sit back and let someone else do it. Let's re-examine the beliefs we know we have and re-assess the assumptions we may not even realize we have.

We must explore again the wilderness of pedagogical method. Let us not accept blindly a philosophy based upon a narrow view of the "needs of the pupil." The new frontiers in method may well be the discovery of ways to motivate, challenge, and stimulate greater achievement, effort, and satisfaction without forcing, or stultifying, or deadening the processes of learning or endangering the physical, mental, or emotional health of students. What is the desirable balance between firsthand, direct experience and the reading of books for children and youth of different age levels and different abilities? Many teachers assume that direct experiences are better than books; many college professors believe the opposite. The coming generation of students will grow up surrounded by television, paperbacks, magazines, advertising, tape recordings, mass organization, and popular culture. Let's find out how this generation learns best. Should the school ape communication agencies of the culture or try to counteract them?

We must experiment with new content in old subjects and old content in new subjects. It is easy for our critics to make fun of the lack of standard content in general science or general mathematics or language arts or social studies. But is the answer to go back to the curriculum of fifty years ago? By no means. Nor do I believe that the way to overcome the evils of an outworn content is to throw out content and make everything easy or superficial. Let's develop intellectually challenging new content where necessary and revitalize the old content where it is still appropriate.

We must find ways to deal constructively with differences of ability but without stratifying differences into rigid categories of social or intellectual inferiority or superiority. How can we deal with the wide range of abilities, motivating, challenging, and pushing toward excellent performance but without creating attitudes of inferiority or defeat among the less able and attitudes of superiority or snobbishness among the more able? This is an important challenge to the comprehensive high school. If it cannot do this, then we might as well have separate secondary schools as our European friends do. That is, if separation into ability groupings really aids learning. Do we know that it does, or is it just easier and nicer for the teacher? Most of us believe in the *social* advantages of the comprehensive high school; but are there *intellectual* advantages, even for the high ability students? Are there certain conditions or certain subjects in which able students learn better in mixed classes than they do in separate sections? And similarly for the slow learners? And by all means do not forget all those in between.

Finally, we must respond to the challenge to define the needs of students in such a way as to strike a proper balance between their need for intellectual achievement, their need for social responsibility, and their need for self-development. For the half of our students who are not going on to college I should say that a proper balance in the educational program would consist of these three ingredients in about equal proportion. For the half who are going on to higher study I should say the educational and cultural priorities require that the ingredients be three parts scholarship, two parts social responsibility, and one part self-development.

Schooling without rigorous knowledge is no education at all; but if the acquisition of organized knowledge is the *only* goal,

then education may become rigid and lifeless. Schooling without self-development becomes routinized and oppressive, but if self-development is the *only* goal, education may become undisciplined and soft-headed. Schooling without social responsibility makes of education the impractical plaything of dilettantes, but if social responsibility is the *only* goal, education may impose a cheerless and drab conformity, throttling the creative sparks of originality and choking the freedom for individuals which we cherish so highly. The purpose of our schooling is to speed the process by which the child learns to become a man of learning in freedom.

Teaching—A Science and an Art

6.7 A Theory of Learning for Teachers*

*H. Gordon Hullfish
and Philip G. Smith*

The Dilemma of the Teacher. At the present time theories of learning are in a chaotic state. No single theory commands general agreement among psychologists. . . . This situation is disconcerting to those who teach. The whole point of teaching is to direct the learning of students, and teachers naturally turn to psychology for a scientific understanding of their task. But, unlike a Watson or a Thorndike, most psychologists today are quite modest in their claims about the meaning of their work for education. Such modesty, scientifically commendable as it is, is hardly reassuring to the teacher. Indeed, it is not untypical to find even the educational psychologist diligently striving to create an image of himself as primarily a psychologist—a psychologist who happens to be teaching in a school of education. Problems of psychology, as a scientific

* H. G. Hullfish and P. G. Smith, *Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1961, pages 169–183, 256, 261. By permission. Copyright © 1961 by Dodd, Mead & Company.

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research discipline, rather than problems of education, are viewed as his chief concern.

Some psychologists have attempted to cut through the rather staggering amount of empirical data that have been recorded during psychological experiments and to summarize the essential meaning for education of all of this activity. Thorpe and Schmuller, for example, suggest that only five firm principles of learning may be stated.¹⁴ They conclude, in effect, that learning is generally facilitated and tends to be most permanent when:

1. The learner is motivated—when he has some stake in the activity.
2. The learning is geared to the learner's level—when it is compatible with the learner's physical and intellectual ability.
3. The learning is patterned—when the learner can see meaningful relationships between the activity and the goal.
4. The learning is evaluated—when the learner has some way of knowing what progress he is making.
5. The learning is integrated with personal-social development—when the learner experiences satisfactory growth and adjustment.

Of these same principles, another psychologist makes the following observation:

These five principles are the harvest of the thousands of experiments performed in the field of learning as they look to educators. Whether these are really principles of learning or just prejudices and platitudes might very well be questioned. As practical propositions, only the fourth (knowledge of results) has any real basis for implementation.¹⁵

¹⁴ L. P. Thorpe and A. M. Schmuller, *Contemporary Theories of Learning*, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953. Goodwin Watson, on the other hand, lists fifty propositions which set forth what is known today about children and learning; which, in his judgment, are important for education; and to which "psychologists of all 'schools' would consistently agree." Nine of these propositions are classified under the heading, Learning Process, in "What Psychology Can We Feel Sure About?" *Teachers College Record*, 61: 253-257, February 1960.

¹⁵ B. R. Bugelski, *The Psychology of Learning*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1956, p. 452.

On the one hand, the teacher is encouraged to study the psychology of learning and thus become more scientific in his teaching. On the other hand, it appears that the more scientific the psychological study of learning becomes, the more tenuous become its connections with the problems the teacher actually confronts.¹⁶ What is the teacher to do? What is needed, of course, is a theory of education (including a theory of learning) that will enable the teacher to continue to engage in the art of teaching, using the lore of the profession in a more consciously reflective manner.

Such a theory must take account of developments in psychology, of course; and, furthermore, it must take account of developments in other disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, and the like. But a theory of education cannot be derived from sources such as these, singly or together. *Some* theory of education is needed initially as a rationale for selecting among the developments in these other disciplines. . . .

Two things seem to be clear. . . . First, at the present time there is no generally acceptable theory of learning which can be presented to teachers for use in guiding the learning experiences of students. Teachers must continue to rely, therefore, upon "teaching lore"; and, if the art of teaching is to be systematically improved, this lore, of course, will need to be intellectualized and refined. Second, if the day does arrive when one or more scientifically established psychological theories of learning become available, *it will still remain the case that they will be psychological theories*. Their meaning for the work of the school will have to be judged in the light of a theory of education. They will not stand alone as educational guides. . . .

¹⁶ It is a pleasure to acknowledge that there are certain exceptions. Some of the work done in perception, social psychology, and clinical psychology does appear to have a more direct bearing on the kind of problems the teacher must face. An especially noteworthy exception is the work of Jerome S. Bruner and others of the Harvard Cognition Project. A review of the "inadequacies inherent in present conceptions of intelligence" by Shephard Liverant, "Intelligence: A Concept in Need of Re-examination," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 24: 2 (April 1960), pp. 101-110, is suggestive, emphasizing, as it does, a descriptive approach to problem-solving behavior, in contrast to the usual postulation of "intelligence" as an explanatory factor which makes for a differential in problem-solving ability among individuals.

An Emerging Theory of Learning. . . . A theory of learning, viewed as part of a general theory of education, may emerge as the effort is made to intellectualize and refine practices for which the art of teaching has given sanction. . . .

Dewey once said of education that "It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."¹⁷ If we view meanings as the basic building blocks of learning, then any event which results in a reconstruction or reorganization of a meaning pattern may be called a learning experience. Any experience, then, which, in consequence of its meaningfulness, "Increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" may be called an educative experience. Certain experiences which misdirect or reduce ability to command future experiences are miseducative, and, perhaps, certain inconsequential learnings should be labeled noneducative. . . .

The learner is not the agent controlling the reorganization of meaning. On the other hand, when the environment is such, either in school or out, as to involve students in situations in which the creating and testing of meaning goes forward reflectively, then the condition necessary for the *reconstruction* of experience exists. In contrast to an imposed or induced reorganization, the learner is the directing agent for such reconstruction. In most cases, experiences may not be classified so neatly, being mixtures of reflective and non-reflective elements. Yet the school should strive to be as clear as possible about the kind of experience it is trying to promote.

Some Examples of Learning. The case of teaching children the multiplication tables may be illustrative. We have not always been clear about what it is that we expect the children to learn under this circumstance. Do we wish them to learn *to recite* the tables? To *use* the tables in solving arithmetic problems? To *understand* how numbers are related? What is the real meaning of "learning the multiplication tables?" If we keep in mind that meanings are the basic building blocks of learning, then it appears that what we want is to have the child learn that "two times two means (that is, points to, stands for, may be used in place of, is the same

¹⁷ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916, pp. 89–90.

as, and the like) four." Further, we wish the child's patterns of meaning to be organized in such a way that whenever the symbols "2 x 2" are seen, heard, or thought of, the symbol, "4," becomes immediately available. Which is to say, we want the child to *recognize* the meaning of "2 x 2." And, as we have seen, where recognitions are sound (and most of life is lived on this level) no reflective reconstruction of experience is needed. The response occurs with immediacy on the level of recognition.

Of course, we also want children to understand how to use the tables and to understand how multiplication is related to addition and, therefore, how the multiplication tables can be constructed by addition. This understanding, according to the third principle of Thorpe and Schmuller, should facilitate *learning* the multiplication tables. Indeed, the four other principles that Thorpe and Schmuller mention should also be utilized in *teaching* the multiplication tables. We must not imagine, however, that such understanding of the relation of multiplication and addition (with the student's attendant ability to construct the tables) is an adequate substitute for meaning patterns which are organized in such a way that whenever various combinations of multipliers and multiplicands are presented the correct numerical products are available at once at the level of recognition, without the need for reflection. If learning [that is, automatic conditioning, or habitual response] has taken place, no problem to be thought about will arise when the organized pattern of meanings is called into play.

Free, reflective men need skills and knowledge, on the level of nonreflective recognitions, as much as other men. Indeed, they need these more than others, and they need them in a distinctive manner. They need to *control* skills and knowledge, a fact that bears directly upon how they gain them. Control will result only as the gain is made under conditions of meaningful activity.

It is possible that some teachers, properly revolting against old, ineffective, drill procedures, have become overly sentimental or squeamish about helping pupils build such meaning patterns. But we need to consider the matter more carefully. All of us are sure that as a boy learns to play a trumpet, for example, it would be somehow good if he were to gain an understanding of the way in which his instrument works. It would be good for him to un-

derstand that as he depresses one or more valves he is actually changing the length of the instrument and, consequently, changing both the length of the air column and the tone produced. All this is good to know. Still, if we are serious about wanting him to learn to play the instrument, we do not ask him to reason out the proper fingering for various notes. In fact, in the case of learning to play a wind instrument, the patterns of meaning which must be organized, involving as they do not only written symbols and sounds but complicated patterns of muscular tension, are so intricate that any attempt by the student to construct the patterns by reflection would likely be doomed to failure. But this does not suggest that either the teaching or learning should sink to the level of meaningless repetition. It does suggest that teacher and student alike, having gained insight into the nature and purpose of the activity, may appreciate the appropriateness of perfecting the activity as far as ability permits.

These considerations bring to the fore two points which teachers should remember. First, there are certain patterns of meaning which may be organized effectively through a practice that lies so close to the conditioning end of the continuum that the process is, in large measure, nonreflective. The learning of these patterns can be, nevertheless, an educative experience when such learning "increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." Second, it is the business of a theory of education to indicate what patterns of meaning are worthy of being learned. . . .

Teachers generally agree that true learning will make a difference in the life of the learner. But it is an oversimplification to say that all learning results in observable changes in behavior. With respect to certain situations a student may have a well-developed pattern of behavior based on meanings which have been gained through an informal conditioning process. When appropriate experiences are undergone in the classroom, the student may come to understand the grounds for this behavior pattern. This is to say that the conditioned meanings may become associated with other meanings in a more precise and systematic manner. Yet, the conditioned meanings remain operative, and so far as observable behavior goes, the student may continue to act as he formerly did. Important learning can be said to have taken place, nevertheless,

since the student's patterns of meaning have undergone modification or reconstruction. . . .

[But in the final analysis, drill and conditioned knowledge are significant only because they lead to the education of free, reflective citizens]. To stand firm for the right to create educational conditions within both the school and culture on which the continuing growth of free men depends is to take a positive position, a professional, if not a political one. . . . It represents—as only an institution free of specific political commitment may—the acceptance of the unique and difficult assignment given the schools by free men: (1) the transmission of knowledge and values, in order that the gains of the past may not be lost, and (2) the reconstruction of knowledge and values, in order that the gains of the past and the present may become thresholds to an improved future, not doors closed against one. . . . [Democracy] relies upon a continuing opportunity for all citizens to participate appropriately in the decisions that build the common life, and at the same time to share an attitude of honoring and protecting differences. Those who come at life in this spirit know that no gain has been made when finality and force are substituted for flexibility and intelligence. . . .

6.8 Teaching as an Art*

Harry S. Broudy

CIVILIZATION and education . . . are consistently on the side of knowledge and purpose and against ignorance and chance. This is as it should be, save for the circumstance that increasing knowledge and purposeful action does not necessarily decrease the volume of life controlled by ignorance and chance. The reason is simple: every deliberately instituted act—driving to the shopping center to buy groceries, for example—sets up chains of events other than and in addition to those that result in buying

* Harry S. Broudy, *Paradox and Promise*, New York: Spectrum Books, 1961, Excerpts from "Mirabile Dictu," pp. 74-85. © 1961. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. By permission.

Harry Broudy is Professor of Education at the University of Illinois.

the groceries. For example, one waves to the postman on the way, or one inadvertently fails to return the greeting of a diffident student. These events in turn set up their own chains of events that in turn intersect with other chains. . . .

[Many schoolroom situations] exemplify the frightening fact that in the act of teaching we create situations and stimuli whose consequences are beyond calculation, even if it occurred to us to calculate them. . . . Will a teacher who makes a child secure inspire him to a significant change in his motivational pattern? Or will a teacher who destroys a child's security inspire him to unusual achievement? That depends, one is told, on the nature of the child and presumably on the nature of the teacher also. So there seems to be no easy substitute for studying the child, the teacher, and, one might add, all other relevant circumstances in their particulars. But is it the duty or is it within the competence of the teacher to undertake such clinical study?

Those who argue that teaching is an art rather than a science probably have in mind this difficulty of predicting pupil behavior from general principles. . . .

When such small behaviors produce such great results, who is to blame a teacher for trembling with anxiety at the close of each day? What remark, what gesture, what grimace, what quip, what praise, what reproof produced what effects on which pupils? And what effects will tomorrow and the day after that engender?

The engineer responsible for the structural integrity of a huge span, the surgeon whose every movement is significant, the general with thousands of lives at his command are familiar symbols of vast responsibility. We wonder at times how these men bear up under it. Yet a teacher—not a mighty person on any scale—daily radiates influences on many many children. The engineer has control over what is being built; the surgeon sees the effect of his movements; the general, one hopes, takes only well-calculated risks. The teacher, however, is often playing blind man's buff, not knowing whom he touches and how the touch is received. Responsibility in such a situation takes on a tinge of desperation.

Mercifully not many teachers are like Socrates, who could never forget the gravity of the teaching relation, who so carefully desisted from letting himself intrude into the learning process. He

was the midwife merely helping the pupil bring his own conceptions to birth. But it was an impossible role. His pupils could not help learning Socrates as well as themselves. Perhaps it is wrong to say that we teach subjects, and it is difficult to understand what is meant by saying that we teach pupils, but the teacher never fails to teach himself to the pupil.

That is why teaching machines may well take over the bulk of instruction in the years to come. Even the best of human teachers is not an efficient teaching machine. All that a human teacher can add to the mechanics of instruction is himself, his peculiar organization of experience, which, fortunately or not, is induplicable. His thoughts are not merely true or false; they are profound or shallow, significant or trivial, interesting or boring. Most important of all, he is a source of praise and reproof.

It is also fortunate that, by and large, school teachers do not reflect on the peculiar responsibilities they bear and, aside from an occasional shudder, they manage to ignore the effects of themselves on their pupils. Only in this way can they concentrate on the routine of instruction and school keeping.

Perhaps responsibility, like our clothes, when continually worn loses its weight. Men's work would cease altogether if their gaze were forever inward, brooding on the possible consequences of their acts. Blessed are the routines that make so many actions so automatic that they no longer need thought and reflection. Like other professionals, the professional teacher becomes aware of responsibility only in critical situations.

Certainly it would be an unsubtle teacher who would wear his care upon his sleeve and allow his pupils to sense his anxiety. Søren Kierkegaard, the Danish theologian, never tired of asking about the mien proper for a genuine Christian. If a true Christian were to avoid pride, over-confidence with respect to salvation, false humility, the escape mechanism of monasticism, smugness, meddlesomeness in the name of neighborly love, and a half hundred other demeanors incompatible with the Christian spirit, just how should he behave?

Kierkegaard's answer was long, dialectical, and overly subtle, but roughly stated it came to suggesting a kind of disguise, an outward mien that belied the inward questioning, anxiety, and

concern. And perhaps something like this is the unhappy answer for the genuine teacher as well.

It means that teachers cannot hover like mother hens over their little charges, nor does it mean a prying concern for the home life and private concerns of the pupil. It does not mean a sentimental "love of children" or being a pal to teen-age boys. To none of these roles is the teacher uniquely essential. Yet when we ask for something positive, there is no one image to recommend, just as there is no one image appropriate to the genuine Christian spirit.

About all one can say is that the teacher, first of all, must be himself, and, second, that he be concerned about the pupil, but in a peculiar way. He is himself *for* the pupil, while his concern for a subject of instruction. Thus it looks as if Teacher X is teaching arithmetic, but his concern, as Rousseau pointed out, is what is happening to the pupil when he has an arithmetical insight. In exemplifying a genuine human perspective of life, the teacher must seem to be wholly unconscious of being an example.

Perhaps this is a roundabout way of stressing the inward dimension of life whenever the transaction is between persons rather than between persons and things, which is sometimes called "subjectivity." It is that reflexive power by which the person's experience is split into a content and an awareness of that content. The content can be classified and described; it is what we have in common with our fellow men; it is what psychology and sociology can study. With the awareness of the content, matters stand otherwise. Because the individual's experience is growing from moment to moment, how he receives each new moment is a unique creative occasion in history....

It would be strange if straightforward analysis of overt behavior succeeded in trapping all the contrasts and nuances that give depth to the teacher and the teaching act. Perhaps that is why millions of dollars spent on isolating the traits of the successful teacher have turned up all sorts of interesting and valuable information about all sorts of things—indeed about everything except the object of the search itself.

TEACHER: *Socrates*

TEACHER EVALUATION®

A. PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS

Rating
(high to low)

	1	2	3	4	5	Comments
1. Personal appearance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Dresses in an old sheet draped about his body
2. Self-confidence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Not sure of himself—always asking questions
3. Use of English	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Speaks with a heavy Greek accent
4. Adaptability	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prone to suicide by poison when under duress

B. CLASS MANAGEMENT

1. Organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Does not keep a seating chart
2. Room appearance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Does not have eye-catching bulletin boards
3. Utilization of supplies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Does not use supplies

C. TEACHER-PUPIL RELATIONSHIPS

1. Tact and consideration
2. Attitude of class

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Places student in embarrassing situation by asking questions
Class is friendly

D. TECHNIQUES OF TEACHING

1. Daily preparation
2. Attention to course of study
3. Knowledge of subject matter

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Does not keep daily lesson plans
Quite flexible—allows students to wander to different topics
Does not know material—has to question pupils to gain knowledge

E. PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE

1. Professional ethics
2. In-service training
3. Parent relationships

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Does not belong to professional association or PTA
Complete failure here—has not even bothered to attend college
Needs to improve in this area—parents are trying to get rid of him

RECOMMENDATION: Does not have a place in Education. Should not be rehired.

* Editors' note: The "Teacher Evaluation" of Socrates illustrates the point of Professor Broady's concluding paragraph. This chart is by John Gauss (El Cajon, Calif.), *Phi Delta Kappan*, 43: Back Outside Cover, January 1962. By permission.

The Impact of Programed Learning

6.9 What Is a Teaching Machine?*

Lawrence M. Stolurow

WHAT is a teaching machine? . . . Its essential ingredient is an automatic self-controlling mechanism that works on the "feedback" principle of the thermostat, which reacts to, as well as controls, the temperature of a room.

The teaching machine, then, puts the feedback principle into the educational process. It operates on the tutorial system—the best and simplest way to teach. The tutorial system has three basic parts: the student, the program of instruction and the tutor. In this instance, the machine simply substitutes for the tutor.

The system works like this. The student looks at the program (a printed sheet, TV screen or rear-view projection screen) and reacts to it. He makes his reaction known to a machine (via push buttons or a writing surface) and the machine does something to the next item on the program. Then the student reacts to this item, again using the machine, and his reaction, in turn, determines what the machine will do next. So the process goes. Conventional classroom instruction of groups—whether or not it includes the use of educational television, films and the like—fails to provide teacher reaction to the responses of the individual student. In fact, no provision is made in conventional teaching to take the student's responses into account until a test is given—and then, of course, it is too late.

Feedback has two important educational functions. The first is to tell the student whether he is right or wrong. Psychologists call this "reinforcement," and it can be accomplished in different

* Lawrence M. Stolurow, "Teaching Machines," *The Nation*, 195: 66-68, August 26, 1962. By permission.

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ways—by the use of a red or green light, the printing of "right" and "wrong" on the program, etc. The second function is to supply information feedback relating to what is being taught. The information can be corrective or "enriching," i.e., it can add to the knowledge of the student.

Related to the information feedback function is the machine's potentiality for recording and collating each response of the student to every step of the program. While all teaching machines do not do this, they could and should if we are to secure the basic data needed to evaluate and improve the program they contain. Here is where an important departure from pedagogical tradition occurs. If the student makes too many errors at any point in a program, it is the program, not the student, that is held to blame. The program is thrown out or sent back to the drawing board. While every student can't learn every subject no matter if Socrates himself were the teacher, it is nevertheless important to take the position that teaching ought to be revised, if it doesn't work, before we give up on the student. The fact is that we do not know how far we can go in teaching. Curriculum-revision projects are currently in vogue; typically, they aim—usually with success—to apply college-level concepts to grammar and high school students. Experimenters are finding that the young learner is capable of mastering many concepts we have traditionally refrained from teaching him. What is the capacity of a brain with an IQ of 50, 100, 150? No one really knows, but with teaching machines and basic research on instructional programming, we might find out.¹⁸

¹⁸ Editors' note: "The elements combined by instructional programming to produce optimal learning are as follows:

"a. Active response by the student . . . [Whether by] writing, speaking, selecting [or] matching . . . a response must occur before it can be reinforced or rewarded and so become established. To learn is to be able to do, and to understand is to be able to explain. . . .

"b. Small steps in which careful control of stimuli produces gradual increments in mastery of the subject . . . Each frame (the basic unit of instructional material) presents material that is carefully arranged in terms of what the learner knows already: the learner, in mastering such a step, need not refer back to earlier material or look ahead to later material. . . .

"c. Immediate feedback for each response . . . Knowing the correct answer rewards the behavior, gives the learner confidence, and encourages retention. . . .

"d. Self-pacing, or individualization of the rate at which the learner

6.10 What Can We Learn from the Teaching Machines?*

Spencer Klaw

HUNDREDS of thousands of Americans have been introduced in recent years to a remarkable new form of pedagogy known as automated teaching or programmed instruction. In essence, it consists of presenting a subject in a sequence of short units, or "frames," each of which contains a question that the student must answer before moving on. Such a sequence is known as a program, and it is often administered mechanically—that is, by a so-called teaching machine, which exposes the program to the

masters the material. . . . [In most] classroom teaching . . . the rapid learner is held back, and the slow learner—who might, nonetheless be a good student—is dragged forward too quickly. . . . In contrast, programmed instruction is learner-centered, and encourages each student to work at his own best rate. . . . Working at a comfortable speed, the learner is, at the same time, given incentives for steady advance through constant reinforcement. The total instructional cycle—increment question, response, feedback—can take place dozens, or even hundreds or more, times an hour, with teaching and testing blended into one seamless process. . . .

"e. Low error rate for the individual learner, as a consequence of the effective operation of the first four principles. . . . Error-free learning is not only simpler, but its effects improve morale, motivation and retention. . . ."

—Donald Cook and Francis Mechner, in *Applied Programmed Instruction*, edited by Stuart Margulies and Lewis D. Eigen, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962, pp. 3-5. Reprinted with the permission of the publisher. Copyright 1962 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

* Spencer Klaw, "What Can We Learn from the Teaching Machines," *Reporter* 27: 19-26, July 19, 1962. By permission. Copyright 1962 by The Reporter Magazine Company.

Spencer Klaw is a free-lance writer who has contributed articles to *Fortune*, *Harper's*, *Playboy*, the *Reporter*, the *Atlantic* and other magazines.

Read also "Teaching Machines and Programmed Learning," edited by A. A. Lumsdaine and Robert Glaser, Washington, D.C., NEA, 1960; B. F. Skinner, "Teaching Machines," *Scientific American*, 205: 36, 90-108, 204, Nov. 1961; *Time* 77: 36-38, March 24, 1961; L. M. Stolurow, *Teaching by Machine*, Cooperative Research Monograph No. 6, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961; Luther Evans and George Arnstein, "Automation and Education," Washington, D.C., NEA, January 1962; Harry S. Broudy and others, "Teaching Machines: Threat and Promise," *Educational Theory*, 12: 151-177, July 1962.

student one frame at a time and tells him instantly whether the answers he is giving are correct. Some machines are made so that questions can be answered by pressing buttons. But while the teaching machine is the most striking symbol of this new pedagogy, programmed instruction can also be administered by a programmed text. This is a sort of workbook designed so that a student may move from frame to frame and check the correctness of his answers simply by turning pages. In whichever form a program is presented, its function is to lead a pupil, as program writers like to put it, from ignorance to wisdom—or, at any rate, to a firmer grasp of the principles of algebra or English grammar—by engaging him in a kind of silent Socratic dialogue.

Few of the many schemes put forward lately for improving education in America have created so great a stir. . . . Students have been experimentally instructed, by machine or by programmed text, in calculus, geometry, physics, spelling, Hebrew, long division, Russian, psychology, logic, statistics, the understanding of poetry, and the operation and maintenance of weapons systems. Mechanics have been taught to read blueprints, telephone operators to route toll calls, engineers to use analogue computers, retarded children to measure with a ruler, and pharmaceutical salesmen to talk intelligently about cortical steroids.

Commercially produced machines and programs are being used in some two thousand schools, and in the coming school year the number may be two or three times as great. One leading textbook publisher, Harcourt, Brace & World, has commissioned the writing of fifty programmed texts, and most of its major competitors have a dozen or so in the works. Encyclopaedia Britannica Films has announced plans to program, in book format, practically an entire high-school curriculum. For a time last year, the bare announcement that a company was planning to market a teaching machine was sometimes enough to send the price of its stock soaring. Programs or machines of one variety or another are now being sold by more than a hundred companies. Teaching machines are even being peddled from door to door, and offered by mail to anxious parents in advertisements headed "Guaranteed to Improve Your Child's School Marks—or you Pay Nothing!"

Claims about the amazing efficiency of programmed instruc-

tion have not emanated solely from manufacturers of teaching machines. Professor B. F. Skinner of Harvard, a distinguished experimental psychologist and one of the principal inventors of the teaching machine, has written that "Exploratory research . . . indicates that what is now taught by teacher, lecture, or film can be taught in half the time and with half the effort by a machine . . ." Some of Skinner's disciples, to be sure, incline to the view that the master was laying it on a bit thick when he made this statement. But a close look at the theory (or theories) of programmed instruction and at the results it is yielding in actual use leaves no doubt that it will bring about significant and, on the whole, beneficial changes in a wide variety of educational practices.

Among other things, programmed instruction will almost certainly have a sharp and lasting impact on the way textbooks are written, the costs of industrial training, the organization of school courses and curricula, the training of teachers, the way schools deal with fast learners, and—perhaps more important—on the way they deal with slow learners. It will even have an effect on the way teachers teach when they are not using machines or programmed texts.

From Pigeons to Pupils. The modern teaching machine and the technique of programmed instruction owe their existence mainly to the development, by Skinner and other experimental psychologists, of a process called operant conditioning. It is often demonstrated to students something like this: A hungry pigeon is placed in a box or cage, and the demonstrator undertakes to teach it to do a simple trick—for example, to turn around in a clockwise direction. He begins by watching for the pigeon to make some move—turning its head to the right, perhaps—that might lead to the execution of a clockwise turn. When he sees such a move, he instantly "reinforces" it by giving the pigeon a grain of corn. As a rule, the pigeon will immediately repeat the move, and the demonstrator will again reinforce it. He will then withhold the corn until the pigeon chances not only to turn its head to the right but at the same time, let us say, steps forward with its left foot. This move, too, will be reinforced with corn.

Proceeding in this fashion, an experienced demonstrator can usually manage within two or three minutes to get the pigeon whirl-

ing rapidly in a clockwise turn. In a few minutes more, he can often teach the pigeon to whirl in the opposite direction and, finally, to combine the two turns so as to execute a sort of figure 8 maneuver. By this same method, pigeons have been conditioned to discriminate among playing cards of different suits, to peck out tunes on a toy piano, and to play a kind of table tennis.

About ten years ago, Skinner was struck with the idea of trying to teach people like pigeons—that is, by arranging matters so that a student, like a pigeon being taught to execute a figure 8, would be reinforced instantly each time he took a step in the right direction. In 1954, he published an article setting forth his views and arguing that the necessary reinforcement should be provided by a machine....

Unlike the pigeon trainer, programmers do not simply wait until the student happens to do what they want. . . . The reinforcement does not consist in giving the students corn but in telling him that he is right. "Human behavior is remarkably influenced by small results," Skinner has written. ". . . We might say that the human organism is reinforced by any simple gain in competence. . . ."

Skinner vs. Crowder. By varying certain factors—the number of separate steps in a program, for example, or the order in which the steps are arranged—they [experimental psychologists] have tried to find out what kind of a program teaches most efficiently. So far, the results of such research have generally been inconclusive. . . .

In [Norman A.] Crowder's . . . scrambled textbook . . . when a student comes to the multiple-choice question, he picks what he thinks is the right answer and turns to a page whose number appears next to the answer he has chosen. If he has chosen correctly, he will find a new block of information on the designated page; if not, he will get more explanation. . . . Crowder's programs differ from the pure Skinnerian variety in several important ways. Skinner believes it is best to proceed in very small steps, and he regards the response the student must make at each step as an essential element in the learning process. Crowder, by contrast, feeds out information in relatively large chunks, and asks questions of the student only to find out if he has properly digested a particular chunk. Another difference involves what is called branching. The Holland-

Skinner psychology program at Harvard, for example, is a non-branching or linear program—it has one sequence of steps that everyone must follow. By contrast, a student who makes a mistake while going through one of Crowder's programs is shunted off the main line and onto a branch where he gets additional instruction....

Crowder appears to be winning the argument about branching. A linear program so easy that a poor student will make virtually no errors is likely to be an awful bore to a brighter one, and many Skinnerians are now writing programs resembling Crowder's in that a good student is not made to plow through so many frames as is a poor one. If he gets a certain question right, for example, he may be told to skip the next ten frames—a technique known as express stopping.

In other respects, however, Skinner's ideas tend to prevail. This is partly because of their plausibility. To a generation of teachers raised to believe in "learning by doing," it makes sense that students should be required, as Skinner insists they should, to compose their own answers when going through a program. (Skinner further argues that multiple-choice questions are bad because a student may remember one of the wrong answers instead of the right one.)

The advantage of programming in short steps is that in the process of revising, the programmer, by noting which questions his subjects miss, can tell exactly where he has been ambiguous or confusing. Questions can, of course, be made too easy. By consistent "overprompting," as it is known in the trade, a programmer may produce a text that students will race through, answering every question correctly but learning very little. If, however, the programmer also tests his subjects carefully to make sure that they are learning what they are supposed to learn, he should be able to produce a program that is not only clear—and therefore "easy"—but one that teaches with great efficiency....

[In this new type of pedagogy] "The programmer has the privilege of deciding what will be taught," [P. Kenneth] Komoski has said, "but the students show him how to teach it...."

Many psychologists (and many computer manufacturers) are entranced with the notion of using computers as teaching machines.

At the University of Illinois, for example, students are invited to sit at a keyboard and type out answers to mathematical questions put to them by a computer with which the keyboard is linked. After making an answer, the student pushes a button labeled JUDGE, and the computer types out either OK or NO. A student who keeps getting NO can push a button labeled HELP, whereupon the computer will start him on a sequence of frames designed to clear up his confusion. A student whose confusion vanishes when he is part way through a HELP sequence can push an AHA! button, and the computer will obligingly give him another chance to answer the question that has been stumping him. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, the firm of Bolt, Baranek & Newman has rigged up a computer so that it will type, at appropriate junctures, remarks like "Good," "Poor," "Dumkopf!" and "Thank you, the pleasure was all mine."

But even though a fairly brisk demand for teaching machines may eventually develop, most companies that have recently gone into the programmed-instruction business are turning out programs, not machines, and these will almost all be marketed as programmed texts. "The human animal is an excellent page-flipper," [said] psychologist Charles W. Slack. . . .

Where to Draw the Line. The prospect that programmed instruction will soon be administered regularly to tens of millions of school and college students damps many people. They fear that education will become a process of grinding up subject matter into a kind of baby food and spooning it out to students who will never learn to eat for themselves. "To learn is not simply to 'respond to the world' but to 'interrogate reality,' to question data, and actively to create one's own picture of the universe," George F. Kneller, professor of educational philosophy at UCLA, told an audience of psychologists last September. He added: "If we seek exact responses and reward those who conform to the demands of the machine, we are likely to snuff out the precious spark of revolt that is necessary to healthy growth and creativity." A similar concern is reflected in predictions that teaching machines will turn America into a nation of robots. . . .

[However] no one . . . thinks that everything taught in schools can or should be taught by program. "Programmed instruction can-

not teach the entire curriculum for the simple reason that it cannot educate a person," Kenneth Komoski of the Center for Programed Instruction has written. "We can instruct a pupil to spell, to punctuate, to use words properly.... However, no method of instruction can teach a person how to write or think creatively, for such things depend on far more subtle types of reinforcement than a program alone can provide." . . .

Even in schools making the fullest possible use of programmed instruction, teachers will still be indispensable. The teacher will still be needed to interest students in learning. The teacher will also be needed, Komoski has said, to help the student "enlarge on, relate, and use what he has learned," and to help him "solve, seek, and state new problems." Moreover, although the phrase "teaching machine" suggests a dreary standardization of the teaching process, programmed instruction may in fact permit a teacher to focus less on the common needs of a group and more on the differing needs of its separate members. . . .

Programmed instruction is, naturally, of scant benefit if the programs used are no good. In a pamphlet recently put out as a guide for parents, the Center for Programed Instruction notes that "there are programs in existence which have not been able to teach anybody anything."

. . . There is some danger, indeed, of shoddy merchandise being palmed off on schools in such quantities that the whole idea of programmed instruction will be discredited. To reduce this risk, the Carnegie Corporation has made a grant to the Educational Testing Service of Princeton, New Jersey, in an effort to set up standards for judging the quality of programs.

Prospects. Assuming programs of good quality, programmed instruction clearly holds great promise for schools. Few teachers, for example, feel they are making the best use of their talents when they are standing at a blackboard trying to teach a roomful of children how to use commas and to diagram sentences. This year, to avoid this necessity, the four teachers who teach eighth-grade English at the Manhasset, Long Island, Junior High School assembled their students in a large room three times each week and put them to work on *English 2600*. The students were encouraged to go ahead as fast as they liked. After finishing the book and

passing a final examination—as about a quarter of the eighth-graders had done by the middle of the school year—they were put in small classes given over entirely to composition. “The papers are a joy,” one of the teachers remarked a few weeks ago. “So few red marks on them. We think we’re teaching the kids more, and teaching it better.” . . .

Programmed instruction may also be used to enlarge a school’s curriculum. In Newton, Massachusetts, for instance, there is a plan to give special programmed instruction to the ATA (Academically Talented in Arithmetic) children and to start teaching French by machines and programs in the elementary grades. . . .

Probably the most significant aspect of programmed instruction is that it permits students to move at their own speed. More and more schools are grouping students by ability and assigning them to different “tracks.” There are also a few ungraded schools, in which pupils are assigned to courses not by age but by ability to handle the work. Programmed instruction can allow even small schools to adapt their curricula in some degree to individual needs and abilities.

Although programmed instruction is sometimes seen as being of value chiefly to the bright student, freeing him to shoot ahead on his own, it is likely to benefit the slow learner even more. Innumerable experiments with programmed instruction have demonstrated that the student who is the last to finish a program may learn just as much from it as the student who finishes it first. . . .

[Some teaching methods in current use seem to be injurious to “poor” students.] Getting left behind can be extremely damaging. “The effect of pressure to move beyond one’s natural speed is cumulative,” Skinner has observed. “The student who has not fully mastered a first lesson is less able to master a second.” A child who is left behind too many times may give up and stop learning anything at all.

Teaching machines and programmed instruction obviously are not going to make every high school student a candidate for MIT or Radcliffe. But they may help to reduce the appalling number of adolescents who drop out of school every year, and they may make more nearly attainable the goal of educating every child to the limit

of his capacities. And that—surely everyone can agree—is the proper goal of schools in a democracy.

6.11 The Teaching Machine and the Teacher*

George E. Probst

DISCUSSION about programed learning sometimes is based on the mistaken premise that the teacher will be replaced by a machine. This premise is mistaken on several counts. First, considering the present stage in the development of programed instruction and the kinds of machines now commercially available, it can be said that the student does not learn from a teaching machine, but from the information and ideas of the program in the machine. The program is a presentation of material optimally arranged in relation to the intrinsic organization of the subject matter itself and in relation to the best sequencing from the point of view of the psychology of learning. The producers of programs can afford to hire teaching talent to prepare programs which most school systems could not afford. Thus the teaching machine does not remove a teacher from the classroom; it introduces a second and specially well qualified teacher.

Second, it is the textbook rather than the teacher's work that moves toward obsolescence with the introduction of programed instruction. The aims of the textbook and the aims of the program are very similar: to provide the student with the basic information on the basis of which to solve problems, to make experiments, to

* George E. Probst, "Programed Learning in the Schools: Tasks for 1962," New York: Thomas Alva Edison Foundation, 1962. By permission.

George E. Probst is Executive Director of the Edison Foundation, publishers of this report.

The notion that teaching machines could be substituted for teachers was cleverly satirized in the following limerick which appeared in *Current*, January 1961, page 46:

The latest report from the Dean
In praise of the teaching machine
Is that Oedipus Rex
Could have learned about sex
By himself, and not bothered the Queen.

participate in discussions, or to write a paper on a specialized topic in the subject. Like the textbook, the program covers core information on which individual learning activities are built. The difference between using textbooks and using programs to get across these core materials is that in many subjects and for many learners the program is more effective in achieving this goal. It is of course true that there is less need for the teacher to lecture on this core material, but this kind of lecture was necessary just because the texts were not fully effective in imparting this information. . . . [The use of programmed learning should result in] greater opportunity for the teacher to give more advanced lectures, lectures which deal with the interpretation of ideas and put ideas into motion, lectures which start a real classroom discussion of basic problems and spark original research.

Third, programed instruction increases, rather than reduces, the role of the classroom teacher. . . . The instructor [will be] able to spend more time than had ever previously been possible in enriching the learning of the faster learners and in providing remedial work for the slower students. No machine or program will ever be able to play this counseling role in education. [However] . . . As long as teaching is defined principally as telling and showing, it will look as if machines will replace the teacher. . . .¹⁹

¹⁹ Editors' note: The following example of programed instruction suggests some of its limitations. The example deals with programed instruction:

[Question] 1. A good program applies the principles of _____.

Answer: learning

2. Although a law of learning applies to all students, it _____ follow that the same program will teach all students under all conditions.

Answer: does not

3. Motivation is an important condition of learning. Even a good program may produce little or no learning in poorly _____. Answer: motivated students

4. A program may be so poorly constructed that it produces _____ in students with the required background.

Answer: no learning

5. A carefully prepared program presupposes some background. A student will not learn from a program if he does not have _____.

Answer: the required background. . . .

6. Student failure to learn from a program may be due to (1)_____, (2)_____, (3)_____.

6.12 Learn with BOOK*

R. J. Heathorn

A new aid to rapid—almost magical—learning has made its appearance. Indications are that if it catches on all the electronic gadgets will be so much junk.

The new device is known as Built-in Orderly Organized Knowledge. The makers generally call it by its initials, BOOK.

Many advantages are claimed over the old-style learning and teaching aids on which most people are brought up nowadays. It has no wires, no electric circuit to break down. No connection is needed to an electricity power point. It is made entirely without mechanical parts to go wrong or need replacement.

Anyone can use BOOK, even children, and it fits comfortably into the hands. It can be conveniently used sitting in an armchair by the fire.

How does this revolutionary, unbelievably easy invention work? Basically, BOOK consists only of a large number of paper sheets. These may run to hundreds where BOOK covers a lengthy program of information. Each sheet bears a number in sequence, so that the sheets cannot be used in the wrong order.

To make it even easier for the user to keep the sheets in the proper order, they are held firmly in place by a special locking device called a "binding."

Each sheet of paper presents the user with an information sequence in the form of symbols, which he absorbs optically for

Answer: poor motivation, a poorly constructed program, [or] lack of background.

John W. Blyth, "Inside Opinion," *Programed Instruction*, Vol. II, No 1, September–October 1962, p. 3. Reprinted from *Programed Instruction* Volume II, No. 1 with the permission of the Center for Programed Instruction, 365 West End Avenue, New York, New York.

See also "Not from Teaching but from Questioning," Carnegie Corporation of New York *Quarterly*, October 1961; reprinted in *Current*, February 1962, pp. 51–52.

* R. J. Heathorn, "Learn with BOOK," *Phi Delta Kappan*, 44: 153, December 1962. This article appeared originally in *Punch*, the British humor magazine, and is here used by permission of *Punch*. © *Punch*, London.

automatic registration on the brain. When one sheet has been assimilated, a flick of the finger turns it over and further information is found on the other side.

By using both sides of each sheet in this way a great economy is effected, thus reducing both the size and cost of BOOK. No buttons need to be pressed to move from one sheet to another, to open or close BOOK, or to start it working.

BOOK may be taken up at any time and used by merely opening it. Instantly it is ready for use. Nothing has to be connected up or switched on. The user may turn at will to any sheet, going backward or forward as he pleases. A sheet is provided near the beginning as a location finder for any required information sequence.

A small accessory, available at trifling extra cost, is the BOOKmark. This enables the user to pick up his program where he left off on the previous learning session. BOOKmark is versatile and may be used in any BOOK.

The initial cost varies with the size and subject matter. Already a vast range of BOOKS is available, covering every conceivable subject and adjusted to different levels of aptitude. One BOOK, small enough to be held in the hands, may contain an entire learning schedule.

Once purchased, BOOK requires no further upkeep cost; no batteries or wires are needed, since the motive power, thanks to an ingenious device patented by the makers, is supplied by the brain of the user.

BOOKS may be stored on handy shelves and for ease of reference the program schedule is normally indicated on the back of the binding.

Altogether the Built-in Orderly Organized Knowledge seems to have great advantages with no drawbacks. We predict a big future for it.

QUESTIONS AND READINGS FOR STUDY AND DISCUSSION

The Status of the American Teacher

THE PROPER EDUCATION OF TEACHERS

In the words of the "Rockefeller Report" on education (listed below), "No educational system can be better than its teachers." To a great many people this means that the most crucial consideration of all is the nature of the education and training teachers receive. Here, it is felt, lie the primary inadequacies, and here the most essential reforms must be instituted. For the prospective teacher, what is the proper balance between general or liberal education, specialization in some established field, and strictly professional preparation? To what extent are current patterns and procedures of certification overly professionalized, legalistic, and narrowly technical—as is widely claimed? Is there a clear-cut "discipline" of education or pedagogy, apart from the conventional subject fields? What should constitute the substance of the teacher's (or the college or university professor's) continuing, advanced education? For the elementary school teacher, for example, how should a doctoral program be designed? Is the education of teachers characteristically too sharply divorced from the mainstream of scholarship and intellectual life?

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THE PROFESSION OF TEACHING IN THE UNITED STATES

Examine the character and operations of various existing teacher's organizations, e.g., the National Education Association, the teacher's association in your state or city, the American Federation of Teachers, the American Association of University Professors, and some subject-area organization (e.g., of music teachers or biology teachers). What needs are served by these organizations? What needs are not adequately served?

Consider such issues as the relative merits of the NEA and the AFT? the right of teachers to strike? the question of merit pay versus fixed salary increments? the problem of dismissing incompetent teachers (and the related problem of raising standards for teacher training institutions)?

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New Techniques of Teaching

TEAM TEACHING

After studying some of the bibliographical references below (and others), defend or criticise the following statements: Team teaching will result in a greater differential between "master teachers," "apprentice teachers" and "teaching assistants." This differential will mean that

superior teachers (as well as counsellors or administrators) will receive better financial rewards.

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TEACHING MACHINES AND PROGRAMED LEARNING

In outline form, list several possible advantages, and several possible disadvantages of programed learning and of teaching machines.

In addition to the references below, examine specific programed materials for the subject area (for example, mathematics), or the grade level (for example, Junior High School) in which you are particularly interested (for example, the programed text *English 2600* by Joseph C. Blumenthal, published by Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1960).

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Open Book Exam

1. What forces brought about the successive development of the teacher training institution from (a) the normal school to (b) the teachers college, and, most recently, to (c) the multipurpose state college or university with special programs for those preparing to become teachers? Consult a history of American education for an analysis of these changes.
2. It is generally agreed that the professional status of teachers has never been very high in the U.S. How do you account for this? What are the changes essential to an upgrading of the teachers' professional position?
3. What does it mean to be "professional"? What, then, are the hallmarks of genuine "professionalism" in teaching?
4. What is the role of professional organization in education? Examine the character and operations of, for example, the Ameri-

can Medical Association or the American Bar Association. In what respects do these organizations represent patterns appropriate to the teaching profession? What reforms are most needed in the professional education associations? Is it desirable or realistic to conceive of a *teaching* profession independent of the public which employs it and whom it serves?

5. Is education a science, or is it an art which sometimes employs sciences such as psychology and sociology? Or is it both? Explain. When we speak of teaching as an art, do we mean the art of organizing subject matter? Is it the artful handling of students? Or is it the art of self-mastery and self-control whereby a teacher's personality has an impact on students?
6. Defend or criticise the following statement: The general (liberal) education of teachers should be exactly the same as for other professions.
7. Do most teachers enter the teaching profession with a sense of mission or merely as job-seekers? Your answer to this question will very likely determine how you will react to the following quotation.

"One thing only," said Mr. Crantit, "prevents our established system of education from crumbling into the dust and ashes of the minds which devised it, and that is the stubborn virtue of individual teachers. Teachers who, under-paid and over-worked in a revolting environment—breathing daily the inspissated odours of boyhood and unclean clothes—stand like missionary saints against the hypocrisy of their present employment and the barbarism of tomorrow!"—Eric Linklater, *Laxdale Hall*, cited on the Frontispiece of George N. Allen, *Undercover Teacher*, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960.

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